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Glossary of Terms and Definitions 
 
Article 75 of the 
Grenelle II Package 
French legislation requiring organisations to publish details of 
their greenhouse gas emissions associated with their legal 
entities based in France. 
Article 225 of the 
Grenelle II Package 
French legislation requiring organisations to publish details 
information on their social and environmental impacts in their 
public management reports. 
Attributional Carbon 
Accounting 
‘Attributional methods [of Carbon Accounting] provide static 
inventories of emissions allocated or attributed to a defined 
scope of responsibility’ (Brander & Ascui, 2015, p.100). Often 
referenced in contrast to ‘Consequential Carbon Accounting’ 
(defined below) 
Blooms Taxonomy Blooms Taxonomy (Andersen, LW et al., 2001) identifies 
several distinct levels of cognition that are addressed in an 
educational course, and is used in this thesis to define and 
classify the ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ (see section 
1.4) 
Brookings Institution  US based think tank (defined below) focused on all parts of 
public policy, including defence and foreign affairs. 
C4ISTAR This term refers to a group of technologies used in the 
defence industry that are related to: Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition and Reconnaissance.  
Technologies categorised in this way are often thought of as 
‘Joint Enabling Technologies’ (defined below). 
Carbon Accounting A term used in this thesis to describe the broad range of 
activities related to measuring and reporting greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The breadth of the term is explained in Figure 1 
(Source: Ascui & Lovell, 2011: p.980) 
Carbon Reduction 
Commitment (CRC) 
A mandatory carbon reduction scheme in the UK that applies 
to large organisations in the public and private sector. Now 
called the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. 
CDP CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) are a non-
governmental organisation that works with investors, 
companies and cities to disclose their environmental impacts. 
Center for a New 
American Security 
(CNAS)  
US based think tank (defined below) that is engaged in 
defence and security research. 
Center for Strategic & 
International Studies 
(CSiS) 
US based think tank (defined below) that is engaged in 
defence and security research. 
Chain Linked Model of 
Innovation 
Term used to describe the interactions of the ‘Technology 
Push’ and ‘Demand Pull’ models of innovation (defined 
elsewhere in this glossary), and presenting these interactions 
as the factors most likely to determine the relative success of 
a particular product. 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) 
One of several flexible mechanisms allowed by the Kyoto 
Protocol (defined below) that provides for emissions 
reduction projects to produce allowances that countries or 
organisations can trade in order to meet their emissions 
reduction obligations.  Its main significance for this research 
is in developing a range of methodologies for accounting for 
greenhouse gas emissions from individual projects. 
Climate Change Term used to describe activities that aim to deal with the 
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Adaptation physical effects of climate change. It is used in this thesis to 
distinguish from activities related to Climate Change 
Mitigation, which are focused on preventing further climate 
change. 
Climate Change 
Agreements (CCAs) 
A voluntary UK government policy allowing energy-intensive 
organisations to obtain discounts on the UK Climate Change 
Levy (CCL – defined below) in order for them to remain 
competitive.  It is significant for this research for its 
application at the sector-level. 
Climate Change 
Governance 
Term used to describe the wide range of activities at all 
levels to understand and react to climate change. 
Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) 
A tax on energy delivered to non-domestic users in the 
United Kingdom, designed to encourage energy efficiency 
and reduction in their GHG emissions. 
Climate Change 
Mitigation 
Term used to describe activities that are focused on 
preventing further climate change. It is used in this thesis to 
distinguish from activities related to Climate Change 
Adaptation, which aim to deal with the physical effects of 
climate change. 
Climate Disclosure 
Standards Board 
(CDSB) 
A non-governmental organisation that aims to advance and 
align corporate reporting models in relation to their 
environmental impacts. 
Combat Platform Any military structure or vehicle bearing weapons.  It is a 
broad term used in this thesis to describe many types of 
defence product. 
Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) 
A term used in the defence industry to describe parts and 
products that are bought and used from the commercial 
sector, as opposed to those that have been specifically 
designed and developed within the defence sector. 
Consequential Carbon 
Accounting 
‘Consequential methods [of Carbon Accounting] attempt to 
measure the system-wide change in emissions that occurs 
as a result of a decision or action’ (Brander & Ascui, 2015, 
p.100). Often referenced in contrast to ‘Attributional Carbon 
Accounting’ (defined above) 
Defence Academy Where referenced in this thesis, the Defence Academy is a 
part of the UK MoD that delivers courses and thought 
leadership related to defence strategy, science & technology, 
and business skills. 
Defence Capability  Term describing the ability of a nation state to project or use 
military power.  It is often used to discuss how defence inputs 
(people, knowledge, systems, tools, processes) aggregate to 
a level of ‘capability’ at the system level. Synonymous with 
‘Military Capability’ (defined below). 
Defence Dependence Hartley (2011) defines ‘defence dependent companies’ as 
those where arms sales represent more than 70% of total 
sales, but this is not a clearly established threshold on which 
all authors and commentators agree. 
Defence Enterprise Term used to describe the complex network of organisations 
related to defence, at whichever level the term is applied 
(e.g. UK Defence Enterprise; EU Defence Enterprise; NATO 
Defence Enterprise).  This includes but is not limited to 
defence departments, multinational defence companies, 
small and medium sized entities, non-governmental 
organisations, and relevant academic institutions. 
Defence Equipment & 
Support (DE&S) 
Used in this thesis to describe the trading entity in the UK 
MoD that manages complex projects to buy and support all 
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the equipment and services for the Royal Navy, British Army 
and Royal Air Force. 
Defence Industrial 
Base 
A term used to refer to a government's industrial assets that 
are of direct or indirect importance for the production of 
equipment for a country's armed forces.  Can be used to 
describe e.g. the UK Defence Industrial Base; the US 
Defence Industrial Base. 
Defence Industrial 
Policy 
Term used to describe a set of literature that is concerned 
with the interactions between defence departments and their 
‘defence industrial base’ (see definition above). It is made up 
of both academic and grey literature (see definition below), 
with sources often emerging from defence departments or 
related defence organisations. 
Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory 
(DSTL) 
An executive agency of the UK MoD, whose purpose is to 
maximise the impact of science and technology for the 
defence and security of the UK. 
Defense Advanced 
Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) 
An agency of the US DoD responsible for the development of 
emerging technologies for use by the military. 
Defense Energy 
Support Center 
(DESC) 
The DESC is the part of the US Defence Logistics Agency 
(defined above) that is specifically focused on energy 
logistics. 
Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the Department of 
Defense's logistics combat support agency, providing 
worldwide logistics support to the military services as well as 
several civilian agencies and foreign countries 
Defense Science 
Board (DSB) 
Part of the US DoD. Particularly relevant in this research for 
their Task Force on Energy Security that have made a series 
of recommendations for how the US DoD should optimally 
manage its energy use (e.g. Department of Defense, 2008b) 
Delivered Energy This is a term used to describe the ‘delivered energy’ used by 
various organisations in the research (electricity, heat, steam, 
cooling), which will have involved some form of combustion 
by other organisations before being ‘delivered’ to site. 
Demand Pull Model of 
Innovation 
Term describing innovation models from the Innovation 
Studies field (see definition below), where the actions of 
consumers are the dominant factor in determining the 
success of a particular product. 
Department for 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) 
The UK government department responsible for 
environmental protection, food production and standards, 
agriculture, fisheries and rural communities. 
Direct Emissions This term commonly refers to Scope 1 greenhouse gas 
emissions (defined above), where the greenhouse gases can 
be directly assigned to the organisation’s activities.  In the 
context of the literature on Scope 3 emissions specifically, 
the term can sometimes also be used to describe Scope 3 
emissions categories that relate directly to the Value Chain 
(defined below). 
Discourse Analysis A general term for a number of approaches for analysing 
language.  Its relevance to this research relates to how 
debates about defence and climate change are framed. 
Discourse Coalition ‘Discourse coalitions’ can be created when relevant 
‘Storylines’ (defined below) recruit a range of actors around a 
particular point of view (Scrase & Ockwell, 2009). 
Discursive Hegemony Scrase & Ockwell (2009) describe most public policy debates 
as ‘a struggle for ‘discursive hegemony’ in which actors seek 
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to…secure support for their definition of reality’ (p.41). Its 
relevance to this research relates to how debates about 
defence and climate change are framed. 
Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index 
(DJSI) 
A market index produced by S&P Dow Jones, that tracks the 
sustainability performance of a range of companies, based 
on their response to a questionnaire dedicated to the topic. 
Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) 
The first large Emissions Trading System (ETS) launched 
globally for greenhouse gas emissions was the EU ETS, 
which required large installations buy and trade ‘allowances’ 
for their emissions.  Similar schemes under different names 
have also now emerged in California and China. 
Energy Savings 
Opportunity Scheme 
(ESOS) 
A UK scheme mandating large organisations to undertake 
energy efficiency surveys for their operations.  It implements 
Article 8 of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (defined 
below) 
Energy Security Energy security is a term widely used to describe the 
relationship between national security and the availability of 
natural resources for energy consumption, which are 
fundamental to the functioning of modern economies. 
Environment Agency 
(EA) 
A non-departmental public body in the UK, that is sponsored 
by Defra (defined above), with responsibilities relating to the 
protection and enhancement of the environment in England 
and Wales. 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(EPA) 
An agency of the federal government of the USA created to 
protect human health and the environment. 
EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive 
A European Union Directive (2012/27/EU) that mandates 
energy efficiency improvements within the European Union.  
Implemented differently across the EU member states, and 
by ESOS in the UK (defined above) 
Facility Energy Use Defence departments commonly report their energy use in 
two categories.  Facility Energy includes energy needed to 
power fixed installations and non‐tactical vehicles. It is 
distinguished from Operational Energy (defined below), 
which refers to energy required for training, moving, and 
sustaining military forces. 
Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) 
Military sales between countries that are controlled by 
governments.  Defence companies will refer to FMS when 
they are not making the sales directly themselves. 
Forward Operating 
Base (FOB) 
A Forward Operating Base (FOB) is a secured forward 
military position, commonly a military base, that is used to 
support military operations. 
Fully Burdened Cost of 
Energy (FBCE) 
A metric that helps describe the full cost (including logistics 
and other items) associated with military energy use.  This 
term is predominantly used in the UK, whereas the term Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) is predominantly used in the 
US. However, both terms describe the same thing. 
Fully Burdened Cost of 
Fuel (FBCF) 
See definition of Fully Burdened Cost of Energy above.  This 
is the US version of the same metric. 
General Public 
Document 
This term is used in the thesis to describe the most important 
public documents produced by an organisation (e.g. the 
organisation’s Annual Report and Accounts, or public vision 
or strategy). These documents have been identified for the 
organisations included in this research as part of the archival 
research strategy described in the Methodology chapter.  
They are distinguished form the ‘Specialist Public 
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Documents’ identified, which have a specific focus on 
environment, energy, or climate change. 
GHG Intensity of the 
Organisation 
Also referred to as ‘emissions intensity’, the GHG intensity of 
an organisation can refer to any metric that attempts to 
normalise the amount of greenhouse gases produced by an 
organisation, by reference to some other indicator.  The most 
common metric used in this thesis to describe the GHG 
Intensity of an Organisation divides their total GHG 
emissions by their total revenue (or budget in the case of the 
defence departments).  This allows the emissions totals of 
different organisations to be compared despite the fact that 
some are larger than others. 
GHG Protocol The Greenhouse Gas Protocol refers to a number of related 
standards, guidance, and tools for business and government 
to quantify and manage GHG emissions.  The most well-
known of these standards is the GHG Protocol Corporate 
Standard (WRI, 2004), but the same organisation also 
produces, for example, the WRI’s Corporate Value Chain 
(Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting Standard for Scope 3 
emissions (WRI, 2011). 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
An international independent standards organization that 
helps organisations understand and communicate their 
impacts on environmental and social issues. 
Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) 
Greenhouse Gas / Greenhouse gases.  Atmospheric gases 
that contribute towards the ‘greenhouse effect’ which is one 
of the main causes of climate change.  Where used in the 
thesis the term refers to the six most abundant greenhouse 
gases (or groups of gases) that are referenced in the Kyoto 
Protocol (see below for definition): Carbon Dioxide; Methane; 
Nitrous Oxide; Sulphur Hexafluoride; Hydrofluorocarbons; 
Perfluorocarbons.  
Greening Government 
Commitments (GCC) 
These set out the actions UK government departments and 
their agencies will take to reduce their impacts on the 
environment.  They have succeeded the Sustainable 
Operations on the Government Estate (SOGE) targets, which 
were the original targets for UK government departments to 
monitor and reduce their energy usage. 
Grey Literature Documents that have not been produced through traditional 
academic publishing channels (i.e. peer-reviewed books and 
journals).  The term is mainly used in this thesis to describe 
‘defence-energy’ and ‘defence-carbon’ literature produced by 
a variety of organisations linked to the defence enterprise 
(see definition above). 
Indirect Emissions This term commonly refers to Scope 2 and Scope 3 
greenhouse gas emissions, where the greenhouse gases 
cannot be directly assigned to the organisation’s activities, 
but are indirectly linked to its activities. In the context of the 
literature on Scope 3 emissions specifically, the term can 
sometimes also be used to describe Scope 3 emissions 
categories that do not directly to the Value Chain (defined 
below), but instead represent supporting activities. 
Industrial Team Two or more defence companies can present themselves as 
an ‘Industrial Team’ in order to bid for work from a defence 
department. 
Innovation Networks Term describing popular contemporary perspectives from the 
Innovation Studies field (see definition above), where 
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innovation is conceptualised as ‘an interactive process 
involving many actors and extending over time…They 
typically engage in information exchange, problem solving, 
and mutual learning as part of the process of innovation.’ 
(Lundvall, 2013, p.33). In this thesis the term can be seen as 
synonymous with ‘Innovation Systems’, and ‘Socio-Economic 
Models of Innovation’ (also defined in this glossary). 
Innovation Studies Term used to describe an interdisciplinary academic field 
focused on how innovation occurs.  Many ‘models of 
innovation’ are defined in this glossary and discussed in the 
thesis.  The debates around these various innovation models 
constitute a large part of the Innovation Studies field. 
Innovation Systems Term describing popular contemporary perspectives from the 
Innovation Studies field (see definition above), where 
innovation is conceptualised as ‘an interactive process 
involving many actors and extending over time…They 
typically engage in information exchange, problem solving, 
and mutual learning as part of the process of innovation.’ 
(Lundvall, 2013, p.33). In this thesis the term can be seen as 
synonymous with ‘Innovation Networks’, and ‘Socio-
Economic Models of Innovation’ (also defined in this 
glossary). 
Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 
An intergovernmental body that aims to provide an objective, 
scientific view of climate change and its political and 
economic impacts. Its work informs and supports the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC – see definition below) 
International 
Aerospace 
Environment Group 
(IAEG) 
A non-profit organization of global aerospace companies 
created to collaborate on innovative environmental solutions 
for the industry. 
International 
Collaborative 
Programme 
Many defence combat platforms (see definition above) are 
now designed and constructed as International Collaborative 
programmes between defence departments of different 
countries and their supporting defence industrial base (see 
definition above). 
International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental 
Conservation 
Association (IPIECA) 
The global oil and gas industry association for environmental 
and social issues. 
International Relations 
Theory 
The study of international relations (IR) from a theoretical 
perspective.  
ISO 14001; ISO 14064 These are part of the ISO 14000 set of standards related to 
environmental management that are used globally to help 
organizations minimize their impact on the environment. ISO 
14001 specifically relates to management systems, and ISO 
14064 provides guidance on quantifying and reporting 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Joint Enabling 
Technologies 
A term used in the defence industry to describe technologies 
that enhance defence capability (defined above) by 
connecting up different defence inputs (whether people, 
knowledge, tools, equipment etc.) 
Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) 
A term referring to specific indicators that have been 
established by the US DoD and are part of its military 
doctrine (defined below). 
Kyoto Protocol An international treaty adopted in 1997 which extended the 
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1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC – see definition below), and committed 
certain countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design. LEED is a 
popular green building certification programs used worldwide. 
Lifecycle Assessment 
(LCA) 
A technique used to assess environmental impacts 
associated with all the stages of a product's life from raw 
material extraction through processing, manufacture, 
distribution, use, repair, and disposal. There is an established 
academic field associated with the topic of LCA 
Linear Model of 
Innovation 
Term describing innovation models linked to the early 
development of the Innovation Studies field (see definition 
above), where the technological characteristics of a particular 
product were the dominant factor in determining its success.  
In this thesis this model can be seen as synonymous with the 
‘Technology Push Model of Innovation’ and ‘Techno-
Economic Model of Innovation’ (also defined in this glossary). 
Lock In A phenomenon used to describe Socio-technical Regimes 
(defined below) that are very resistant to change. 
Military Capability Term describing the ability of a nation state to project or use 
military power.  It is often used to discuss how defence inputs 
(people, knowledge, systems, tools, processes) aggregate to 
a level of ‘capability’ at the system level. Synonymous with 
‘Defence Capability’ (defined above). 
Military Doctrine Military Doctrine is used in this thesis to summarise the 
various policies, processes, and mandates by which defence 
departments operate. 
Military-Industrial 
Complex 
A term used to describe the mutually beneficial relationship 
between a nation’s defence department and defence 
industrial base (see definition above), where together they 
are able to influence public policy. 
Military Lexicon Military Lexicon is used in this thesis to summarise terms and 
acronyms that are widely acknowledged in the defence 
sector. 
Monitoring, Reporting 
& Verification (MRV) 
Term used to refer to three distinct sets of activities related to 
corporate disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions.  For the 
purposes of this thesis it is included within the breadth of the 
term Carbon Accounting (defined above). 
Normalising Data Term used to describe data that doesn’t directly relate to 
greenhouse gas emissions, but is used to help understand 
the ‘GHG Intensity of an Organisation’ (defined above).  
Examples include but are not limited to: revenue; budget; 
employee numbers. 
Normalising Metric Term used to describe the particular way that an 
organisation’s emissions have been normalised, and often 
used to describe the ‘GHG Intensity of an Organisation’ 
(defined above).  Examples include but are not limited to: 
‘tCO2e per $m Revenue’; ‘tCO2e per employee’. 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) 
An intergovernmental military alliance between several North 
American and European states, who agree to mutual defence 
in response to an attack by an external party. 
Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. The OSD is the 
headquarters-level staff of the US DoD, and assists the 
Defense Secretary in managing the Department of Defense. 
Operational Energy 
Use 
Defence departments commonly report their energy use in 
two categories.  Operational Energy (or sometimes 
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‘Equipment Energy’) refers to energy required for training, 
moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons 
platforms for military operations. It is distinguished from 
Facility Energy (defined above), which includes energy 
needed to power fixed installations and non‐tactical vehicles. 
Organisational Carbon 
Accounting (OCA) 
Organisational Carbon Accounting / Organisational Carbon 
Account / Organisational Carbon Accounts.  A term used in 
this thesis to describe the public emissions accounts 
produced by organisations, as distinguished from those 
produced by countries, cities, specific installations or 
projects. 
Pew US based think tank (defined below) focused on all parts of 
public policy, including defence and foreign affairs. 
Product Lifecycle Term used to describe all the stages of a product's life from 
raw material extraction through processing, manufacture, 
distribution, use, repair, and disposal. 
Product Sales  Most defence companies included in this research report 
their revenues in relation to ‘Product Sales’ (e.g. sales of a 
ship or aircraft), and ‘Services Sales’ (e.g. sales related to 
maintenance and upgrade of equipment, or training) 
Project Level Carbon 
Accounts 
Term used to describe the Greenhouse Gas emissions 
associated with a specific project or product. 
Research and 
Development (R&D) 
The term is used to refer to innovative activities undertaken 
by organisations to develop new services or products, or 
improving existing services or products. 
Research Onion Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2015) use the concept of the 
‘Research Onion’ to inform and describe the design of a 
research methodology.  The concept has been used in this 
research and is described in the Methodology chapter. 
Revenue-Adjusted 
Emissions 
This term is unique to this research and refers to some 
analysis in the Results chapter, where the emissions of 
certain defence companies have been adjusted with 
reference to their revenues associated with a related 
organisation.  For example, if a certain percentage of BAE 
Systems revenues related to the UK MoD, its ‘Revenue-
Adjusted Emissions’ related to the UK MoD refer to its total 
emissions multiplied by that percentage sales figure. 
Rocky Mountain 
Institute (RMI) 
A US-based non-profit organisation that encourages 
organisations to shift from fossil fuels to efficiency and 
renewables. Relevant here for their publications focused on 
the energy strategy of the US DoD. 
Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI) 
UK-based think tank (defined below) that is engaged in 
defence and security research. 
Scope 1; Scope 2; 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Three established categories of emissions produced by an 
organisation, that have been popularised by the GHG 
Protocol (defined above).  Each of these categories are 
defined in more detail below. 
Scope 1 Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Scope 1 Greenhouse Gas emissions are described as 
follows in the GHG Protocol (WRI, 2004): ‘Scope 1 emissions 
occur from sources owned or controlled by the organisation’ 
(p.25) 
Scope 2 Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Scope 2 Greenhouse Gas emissions are described as 
follows in the GHG Protocol (WRI, 2004): ‘Scope 2 accounts 
for GHG emissions from the generation of purchased 
electricity consumed by the organisation, but physically occur 
at the facility where electricity is generated’ (p.25) 
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Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Scope 3 Greenhouse Gas emissions are described as 
follows in the GHG Protocol (WRI, 2004): ‘Scope 3 allows for 
the treatment of all indirect emissions.  They are a 
consequence of the activities of the organisation, but occur 
from sources it does not own or control’ (p.25).  The different 
categories of Scope 3 emissions referred to in this thesis are 
also defined below. 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Business Travel 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Transportation of employees for business-related 
activities…in vehicles not owned or operated by the reporting 
company’ (p.8) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Downstream 
Transportation and 
Distribution 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Transportation and distribution of products sold by the 
reporting company…between the reporting company’s 
operations and the end consumer’ (p.9) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Employee Commuting 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Transportation of employees between their homes and their 
worksites…in vehicles not owned or operated by the 
reporting company’ (p.8) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to Fuel 
and Energy Related 
Activities Not Included 
in Scopes 1 & 2 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Extraction, production, and transportation of fuels and 
energy purchased or acquired by the reporting 
company…not already accounted for in scope 1 or scope 2’ 
(p.7) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Purchased Goods and 
Services 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Extraction, production, and transportation of goods and 
services purchased or acquired by the reporting company’ 
(p.7) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Upstream Leased 
Assets 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Operation of assets leased by the reporting company 
(lessee)…and not included in scope 1 and scope 2’ (p.8) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to 
Upstream 
Transportation and 
Distribution 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Transportation and distribution of products purchased by the 
reporting company…between a company’s tier 1 suppliers 
and its own operations…[and] transportation and distribution 
services 
purchased by the reporting company’ (p.8) 
Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to Use 
of Sold Products 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: ‘End 
use of goods and services sold by the reporting company’ 
(p.9) 
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Scope 3 Greenhouse 
Gases related to Waste 
Generated in 
Operations 
This category of Scope 3 emissions is defined by the WRI’s 
Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting 
Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011) as follows: 
‘Disposal and treatment of waste generated in the reporting 
company’s operations’ (p.8) 
Scope 4 Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber (2008) complain that the 
Scope 3 criteria at present are far too vaguely defined, and 
offer a potential step forward in this area by introducing a 
‘Scope 4’ in order to tighten definitions in this area.  Scope 3 
would then be reserved for indirect emissions for production, 
and the new Scope 4 used for indirect emissions that directly 
relate to the product lifecycle or Value Chain (as defined 
below). 
Security Studies An interdisciplinary academic field that overlaps significantly 
with Strategic Studies (see definition below), and can be 
seen as a sub-field of International Relations Theory (see 
definition above) 
Selection Environment This term is related to the Innovation Systems perspective 
(defined above) and describes the specific environment (or 
system) into which a product or technology is introduced.  
The ‘Selection Environment’ for the product or technology is 
heavily influenced by the wider socio-technical regime in 
question (defined below), and is likely to determine whether it 
is adopted or neglected. 
Services Sales Most defence companies included in this research report 
their revenues in relation to ‘Product Sales’ (e.g. sales of a 
ship or aircraft), and ‘Services Sales’ (e.g. sales related to 
maintenance and upgrade of equipment, or training) 
Single Services / The 
Services 
Term often used in the literature related to defence to 
describe the non-civilian parts of the defence departments 
(e.g. Air Force, Army, Navy, and in some cases special 
forces divisions) 
Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are businesses 
whose revenues or employee numbers fall below certain 
thresholds, which can be defined differently in different 
jurisdictions. 
Socio-economic Model 
of Innovation 
Term describing popular contemporary perspectives from the 
Innovation Studies field (see definition above), where 
innovation is conceptualised as ‘an interactive process 
involving many actors and extending over time…They 
typically engage in information exchange, problem solving, 
and mutual learning as part of the process of innovation.’ 
(Lundvall, 2013, p.33). In this thesis the term can be seen as 
synonymous with ‘Innovation Networks’, and ‘Innovation 
Systems’ (also defined in this glossary). 
Socio-technical 
Regimes 
Socio technical regimes ‘consist of a set of technologies 
embedded in a social, political and institutional context, with 
its associated regime-specific set of rules, procedures, habits 
and practices.’ (Lehtonen and Kern, 2009, p.104). 
Socio-technical 
Transitions 
This term is used to describe or propose changes to 
established ‘Socio-technical Regimes’ (defined above).  
Specialist Public 
Document 
This term is used in the thesis to describe the most relevant 
‘specialist’ public documents produced by an organisation in 
relation to environment, energy, or climate change (e.g. the 
organisation’s Sustainability Report, or Energy Strategy). 
These documents have been identified for the organisations 
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included in this research as part of the archival research 
strategy described in the Methodology chapter.  They are 
distinguished form the ‘General Public Documents’ identified, 
which represent mainstream public documents such as an 
Annual Report and Accounts, or a public vision or strategy. 
Stockholm International 
Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) 
A non-profit organization publishing various reports and 
statistics about global defence spending. 
Storylines The concept of ‘Storylines’ in discourse analysis can help 
define policy problems. ‘Storylines’ are referred to in this 
research for their potential to help create ‘discourse 
coalitions’ (defined above) in relation to the defence sector’s 
development of low carbon technologies. 
Strategic Studies An interdisciplinary academic field centred on the study of 
conflict and peace strategies, often devoting special attention 
to the relationship between international politics, diplomacy, 
economics, and military power. 
Strategic Vector Lovins (2010) describes ‘Strategic Vectors’ as ‘succinct 
descriptions of capabilities that make a big difference in 
military operations’ (p. 3-4).  The current vectors used by the 
US DoD are speed, stealth, persistence and networking, and 
the DSB Task Force on Energy Security recommend two 
further vectors to appropriately consider energy within this 
process: endurance and resilience. (Department of Defense, 
2008b: p.35) 
Sustainability 
Reporting 
Term used to describe an academic field and professional 
practice concerned with how organisations publically report 
their environmental and social impacts. 
Sustainable 
Procurement 
Sustainable Procurement is a widely used term that 
describes procurement processes that consider the 
economic, social, and environmental impacts of a 
procurement decision. 
Techno-Economic 
Model of Innovation 
Term describing innovation models linked to the early 
development of the Innovation Studies field (see definition 
above), where the technological characteristics of a particular 
product were the dominant factor in determining its success.  
In this thesis this model can be seen as synonymous with the 
‘Technology Push Model of Innovation’ and ‘Linear Model of 
Innovation’ (also defined in this glossary). 
Technology Push 
Model of Innovation 
Term describing innovation models linked to the early 
development of the Innovation Studies field (see definition 
above), where the technological characteristics of a particular 
product were the dominant factor in determining its success.  
In this thesis this model can be seen as synonymous with the 
‘Linear Model of Innovation’ (defined above). 
Tether of Fuel Term used in the defence sector to describe the way that 
logistics associated with supplying fuel to operational forces 
can restrict their defence capability (defined above). 
Think tank A think tank is an organisation that performs research and 
advocacy concerning topics relevant to government policy. 
Can also be known as a ‘policy institute’ or ‘research 
institute’. 
Tooth-to-Tail Ratios ‘Tooth-to-Tail’ ratios are a concept used to compare the 
proportion of military activity associated with applying force 
(tooth), with that associated with supporting logistics (tail). 
UCLan University of Central Lancashire. 
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UK Mandatory Carbon 
Reporting  
This refers to a 2013 amendment to the Companies Act in 
the UK, mandating that UK listed companies publish their 
GHG emissions in a particular format in their Annual Report 
and Accounts. 
UK Ministry of Defence 
(UK MoD) 
The defence department of the United Kingdom. 
UK National Security 
Strategy (UK NSS) 
The UK NSS and UK SDSR (defined below) provide the 
overarching policy framework for defence in the UK.  They 
are usually updated alongside the electoral cycle. 
UK Strategic Defence 
and Security Review 
(UK SDSR) 
The UK NSS (defined above) and UK SDSR provide the 
overarching policy framework for defence in the UK.  They 
are usually updated alongside the electoral cycle. 
UN Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) 
The first international treaty adopted by UN member states 
aimed at stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere in order to prevent dangerous levels of climate 
change.  It was adopted in 1992 and is the foundation for 
most of the subsequent activity on climate change mitigation 
at the nation state level. 
US Department of 
Defense (US DoD) 
The defence department of the USA. 
US Executive Order 
13514 on Federal 
Sustainability 
This is an Executive Order titled ‘Federal Leadership in 
Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance’ which 
was issued in 2009 and mandates energy efficiency 
requirements for US federal agencies, including the US 
Department of Defense. 
US National Military 
Strategy (US NMS) 
The US QDR (defined below) and US NMS provide the 
overarching policy framework for defence in the US.  They 
are usually updated alongside the electoral cycle. 
US Quadrennial 
Defense Review (US 
QDR) 
The US QDR and US NMS (defined above) provide the 
overarching policy framework for defence in the US.  They 
are usually updated alongside the electoral cycle.  
Value chain A value chain is a set of activities that a firm operating in a 
specific industry performs in order to deliver a product or 
service for the market.  It is used in this thesis to distinguish 
between emissions-producing activities that directly relate to 
a defence product/service, and are therefore a fundamental 
part of its value proposition (e.g. sourcing parts, building a 
product, testing a product, using the product), and those that 
can be considered as supporting activities (e.g. business 
travel; employee commuting). 
World Resources 
Institute (WRI) 
A global research non-profit organization that was 
established in 1982 to promote environmental sustainability, 
economic opportunity, and human health and well-being. Its 
main significance to this research is its role in developing the 
GHG Protocol (defined above) that defines how many 
organisations account for their greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Abstract 
 
‘Climate change’ and ‘defence’ are becoming closely associated topics, particularly in 
relation to the potential that the defence sector has to support the development of low 
carbon technologies.  This exploratory research applies an inductive approach and a 
strongly archival strategy in order to investigate how Organisational Carbon Accounting 
(OCA) practices in the defence sector can best support low carbon technology 
innovation.  It takes an interdisciplinary approach to the literature, drawing on the fields 
of Carbon Accounting, Defence Industrial Policy, and Innovation Studies. 
It finds that there some difficulties allocating emissions to organisations in existing 
OCAs, which are particularly marked in the defence sector due to close working 
relationships between organisations.  These allocations can result in abstract OCAs 
that do not always reflect the underlying activities causing emissions to be produced.  
In contrast, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts focused on large-scale collaborative 
programmes can better account for the emissions of the defence sector in an 
understandable way that engages new and relevant actors to defence-energy debates.  
These accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCA practices to support low 
carbon technology development across innovation networks.  A positive selection 
environment for low carbon technologies can be promoted if these ‘Project-Level’ 
Carbon Accounts are presented within an appropriate strategic framework, and this 
research describes the relevance of the defence sector concepts of ‘resilience’ and 
‘endurance’ and the related metric of the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE). 
The findings emphasise the value of sector-level analyses of OCA practices, which are 
not represented in the literature at present.  The sector-level perspective can help 
identify relevant methods from the wider Carbon Accounting field that can improve 
existing organisational approaches.  More importantly, it can help researchers engage 
with the fundamental question of what Carbon Accounting is for, by analysing how the 
OCA practices within a specific sector support or inhibit its most effective contribution 
to climate change mitigation. 
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1) Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter is divided into five parts.   
The first provides some essential background to the research, introducing the concept 
of climate change and describing how the defence sector is being characterised as a 
‘technology innovator’ in climate change debates. 
This research is concerned with Organisational Carbon Accounting (OCA) practices, 
and specifically how these can best support low carbon technology innovation in the 
defence sector.  The second part of the introduction briefly describes the academic 
context to these debates, defining OCA, and describing some other relevant academic 
literatures that have been necessary to investigate the title question (Defence Industrial 
Policy and Innovation Studies).  It also discusses the novelty of this research, 
particularly with reference to the relative scarcity of sector-level analyses of OCA. 
The third part of this chapter introduces the research approach taken.  It explains how 
the research has been conducted over seven years with a strong-industrial link.  Given 
these factors, and its context within an academic field of Carbon Accounting where 
both professional practice and academic analysis are still relatively immature and 
evolving, it explains the rationale for taking an inductive and exploratory approach to 
the research.  Despite the evolving nature of the field, it comments on the scale of 
Carbon Accounting activity taking place in the world today, and explains how an 
archival research strategy is suitable for integrating the significant volumes of relevant 
information provided by organisations with the emerging academic literature. 
Section 1.4 describes the ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’, using an established 
method to categorize these according to the cognitive levels that are addressed by 
each.  This helps communicate what the research covers and what the reader can 
expect to learn from each chapter of the thesis. 
The fifth and final part of this introductory chapter describes the structure of the 
remainder of the thesis, describing how each of the objectives are met throughout. 
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1.1 Background 
 
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our age, and one that has 
dominated much political discussion for the past 30 years or more.  Since the industrial 
revolution, humans have been burning exponentially increasing amounts of fossil fuels, 
and releasing corresponding volumes of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to the Earth’s 
atmosphere as a result. 
Climate Science has provided fairly unanimous assessments of the scale and rate of 
anthropogenic climate change caused by these concentrations of GHGs (IPCC, 2013), 
but governments have struggled to respond, given the fundamental importance of fossil 
fuels to virtually all economic activity.  Despite numerous high-profile international 
conferences, and an enormous variety of schemes and initiatives aimed at curbing 
global emissions growth, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs remain high, and this 
has led some to suggest that the issue presents an ‘intractable problem’ for global 
governance (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010). 
The ability to accurately monitor, report and verify GHG emissions and climate change-
relevant performance, at various governance levels, becomes of fundamental 
importance to the success of any of these initiatives.  For the purposes of this research, 
these activities are described as ‘Carbon Accounting’.  Without it, progress cannot be 
tracked, and lessons cannot be learned about which methods are working, and which 
are not. 
The scale of the challenge of mitigating dangerous climate change is such that all 
industrial sectors must play a part, and this research is concerned with how 
organisations within the defence sector account for carbon and report on their 
performance in helping to mitigate climate change.  
The term ‘mitigation’ is important, as climate change debates are usually split between 
those focused on ‘mitigation’, and those focused on ‘adaptation’.  ‘Mitigation’ initiatives 
aim to reduce the amount of GHGs being released to the atmosphere and contributing 
to climate change, whereas ‘adaptation’ initiatives aim to manage the anticipated 
impacts of it (IPCC, 2013). 
‘Adaptation’ debates are undoubtedly relevant to the defence sector (perhaps moreso 
than those concerned with ‘mitigation’), particularly as the lines between defence, 
human security, and humanitarian aid and civil contingencies continue to blur (Kaldor, 
2007).  These debates are beyond the scope of this research, but would be a valuable 
area for potential further work. 
In relation to activity to mitigate climate change and better manage GHG emissions, 
climate change impacts and Carbon Accounts can be created at numerous ‘levels’, 
covering international regions, independent nation states, individual organisations or 
projects.  Whilst this research reviews ‘Organisational Carbon Accounts’ (OCA), 
understanding how these individual accounts cumulate to the ‘sector-level’ is also very 
relevant, as different sectors will have different roles to play in mitigating climate 
change.  A sector that consumes significant volumes of fossil fuels (e.g. extractive 
industries such as mining or oil and gas, or airlines) might be expected to contribute by 
reducing its dependence on fossil fuels.  In contrast, a sector that consumes relatively 
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smaller volumes of fossil fuels but produces products that have the capacity to burn 
significant amounts (e.g. automotive), might be expected to reduce the GHG-impact of 
its products as the most constructive way to support climate change mitigation. 
The Defence Sector sits somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, with defence 
departments being large consumers of fossil fuels that and tend to dominate 
government GHG emissions profiles (Deloitte, 2009).  However, the sector is often 
characterised as a ‘technology-innovator’, with many authors noting the significant 
‘technology spin-offs’ that have resulted from defence Research and Development 
(R&D), including radar, the internet, and space satellites and GPS to name just three 
(Hartley, 2011; Hambling, 2005).  As a result, many commentators have espoused the 
potential for defence to support the development of low carbon technologies that are 
useful for its own operations but also have wider application in a more secure, low 
carbon domestic energy system (Lovins, 2010; Friedman, 2008).  These advocates 
suggest that defence support for low carbon technologies could represent a ‘game-
changer’ that might galvanise a transition to the wider energy system.  This scenario is 
not without precedent, with military development of the jet engine crucial to the 
development of the combined cycle gas turbine that heralded a shift in how power was 
generated in all developed economies (Watson, 2004). 
This research is concerned with how OCA practices can be best applied to the defence 
sector in order to support these ambitions, and encourage low carbon technology 
innovation. 
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1.2 Academic Context and Novelty 
 
There is no strong consensus in the academic literature as to the definition of Carbon 
Accounting.  Indeed, many terms are used to describe the same area of literature: 
‘Carbon Accounting’; ‘Carbon Management Accounting’; ‘Carbon Footprinting’; 
‘Greenhouse Gas Accounting’; ‘GHG Reporting’; ‘Climate Change Accounting’; 
‘Climate Change Management Accounting’; ‘Monitoring, Verification and Reporting of 
Carbon (MRV)’.  The issues are not purely semantic.  Schaltegger suggests that 
‘Carbon Accounting’ has a ‘climate change mitigation’ focus, whereas ‘Climate Change 
Accounting’ has an adaptation focus (Schaltegger et al., 2015).  Similarly, Zvedov and 
Schaltegger discuss the difference between ‘carbon management accounting’ and 
‘carbon reduction accounting’ in the context of the differing motivations of the reporting 
companies (Zvedov & Schaltegger, 2015).  At the more technical level, others make 
the distinction between ‘Carbon’ and other greenhouse gases (Harangozo, Szechy & 
Zilahy, 2015). 
Several authors attempt a formal definition (e.g. Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012), but 
Ascui and Lovell provide a useful summary diagram reproduced in Figure 1 below that 
captures the breadth of issues included under the term Carbon Accounting, and it is in 
this broad sense that the term is used in this research. 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram (Reproduced) summarising the breadth of the field of Carbon Accounting (Source: 
Ascui & Lovell, 2011: p.980) 
 
The breadth of this definition demonstrates the links that Carbon Accounting 
necessarily has to Climate Change governance at all levels.  The vast majority of 
schemes or initiatives aimed at mitigating climate change involve some element of 
Carbon Accounting, and there is a rapidly growing set of academic literature dedicated 
to ‘climate change governance’ (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; Hoffman, 2011; Newell & 
Paterson, 2010), which is underpinned by International Relations Theory and 
contemporary theories of governance (e.g. Brown & Ainley, 2005; Held & McGrew, 
2007; Diehl & Frederking, 2010; Rosenau, 2000).  This literature has been reviewed 
but is outside the scope of the final thesis. 
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This research is most interested in Carbon Accounting practices as they apply to 
organisations – or ‘Organisational Carbon Accounting’ (OCA) as it is described in this 
thesis.  This represents an emerging but fairly distinct area of the Carbon Accounting 
literature often considered in relation to wider Sustainability Reporting practices by 
organisations.  The first part of the Literature Review in section 2.1 is focused on OCA, 
but draws on other areas of the wider Carbon Accounting field where relevant.  The 
research is also interested in how these OCAs cumulate to a ‘sector-level’ perspective 
on Carbon Accounting.  Interestingly, there has been little ‘sector-level’ analysis in the 
Carbon Accounting literature to date, and the term ‘sector’ is conspicuous by its 
absence in column 4 of Ascui and Lovell’s table in Figure 1 above.   
Partly due to the lack of clear sector-level Carbon Accounting precedents to follow, this 
research also reviews two ‘supporting literatures’.   
The literature available on ‘Defence Industrial Policy’ is reviewed in order to connect 
relevant themes from the OCA literature to the contemporary defence industrial 
context.  As mentioned above in relation to climate change governance, there are 
significant volumes of academic literature available that link International Relations 
Theory and the contemporary defence context – often referred to as the Strategic 
Studies or Security Studies literature (e.g. Collins, 2009; Kaldor, 2006; Smith, 2006).  
However, this research is concerned with the Carbon Accounting practices of a range 
of defence sector organisations (whether defence departments, supporting defence 
companies, or other related organisations), and therefore it is the ‘Defence Industrial 
Policy’ literature that best applies, and this is summarised in section 2.2 of the 
Literature Review. 
In order to respond to the way that the defence sector is being characterised as a 
‘technology innovator’ in climate change debates, the research also draws on various 
aspects of the Innovation Studies literature.  The historical development of the 
Innovation Studies discipline is used to contextualise existing calls for defence to 
develop low-carbon technologies, with these mostly responding to out-dated 
(technology push / demand pull) models of innovation, as opposed to the ‘network’ 
perspectives that have most contemporary relevance (Fagerberg, Martin & Andersen, 
2013a).  It draws on the literature associated with ‘socio-technical transitions’ to explain 
the role that ‘discourse’ can have in encouraging change to existing systems.  In this 
context, the field is relevant for exploring the potential that Carbon Accounting practices 
have to frame defence-carbon debates in ways that favour low carbon technology 
innovation. 
In terms of the academic novelty of this research, it has relevance for its analysis of 
OCA at the sector level, within an under-developed field of literature more generally.  
Bebbington, Unerman & O’Dwyer (2014b) confirm that the wider discipline of 
Sustainability Reporting is very much still developing as a field, and review papers 
have shown the topic of Climate Change within Sustainability Reporting to have 
‘surprisingly low take up…given its prominence as an issue’ (Thomson, 2014: p.21-22).  
Specifically in relation to Carbon Accounting, Schaltegger et al. (2015) confirm that ‘the 
question of how climate change accounting could be designed and developed has so 
far remained largely experimental and underdeveloped in the literature’ (p.7), and 
Gibassier (2015) confirms that this is particularly the case in relation to how 
organisations account for carbon.  
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Within this emerging area of literature sector-specific analysis is particularly rare.  
Some precedents exist in the wider Sustainability Reporting literature that tend to be 
confined to sectors with significant local impacts such as mining and extractives 
(Fonseca, 2010; Fonseca, 2014; Perez, 2009), and several papers call for more sector-
level emphasis (Beare, Buslovich & Searcy, 2014), with Weber emphasising the 
importance of this area for Sustainability Reporting as trends in ‘sectoral difference’ 
tend to be more relevant than ‘national difference’, despite the latter being studied far 
more comprehensively (Weber & Marley, 2012).  In relation to Carbon Accounting there 
are very few academic studies focused at the sector-level1, and where grey literature 
exists it tends to be focused on very ‘production-intensive’ (high scope 1 emission) 
industries2.   
The lack of sector-level analysis of Carbon Accounting could relate to the fact that 
many of the established responses to climate change have emerged in an era of 
heightened neo-liberalism. Bulkeley & Newell (2010) explain how this influenced the 
design of the most significant international agreements aiming to reduce GHG 
emissions, with the Kyoto Protocol including several ‘flexibility mechanisms’ that enable 
nation states to use market-based approaches to meet their obligations.  The same 
authors describe the emergence of ‘private carbon governance’ initiatives such as the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which gathered a large investor mandate in order to 
encourage organisations to provide information on their impacts and strategies 
associated with climate change.  As a result, initiatives can be focused on individual 
organisations and how they compare to each other, as opposed to collaborative 
solutions at the sector-level.  Bebbington, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2014b) describe how 
organisational responses have begun to focus on an increasingly small number of 
stakeholders, with investors being prioritised. 
As regards Carbon Accounting practices specifically related to the Defence Sector, this 
research is not aware of any other academic studies that have covered it.  Given the 
potential it is claimed to have by some for developing ‘game-changing technologies 
that might galvanise a transition to the wider energy system’, this is somewhat 
surprising, and this research hopes to redress this gap.   
In doing so, it hopes to also provide another useful sector-level investigation of Carbon 
Accounting to add to the few existing studies, something which has been recognised as 
important by both academic3 and non-academic audiences alike4.  
                                                
1 Examples exist but are rare.  For example: Rugani et al (2013) discuss carbon footprints in the 
wine industry; Gibassier (2015) provides an investigation of Carbon Accounting that refers 
heavily to a French food multinational (Gibassier, 2016); and Lee (2012) provides some 
analysis relevant to the automotive industry. 
2 Relevant grey literature includes the guidance for producing national GHG inventories that 
support the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.  The 
‘Common Reporting Format’ tables that countries must report within require emissions to be 
reported across a number of activities characterised by high emissions production, and chapters 
3-9 of all National Inventory Reports similarly focus on particular activities.  Chang & Bellassen 
(2016) provide a thorough summary of these processes. 
3 Bebbington & Larringa describe how “it is…likely that sector focused research will emerge 
going forward, as dynamics created by both production activities and institutional settings will 
affect [climate change] responsiveness” (Bebbington & Larrinaga, 2014: p.208) 
4 For example The Carbon Disclosure Project or CDP (see section 2.1.2) are currently trying to 
better accommodate the vastly different implications of climate change for different sectors via 
their ‘Assesing Low Carbon Transition Initiative’ (CDP, 2016a) 
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1.3 The Research Approach 
 
This research is the result of an Industrial CASE Studentship between the University of 
Central Lancashire (UCLan) and BAE Systems, one of the world’s largest aerospace, 
defence and security companies.  The research began in late 2010 and will complete 
on a part-time basis in 2017. 
The third part of this introductory chapter introduces the research approach taken.    
Both the academic context for the research and the way in which it has been carried 
out has made an exploratory, inductive approach highly appropriate.  A flexible 
approach that allowed relevant patterns to emerge throughout the research made 
sense in a context where both the academic field and professional practice were still 
emerging. 
As explained in the previous section, the field of Carbon Accounting is currently 
immature and still evolving, and therefore an exploratory approach to the research is 
appropriate for a field where relatively little is known.  ‘Supporting literatures’ 
associated with Defence Industrial Policy and Innovation Studies were explored and 
reviewed, in order to ground key themes from the emerging Carbon Accounting 
literature with their sector-specific context. 
The exploratory, inductive approach was also appropriate to the specific context of this 
study, with the researcher based with an industrial partner, and carrying out the 
research over a long period of time.   
The Methodology chapter describes the research approach in more depth, and also 
elaborates on the relevance of an archival strategy to this research.  Several authors 
describe the speed at which real-world initiatives to govern climate change are 
emerging, creating a huge plethora of sites of enquiry, as all inevitably involve some 
element of Carbon Accounting.  New experiments are happening within climate change 
governance at a rate which any academic field might struggle to keep pace with.  
Bulkeley & Newell (2010) describe how this generates significant challenges of co-
ordination, but should be seen as a positive thing in a context where solutions urgently 
need to be sought and identified: 
‘While the tremendous diversity and dynamism of climate governance 
generates huge challenges of co-ordination, accountability and effectiveness … 
the plurality of sites of action could also be a positive thing as actors move 
between arenas trying to advance action in the fastest and most effective way 
they can, working with whom they need to, wherever that happens to be.’ 
(p.114) 
Given this ‘tremendous diversity and dynamism’ in relation to the activities underway to 
mitigate climate change, an archival research strategy made sense in order to connect 
the themes from the emerging academic literature with the activities already underway 
in the defence sector, as evidenced by relevant public sources of information. 
The research has reviewed both narrative and numerical information on energy use, 
GHGs and climate change mitigation across the UK MoD and US DoD, as well as the 
ten largest multinational defence companies, and relevant grey literature provided by 
think tanks and other organisations related to defence.  It describes the quantitative 
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and qualitative trends communicated by these public documents, and discusses these 
in relation to some key themes identified across the Carbon Accounting and supporting 
literatures described in the Literature Review. 
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1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
The title of the thesis describes the research aim: 
“An investigation of Organisational Carbon Accounting (OCA) practices in the 
Defence Sector to determine how these can best support Low Carbon 
Technology Innovation” 
The following objectives have been designed to meet this research aim, and have been 
produced with reference to Blooms Taxonomy (Andersen, LW et al., 2001), which 
identifies several distinct levels of cognition that are addressed in an educational 
course, as follows: 
- Remembering: which involves the recognizing or remembering of facts, terms 
and basic concepts 
- Understanding: which involves organising or interpreting facts and ideas in 
order to demonstrate understanding 
- Applying: which involves using acquired knowledge to solve new problems 
- Analysing: which involves examining information; determining how component 
parts relate to each other, and noting potential motives or causes 
- Evaluating: which involves presenting and defending opinions by making 
judgements about the information 
- Creating: which involves reorganizing elements into a new pattern or structure 
Though not a course, this research intends to achieve certain outcomes for both the 
reader and researcher, and this section summarises how the objectives for each 
chapter of the thesis address these different cognitive levels.  Bloom’s Taxonomy is 
designed as a hierarchy or pyramid, where each subsequent cognitive level builds 
upon the last.  Therefore, the Literature Review inevitably focuses on the lower 
cognitive levels at the base of the pyramid (Remembering / Understanding), and the 
higher levels are covered in the Discussion and Conclusion towards the end of the 
thesis. 
The objectives for this research are described in relation to each main chapter of the 
thesis below, with the relevant cognitive levels addressed in brackets alongside each 
one. 
 
Literature Review (Chapter 2) 
- Develop a broad knowledge of the history and key theories associated with 
three relevant academic fields: Carbon Accounting; Defence Industrial Policy; 
and Innovation Studies (Cognitive Level: Remember) 
- For the ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting identified as most relevant to this 
research, describe the gaps and areas of immaturity in the existing knowledge 
(Cognitive Level: Remember) 
- Understand how the gaps in the Carbon Accounting literature are reinforced by 
contextual aspects of the Defence Industrial Policy literature (Cognitive Level: 
Understand) 
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- Understand how Carbon Accounting can influence technology innovation, and 
relevant implications for existing defence sector approaches to low carbon 
technology innovation (Cognitive Level: Understand) 
- Understand the relevance of taking an interdisciplinary approach and using 
relevant supporting literatures to investigate Carbon Accounting at the sector 
level (Cognitive Level: Understand) 
Methodology (Chapter 3) 
- Understand the relevance of an exploratory archival research strategy for 
analysing Carbon Accounting and climate change information produced by 
defence sector organisations (Cognitive Level: Understand) 
- Apply an exploratory archival research strategy to sector-specific grey literature, 
identifying relevant primary and secondary sources, and categorizing relevant 
quantitative and qualitative data associated with Carbon Accounting and climate 
change mitigation (Cognitive Level: Apply) 
Results (Chapter 4) 
- Use Correlational Research to analyse quantitative and qualitative data related 
to defence sector Carbon Accounting practices, making inferences and 
presenting relevant evidence (Cognitive Level: Analyse) 
- Associate findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis with information 
from relevant secondary sources to illustrate pertinent issues in defence sector 
Carbon Accounting (Cognitive Level: Analyse) 
- Defend/justify the interdisciplinary approach taken to the academic literature, 
and exploratory archival research strategy used (Cognitive Level: Evaluate) 
Discussion (Chapter 5) 
- Relate the most relevant themes of defence sector Carbon Accounting that 
were identified in the Literature Review to the analysis of OCA practices 
presented in the Results chapter (Cognitive Level: Evaluate) 
- Generate a set of recommendations for defence sector Carbon Accounting 
practices that will better support low carbon technology innovation (Cognitive 
Level: Create) 
Conclusion (Chapter 6) 
- Formulate some recommendations for the wider field of Carbon Accounting that 
can inform its ongoing development (Cognitive Level: Create) 
Recommendations for Further Work (Chapter 7) 
- Develop some suggestions of specific areas of further work that could 
effectively build on this exploratory research (Cognitive Level: Create) 
 
Section 1.5 that follows below describes the structure of the thesis, and summarises 
how the objectives above are met throughout the remainder of the document.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Where section 1.4 above explained the ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’, this 
section provides a more detailed description of the structure of the thesis.  It aims to 
help navigate the reader around the document as a whole, and summarises how the 
objectives from the previous section are met throughout the remainder of the thesis.   
The document follows an orthodox PhD structure, beginning with a Literature Review, 
followed by Methodology and Results chapters, and then a Discussion chapter that is 
followed by a Conclusion. 
There are several objectives relevant to the Literature Review (chapter 2) that follows 
this section.  The first simply aims to provide the reader with a broad knowledge of the 
history and key theories associated with three academic fields that are dealt with in 
turn: Carbon Accounting (2.1); Defence Industrial Policy (2.2); and Innovation Studies 
(2.3).  Given the emerging nature of the field of Carbon Accounting, particularly as 
regards sector level research, the supporting literatures of Defence Industrial Policy 
and Innovation Studies are reviewed to provide essential context to the Carbon 
Accounting debates discussed.   
Section 2.1 identifies three ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting that are most relevant to this 
research, and describes the gaps and areas of immaturity in the existing knowledge.  
The three ‘themes’ identified relate to the difficulty of attributing Scope 1 & 2 emissions 
to individual organisations with methodologies still evolving (2.1.2); the lack of mature 
Scope 3 emissions accounting and ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts related to the 
value chain despite their acknowledged importance to organisational reporting (2.1.3); 
and the relevance of little-known ‘consequential perspectives’ for OCAs that are 
increasingly informing organisational decision making (2.1.4).  
The third objective for the Literature Review is to convey how the gaps in the Carbon 
Accounting literature are reinforced by specific aspects of the contemporary defence 
context.  Section 2.2 on Defence Industrial Policy describes how the difficulty of 
attributing emissions to individual organisations is particularly challenging in the 
defence sector due to the increasing private sector involvement in nearly all defence 
tasks, to the extent that defence departments and their supporting industrial base can 
be highly integrated and difficult to separate for emissions accounting purposes (2.2.2).  
In contrast, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting methods align well to a sector that is 
increasingly characterised by a small number of large, high profile international 
programmes supported by industrial ‘teams’ comprising multiple companies (2.2.3).  
Similarly, consequential perspectives on Carbon Accounting align well with concepts of 
‘defence capability’ that are gaining traction in a period of defence reform in most 
western countries (2.2.4). 
The Literature Review explains how Carbon Accounting can influence technology 
innovation (2.3), most notably in its discursive power to build coalitions of interests that 
can challenge established ways of working, and existing socio-technical regimes.  It 
characterises the existing calls for defence to support low carbon technology innovation 
as based on outdated models of innovation (technology push, demand pull), and 
describes how Carbon Accounting is particularly relevant to more contemporary 
‘networked’ models of innovation. 
36 
 
The final objective for the Literature Review is to convey the relevance of an 
interdisciplinary approach.  The summary section (2.4) describes how the supporting 
literatures are necessary to effectively investigate Carbon Accounting at the sector 
level, given the way that strengths and weaknesses of existing Carbon Accounting 
methods can be amplified or reduced in the sector-specific context.  Given that the 
defence sector is widely characterised as a ‘technology innovator’ in climate change 
debates, the innovation studies literature is also particularly relevant for reflecting on 
the purpose of OCA practices in the sector. 
The Methodology (chapter 3) immediately follows the Literature Review.  The first 
objective for this chapter of the thesis is to understand the relevance of an exploratory 
archival research strategy for analysing Carbon Accounting and climate change 
information produced by defence sector organisations.  The exploratory, inductive 
approach to the research makes sense given that relatively little is currently known 
about the subject, but there are increasing quantities of public information being made 
available by organisations across the world.   
The second (related) objective is to apply an exploratory archival strategy, and the 
different parts of the Methodology explain in detail how relevant primary and secondary 
sources of data were identified and reviewed for quantitative and qualitative data.  A 
sample of defence organisations was selected for inclusion in the research that 
included the UK MoD, US DoD, and the ten largest multi-national defence companies 
globally.  The Methodology explains how this sample covered a significant proportion of 
the defence sector by spend, and allows the analysis to extend across different regions 
and types of defence company.  The chapter describes a rationale for selecting 
relevant public documents for the organisations in the sample, and a systematic 
approach to identifying these.  With a large selection of relevant documents selected, 
the Methodology then describes how quantitative datasets were established for GHG 
and energy data, as well relevant normalising data.  Qualitative datasets were also 
established in relation to energy and climate change keywords used in the documents, 
and any public targets or ambitions being communicated by them.  Secondary sources 
of defence-energy grey literature are also reviewed to provide some additional context 
to the data identified in the primary sources from the organisations in the sample. 
The Results (chapter 4) aims to present relevant correlational analysis in relation to the 
quantitative and qualitative datasets established in the Methodology.  Comparisons of 
the quantitative data show that defence departments currently report the overwhelming 
majority of the overall emissions from the sector.  Where scope 3 data related to the 
value chain is available it has a significant impact on these quantitative trends, and 
suggests that ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts could potentially account for a large 
proportion of the sectors total emissions, complicating the picture as to which 
organisations in the sample are the most quantitatively significant.  By integrating the 
qualitative data, a connection can be demonstrated between the volume of emissions 
reported and the level of priority placed on the issue of climate change mitigation, 
suggesting that the technical accounting issues that drive reported volumes do 
potentially influence organisational responses to climate change, and therefore are 
significant.   
The second objective for the Results chapter is to associate findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis with information from relevant secondary sources 
to illustrate pertinent issues in defence sector Carbon Accounting.  The Results chapter 
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describes the emergence of some new ‘strategic vectors’ of ‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ 
in the military discourse.  The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) is a metric that 
could be described as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon Accounting that is helping 
to drive these new strategic vectors into military doctrine and improve decision making 
in relation to defence energy use.  However, the implementation of the FBCE relies on 
robust ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and less attributional mind-sets that are 
discussed in other parts of the thesis. 
The final objective for the Results chapter is to defend/justify the interdisciplinary 
approach taken to the academic literature, and exploratory archival research strategy 
employed.  Despite the lack of relevant precedents in the Carbon Accounting literature, 
and the evolving nature of existing OCA practices, relevant patterns are identified in the 
quantitative and qualitative data.  When aligned to the secondary sources of defence-
energy grey literature, strong trends can be observed that could begin to define some 
relevant ways forward for OCA practices in the sector, validating the research 
approach taken. 
The Discussion (chapter 5) aims to bring the preceding chapters of the thesis together 
in order to comprehensively evaluate OCA practices in the defence sector, and their 
potential to support low carbon technology innovation.  The first objective for the 
Discussion from section 1.4 (‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’) is to relate the most 
relevant themes of defence sector Carbon Accounting that are identified in the 
Literature Review to the analysis of OCA practices presented in the Results chapter.  
The first of these themes relates to the difficulty of allocating emissions between 
organisations in existing OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence 
sector due to close working relationships, and may result in abstract OCAs that do not 
connect effectively to the underlying activities causing emissions to be produced.  This 
is likely to inhibit the extent to which the accounts engage new/relevant actors and 
support low carbon technology innovation.  In contrast, the second theme running 
through the thesis relates to the potential for ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts focused 
on large-scale collaborative programmes, to better account for the emissions of the 
defence sector in a way that engages new/relevant actors to defence-energy debates. 
These accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCAs to support low carbon 
technology innovation.  However, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts cannot work 
effectively in isolation, which leads onto the third theme running through this thesis 
related to the potential for ‘consequential carbon accounting’ perspectives to align with 
concepts of ‘defence capability’, in order to inform wider strategic narratives that help 
construct a positive selection environment for low carbon technologies in the defence 
sector.   
The other objective for the Discussion is to generate a set of recommendations for 
OCA practices in the defence sector that will better support low carbon technology 
innovation.  The research concludes that if OCA practices in the defence sector are to 
effectively support low carbon technology innovation, then existing practices need to 
change; ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts need to be developed; and these need to be 
presented within an appropriate strategic framework.  Existing OCA practices focused 
on attributing Scope 1 & 2 to individual organisations do have a legitimate role in the 
Carbon Accounting landscape, given their usefulness for policymakers and civil society 
across all sectors.  However, for defence sector organisations these accounts should 
be seen as a means to a regulatory end, and any spare capacity should be focused on 
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producing collaborative ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts that are more likely to widen 
participation in energy and climate change debates in the defence sector.  Given that 
technology innovation is seen as the most valuable contribution that the defence sector 
can make to climate change mitigation, these ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts – by 
widening participation – are more likely to support the building of relevant ‘discourse 
coalitions’ that can challenge incumbent interests in the sector and encourage 
technology innovation.  Finally, this research recommends that OCA practices in the 
defence sector need to be very conscious of the interplay between ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts and relevant strategic narratives.  Alone, both the ‘Project-Level’ 
Carbon Accounts discussed in the second theme of this thesis and ‘system-level’ 
perspectives discussed in the third theme, are limited in the change that they can 
achieve.  However, together they can have a transformative impact on the way that the 
sector views energy use and GHG emissions, and begin to construct a strong selection 
environment for low carbon technologies that effect positive change at the system 
level. 
The Conclusion (chapter 6) summarises the thesis as a whole and re-iterates how the 
objectives described in section 1.4 have been met.  It also responds to another 
objective to “Formulate some recommendations for the wider field of Carbon 
Accounting that can inform its ongoing development”.   
It emphasises the value of the ‘sector-level’ perspective on Carbon Accounting, 
examples of which are rare in the literature at present.  The perspective proves 
particularly useful in this research for identifying relevant Carbon Accounting methods 
from other fields of practice that can improve ‘Organisational’ Carbon Accounting 
(OCA) specifically.  The sector-level perspective is particularly relevant, as the 
strengths and weakness of different methods can be amplified by the sector-specific 
context.  For example, this research shows that existing OCA practices focused on 
attributing scope 1 & 2 emissions to individual organisations do not align well to 
contemporary trends in the defence sector, but ‘Project-Level’ methodologies have 
considerable potential. 
Perhaps more significantly, amidst calls for the field to become more radical and 
ambitious with its research questions in the context of an imminent environmental 
disaster (e.g. Thomson, 2014), the sector-level perspective is particularly useful for 
critically analysing existing practices and future trajectories.  This research argues that 
‘sector-level’ perspectives need to inform the Carbon Accounting literature as it 
develops, and these will inevitably drive the field to become more interdisciplinary.  Just 
as it has been necessary to engage with the Defence Industrial Policy and Innovation 
Studies in this research, other sector-level studies will require engagement with other 
literatures relevant to the sector in question.  The choice of relevant supporting 
literatures needs to be based on an understanding of the most effective contribution the 
sector in question is likely to make to the challenge of mitigating climate change, and 
an exploratory, inductive approach to the research can help ground the investigation in 
its unique context. 
The thesis ends with a final chapter (7) that provides some ‘Recommendations for 
Further Work’, that would be beneficial to investigate but are beyond the scope of this 
research.  It is often considered that exploratory research approaches in under-
developed academic fields can be most valuable in the basis they create for further 
investigation, and chapter 7 responds by describing two areas related to Carbon 
39 
 
Accounting in the defence sector where further research could be particularly 
beneficial. 
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2) Literature Review 
 
The introduction has explained the exploratory, inductive approach to this research, as it is a 
field where the academic literature and professional practices are still evolving.  Just as this 
approach informs the research methods used that are described in chapter 3 (Methodology), 
it also informs the approach to the academic literature.  Sector-level studies of Carbon 
Accounting are rare in the literature at present, and as such an exploratory approach has 
been applied that has reviewed three separate academic fields that are all relevant to this 
research. 
The focus of this research is Carbon Accounting, which is comprehensively reviewed in 
section 2.1, identifying several ‘themes’ which are particularly relevant for this study.  The 
other two literatures reviewed represent ‘supporting literatures’.  Section 2.2 on Defence 
Industrial Policy grounds the research in its sector-specific context, and shows how the 
relevant ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting can be significantly affected by characteristics 
unique to the defence sector.  Section 2.3 reviews the Innovation Studies literature, which 
allows the research to engage with the way that the sector is currently characterised as a 
‘technology innovator’ in climate change debates, and respond to the title question that is 
concerned with how OCA practices can best support low carbon technology innovation. 
Section 1.4 introduced the ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’, which are categorized into 
the different cognitive levels that they address according to Blooms Taxonomy (Andersen, 
LW et al., 2001).  Bloom’s Taxonomy is designed as a hierarchy or pyramid, where each 
subsequent cognitive level builds upon the last.  Therefore, the Literature Review inevitably 
focuses on the lower cognitive levels at the base of the pyramid (‘Knowledge’ / 
‘Understand’), but these provide the essential context for the later stages of the thesis. 
The objectives specific to the Literature Review were as follows: 
The first simply aims to provide the reader with a broad knowledge of the history and key 
theories associated with three academic fields that are dealt with in turn across this chapter: 
Carbon Accounting (2.1); Defence Industrial Policy (2.2); and Innovation Studies (2.3). 
The second objective is to describe the areas of immaturity in the existing knowledge of 
Carbon Accounting that are relevant to this research.  The Organisational Carbon 
Accounting section of the Literature Review (2.1) provides an overview of the field before 
breaking it down into three ‘themes’ relevant to this research, each of which include areas 
where there is scope for further research.   The first of these ‘themes’ relates to the difficulty 
of attributing Scope 1 & 2 emissions to individual organisations, in a context of ongoing 
efforts to standardise emissions accounting methodologies (2.1.2).  The second ‘theme’ 
relates to the lack of mature Scope 3 emissions accounting and ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts related to the value chain despite their acknowledged importance to organisational 
reporting (2.1.3).  The third focuses on the relevance of little-known ‘consequential 
perspectives’ for OCA practices that are increasingly informing organisation decision making 
(2.1.4).  
The third objective for the Literature Review is to convey how the gaps in the Carbon 
Accounting literature are reinforced by specific aspects of the contemporary defence context.  
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Section 2.2 on Defence Industrial Policy describes how the difficulty of attributing emissions 
to individual organisations is particularly challenging in the defence sector due to the 
increasing private sector involvement in nearly all defence tasks, to the extent that defence 
departments and their supporting industrial base can be highly integrated and difficult to 
separate for emissions accounting purposes (2.2.2).  In contrast, ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounting methods align well to a sector that is increasingly characterised by a small 
number of large, high profile international programmes supported by industrial ‘teams’ 
comprising multiple companies (2.2.3).  Similarly, consequential perspectives on Carbon 
Accounting align well with concepts of ‘defence capability’ that are gaining traction in a 
period of defence reform in most western countries (2.2.4). 
The fourth objective for Literature Review is to explain how Carbon Accounting can influence 
technology innovation and the implications for existing defence sector approaches to low 
carbon technology innovation.  Section 2.3 is focused on the Innovation Studies literature 
and addresses this objective, explaining the discursive power that Carbon Accounting has to 
build coalitions of interests that can challenge established ways of working, and existing 
socio-technical regimes.  It characterises the existing calls for defence to support low carbon 
technology innovation as based on outdated models of innovation (technology push, 
demand pull), and describes how Carbon Accounting is particularly relevant to more 
contemporary ‘networked’ models of innovation. 
The final objective for the Literature Review is to convey the relevance of an interdisciplinary 
approach.  The summary section (2.4) describes how the supporting literatures are 
necessary to effectively investigate Carbon Accounting at the sector level, given the way that 
strengths and weaknesses of existing Carbon Accounting methods can be amplified or 
reduced in the sector-specific context.  Given that the defence sector is widely characterised 
as a ‘technology innovator’ in climate change debates, the innovation studies literature is 
also particularly relevant for reflecting on the purpose of OCA practices in the sector.  The 
summary section (2.4) also provides a link to the Methodology and Results chapters that 
follow, explaining how the exploratory approach to the academic literature is central to the 
research methods applied across the investigation as a whole.  It also explains how the 
relevant themes identified in the literature are taken through to the Methodology and Results 
chapters. 
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2.1 Organisational Carbon Accounting (OCA) 
 
This first section of the Literature Review provides an overview of the Carbon Accounting 
field before breaking it down into three ‘themes’ relevant to this research, each of which 
include areas where there is scope for further research.   The first of these ‘themes’ relates 
to the difficulty of attributing Scope 1 & 2 emissions to individual organisations, in a context 
of ongoing efforts to standardise emissions accounting methodologies (2.1.2).  The second 
‘theme’ relates to the lack of mature Scope 3 emissions accounting and ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts related to the value chain despite their acknowledged importance to 
organisational reporting (2.1.3).  The third focuses on the relevance of little-known 
‘consequential perspectives’ for OCA practices that are increasingly informing organisation 
decision making (2.1.4).  
 
2.1.1 Overview of the Carbon Accounting Literature  
 
Bebbington and Larrinaga (2014) describe the Carbon Accounting field as an emerging body 
of literature that ‘links concerns from the science and policy world with respect to 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere with management and accounting 
practices’ (p.199).   
Similarly, Bellassen & Cochran (2016) emphasise the importance of the connection with 
climate change science and policy, identifying this as one of the field’s strengths:  
‘the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas emissions [is] all 
the more crucial, as the only concrete link between the physical world and…large but 
intangible markets and mandates…[it] stands as one of the few solid pillars of climate 
action.  Indeed, the need for MRV is a common feature of all the possible future 
carbon pricing mechanisms, be they carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems, 
environmental labelling or carbon footprint disclosure’ (p.3) 
This connection to climate change governance is also relevant for the close connections 
between the academic and grey literature on this topic.  The relatively slowly emerging 
academic literature on Carbon Accounting is in contrast with the plethora of grey literature 
that has emerged on the topic over the last 10-20 years, associated with various carbon 
reduction schemes/initiatives that have been established at various governance levels 
across the world.  Indeed, Bellassen & Stephan’s (2016) recently published volume on 
Carbon Accounting presents itself as the first comprehensive summary of the topic, and is 
structured around a summary of the 15 most influential schemes put in place around the 
world, and their associated grey literature, as opposed to any structured approach to the 
existing academic literature. 
Bebbington and Larrinaga (2014) describe how the ‘policymaking architecture is a live 
experiment’ (p.207), referring to the various schemes as ‘natural laboratories’ (p.206) where 
an extensive and dynamic set of activities is taking place.   
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Despite the emerging nature of the Carbon Accounting literature, some common organising 
principles do exist around different scales or categories of Carbon Accounting.  Whilst some 
authors organise the Carbon Accounting literature around functional areas or similarly the 
management cycle (Glienke & Guenther, 2016), the topic is most commonly categorised 
according to the governance scale in question. 
The following three Carbon Accounting scales are taken from Bellassen & Stephan (2016), 
but similar categorisations are used by other authors (e.g. Harangozo, Szechy & Zilahy, 
2015; Gibassier, 2015):  
- Territorial / Jurisdictional Areas;  
- Industrial Sites and Entities;  
- (Offset) Projects. 
Each are briefly described below with their most relevant example schemes, as is their 
influence on OCA specifically, which is the focus of this research. 
The most significant Carbon Accounting scheme at the territorial scale relates to the 
National GHG inventories associated with the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change or UNFCCC (United Nations, 1992), but this scale would also include various 
schemes and initiatives focused on specific regions or cities.  Chang & Bellassen (2016) 
confirm that the national inventories associated with the UNFCCC are the ‘longest standing 
implementation of monitoring, reporting and verifying GHG emissions’ (p.21).  Bulkeley & 
Newell (2010) provide a useful review of all of the relevant initiatives associated with the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, and Chang & Bellassen (2016) provide a thorough description 
of the Carbon Accounting practices that support them. 
They are significant for OCA due to some of the wider philosophical perspectives that they 
have helped establish.  For example, they encourage reporting of emissions based on 
production, rather than consumption, and establish a flexible framework for Carbon 
Accounting that refers to various principles that must apply in each case.  Both of these traits 
recur in the Carbon Accounting at other reporting scales, and are particularly relevant to the 
way that organisations account for their emissions. 
The second Carbon Accounting scale listed above is very relevant to OCA practices, as 
schemes designed around industrial sites and legal entities will inevitably impact the 
reporting of the larger organisation to which they belong.  For organisations, there are 
significant interactions between these different types of reporting, as organisational totals are 
often aggregated from site-level data, and legal entities often correspond to major 
operational regions.  However, the rules of specific schemes and organisational reporting 
systems often don’t align across these, meaning that organisations can sometimes be 
subject to a number of reporting drivers that require different Carbon Accounting practices – 
particularly large multinationals. 
Perhaps the most influential example of a Carbon Accounting practice aimed at individual 
industrial sites would be the EU ETS, which includes any site that generates more than 
20MW of power from fossil fuels.  It operates on a cap-and-trade basis and is linked to the 
Kyoto Protocol mentioned above at the national level, highlighting the way that Carbon 
Accounting mechanisms can interact across all of these levels.  The successes and failures 
of the different stages of the EU ETS have been comprehensively reviewed in the academic 
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literature (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; Jacquier & Bellassen, 2016), and other similar schemes 
have since been set up in California (Afriat & Alberola, 2016) and China (Chiquet, 2016).  It 
should be noted that whilst the EU ETS is the most influential example, these ‘industrial-
entity’ schemes are not always mandatory or constructed on a ‘cap-and-trade’ basis, for 
example the UK’s Climate Change Agreements (Environment Agency, 2016) which allow 
industrial sites a discount on their energy bills if they meet agreed emissions reduction 
targets. 
Carbon Accounting practices aimed at ‘legal entities’ are less common, and are usually 
responding to nation-specific schemes or initiatives that are aimed at an organisation’s ‘UK 
Operations’ for example.  France and the UK are the best examples of where these types of 
scheme have been introduced, with Article 75 of the Grenelle package in the case of France 
(Morel & Cochran, 2016), and the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) in the case of the 
UK (Environment Agency, 2015).  These types of scheme have been quite critically received 
due to the fact that the legal entity distinction is not ‘adapted to the design and 
implementation of an action plan at the business unit level: several business units may be 
represented in the same legal entity while at the same time each business unit is active 
across several legal entities’ (Morel & Cochran, 2016: p306). 
In addition to these industrial site, and ‘legal entity’ focused practices, there are also 
schemes and initiatives that require organisations to account for their emissions across all of 
their operations.  Some are mandatory, as in the case of France’s Article 225 of the Grenelle 
II legislative package (Morel & Cochran, 2016), or the UK’s 2013 amendment to the 
Companies Act (Companies Act, 2006) that requires large organisations to publish their 
operational emissions in their annual report.  Others are voluntary, such as the CDP Climate 
Change questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B), which asks organisations to report on 
the emissions associated with their entire operations.  All tend to allow more flexibility in how 
emissions are reported than in relation to the site / entity-level schemes. 
The types of initiative included at this reporting scale are most relevant to this research, 
given that most large defence sector organisations will be subject to several of the Carbon 
Accounting practices described above, whether relevant to their industrial sites, regional 
legal entities, or their entire operations.  
The third common reporting scale by which to categorise Carbon Accounting practices 
relates to individual (offset) projects.  There are a number of example schemes at this 
scale but the most well-established is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), that is 
again linked to the Kyoto Protocol and allows the emissions from specific ‘projects’ to be 
offset from national or organisational accounts.  Shishlov (2016) describes how ‘with over 
6,500 registered projects and over 1.3bn tCO2e of GHG emissions reduced in developing 
countries as of June 2013, the CDM is the largest carbon offset scheme in the world’ 
(p.341).  Again, much has been written about the successes and failures of the CDM 
(Bulkeley & Newell, 2010), and the technical Carbon Accounting practices that underpin it 
(Shishlov, 2016).  However, this is a very broad category of Carbon Accounting, and indeed 
any individual business case for a low carbon intervention (that can vary enormously in 
practice) could be considered as a ‘Project Level’ Carbon Account.  However, the 
methodologies used and governance structures around these projects can vary from the 
elaborate processes set up to manage CDM projects, to a simple excel spreadsheet within a 
facilities department. 
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Perspectives from the Life Cycle Assessment literature are very relevant to this type of 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting, and the practices often benefit from a strong link to 
organisational decision making due to their focus on justifying (or not) the investment in a 
specific project that will have a positive impact on emissions reduction.  
Perhaps the most important point to make in relation to the summary of Carbon Accounting 
at the different scales described above, is the significant interplay between the ‘reporting 
scales’. 
For example, Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) describe how territorial/jurisdictional 
approaches can have an impact on the wider Carbon Accounting activity in a given region at 
lower levels (p.203).  Similarly, site, entity or organisational Carbon Accounting can often be 
a response to regulation or initiatives articulated at a territorial scale.  Likewise, ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts can be integral to building up useful corporate inventories. 
This potential for learning between the reporting scales is highlighted in the academic 
literature on Carbon Accounting, with Brander & Ascui (2015) noting that: 
‘methods of carbon accounting…have developed in a number of semi-isolated fields 
of practice, such as national inventory accounting, corporate carbon accounting, 
project level accounting, and product life cycle assessment, and there appears to be 
considerable potential for learning across these different fields’ (p.100) 
There is also optimism about what can be achieved if these different ‘semi-isolated fields of 
practice’ can be brought together, given the weight of empirical activity happening in the 
Carbon Accounting field, as Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) summarise:  
‘this is an area…where there will be no shortage of empirical sites around which 
investigations might emerge.  Likewise, it is possible that this area might provide a 
bridge between social and environmental accountants and the mainstream of 
accounting theorizing as well as being a site upon which insights from a whole variety 
of related disciplines might be brought together.  The practice, policy and intellectual 
ramifications of the global climate change agenda and accounting for carbon, we 
would suggest, are only just starting to be realised.’ (p.208) 
This research is very interested in the potential for improving existing OCA methods by 
integrating practices from other areas of the Carbon Accounting field.  Whilst the next 
section (2.1.2) focuses in detail on existing OCA methods, the subsequent sections discuss 
relevant parts of the wider field that have the potential to improve how organisations within 
the defence sector account for their emissions.  
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2.1.2 Organisational Carbon Accounts (OCA) and their Limitations 
 
As articulated above, Organisational Carbon Accounting (OCA) can cover a broad range of 
Carbon Accounting schemes and initiatives, relevant to industrial sites, individual legal 
entities, or regional groupings of legal entities, and these tend to require multiple (often 
unaligned) Carbon Accounting approaches from large organisations (Morel & Cochran, 
2016).   
However, the Carbon Accounting data that appears in most Sustainability Reports or on 
websites, and aimed at a wide-set of stakeholders tends to represent a broad Organisational 
Carbon Account (OCA), in which organisations strive to report as many of their relevant 
GHG emissions as possible, for as much of their operational activity as possible, wherever in 
the world those activities are taking place.  Given the focus of this research on large multi-
national defence organisations and their public Carbon Accounting practices, it is this type of 
accounting that is of most interest to this research.  OCA is discussed in depth in this 
section, which notes the difficulty of assigning emissions to individual organisations in a 
pragmatic and comparable way, yet which still retains a clear and relevant link to the 
‘emissions producing activities’ that underpin those accounts. 
The CDP Climate Change Questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B) is arguably the most 
influential global, voluntary initiative that is encouraging organisations to disclose their 
organisational emissions.  Given its global emphasis, and the fact that it is focused on large, 
multinational companies, it has strong relevance to the broad type of OCA described 
immediately above, as it is not focused on specific regions, legal entities, or sites.  Given its 
broad remit, it allows organisations flexibility in how they account for carbon, but it does 
recommend use of the World Resources Institute’s GHG Protocol Corporate Standard (WRI, 
2004), and the majority of large, global organisations tend to use this standard to produce 
their OCAs, whether for CDP or other external outlets.  Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) 
confirm that ‘of the various investor led reporting regimes the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) is the one that has attracted the most attention and which has the most substantive 
impact on reporting practices [of companies]’ (p.205).  CDP built on the fact that numerous 
companies have been actively trying to calculate and communicate their GHG emissions for 
a number of years since the early 2000s, and by gathering a large investor mandate 
(representing trillions of dollars in assets), have requested that increasing numbers of 
companies provide the data to investors via their reporting platform.  CDP analyse the 
company responses and score them based on ‘disclosure’ (how fully they have completed 
the questionnaire), and ‘performance’ (based on the quality of disclosure and how well the 
company is deemed to be managing their climate change impacts). 
Take-up of the CDP Climate Change questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B) is 
significant.  In 2016, some 5,800 companies responded to its survey, representing close to 
60% of global market capitalization (CDP, 2016c), and there is a set of academic literature 
emerging around CDP (e.g. Matisoff, Noonan & O’Brien, 2013; Eun-Hee & Lyon, 2011; 
Andromidas, 2013; Luo, Lan & Tang, 2012), although Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) 
confirm that ‘initiatives in this area are still evolving’ (p.205) and the academic literature 
focused on CDP is certainly not as well established as that described above as emerging 
around the GRI framework. 
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CDP is not prescriptive over the perimeter or method that a company uses to report its 
GHGs but does recommend the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard for scopes 1 and 2 
emissions (WRI, 2004), and the WRI’s Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and 
Reporting Standard for Scope 3 emissions (WRI, 2011).  It has supported the GHG Protocol 
Corporate Standard in becoming the most common standard that companies will use for 
reporting emissions, with Morel & Cochran (2016) confirming that although there are 
numerous explicit and implicit GHG reporting standards that apply to companies across 
different jurisdictions, there is convergence in reporting approaches for scope 1 and 2 
emissions (even if the same can’t be said for scope 3). 
‘at the international level, the GHG Protocol is perceived as the reference for GHG 
quantification – explicitly identified as the recommended methodology to use by the 
CDP.  While no official guidelines are in place, increasingly the use of other 
methodologies is seen to deviate from common practice’ (Morel & Cochran, 2016: 
p.299) 
Importantly, the GHG Protocol has popularised the method of Carbon Accounting across 
three broad categories or ‘Scopes’, and these are now commonly referred to across the vast 
majority of Carbon Accounting methodologies in most regions and for most schemes or 
initiatives.  Scopes 1, 2, and 3 are described as follows in the GHG Protocol (WRI, 2004): 
- ‘Scope 1 emissions occur from sources owned or controlled by the organisation (e.g. 
emissions from combustion or in owned or controlled boilers, furnaces, vehicles, etc.) 
- Scope 2 accounts for GHG emissions from the generation of purchased electricity 
consumed by the organisation, but physically occur at the facility where electricity is 
generated 
- Scope 3 allows for the treatment of all other indirect emissions.  They are a 
consequence of the activities of the organisation, but occur from sources it does not 
own or control. Some examples of scope 3 activities are extraction and production of 
purchased materials; and use of sold products and services’ (p.25) 
Alongside these ‘Scopes’ of Carbon Accounting, the GHG Protocol has also popularised the 
following principles for generating GHG inventories (WRI, 2004)5: 
- ‘Relevance – ensure the GHG inventory appropriately reflects the organisation 
- Completeness – report on all sources within the chosen GHG inventory boundary 
and justify exclusions  
- Consistency – use consistent methodologies to allow for comparisons over time 
- Transparency – address issues in a factual and coherent manner, explaining 
assumptions and using appropriate references 
- Accuracy – ensuring that uncertainty is reduced as far as practicable’ (p.7) 
These are fundamental concepts that underpin most Carbon Accounting methodologies, and 
therefore the GHG Protocol does provide additional information and several methods by 
which to create an OCA. 
                                                
5 These ‘principles’ are reiterated in the guidance published for National GHG Inevtories (Chang & 
Bellassen, 2016), and CDM projects (Shishlov, 2016), and various other Carbon Accounting guidance 
documents in the grey literature (e.g. DEFRA, 2013)  
48 
 
The GHG Protocol (WRI, 2004: p.17) offers three broad methods for setting organizational 
boundaries that are summarised as follows: 
- Equity Share Approach - Under the equity share approach, a company accounts for 
GHG emissions from operations according to its share of equity in the operation. The 
equity share reflects economic interest, which is the extent of rights a company has 
to the risks and rewards flowing from an operation 
- Control Approach – Under the control approach, a company accounts for 100 percent 
of the GHG emissions from operations over which it has control 
o Financial control - The company has financial control over the operation if the 
former has the ability to direct the financial and operating policies of the latter 
with a view to gaining economic benefits from its activities 
o Operational control - A company has operational control over an operation if 
the former or one of its subsidiaries…has the full authority to introduce and 
implement its operating policies at the operation 
The GHG Protocol confirms that both of the ‘control’ approaches above are likely to produce 
similar results in practice (WRI, 2004: p.17), however one can see the level of interpretation 
open to the statements above.  The GHG Protocol does provide some explanatory guidance 
but it is fairly limited. 
The Carbon Accounting literature discusses the potential variability of interpretation of the 
GHG Protocol, and by extension the potential variability of associated OCA methods.  
Schaltegger et al (2015) describe how ‘the allocation of emissions…to scopes is a tricky 
issue and depends on how corporate boundaries are defined and may also depend on 
whether the company applies a financial control or an operational control approach’ (p.11).  
Gibassier (2015) suggests that there are significantly different processes involved in 
producing a GHG inventory under the different methods available in the GHG Protocol, 
describing how: 
‘the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard is closely linked to the responsibility 
framework from financial accounting and the boundaries are based on equity or 
financial control.  One last possibility is to base results on operational control, which 
is the most difficult to implement as it is very different from existing data collection 
systems based on traditional financial accounting’ (p.124) 
Whilst it is certainly true that in practice the different GHG Protocol methodologies can rely 
on very different data collection systems, the relative popularity of the different methods is 
open to dispute.  Table 1 in Appendix A shows a survey of the emissions boundaries 
reported in the 2014 CDP Academic Dataset6.  It underlines the pre-eminence of the GHG 
Protocol (96% of respondents refer to one of the three GHG Protocol boundary methods), 
but also shows a clear preference for the ‘Operational Control Method’ above the others. 
This holds true for the Aerospace and Defence sector. Table 2 in Appendix A is discussed in 
more depth in the Methodology chapter (see 3.4.1 ‘Establishing the Quantitative Dataset’), 
but shows the GHG accounting methodologies used by a range of defence sector 
companies, and the prevalence of the GHG Protocol’s Operational Control method.  
                                                
6 See Methodology section 3.4 for more information on this dataset, which was purchased by UCLan 
for use in this research 
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Morel & Cochran (2016) summarise the variability of reporting that could be associated with 
this ‘high-level’ guidance under the GHG Protocol, in contrast with the reporting ‘rules’ 
associated with a scheme with market-implications like the EU ETS: 
‘as opposed to the exhaustive and directive Monitoring and Reporting Regulation 
attached to the EU ETS, the GHG protocol provides only limited guidance for specific 
sources and industries…it is up to each corporation to interpret and adapt the 
guidelines to the available data, reporting perimeter etc.  As such the reported 
emissions…may significantly differ from same-sector companies following the 
availability of data, technical choices made and the willingness to disclose what could 
be perceived as sensitive information’ (p.299) 
The same authors explain that some companies have clearly identified this as an issue with 
the CDP Climate Change Questionnaire: 
‘It is important to note that a number of companies have expressed complaints about 
the CDP ranking process, particularly given the insufficient standardization of 
monitoring and reporting across competitors’ (p.304) 
However, when comparing reporting approaches for CDP to those in mandatory market-
based schemes like the ETS, the most significant difference arguably concerns the 
‘verification’ process, as Morel & Cochran (2016) explain:  
‘verification is focused on procedures rather than on the accuracy or comparability of 
the reported figures.  As such…CDP verification is very different from verification [for 
other schemes]’ (p.293) 
Indeed, it is generally completed by the existing financial auditor as opposed to specialists, 
and is more focused on ‘fairness’ of reporting and transparency than actual comparability.  
This is a key conceptual difference in the approach to Carbon Accounting verification for 
companies, and Morel & Cochran (2016) summarise the implications:  
‘it should… be noted that even if verification has occurred, this does not ensure that 
companies in similar market segments are using similar reporting perimeters’ (p.293) 
Having identified the potential variability in interpretation of the GHG Protocol, and by 
extension the potential lack of comparability in the OCAs produced, there is an ongoing drive 
to better standardise OCA practices in a way that makes them useful to external audiences. 
Bebbington and Larrinaga (2014) confirm that across myriad reporting practices by 
organisations at all levels, there is: 
‘a common problem identified in the literature [concerning] the tensions between 
accuracy, consistency and certainty, with reporting regimes yet to mature in terms of 
how to measure and report carbon in a way that is likely to be useful to stakeholders’ 
(p.205) 
Regional guidance for producing OCAs doesn’t always need to be seen in competition with 
the GHG Protocol, and indeed can sometimes be read as an elaboration of it, attempting to 
standardise approaches within different jurisdictions (e.g. DEFRA, 2013).  Similarly, NGOs 
such as the Climate Disclosure Standards Board have brought out guidance that again 
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attempts to elaborate on the GHG Protocol and make OCA (and broader climate change 
reporting) practices more standardised and comparable (CDSB, 2015).   
There is also a drive to standardise approaches within specific sectors.  The GHG Protocol 
acknowledges that sectors will differ in the extent to which they may have issues of 
comparability using the standard.  The GHG Protocol refers directly (WRI, 2004: p.17) to 
guidance from the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA, 2003) that provides standardised guidance for organisations in the Oil and Gas 
industry in relation to how they should interpret the GHG Protocol and report their GHG 
emissions, conceding that the sector is likely to display significant differences in reported 
volumes without applying this supplementary guidance due to the complexity of its 
operational structures and activities.  King refers to sector complexity as one of the key 
determinants of the cost of producing credible Carbon Accounts (King, Pye & Davison, 
2010), and IPIECA are not alone in producing extended guidance for their sector that 
elaborates on the guidance from the GHG Protocol.  The International Aerospace 
Environment Group (IAEG) – a self-governing trade association formed by several 
organisations in the Aerospace sector, has produced similar guidance (endorsed by the WRI 
and the GHG Protocol) for the Aerospace industry, acknowledging the need for more 
specific guidance on Carbon Accounting to resolve the complexities of producing these 
accounts in the sector (IAEG, 2016).  
One of the challenges with this drive towards standardisation is to produce guidance 
(whether by DEFRA, CDSB, IPECA or IAEG) that encourages comparability but does not 
create significant barriers to entry for organisations wishing to produce OCAs (e.g. by 
making it too laborious or costly for organisations to apply).  Bellassen et al. (2016) identify 
‘cost vs uncertainty’ as a ‘trade-off’ that is common to all Carbon Accounting schemes, and 
provide a useful assessment of the costs associated with different Carbon Accounting 
schemes.  The authors identify a difference in approach to this trade-off across different 
types of scheme.  At one end of the spectrum, company reporting tends to be lower cost and 
more uncertain, owing to the often ‘voluntary’ nature of their inventories, and their less direct 
aims to inform a wide-set of stakeholders of their impacts.  In contrast, schemes that relate 
to traded carbon allowances and with a more direct impact on certain financial sector actors 
(e.g. the EU ETS) tend to have more stringent accuracy requirements and associated higher 
costs to monitor, report and verify.  The authors reiterate the findings from Morel & Cochran 
(2016) in distinguishing between ‘fairness’ of reporting and ‘accuracy’ of reporting, with the 
lower financial-stakes methods often more concerned with the former than the latter, and 
more concerned with issues of ‘transparency’ than ‘accuracy’. 
Schaltegger et al (2015) summarise the broader challenge that Bellassen identifies 
empirically: 
‘accuracy requires that reported information is sufficiently precise, representative and 
detailed for users to assess the organization’s performance.  The characteristics that 
determine accuracy vary according to the nature of information and the user.  This 
complicates the management of accuracy in climate accounting, firstly, because of 
the complexity and the invariable needed value assessments of information creation, 
and secondly, because of the differences between the information requirements of 
users’ (p.20) 
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Another trade-off identified by Bellassen et al (2016) is that as Carbon Accounts become 
more standardised or comparable (in a pragmatic and relatively low-cost way), they also 
become less ‘relevant’.  The authors articulate this as a challenge for all Carbon Accounting 
initiatives, and this research contends that this issue is particularly marked in relation to the 
OCAs of large organisations, where organisational totals (often aggregated many times from 
site level), can become fairly remote from the underlying emissions-producing activities that 
underpin them. 
For example, the IAEG guidance for GHG Accounting in the Aerospace sector pragmatically 
advises that reporting aligns with ‘energy measurement’ points for static infrastructure, 
focusing on the main utility meters from which a site is billed in order to determine the data 
that it is reported by an individual organisation7.  More recent legislative initiatives in the UK 
have also focused on the points where utilities are billed in order to determine reported 
volumes, with the simplified version of the UK’s Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) 
scheme (Environment Agency, 2015) requiring companies to report their billed volumes of 
electricity and gas that have been delivered to the site. 
These pragmatic approaches allow for comparable approaches between organisations, but 
have the potential to simplify the broad definition of ‘operational control’ above to the extent 
that the emissions from a large and complex site can be allocated in a fairly binary way to 
one organisation or another.  Thus, the relevance of the resulting OCAs may be reduced as 
the reported total does not reflect the different organisations active on the site and their 
related emissions producing activities. 
The ‘Relevance vs Comparability’ trade-off is noted across a lot of the Carbon Accounting 
literature and particularly in relation to the sustainability reports in which OCAs commonly 
appear.  Keeble et al (2003) summarise how the need for organizations to produce a 
relevant report needs to be balanced by the use of prescribed methodologies: 
‘indicators should reflect the business realities, values and culture of the 
organization, and as such their development should not be constrained to prescribed 
methodologies or standards... [But] internationally recognised standards can play a 
role in informing the development of appropriate indicators.’ (p. 151) 
Bellassen et al (2016) conclude in the case of Carbon Accounting, that ‘comparability often 
trumps relevance’ (p.533).  As efforts continue to make Carbon Accounting more 
standardised (and particularly if doing so while keeping costs low), it is a legitimate concern 
that these ‘more comparable’ accounts, could become less relevant still, as pragmatic 
means are used to allocate emissions between organisations that may not be representative 
of the underlying organisational activities that produce the emissions. 
Morel & Cochran (2016) make the point explicit, suggesting ‘frameworks that require 
reporting that does not match the operational realities of the company…decrease the 
usefulness of the regulation for reporting companies’ (p.310).   
                                                
7 ‘In short, companies shall report GHG emissions for all leased buildings for which the company 
directly pays the utility bills. In the event that the utility bills are a part of the rent and not 
independently available, an estimation of GHG emissions shall be derived consistent with the 
guidance identified in The Corporate Standard. Where utility data is directly available, the company 
shall report them.’ (IAEG, 2016: p4) 
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The next section builds on these challenges to the ‘relevance’ of existing OCAs, by not only 
questioning the limitations of standardising methodologies, but also the scope of emissions 
that are being covered by existing accounts. 
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2.1.3 Scope 3 Emissions Inventories and the Relevance of ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts 
 
The previous section challenged the ‘relevance’ of existing OCAs as they become more 
standardised, limiting their usefulness to the organisations reporting them.  
There is another challenge to their ‘relevance’ in relation to the types of emissions that are 
included in OCAs, which often do not include emissions categories over which the 
organisation does not have full control.  These types of emissions are described as Scope 3 
emissions in the Carbon Accounting literature.  This section discusses the state of Scope 3 
emissions reporting, and explains how ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting techniques could 
be particularly useful in building up relevant Scope 3 inventories. 
The CDP 2013 Global 500 Climate Change Report (CDP, 2013) confirms that ‘current 
reporting of indirect scope 3 emissions does not reveal the full impact of companies’ value 
chain’ (p.7), and explains that ‘only 25% of companies report emissions data for ‘use of sold 
products’ however, it is estimated that this represents up to 76% of scope 3 emissions’ (p.9).  
Conversely, 72% of companies report business travel related emissions accounting for only 
an estimated 0.2% of total reported scope 3 emissions (p.9).  This is no doubt linked to the 
availability of data and ease of categorising certain elements of scope 3 accounting over 
others for companies.  CDP are certainly not alone in making this point, with numerous 
sources in the academic literature echoing the importance of scope 3 emissions to any 
realistic assessment of OCA (e.g. Huang, Weber & Matthews, 2009; Matthews, Hendrickson 
& Weber, 2008; Rosenblum, Horvath & Hendrickson, 2000).  Schaltegger et al (2015) 
summarise these views: 
‘significant carbon mitigation strategies cannot be revealed if scope 3 emissions are 
neglected…The climate change impact of downstream industries, e.g. service 
industries, can be as big as the impact of manufacturing sectors, if indirect impacts 
are accounted for.’ (p.11) 
Morel & Cochran (2016) also emphasise the fundamental importance of Scope 3 emissions 
to credible OCA, but mention the lack of appropriate methodologies as a limiting factor: 
‘scope 3 emissions can represent the lion’s share of emissions and cannot be 
ignored…however, due to more complex calculations and data needs, 
standardization of scope 3 emissions quantification approaches is ongoing’ (p.310) 
Bellassen et al (2016) confirm that: 
“for scope 3 – upstream and downstream emissions…company-level footprints 
remain very heterogeneous” (p.533) 
Despite the existence of the GHG Protocol’s Scope 3 Guidance (WRI, 2011), Morel & 
Cochran (2016) make clear that it is this area of Carbon Accounting where comparisons 
between organisations can be least instructive or indicative of performance, due to the 
limited amount of reporting, and the variability of sources and methods used where reporting 
does exist: 
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‘the methodologies used for scope 3 emissions are more complex and less 
standardised than methodologies on scopes 1 and 2.  As such, a company going 
beyond current sector practice in terms of reporting scope 3 emissions would 
potentially be compared with companies reporting only a little more than emissions 
from scopes 1 and 2.  Thus they could be seen in a negative light.’ (p.304) 
Some examples do exist where sectors join together to agree a common approach to Scope 
3 Carbon Accounting, facilitating effective comparison, with Morel & Cochran (2016) 
explaining the approach taken by the banking sector, but these are rare. 
The wider challenge with scope 3 accounting relates to common definitions of organizational 
boundaries, as Harangozo Szechy & Zilahy (2016) describe:  
‘beyond the general consensus that indirect impacts should be included in footprint 
calculations, the precise setting of the boundaries of the analysis remains a key 
issue.  For example, upstream impacts are considered more often, while there is a 
greater variation regarding the inclusion of downstream impacts.  Another open 
question is whether personal impacts generated by internal stakeholders 
(employees, managers, owners etc.) should be included in corporate footprint 
accounts…furthermore the practical difficulty of assessment of the indirect impacts 
concerning methodology and data requirements often leads to the omission of these 
impacts.’ (p.66) 
…The most important future challenge is the definition of organizational boundaries.’ 
(p.67) 
Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber (2008) complain that the Scope 3 criteria at present are far 
too vaguely defined, and offer a potential step forward in this area by introducing a ‘Scope 4’ 
in order to tighten definitions in this area.  Scope 3 would then be reserved for indirect 
emissions for production, and the new Scope 4 used for indirect emissions that directly 
relate to the product lifecycle.   
The introduction of a ‘scope 4’ may begin to break down the challenge of Carbon Accounting 
for companies, allowing them to use alternative methods for each and prioritise more 
material categories of emissions.  The challenges of compiling these different types of scope 
3 inventory are likely to be quite different in each case, and draw on different methodologies 
for estimating emissions.  Two such methodological approaches that relate well to each of 
the ‘Scope 3’ and ‘Scope 4’ categories described above are ‘hybrid accounting’ (for Scope 3) 
and ‘use of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methods’ (for Scope 4).  Harangozo, Szechy & 
Zilahy (2015) contrast these methods of producing a scope 3 inventory:  
‘indicators can be quantified using a LCA-based ‘bottom up approach’…or an ‘input-
output’ approach, where the mapping of direct and indirect material flows is following 
a top down approach…’Hybrid approaches’ mix bottom up and top down methods’ 
(p.49) 
‘Hybrid Accounting’ methods are discussed in various aspects of the literature (Schaltegger 
et al, 2015; Lenzen (2009); Lenzen et al (2009), and recommended for use by CDP8, but as 
                                                
8 These methods are encouraged by CDP, who refer to some software that they have developed in 
collaboration with Quantis that companies can use to make an initial assessment of their scope 3 
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they are based on statistical averages their usefulness can be limited in bespoke sectors, or 
the more bespoke categories of GHG emissions, as explained by Schaltegger et al (2015): 
‘the results are based on statistical average[s] and…depend on how typical the 
studied product or company is in relation to the sector where it appears…hybrid 
accounting should not be used for convenience reasons where physical emissions 
data is available at reasonable cost.  Thus hybrid accounting can be seen as an 
auxiliary method to conventional…LCA studies and should be used when making a 
rough estimation is more rewarding than making no estimation at all’ (p.12) 
Thus, the characteristics of the specific sector, and the aspect of scope 3 in question are 
particularly relevant to the method used.  From this perspective, one could make the 
argument that hybrid-accounting approaches are particularly well suited to Matthews, 
Hendrickson & Weber’s (2008) ‘Scope 3’ definition above (indirect emissions linked to 
production), and initial calculations of emissions related to employee commuting or business 
travel.  However, depending on the product, it may be less useful in relation to the authors’ 
‘Scope 4’ definition (emissions relevant to the lifecycle), and this would very likely be the 
case with defence, where low volume/bespoke products would undermine (unavailable) 
statistical averages. 
The use of Life Cycle Assessments (LCAs) to generate a Scope 3 inventory is relatively 
common, and are recommended by the GHG Protocol Scope 3 Guidance (WRI, 2011).  For 
defence and probably other sectors, they apply far better to Matthews, Hendrickson & 
Weber’s (2008) ‘Scope 4’, where value chain assessments of products are being made. 
The topic of LCA has its own longstanding literature (see e.g. Brander & Ascui, 2015), and 
though starting as a field dominated by engineers and natural scientists it has gradually 
become far more interdisciplinary. 
The case of the Clean Development Mechanism (or CDM, introduced in section 2.1.1 above 
‘Overview of the Carbon Accounting Literature’) is useful in establishing the essential 
variability of LCAs, even within the most well-established ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting 
scheme.  Shishlov (2016) refers to several relevant published documents outlining how to 
align with the CDM scheme, but describes how methodologies can be very diverse in 
practice, because of the vast variety of potential projects that could apply within the 15 
sectors identified by the scheme.  Shishlov (2016) explains: 
‘the sectors [in which projects can take place] vary significantly…which explains the 
need for specific methodologies that reflect the peculiarities of different project types 
and sub-types. Methodologies are designed in a bottom-up manner: stakeholders, 
usually project developers, come up with a project idea and propose a methodology 
to monitor its emissions reductions’ (p.352) 
The Carbon Accounting methodologies have to align with the guidelines, but essentially can 
be bespoke to the relevant project.  Shishlov (2016) explains that ‘the bottom up approach to 
development of methodologies resulted in multiple project-specific methodologies not 
tailored to be applied across all projects of the same type’ (p.353).  This is something that 
                                                                                                                                                    
emissions by entering some generic company data (related to company size, employee numbers, 
procurement spend etc.) (CDP, 2016b: p.173)   
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the CDM Executive Board have tried to address by publishing the CDM Methodologies 
Booklet (United Nations, 2016), but this still includes over 200 active methodologies in use. 
This section has described the clear relevance of Scope 3 reporting to organisations, but 
contrasted this with the relative immaturity of organisational emissions inventories, 
particularly in relation to the most relevant categories of scope 3 emissions where they relate 
to the value chain. 
Methodologies underpinning these more relevant ‘Scope 3’ emissions can be highly variable, 
but this is in some ways inevitable, given their dependence on diverse Carbon Accounting 
methodologies linked to the field of LCA. 
This research contends that a diversity of methodologies for ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounting is not problematic in isolation – as Shishlov (2016) explains above in relation to 
the CDM, where projects are unique the processes used to account for their carbon may 
also need to be unique. 
The issue of variability becomes more problematic when ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
are combined with OCAs to build up comparable Scope 3 inventories.  Their essential 
variability challenges the ‘drive to standardisation’ and ‘attributional-emphasis’ that 
characterise the more established OCA methods described in section 2.1.2 above (‘OCAs 
and their Limitations’). 
Despite these issues, Harangozo, Szechy & Zilahy (2015) note the increasing interest in this 
area of corporate OCA, and specifically the link between product footprinting and wider 
organisational inventories: 
‘academic interest in the application of footprint type indicators in the assessment of 
organizational/corporate sustainability has increased markedly in the past 5-6 years’ 
(p.55) 
The connection of ‘organisational footprints’ to ideas of product footprinting is significant, as 
it reinforces the interplay between the different scales of Carbon Accounting described 
above, and potentially provides a means for organisations to build up more relevant 
emissions inventories in a pragmatic way.  Harangozo, Szechy & Zilahy (2015) pick up on 
this theme, describing how:  
“the building blocks of organizational footprints are typically product and process 
level footprints.  In some cases, accounting and reporting focuses mainly on the 
footprint of the company’s products rather than the whole organization itself” (p.67) 
Gibassier (2015) similarly looks at the connection between OCAs and ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts, confirming that: ‘to our knowledge, [no companies] have tried to devise a 
company-wide result using product footprints’ (p.124).   
It is clearly possible to use LCA-driven product footprints to build up OCAs, and this does 
seem to have potential as a means to create more relevant Scope 3 inventories.  However, 
this may require an approach to OCA that is less inhibited by the technical complexities of 
attributing emissions between organisations that characterises the Scope 1 & 2 Carbon 
Accounting practices described above (see section 2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their Limitations’), and 
an acceptance that standardised, comparable accounts may not always be available. 
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Interestingly, Harangozo, Szechy and Zilahy (2015) suggest that the lack of ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts do not only inhibit building up organisational Scope 3 inventories, but also 
inhibit the types of sector-level benchmarks that are lacking more generally in the field of 
Carbon Accounting (as discussed in 1.2 ‘Academic Context and Novelty’) 
‘comparisons within industrial sectors or industry specific benchmarks would be the 
most useful information to one organization’s management accounting.  However, in 
practice this is scarce due to the lack of application of the footprint concepts in 
organizational accounting, different methods of calculation and the lack of information 
on peer companies… Product level comparisons may play an even more important 
role in the future’ (p.68) 
The next part of this review explains some of the broader conceptual challenges raised for 
established ‘attributional’ perspectives on OCA by LCA-driven ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts.  It describes how OCAs can better connect to decision making and positive 
change at the sector-level by incorporating wider Carbon Accounting perspectives linked to 
the field of LCA. 
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2.1.4 Attributional-Consequential Distinctions in Carbon Accounting and the 
Implications for OCAs 
 
The discussion of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting above – particularly as it relates to 
organisational emissions inventories – leads onto this fourth part of the review that 
introduces some alternative conceptual perspectives on Carbon Accounting that have their 
basis in life-cycle assessments (LCA).  These perspectives place less emphasis on 
attributing emissions to organisations, and more on the consequential impacts their actions 
have at the system level. 
One key feature of the types of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting described above is their 
focus on decision making.  Specifically, the real-world carbon impacts of decisions made at 
the outset of a project.  In this sense they are future orientated and concerned with actual 
emissions reductions.  Shishlov (2016) explains that this to some extent distinguishes them 
from the many other types of Carbon Accounting: 
‘unlike national inventories or cap-and-trade schemes, which require monitoring 
absolute levels of GHG emissions…the object of Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) in carbon offset projects is ‘emissions reductions’.  This means 
that a project developer has to monitor not only realized emissions within the project 
boundary, but also the hypothetical emissions that would have occurred in the 
absence of a project, which is usually referred to as a baseline’ (p.351-352) 
This focus of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting on emissions reductions locates it far more 
closely to issues of organisational decision making, and connects it to some interesting wider 
parts of the Carbon Accounting literature, notably distinctions between ‘attributional’ and 
‘consequential’ inventories of GHG emissions for a project or organisation.  Brander & Ascui 
(2015) provide a useful review paper that summarises this topic.  The authors explain how 
the distinction between attributional and consequential LCAs occurred around 30 years into 
the development of the field, as a result of the influence of new interdisciplinary links, 
particularly with economists: 
‘the consequential approach [brought] concepts borrowed from economics to a field 
previously dominated by engineers and natural scientists’ (p.104) 
It is easiest to explain the ‘consequential approach’ by contrasting it with the (far more 
common) ‘attributional approach’ to Carbon Accounting: 
‘attributional methods provide static inventories of emissions allocated or attributed to 
a defined scope of responsibility, while consequential methods attempt to measure 
the system-wide change in emissions that occurs as a result of a decision or action, 
such as the decision to produce one extra unit of a given product’ (p.100) 
It is this system-level emphasis, as well as the focus on decision-making and the 
consequences of decisions that are crucial to the ‘consequential’ perspective, as Brander 
confirms: 
‘emphasis on quantifying the consequences of a decision or action, as distinct from 
quantifying the total environmental burdens associated with the process directly used 
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or connected with the entity studied, is the essence of the ‘consequential’ approach’ 
(p.102) 
Brander & Ascui (2015) provide the example of a project to build a Swedish Hydropower 
plant (amongst other examples) to demonstrate that the attributional emphasis of the 
majority of Carbon Accounting practices can misunderstand the system level impacts of 
actual decisions and result in unintended consequences. The authors draw the conclusion 
that ‘the magnitude of difference between attributional and consequential LCA results clearly 
depends on the specific product that is studied.  However, it is also clear that in some cases 
the difference can be very large’ (p.108). 
Despite a growing number of papers discussing the consequential approach with reference 
to LCA (e.g. Ekvall & Weidema, 2004), the ‘[attributional-consequential] distinction has not 
yet been widely appreciated or explored within the field of corporate carbon accounting’ 
(Brander & Ascui, 2015: p.100). 
Brander & Ascui (2015) argue that just as the distinction has significant implications for 
decision making in relation to environmental LCA at project-level; it has great significance 
more broadly, and could be applied to decisions taken at the national scale, and decision-
making within organisations: 
“organization-level inventory of physical GHGs, typically produced for the purposes of 
voluntary carbon disclosure…[follow] standards such as the GHG Protocol…[that] 
guide the production of corporate carbon accounts that are attributional in 
nature…and thus it is probable that decisions based on such inventories may, like 
attributional LCAs, result in unintended consequences.  Applying the attributional-
consequential distinction to corporate carbon accounting may therefore be useful in 
choosing appropriate methods to inform decision making, and for understanding the 
nature and limitations of mainstream (attributional) corporate carbon accounting more 
generally” (p.100) 
Brander & Ascui (2015) use the example of outsourcing activities to demonstrate the 
relevance of consequential perspectives and the type of ‘unintended consequences’ that can 
occur in relation to attributional methods.  However, the application of consequential 
approaches to OCA is very rare and from this Literature Review it remains unclear as to 
whether any examples exist.  The relevant grey literature also gives scant reference to the 
distinction.  The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard (WRI, 2004) does not mention the actual 
terms but provides clear enough advice that inventories should be attributional.  CDP’s 
Guidance (CDP, 2016b) does mention the distinction, but in this case to make clear that 
inventories should be attributional (p.37). 
Brander & Ascui (2015) do attempt an explanation of the lack of attention that the 
attributional-consequential distinction has received in relation to OCA practices: 
“we believe that the history of the emergence of the distinction [between attributional and 
consequential methods] in LCA demonstrates that thinking in terms of the systematic 
consequences of a decision or action, rather than thinking in terms of attributing 
responsibility for a given situation, involves a conceptual shift – a subtle change of 
emphasis with far-reaching implications – that is challenging and difficult to introduce 
when the dominant thinking is attributional.” (p.101) 
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There are significant potential benefits to applying the ‘consequential’ perspective to OCAs, 
and these address some of the criticisms of existing Sustainability Reports in which OCAs 
are currently presented. 
The emphasis on ‘system-level’ change directly addresses one of the main criticisms of 
existing sustainability reporting (including related OCA practices), that it ‘falls a long way 
short of understanding eco-systems / interactions beyond the individual organisation’ (Buhr, 
Gray & Milne, 2014: p.55). 
Similarly, the emphasis on ‘decision-making’ and its consequences, addresses the issue that 
existing practices are ‘backward looking’ in emphasis, simply describing impacts and 
enhancements that have occurred in the period, as Zvedov & Schaltegger (2015) 
summarise: 
‘the majority of…publications explicitly dealing with CMA [Carbon Management 
Accounting] discuss aspects not related to the management relevance of improved 
carbon performance.  Most of the explicit CMA literature deals with past orientated 
and ad hoc information while focusing on decision support to secure legitimacy or 
profits.  Sustainable development and corporate sustainability, however, would-in 
addition-require considering future orientated decision situations and the generation 
of routinely generated carbon information to create continuous management attention 
and to support management of decisions for improved carbon performance.’ (p.40) 
… 
‘subsequent research is challenged to look into possibilities to harness the potential 
of CMA to actually reduce carbon emissions in view of an eminent ecological crisis. 
Expanding the currently limited set of carbon accounting tools at a management’s 
disposal thus constitutes a central challenge.’ (p.40-41) 
Therefore, whilst the types of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts discussed in section 2.1.3 
might make OCAs more ‘relevant’ (by connecting better to actual emissions producing 
activities than specific organisations), it is arguably the application of the ‘consequential’ 
perspective that makes them ‘useful’ – that is it could connect these more relevant accounts 
to ‘decision-making’ and meaningful GHG reductions at the system level. 
Creating the type of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts discussed in 2.1.3 whose impacts span 
across different organisation would inevitably reduce the attributional emphasis of existing 
OCAs.  They would also aggregate much more usefully to ‘system-level’ accounts for 
Carbon (e.g. several warship Carbon Accounts would provide a Carbon Account for the 
Fleet, or our Maritime Defences). 
It is interesting that in the literature the additive nature of attributional inventories is 
highlighted as a benefit (e.g. for setting carbon budgets) over consequential accounts, which 
cannot be aggregated meaningfully (Tillman, 2000).  However, adding together the type of 
(non-attributional) ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts as described above potentially provides a 
far more meaningful result than several individual organisational totals that may be fairly 
abstract in their relation to the underlying emissions producing activities. 
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The next part of this Literature Review explores the Defence Industrial Policy literature in 
order to expand on the themes that have been established above in relation to OCA, and 
ground this research in its sector-specific context. 
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2.2 Defence Industrial Policy 
 
Despite the Carbon Accounting field being the focus of this research, the introduction 
explained how two ‘supporting literatures’ were appropriate for grounding the research in its 
sector-specific context and responding to the title question of the thesis.  This second part of 
the Literature Review describes the Defence Industrial Policy literature, and its relevance to 
the ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting identified in the previous section. 
This section provides an introduction to the Defence Industrial Policy literature (2.2.1), before 
focusing on each of the themes from the previous section in turn, and explaining the sector-
specific context.  Section 2.2.2 describes how the difficulty of attributing emissions to 
individual organisations is particularly challenging in the defence sector due to the increasing 
private sector involvement in nearly all defence tasks, to the extent that defence 
departments and their supporting industrial base can be highly integrated and difficult to 
separate for emissions accounting purposes.  In contrast, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting 
methods align well to a sector that is increasingly characterised by a small number of large, 
high profile international programmes supported by industrial ‘teams’ comprising multiple 
companies (2.2.3).  Similarly, consequential perspectives on Carbon Accounting align well 
with concepts of ‘defence capability’ that are gaining traction in a period of defence reform in 
most western countries (2.2.4). 
 
2.2.1 Introduction to the Defence Industrial Policy Literature 
 
It is first worth noting the substantial academic literature available on defence issues and 
foreign affairs.  The majority of this is in some ways connected to the International Relations 
literature (e.g. Brown & Ainley, 2005; Weber, 2005), and the related fields of Security 
Studies and Strategic Studies (e.g. Collins, 2009; Kaldor, 2006). 
Nearly all of these authors acknowledge the complexity of contemporary security studies and 
the end of the traditional conceptions of security and war.  Smith (2006) describes the 
profound change in the context of contemporary conflict, declaring the end of old certainties: 
‘War no longer exists.  Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all 
around the world…and states still have armed forces which they use as symbols of 
power. None the less, war as cognitively known to most combatants, war as battle in 
a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in 
international affairs: such war no longer exists.’ (p.1)  
For Smith, we have entered a ‘new paradigm’ in global conflicts: 
‘It is now time to recognise that a paradigm shift in war has occurred: from armies 
with comparable forces doing battle in a field to strategic confrontation between a 
range of combatants, not all of which are armies, and using different types of 
weapons, often improvised.  The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war.  
The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people.’ (p.3) 
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Kaldor makes a similar contrast between ‘old wars’ and ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2007), and many 
authors link the ‘old wars’ paradigm to the ‘old certainties’ established during the Cold War 
(e.g. Dannreuther, 2007).  These contrasting perspectives are not confined to the academic 
literature, and are well-established in the published security strategies of the US and UK.  
The UK National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a) confirms that ‘many future wars 
will be ‘among the people’ (p.17), and the US Quadrennial Defence Reviews (e.g. 
Department of Defense, 2014a) and National Military Strategies (e.g. Department of 
Defense, 2015a) also clearly recognise this changed paradigm. 
These debates are well established in the academic literature, and provide some essential 
context to the Defence Industrial Policy literature that is most directly relevant to this 
research. 
The Defence Industrial Policy literature is concerned with the interactions between different 
organisations in the defence value chain.  It is most relevant to this research as it is these 
organisations who are accounting for, and publicly reporting their carbon emissions.  It is a 
less well-established area of literature than the security or strategic studies literatures 
mentioned above, and where it does exist the lines between academic and grey literature 
can be blurred, with relevant academic sources often emerging from defence departments or 
related organisations. 
In order to discuss Defence Industrial Policy, it is important to emphasise the close 
relationship between national defence departments and their supporting defence industry, as 
Dunn et al (2011) describe in the UK context: 
‘The MoD, the armed forces it oversees, and – arguably – the industry that supports 
it with goods and services are all best thought of as a single and complex organic 
entity; one that has changed considerably since the end of the Second World War. 
Changing it in a controlled manner is not straightforward, since amendments in one 
area can have significant and sometimes hard to discern consequences elsewhere’ 
(p.2)  
It is this notion of defence as ‘one complex entity’ that has led to the widespread use of the 
term ‘military-industrial complex’ to describe the relationship between defence and its 
industrial base.  The term was coined by Dwight Eisenhower, who was concerned that 
industrial concerns might begin to influence defence strategy with negative consequences, 
when the opposite should be the case.  There are many books concerned with this issue 
(e.g. Ledbetter 2011; Pavelec, 2010; Smith, 2009), and a number of critical analyses of the 
‘arms trade’ in this context (e.g. Stohl and Grillot, 2009; Feinstein, 2011; Gilby, 2009), 
however many of these are perhaps best categorised as popular non-fiction.  The sector 
attracts this type of literature, not just because of the ethical and philosophical dimensions of 
weapons and war, but because it is so clearly not a ‘normal market’.  Most nations have a 
single buyer (their defence department), and a small group of major suppliers.  It is a highly 
structured market, with the defence departments often acting as the sole buyer and the 
regulator. 
Gansler (2011) explains the uniqueness of the defence market in the US context: 
‘the US Dept. of Defence (DoD) is a single (monopsony) buyer that can make 
purchases from only a few, select suppliers in each critical sector of the economy…; 
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and the market operates in an extremely regulated and transparent environment.  
Both of these characteristics are unlike anything in the commercial world, where 
many buyers and many sellers operate in a largely free market.’ (p.156) 
The author continues that the government is so involved ‘in the day to day operating of the 
[defence] firms… [that the] defence market becomes totally unique and ceases to be a 
market in any traditional sense.’ (p.157) 
Despite the wide variety of political or philosophical positions from which to analyse Defence 
Industrial Policy, the idea of defence as a ‘complex organic entity’ is certainly helpful in 
understanding the nature of the modern defence context.  Indeed, this does not just concern 
the relationship between defence departments and their largest industrial suppliers, but the 
whole system of organisations related to defence.  For example, in the UK, as well as the 
single services and main civilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) offices, there are over fifty public 
sector organisations that are under the management of the MoD, ranging from the Met 
Office to the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSTL), and the list of organisations 
is even larger and wider in the US context. 
Another term used to describe this ‘complex entity’ is the ‘Defence Enterprise’, and as 
defence becomes a more global and inter-related concern, this term can increasingly be 
applied at multiple levels (e.g. the UK Defence Enterprise, the EU Defence Enterprise; the 
NATO Defence Enterprise; the Western Defence Enterprise). 
All the organisations bound up within this complex organic entity, at whichever level it is 
defined, produce significant volumes of grey literature – whether annual reports, strategic 
visions and strategies, or performance reports and statistics. This grey literature has been 
reviewed and is discussed in more detail in the Methodology (section 3.5 ‘Relevant 
Secondary Sources of Data’). 
The academic literature on the topic is also bound up within this ‘complex organic entity’ 
given that it often emerges from defence-academic institutions, think tanks, or policy 
organisations related to defence.  For example, the UK and US armed forces tend to have 
‘academies’ or ‘colleges’ that are either joint or linked to the single services, and a significant 
amount of academic literature is produced and published in close association with these 
organisations (e.g. Moore, 2011; Moore & Antill, 2014; Sorensen, 2008). 
Similarly, the defence enterprise includes a number of well-regarded think tanks (e.g. 
Council on Foreign Relations, RAND Corporation, Royal United Services Institute, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, CSIS, Brookings, Chatham House, Janes, Royal 
Institute for International Affairs, Pew), who also produce and publish academic literature 
(e.g. Markusen & Costigan, 1999; Lorell et al, 2003; Heidenkamp, Louth & Taylor, 2014). 
The authors in both cases can be academics that work (or have worked) within the defence 
enterprise in some capacity, whether in industry or MoD civilian roles, or serving in the 
forces.  And indeed, even when academic work is produced and published by more 
independent institutions, it is usually done by academics connected in some way to the 
defence enterprise (Gansler, 2015; Mathaisel, Manary & Comm, 2009).  Arguably the 
exceptions to this rule are some of the work of applied economists analysing defence (e.g. 
Hartley and Sandler, 1995, 2007; Hartley, 2011; Markowski, Hall & Wylie, 2010), and these 
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sources are used heavily in this review but backed up with sources more closely connected 
to the defence enterprise. 
As with the Carbon Accounting literature, many authors note the under-developed nature of 
the research.  The aforementioned applied economists are quite specific in mentioning this, 
describing their field as ‘a relatively new sub-field of economics’ (Hartley, 2011: p.1), and 
claiming that: 
‘despite the importance of defence policy, the opportunity costs of defence budgets 
and the implications of war for the future of civilisation, the field of defence 
economics has attracted relatively few economists willing to apply their ‘tool kit’ to the 
defence sector’ (p.XV) 
This has been a longstanding issue, with Markusen & Costigan (1999) noting in the late 90s 
- a time of significant change in the defence industrial context as will be discussed below, 
that the field had received little academic attention, and that ‘the consequences of defence 
industrial restructuring through mergers, increased exports, and privatisation are surprisingly 
under-researched’ (p.21). 
As well as being under-developed, the research also tends to be cyclical, with academic 
debates occurring more vigorously in times of significant change to defence budgets.  
Gansler (2011) explains the understandable connection between defence procurement 
cycles and external events, with Figure 2 showing how the US DoD budget has varied since 
the 1940s, including annotations relevant to periods of conflict.  The author confirms that 
defence spending has been sustained more recently to support the ‘long war on terrorism’ 
(p.18).  These large swings in the size of the defence enterprise are a fairly unique feature of 
the sector, and the volume of research published tends to relate to these periods of 
significant change in the sector. 
 
 
Figure 2: US DoD budget for the period 1946-2008, including annotations relevant to significant periods of conflict 
that show the impact of external events on defence procurement cycles. (Source: Gansler, 2011: p.10) 
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This section has briefly summarised the modern defence context and explained the unique 
nature of the defence enterprise.  The associated Defence Industrial Policy literature has 
emerged from all parts of this enterprise, and is both under-developed and cyclical in nature.  
However, it clearly emphasises the need to analyse the themes of Organisational Carbon 
Accounting (OCA) that were described in the first part of the Literature Review with 
reference to the defence-specific context, and the next section is focused on the increasing 
role of the private sector in the contemporary defence enterprise, and the challenges this 
presents for appropriately allocating emissions to individual organisations within it.  
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2.2.2 The Increasing Role of the Private Sector in All Defence Tasks 
 
Markusen & Costigan (1999) and Gansler (2011) both provide good summaries of the 
‘peace dividend’ expected from the end of the cold war in the early 1990s.  From an 
industrial perspective, the hope was for the existing (numerous) defence firms to 
commercialise, finding civilian markets for their technological expertise, and in doing so 
providing an innovation-boost to the global economy.  Whilst some of this did occur, the 
majority of activity was focused on the merging and consolidation (and specialisation) of the 
existing defence firms around a shrinking volume of defence orders, who then looked to 
export markets (foreign military sales) for future growth.  Gansler (2011) provides the 
diagram in Figure 3 to demonstrate the scale of this consolidation, describing how in the US 
‘five firms absorbed over fifty previous entities.  These mergers and acquisitions occurred 
both horizontally (such as the McDonald Douglas and Boeing combination) …and also 
vertically (such as Lockheed’s acquisition of Loral)’ (p.32).  The author explains that the 
amenable position of the US administration in the 1990s to the mergers is largely 
responsible for the result, but possibly also management theories related to ‘core 
competence’ and outsourcing that were also prevalent at the time, and remain so. 
 
 
Figure 3: Diagram showing Defence Industry Consolidation 1986-2001, showing the scale of consolidation in the 
industry with over 50 firms absorbed into five large defence multinationals (Source: Gansler, 2011: p.33) 
 
With shrinking domestic orders, these consolidated defence firms began to look for 
increasing volumes of exports (foreign military sales), something sanctioned by host 
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countries on the basis of keeping skills available and costs down, and the security case 
justified on the grounds that it allows host countries’ industries to stay ahead of the 
technology curve.  Whether this approach has been successful or represents a case where 
industrial concerns are undermining strategic security, is a significant topic of debate in the 
defence industrial literature as well as the strategic studies field (e.g. Markusen & Costigan, 
1999).  Its significance to this research is the changed structure of the defence industrial 
base, concentrated around few large multinational defence companies that are international 
in structure and outlook. 
One consequence of this more global defence industry supported by fewer, specialist 
multinationals, is that different countries have to make complex decisions about how much of 
their domestic industrial base they want to maintain.  Hartley (2011) explains how national 
perspectives can vary significantly: 
‘nations differ with some not having a defence industrial base, whilst others have a 
small-scale industry offering repair and maintenance facilities or supplying 
ammunition and small arms, whilst some have a large-scale defence industry 
providing a range of high technology air, land, and sea equipment… within the world 
market, there are examples of defence industries of varying sizes and scope’ (p.183) 
Markowski, Hall & Wylie (2010) have produced a thorough analysis of the approaches to 
defence procurement taken by small, advanced countries, explaining that within this 
globalised industry, these countries need to make conscious decisions about how much 
capability they maintain domestically.  
The question doesn’t just occupy small countries though; even the UK with its established 
defence industrial base has to make decisions as to how much capability it maintains 
domestically.  Hartley (2011) explains: 
‘traditionally, the UK has supported its domestic defence industrial base.  If buying 
British means paying more for some defence equipment and waiting longer for 
delivery, the result is a smaller defence force and less protection for our citizens.  
Questions arise as to what the defence budget is buying: is it buying protection for 
our society or protection for UK defence industries’ (p.27) 
Between the two extreme positions of ‘buying British’ and ‘Buying Foreign (American)’, 
Hartley (2011) explains that there is lots of middle ground, and at present roughly 70% of 
MoD procurement is spent in the UK (p.27).  The UK Defence Industrial Strategy (Ministry of 
Defence, 2005), was keenly aware of these issues: 
‘Companies now have more choice than ever before about which markets to enter, 
which secure the best return for shareholders, and where to base their operations. If 
we do not make clear which industrial capabilities we need to have 
onshore…industry will make independent decisions and indigenous capability which 
is required to maintain our national security may disappear. Equally, we do not seek 
to restrict the scope for international cooperation and competition where this is 
appropriate, and we cannot afford to maintain a complete cradle-to-grave industrial 
base in all areas.’ (p.6) 
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Indeed, even the US with its dominance in global defence spending has to ask questions of 
whether it can or should try and maintain the capability to do everything alone.  Markusen & 
Costigan (1999) confirm that: 
‘fortress America is no longer an option. American-designed arms will be bought and 
used by more nations in the future, and we may rely heavily on foreign suppliers for 
components if not whole weapons systems.  Our leaders have no alternative but to 
explore with our allies international agreements and machinery to streamline the 
defence industrial base, share its output, and control access globally’. (p.6) 
Gansler (2011) confirms that at present, autarchy (defence as a closed domestic economic 
system) is a false perception for the US defence industry:  
‘every weapon system built in the United States contains foreign parts, and many are 
based on foreign designs.  This trend is growing as a result of globalization of both 
technology and industry’. (p.17) 
Defence departments are clearly conscious of providing work for the private sector in order 
to maintain domestic capability in certain areas, and thus there is inevitably substantial 
overlap between the private sector and national defence departments in relation to defence 
activities.  However, as well as this desire to maintain domestic capability, there is also more 
recently an economic necessity to further engaging the private sector related to ‘defence 
austerity’. 
This has been a key focus of most recent literature since the global financial crisis in 2008 
and emphasises the links between economic security and national security9 as the 
foundation for another period of significant defence reform10.  The reality of this for defence 
departments in the US and Europe is increasingly squeezed defence budgets, and many 
commentators emphasise the need for this to be managed intelligently and cognisant of 
broader strategic objectives, as opposed to simply muddling through with lower defence 
budgets11. 
One area that is central to defence reform relates to acquisition and the defence 
departments’ increasing interactions with the private sector. 
                                                
9 Gansler (2011) explains how ‘a strong US economy is needed to pay for the full range of 21st 
century security needs…the clear challenge is how to achieve an effective 21st century national 
security posture within an affordable budget’ (p.2). The UK National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 
2010a) acknowledges this: ‘We cannot have effective foreign policy or strong defence without a sound 
economy and a sound fiscal position to support them’ (p.14).  The US National Security Strategy 
makes the same point (White House, 2010): ‘At the center of our efforts is a commitment to renew our 
economy, which serves as the wellspring of American power’ (p.2). See also Sharp (2011) and 
Berteau (2011). 
10 See Ministry of Defence (2011), Gray (2009), and Dunn et al (2011) for some useful documents on 
‘Defence Reform’ in the UK context 
11 Various think tanks have produced papers critical of the mismatch of strategic objectives and 
resources in defence, and highlighted that this is all the more crucial in a period of ‘defence austerity’ 
(See Cornish, 2010; Cornish & Dorman, 2011). The UK 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(Cabinet Office, 2010b) highlighted this as a longstanding issue in UK defence 
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Hartley (2011) provides a useful summary of defence acquisition in the UK context, and 
Gansler (2011) provides a similar overview in the US context12.  Since the post-cold war 
contraction in defence budgets, the proportion of acquisition spend related to services has 
been growing in both the UK and US contexts, and this has to some extent changed the 
nature of the tasks performed for defence departments by the private sector.  Equipment 
expenditure accounts for around 40% of UK defence spending, with the remainder of the 
acquisition budget spent on services (Hartley, 2011: p.95), and the proportion is very similar 
in the US, where 60% of the 2009 defence procurement budget was spent on services 
(Gansler, 2011: p.46).  As defence budgets shrank, priorities shifted to maintaining existing 
equipment, and ‘in response, industry shifted much of its focus from production of weapons 
to support, upgrades, and services’ (Gansler, 2011: p.31).  These trends were very much 
encouraged by the Defence Departments who were keen to encourage provision of services 
and partnering arrangements with industry (Ministry of Defence, 2005). 
As the emphasis of defence acquisition has shifted towards services, the role of the private 
sector has become increasingly important, with many previously ‘military’ tasks being 
outsourced to the private sector.  Hartley (2011) provides some historical context in relation 
to these trends in the UK: 
‘military outsourcing has been a major feature of the UK’s efficiency programme 
since 1983…in-house units in the armed forces can be regarded as public 
monopolies protected from competition.  Examples include the armed forces training 
personnel and repairing equipment…competitive tendering, market testing and 
contracting-out were viewed as the solution to assessing the efficiency of ‘in-house’ 
public monopolies’ (p.20) 
By outsourcing some of these services, defence departments have introduced competition to 
previously protected in-house activities, and Hartley (2011) describes how this process has 
been widely regarded as a success. 
Despite the successes, several authors believe that further military outsourcing to the private 
sector is possible, and is likely to become increasingly desirable in this next period of 
defence reform since the financial crisis.  In the UK, Hartley (2011) describes how: 
‘despite the substantial progress which MOD has made in introducing and extending 
competition through the contracting-out and outsourcing of services and through 
equipment procurement policy, major barriers exist to further efficiency improvements 
in these areas… examples of services which have been subject to competition from 
private contractors include catering, cleaning, grounds maintenance, security 
guarding, managing and manning facilities, and equipment maintenance.  
                                                
12 The MoD is British industry’s largest single customer. Hartley (2011) explains that in 2009 the UK 
MoD spent around £20 billion on all acquisitions, contracting with some 29,000 suppliers, although 
about 40% of this figure was spent with 10 companies (p.95). The situation is similar in the US, 
although of a scale of magnitude larger.  Gansler (2011) describes how in 2006, DoD processed 
around 3.6 million procurement actions for $285 billion, and over 80% of these were with a few very 
large firms (Gansler p172-3). Gansler also provides a detailed account of the defence acquisition 
process (p158-192), but notes that whole books have been written on separate stages of it. The 
process is marked by complexity, efforts to introduce competition and efficiency where possible, and 
shifting power dynamics between the defence department (as a monsopony buyer), and the few 
potential large company suppliers that can provide the relevant products or services. 
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Opportunities exist for a major extension of the policy in repair and maintenance 
work, air, land and sea transport, air traffic control, search and rescue, and training 
functions.’ (p.26) 
Similarly, in the US context, Gansler (2011) notes that ‘for almost exclusively political and 
historical reasons…a large portion of the defence industrial base has been maintained in the 
public sector’ (p.143).   
UK Defence Reform proposals have been keen to maximise future military outsourcing.  The 
UK Defence Reform Unit (DRU) restructured aspects of the MoD in part to allow the private 
sector to play a greater role in the organisation13, and for Lord Levene (Chair of the DRU), 
the ‘support’ role of the defence industry in the UK can go far beyond upgrade and 
maintenance: 
‘on support, there is the potential to build on the trend over the last decade and move 
towards the greater involvement of industry in supporting military capabilities both at 
home and on operations and new models for contracting… [there is] scope for a 
more fluid and flexible mix of military, contractor and civilian staff in support roles and 
for integrated bases on which a range of functions are brought together to realise 
efficiencies.’ (Ministry of Defence, 2011a: p.52)  
As can be seen from the discussion in this section, the challenge of allocating emissions 
between defence departments and defence companies (see 2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their 
Limitations’) is likely to be particularly marked in the modern defence context, characterised 
by significant interaction between the defence departments and the private sector.   
Section 2.1.2 (‘OCAs and their Limitations’) summarised some of the challenges that 
organisations have had in determining organisational boundaries using the GHG Protocol’s 
‘Operational Control’ method, with the guidance in the standard open to wide interpretation: 
‘A company has operational control over an operation if the former or one of its 
subsidiaries has the full authority to introduce and implement its operating policies at 
the operation…It is expected that except in very rare circumstances, if the company 
or one of its subsidiaries is the operator of a facility, it will have the full authority to 
introduce and implement its operating policies and thus has operational 
control…Under the operational control approach, a company accounts for 100% of 
emissions from operations over which it or one of its subsidiaries has operational 
control.’ (WRI, 2004, p.18) 
The statement above is likely to be very difficult to apply to large defence sites, with many 
organisations involved in the various activities taking place on them.  The researcher was 
based for a significant part of this study on Portsmouth Naval Base, which is the largest 
energy user in the MoD estate and illustrates some of the challenges.  The site occupies a 
large part of the city of Portsmouth.  It is owned by the MoD but BAE Systems maintain a lot 
of the static infrastructure, as well as servicing the surface fleet of ships, which the company 
maintains and repairs.  There are also numerous other companies working on the base day-
in, day-out.  Determining who ‘has the full authority to introduce and implement its operating 
                                                
13 For example, by creating some large ‘shared services centres’ within the MoD, such as Defence 
Business Services (DBS), and the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) 
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policies at the operation’ is not straightforward, and may vary according to the activity in 
question.  Similarly, BAE Systems support the operations of numerous other large defence 
sites across all domains (land, air, sea) in the UK, US, Australia and Saudi Arabia, and are 
likewise involved in temporary ‘deployed’ defence sites.  In all these cases, the operating 
policies for particular activities will differ.  Scenarios also arise where high-level policies 
established by one organisation can refer to more detailed policies that are maintained by 
sub-contractors. Therefore, at complex defence sites, there are likely to be many policies 
relevant to different operations, and maintained by different organisations.  This inevitably 
results in a variety of stakeholders that cross organisational boundaries having some degree 
of influence.   
Even at sites that ought to be more straightforward, where BAE Systems either own or lease 
them on a long-term basis, determining the extent of the company’s ‘operational control’ can 
be complex.  The researcher undertook a survey of the twenty BAE Systems sites that 
produced the highest volumes of GHGs (accounting for ~70% of the organisational Scope 1 
& 2 emissions) in order to determine the extent of ‘operational control’ at each14.  Table 3 in 
Appendix A shows the results, and confirms the complexity of control arrangements in that 
only 11 of the 20 sites could clearly say they were 100% in control of the facility. 
Even if it were simple to determine which party controlled relevant activities, it is very unlikely 
that measurement infrastructure (whether utility meters, of various types and reliability 
across static infrastructure; or measurement devices associated with mobile vehicles) would 
neatly align to these distinctions, especially at large, often very old defence sites. 
The next section explains the increasing number of collaborative programmes in the defence 
sector, often involving multiple defence departments or companies.  This is partly the result 
of the economic necessities described above, but also the operational need for allied 
countries to increasingly work together in a complex, globalised threat environment.  Whilst 
traditional OCA practices are difficult to apply to complex defence sites and activities, the 
type of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts discussed in section 2.1.3 have the potential to 
better align with contemporary trends in the defence sector. 
  
                                                
14 The survey asked some simple prompting questions as follows, and then asked responding sites to 
then estimate on a scale of 0-100% the extent of Operational Control they had: Do BAE Systems own 
(or long term rent) the entire site?; Do BAE Systems control the capital expenditure for the site?; Do 
BAE Systems control the maintenance budget for the site?; Do BAE Systems occupy the whole site?; 
How much influence does BAE Systems have on the operating profile?; Do BAE Systems get the 
benefit of reducing energy, water and waste usage?; Do BAE Systems process the utility bills for the 
site? 
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2.2.3 International Collaborative Programmes and Industrial Teaming 
 
In discussing globalisation, Diehl and Frederking (2010) describe contemporary governance 
and security interdependence in the modern world: 
‘the most important issues in world politics today – poverty, terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, disease, regional conflict, economic stability, climate change, and many 
others – cannot be solved without multi-lateral co-operation. World politics is 
characterized by “security interdependence”: no one state, not even the most 
powerful state, can manage these problems alone.’ (p.1) 
The security strategies of the UK and US acknowledge the need for a multi-lateral approach 
and both stress the need for ‘collective security’ (Cabinet Office, 2010a; White House, 2010). 
Therefore, as well as the economic realities driving increased integration in the defence 
sector between defence departments and defence companies, there are also operational 
necessities driving the same trend.  Allies are responding to a globalised threat environment 
with an increasing number of joint operations that are addressing complex ‘wars amongst 
people’.  In this defence industrial context, having inter-operable equipment becomes 
increasingly important. 
It is worth noting that the standardisation of defence equipment and the preference for 
national defence industrial capabilities are strongly linked issues, as Hartley (2011) explains: 
‘nations purchasing defence equipment [can choose between] … the extremes of 
complete independence (nationalism) and buying everything from overseas…clearly, 
the more nation’s buy each other’s equipment, the greater the extent of 
standardisation: hence national independence is a major barrier to equipment 
standardisation’ (p.127) 
The standardisation of defence equipment has been of particularly concern to NATO, both 
for economic and operational reasons, as the same author explains: 
‘NATO is often criticised for being an inefficient organisation both in providing armed 
forces and supplying defence equipment.  The allies are criticised for failing to agree 
on common tactics, common training and common weapons, with adverse effects on 
NATO’s military effectiveness and an associated waste of resources.  The estimates 
of wasted resources appear staggering…by failing to standardise, NATO is 
apparently incurring substantial economic and military penalties’ (p.116-117) 
Defence products, with fixed R&D and development costs, benefit enormously from 
economies of scale.  Large numbers of orders and longer production runs also allow learning 
in the manufacturing phase to be exploited.  Hartley (2011) shows the higher costs of 
European combat aircraft when compared to their US equivalents as a result of their smaller 
numbers of orders.  He argues that if the aircraft used by NATO allies were standardised, 
the unit costs associated with the aircraft could be significantly reduced, and inter-operability 
between the allies enhanced. 
These challenges are best illustrated in the European context, and the same arguments 
above in relation to NATO (the economic and operational benefits of standardising) apply to 
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the main defence industrial nations in the European Union.  In fact, NATO’s standardisation 
challenges are essentially defined by Europe’s standardisation challenges (Hartley, 2011). 
Much has been written about the EU’s defence integration challenges, by the European 
institutions (European Commission, 2001; 2007; European Parliament, 2016), as well as 
some of the defence enterprise think tanks mentioned above (e.g. Kiss, 2014) and by wider 
academic texts (Britz, 2008; Kurowska & Breuer, 2011; Howorth, 2007). 
As with the allegations of inefficiency and waste in relation to the NATO countries as regards 
defence spending, the same has been levelled particularly at the countries of the European 
Union.  Within the context of increasing political integration over the last 50 years, the 
opportunity to integrate around defence has been argued for by many.  
Hartley (2011) explains the scale of European defence inefficiency by comparison to the US: 
‘the USA has a competitive advantage through its large home market compared with 
the large number of small scale national defence markets in Europe.  Critics point to 
massive inefficiencies in Europe’ (p.131) 
‘the EU is characterised by fragmented defence markets and defence industries with 
each member state protecting its national defence industry… national independence 
is preferred for reasons of security of supply, access to information, jobs and 
technology with member states unwilling to accept mutual dependence.  The result is 
duplication of costly weapons programmes with the development of 89 different 
weapons projects in the EU compared with only 27 in the USA’ (p.132) 
The author elaborates on the inefficiencies, complaining that ‘there is massive duplication of 
defence ministries, procurement agencies, armed forces, training, infrastructure and military 
bases’ (p.133), as well as describing how European defence markets are characterised by 
duplication of costly R&D programmes.  He compares the major European programmes 
related to the land and sea domains (11 types of naval frigate, 16 national programmes for 
infantry vehicles) to the US where there is one naval frigate, one main battle tank, and three 
types of infantry fighting vehicles.  This duplication ‘results in small scale production for 
national markets’, where the opportunity for learning in the manufacturing phase is 
diminished (p.133). 
Whether in the NATO or European context, the question remains unanswered as to why this 
potential ‘pot of gold’ in economic efficiency (alongside the attendant benefits of increasingly 
inter-operable equipment) has not been realised.  Lovering (1999) suggests that it may be 
because the customers simply don’t want it to happen, contrasting some of the cultural mind-
sets of defence industries across Germany, France and the UK. 
However, some specific policy issues can be identified, such as the caveats around EU 
single market rules that apply to defence.  Article 296 allows member states to exempt 
defence contracts from single market rules.  Markusen & Costigan (1999) highlighted this 
issue in the late 90s, commenting how: 
‘defence sectors are exempt from the integrative processes and market discipline 
imposed on other industries.  Even on the security front, tensions over sovereignty 
are far from resolved, and domestic regime changes can sabotage progress.  In the 
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defence sector, a preference for creating and defending national champion firms 
places roadblocks on the path to an efficient, integrated European military industrial 
complex.’ (p.25-26) 
In the late 90s, Lovering (1999) raised the prospect that disarray in the European market 
might result in transatlantic mergers instead, and this prediction has proved prescient with 
BAE Systems aggressively acquiring US defence businesses in the early 2000s, whilst a 
more recent proposed merger with EADS (now Airbus) was blocked by the relevant political 
forces in Europe. 
Indeed, industrial activity has arguably driven some of the trends towards integration as 
much as political activity at governmental level.  With NATO and European defence 
integration proving intractable challenges for the western industrial powers, one seemingly 
obvious solution has presented itself over the past 20 years in relation to international 
collaborative projects and industrial teaming.  These projects can involve multiple defence 
departments and/or multiple defence firms joining together around a specific project in order 
to create a better product at lower cost.  The rationales are fairly clear, with joint projects 
allowing partners to share the costs and risks of developing high-tech equipment, and 
achieve economies of scale in production runs (and the associated learning benefits of 
longer production runs). 
Hartley (2011) explains how teaming has certainly proved an attractive proposition in the 
European context: 
‘Europe’s high technology defence industries are frequently criticised for the wasteful 
duplication of costly R&D programmes and for relatively short production runs 
reflecting dependence on a small domestic market. International collaboration 
between EU states is often presented as the ideal solution.’ (p.169) 
There are now many such examples in the European context, perhaps most notable among 
these being the Eurofighter Typhoon programme, where the UK, Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain formed a multinational collaboration to develop a new multi-role fighter aircraft in the 
early 1980s (France subsequently exited the collaboration).  It is manufactured by a 
consortium including BAE Systems, Airbus, and Alenia Aermacchi. 
Gansler (2011) explains that the concept has also made sense in the US defence industrial 
context: 
‘because fewer and fewer new defence programs were being initiated during [the] 
downturn, the small number of remaining firms in a given sector often attempted to 
team to ensure they would get at least part of each program.’ (p.38)  
The author provides an example where US defence industrial firms had successfully joined 
together to present the US Navy with a ‘dream team’ of Lockheed Martin, Bath Ironworks, 
and Ingalls Shipbuilding to design and build its next Destroyer (Gansler, 2011, p.38).  
Gansler (2011) is a strong advocate of industrial teaming in the defence industry and also 
enthusiastic about international teaming between the US and European defence firms, as it 
presents an opportunity to increase competition, and therefore increase efficiency and 
reduce costs (p.63). 
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This type of ‘international industrial teaming’ is now becoming commonplace in the defence 
sector, with for example, BAE Systems providing key sub-systems for the international F-35 
programme (where Lockheed Martin are the prime contractor), and the work to develop the 
next generation of US trainer aircraft likely to be contested by a number of joint international 
teams, including one made up of BAE Systems (UK) and Northrop Grumman Corporation 
(US). 
Despite the clear dominance of these collaborative approaches to major defence projects, 
Hartley (2011) notes that ‘surprisingly, there is an absence of publicly available information 
on the magnitude of the benefits and cost savings from collaborative programmes.’ (p.169) 
As explained above, the rationales for collaborative programmes are clear, but they are not 
without problems and have attracted criticism, as Hartley (2011) summarises: 
‘the UK and Europe have substantial experience of collaborative projects, especially 
in both military and civil aerospace… international collaboration is dominated by 
myths, emotion and special pleading, often lacking independent economic analysis, 
critical evaluation and empirical evidence.  Supporters regard all collaboration as 
good and more desirable, regardless of costs.  Critics point to bureaucracy, 
compromises, delays in decision making and design by committees, leading to 
uncompetitive products, the loss of valuable technology to rivals and, ultimately, the 
loss of national independence.’ (p.168) 
The author articulates some of the key problems associated with collaborative programmes, 
including the difficulty of stopping the collaborative programmes once underway, and the 
tendency for work to be allocated between partner nations based on political and equity 
criteria as opposed to economic criteria of efficiency and competitiveness (p.171-2).  The 
costs of controlling the necessary institutional structures can be large, and even the 
anticipated design improvements by pooling scientific knowledge can be undermined by 
‘design by committee’ approaches (which also lead to delays).  On top of this are the 
difficulties associated with aligning production with varying national operational and 
replacement schedules, alongside the need to accommodate modifications at the national 
level.  With the increased volume of large collaborative programmes, Gansler (2011) 
describes how defence-industrial firms can be put in strange positions where they may be 
teaming with rivals on one project, and competing on another.  For all of these reasons, 
some authors contend that collaborative programmes between nations and/or defence 
industrial firms often don’t realise the benefits that one might expect from them, and Hartley 
(2011) provides a good case study of Typhoon in this context.   
However, as explained above, international collaborative approaches to major defence 
projects certainly seem to be the direction of future travel, and in a context of increased 
defence integration globally, ought to become increasingly efficient in delivering effective, 
more standardised defence products at reduced costs. 
The trends towards increased defence integration, both via international collaborations and 
industrial teaming are very significant for the second theme relevant to OCA that was 
explained in section 2.1.3; the relevance of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts for building up 
relevant ‘Scope 3’ inventories for organisations.  It is clear that this has particular relevance 
for the defence sector, which is characterised by relatively few large, collaborative 
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programmes, and Carbon Accounts of these would be very tangible and relevant for 
understanding the sector’s emissions profile. 
Section 2.1.3 made the point that developing these more relevant ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts may require an approach to OCA that is less inhibited by the technical 
complexities of attributing emissions between organisations and an acceptance that 
standardised, comparable accounts may not always be available.  One can see how this is 
particularly relevant to the defence industrial context, given the extent to which organisations 
across the defence sector are integrated and working together. 
The next section explains the increasing focus on ‘defence capability’ in the Defence 
Industrial Policy literature.  This builds on the discussion above of increasing collaboration, 
and explains the priority to understand the aggregated effect of increasingly inter-operable 
individual defence products, and joint/allied military operations in complex ‘wars amongst 
people’.  
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2.2.4 Concepts of Defence Capability 
 
To address an increasingly complex and globalised threat environment, in a period of 
defence reform characterised by diminishing economic resources, many authors have 
stressed the importance of understanding ‘defence capability’ from a system-level 
perspective.  Cornish (2010) explains how:  
‘Capabilities are much more than assets, they are the ‘interconnected people, 
knowledge, systems, tools and processes that establish a company’s right to win’. 
(p.22) 
The author stresses the need to move defence debates from second order questions in 
relation to specific items of equipment, to conversations about strategic outputs and 
capabilities: 
‘What is required is a shift in emphasis from defence ‘inputs’ – weapon systems, 
equipment and force postures – to strategic ‘outputs’ – the functions required to 
ensure national security and defence in a challenging and changing environment.’ 
(p.vii) 
Gansler (2011) explains how in the US context:  
‘by 2005, the Defense Science Board…observed that the defence industry’s 
independent research and development (R&D that is funded by the firms and not by 
the Department of Defense) was declining significantly; that resources needed to be 
shifted from weapons platforms (such as ships, planes, and tanks) to information and 
systems thinking’ (p.5).   
Hartley (2011) notes how the UK government has attempted to define defence output in 
terms of capability, setting the strategic ambition to be able to ‘undertake one large scale 
operation as part of an international alliance, or three small to medium scale operations’ 
(p.22).  However, the author confirms that the concept of ‘defence outputs’ in an economic 
sense, and by extension ‘defence capability’, are incredibly difficult concepts to define.  
When discussing declining force numbers in the UK, he confirms that: 
‘since 1990, there have been substantial reductions in the UK’s front-line forces; but 
published data do not allow any assessment of the effectiveness of these smaller 
forces and the impact on aggregate defence capability.’ (p.12) 
Despite the lack of any clear definition of defence ‘capability’, the concept is widely referred 
to, and most authors agree that the impact of technical changes on defence strategy can be 
very significant.  Hartley (2011) explains how: 
‘defence is a classic example of technical change and substitution effects.  Nuclear 
weapons have reduced the traditional military advantages of large concentrated land 
and naval forces; guided weapons, cruise missiles and inter-continental ballistic 
missiles have replaced some of the roles of fighter, strike, and bomber aircraft, 
artillery, anti-aircraft guns, battleships and cruisers; and jet transport aircraft which 
can fly out reinforcements quickly have meant that home bases have replaced many 
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overseas garrisons. These technical developments have been reflected in strategy’ 
(p.67) 
In this context, authors such as Cornish (2010) stress the need for the type of ‘joint enabling 
technologies’ being developed in the commercial world as crucial to maximising the ‘defence 
capability’ of existing assets, and calls for smaller conventional forces that are more agile 
and capable: 
‘Expensive ‘heavy metal’ weapon systems, often a Cold War legacy with little obvious 
relevance to 21st-century international security, can have a distorting effect on the 
function/cost value ratio… this ratio could be improved by investing in intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance and communications technologies; not as ‘force 
multipliers’ for a dwindling conventional force configured for a narrow range of 
contingencies, but as ‘output maximizing’ strategic assets that enable conventional 
forces to be put to better use.’ (p.vi) 
There is widespread recognition across the grey and academic literature of the increasing 
importance of rapidly developing commercial technology, and how this is key to enhancing 
defence capability in its wider sense. 
Interestingly, the debates in the 1990s had largely been characterised by debates about how 
the defence sector could most effectively ‘spin off’ technologies to the commercial sector, 
thereby justifying the enormous costs of defence to taxpayers via its wider economic 
benefits.  The relevant term in this paradigm case was ‘dual use’ technologies, and how best 
to encourage the development of these by defence firms in the post-Cold War period, whilst 
at the same time limiting proliferation of dangerous technology (e.g. Markusen & Costigan, 
1999).  These perspectives are indebted to relatively outmoded ‘technology push’ models of 
innovation, but nevertheless persist in some of the literature (e.g. Hambling, 2005). 
However, over the past twenty years, the increasingly rapid pace of commercial technology 
development arguably outpaced that in defence, ‘a trend that reversed what was typical 
during most of the 20th century’ (Gansler, 2011: p52-53).  As a result, more recent concerns 
have moved away from encouraging ‘spin offs’, and instead ensuring that defence 
technology is effectively integrating relevant commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies 
into its products, both for the economic and capability benefits they can bring. 
This is particularly the case in relation to ‘joint enabling technologies’, on which there is 
some specific defence-technological literature (Dombrowski & Gholz, 2006; Adams et al, 
2012).  The UK Defence Industrial Strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2005) recognised that 
Command, Control, Communication and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) technologies in particular require specific focus, 
as they are increasingly important to defence but their growth and development are not 
driven by the defence sector.  The US Quadrennial Defence Review recognised similar 
trends (Department of Defense, 2010a).  However, despite this recognition in key strategic 
documents in the UK and US, there is certainly a perception in the literature that defence is 
not effectively integrating COTS technologies, and using them to develop defence 
technology appropriate to the types of ‘new wars’ described above.   
Reasons given for this deficit are partly cultural and relate to institutional resistance to new 
products in defence and ‘cold war equipment’ mind-sets.  They are partly technical, with 
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Gansler (2011) explaining the increasing complexity of defence acquisition systems making 
it particularly unattractive to commercial firms15.  They are also a consequence of the 
increasing ‘defence dependence’ of the defence industrial base. 
Just as defence departments rely on their domestic defence industry to supply them with the 
equipment and capability, the defence industry relies on the defence department of its home 
country (and defence exports allowed by that home country) in order to sustain itself.  In this 
latter sense, defence companies can be characterised by different degrees of ‘defence 
dependence’.  Hartley (2011) defines ‘defence dependent companies’ as those where arms 
sales represent more than 70% of total sales, but this is not a clearly established threshold 
on which all authors and commentators agree.  In terms of the trends in the largest global 
defence companies, they are clearly becoming more ‘defence dependent’, in both the US 
and the European contexts. 
This increasingly specialised nature of the defence industrial base is of concern to the 
sector, given the increasingly rapid development of commercial technology, and its 
importance to defence products and enhancing their wider capability at the ‘system level’.  
Perversely, the inability of defence to acquire certain commercial technologies (whether for 
cultural, technical, or defence industrial reasons) and adjust its product portfolio can 
undermine military capabilities, just as they can be more easily available to adversaries not 
subject to the same mind-sets and procurement processes.  Many authors in the security 
studies literature note a ‘levelling’ of the playing field in defence technology, given the 
potential that commercial technology has to support the intentions of non-state actors.  
These concerns are echoed in the national security strategies of both the UK and US 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a; Department of Defense, 2010a). 
This section has explained how concepts of ‘defence capability’ are difficult to define, but are 
acknowledged as increasingly important in the context of rapidly emerging ‘joint enabling’ 
commercial technologies, and the increasing cost of defence products in an enduring period 
of budgetary pressure.  They emphasise the need to understand ‘defence capability’ at the 
system level and make appropriate decisions, as opposed to seeing it as a series of 
individual pieces of equipment. 
The debates are very relevant to the discussion of ‘consequential approaches’ to Carbon 
Accounting, which seek to similarly focus on decision making and positive change at the 
system level (see section 2.1.4).  One could argue that having some ‘joint enabling’ concepts 
and/or metrics that could aggregate the carbon impacts of individual defence products in 
order to determine the ‘system-level’ impacts of defence operations would enable effective 
decision making in the sector that could better accommodate lower-carbon approaches. 
The next part of this Literature Review explores the Innovation Studies literature in order to 
understand the implications for low carbon technology development that might result from 
OCA practices in the defence sector.  
                                                
15 Gansler (2011) explains that as commercial technology was becoming more advanced, defence 
procurement regulations were growing increasingly complex.  The result was that the defence market 
was becoming increasingly unattractive to the commercial firms that were producing some of these 
significant technological advances, both because of export control regulations (p76-77), and some of 
the cost accounting requirements and profit policies imposed by defence customers (p140-142). 
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2.3 Innovation Studies 
 
Section 2.1 of this chapter reviewed some key themes of the Organisational Carbon 
Accounting (OCA) literature, and section 2.2 grounded these themes in the contemporary 
trends relevant to the Defence Sector.  This section reviews the literature associated with 
Innovation Studies in order to explore the extent to which Carbon Accounting can encourage 
or inhibit innovation, and the implications for low carbon technology development in the 
Defence Sector. 
 
2.3.1 Historical Development of the ‘Innovation Studies’ Literature 
 
‘Innovation studies’ is a large and complex field that has grown in prominence over the last 
50-100 years.  As one would expect, is has an established academic literature, with a 
number of summary works that catalogue the historical development of the field and 
contemporary context (e.g. Fagerberg, Martin & Andersen, 2013a). 
The history of ‘innovation studies’ is entwined with developments in the defence sector, and 
some of the key early authors in the field (e.g. Kenneth Arrow, Richard Nelson, Sidney 
Winter) worked for the RAND Corporation as research consultants to the US military 
establishment (Hounshell, 2000).  The discipline originally had a focus on collecting 
information and statistics on R&D activities.  In the 1950s, it existed ‘towards the fringes of 
the academic world… drawing on existing disciplines, particularly economics and sociology’ 
(Fagerberg, Martin & Andersen, 2013b: p.3).  However, this began to change in the 1960s 
with the establishment of dedicated academic units focused on the study of science, 
Research & Development (R&D), and innovation.  Over the decades that followed, a lively 
and heterogeneous scientific field evolved drawing on methods, theories and knowledge 
from several disciplines.  This heterogeneity expanded the field from traditional ‘linear’ 
models of innovation to ‘a more ‘systemic’ understanding of innovation… which emphasised 
the complementarities between firms’ innovation activities and the characteristics of the 
environments (national, regional, sectoral) in which they are embedded’ (Fagerberg, Martin 
& Andersen, 2013b: p.4).   
However, a theme that seems to recur strongly across all reviews, and that holds particular 
relevance to this thesis is the contrast between the linear model and the systemic model of 
innovation. 
The linear model is most prevalent in the early ‘innovation studies’ literature, and particularly 
the period up to the 1970s.  Lundvall (2013) refers to this as the techno-economic 
perspective in his classification of the innovation literature, and describes this as a 
complementary perspective to other more recent models, but it is clearly most prevalent in 
the early years of the field.  The linear or techno-economic model has developed as the 
innovation studies literature has evolved.  Schumpeter (1942) was one of the most important 
authors in early innovation studies, and Lundvall (2013) explains his ‘technology push’ 
perspective on how innovation occurs: 
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‘Schumpeter assumed that the demand side does not play an active role in 
innovative change…he thought that it was the supply side that persuades consumers 
and users to adjust their prevailing routine behaviour.’ (p.39) 
These theories were challenged in the 1960s, with Schmookler (1966) taking the opposite 
view, as Lundvall (2013) summarises: 
‘[Schmookler] used a host of empirical data on inventions as well as secondary 
sources to demonstrate that inventions and innovations tend to flourish in areas 
where demand is strong and growing.  One important outcome of the ensuing debate 
was a new perspective on innovation as reflecting the interplay between technology-
push and demand-pull’ (p.39) 
This interplay between ‘technology push’ and ‘demand pull’ can also be described as the 
‘chain linked’ or ‘coupled’ model of innovation (Watson, 2009). 
However, alongside these developments in the 1970s and 1980s, Freeman (1988) and 
others were producing work that ‘gave strong emphasis to the role of networking and to the 
importance of organization of work…preparing the ground for the innovation system 
perspective’ (Lundvall, 2013: p.41). 
Lundvall (2013) comments that it is this ‘innovation systems’ perspective (or socio-economic 
perspective) that gets closest to a theoretical core of the contemporary innovation studies 
field: 
‘the closest we get to a core in innovation studies is the conceptualization of 
innovation as an interactive process involving many actors and extending over time. 
The focus of the analysis is upon individuals with heterogeneous skills or upon other 
organizations with heterogeneous capabilities that interact with one another.  They 
typically engage in information exchange, problem solving, and mutual learning as 
part of the process of innovation.  In the course of this, they establish ‘relationships’ 
that may be interpreted as forming organizations, networks, clusters, or even 
‘innovation systems’’ (p.33) 
The author describes how this ‘innovation systems’-perspective is central to all of the most 
recent ‘top-cited’ works in innovation studies, and therefore to some extent can be seen to 
have superseded the linear model, although they can also be seen as complementary 
models to use. 
In practice, this means that organisations wishing to innovate are more likely to be 
successful if they can successfully engage widely and specifically beyond the skills that exist 
within their own organisation or ‘firm’:  
‘in general, during the last few decades, the strongly firm-centric focus from the field’s 
early years has given way to a broader perspective that places more emphasis on 
the environment in which firms operate, in particular the innovation system(s) in 
which they are embedded…these insights have led to the development of ‘systems’ 
approaches that put interactions, between firms as well as between agents in the 
private and public centres, at the very centre of the analysis’ (Fagerberg, Martin & 
Andersen, 2013b: p.6-7) 
83 
 
This is also the context in which we hear references to ‘network society’, or ‘open 
innovation’, as Lundvall (2013) describes: 
‘flat organizations with extensive horizontal communication are more efficient than 
hierarchical organizations with barriers between functions…One can see references 
to ‘the network society’…and ‘open innovation’…as pointing to another important 
dimension of the learning economy.  In an era of growing complexity and rapid 
change, it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate all the necessary competencies 
inside the organisation.’ (p.52) 
The next section reflects on these different stages of development in the Innovation Studies 
literature, and uses them to characterise existing calls for the defence sector to engage in 
low carbon technology innovation. 
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2.3.2 Contextualising calls for the Defence Sector to Develop Low Carbon 
Technologies  
 
The development of the academic discipline of ‘innovation studies’ provides some useful 
context to the way that the defence sector is being characterised as an ‘technology 
innovator’ in climate change debates.  Most of these arguments can be related to earlier 
‘technology-push’ and ‘demand-pull’ models of innovation, and therefore are arguably not 
the most appropriate arguments for how the defence sector can support innovation in 
contemporary socio-economic models of innovation. 
From a ‘technology push’ perspective, the simple idea that defence could develop ‘game-
changing’ low carbon technologies through basic R&D for energy technologies would be 
challenging in the modern context described above where innovation is no longer assumed 
to take place within the ‘firm’, but rather as part of a broader ‘networked’ landscape.  To 
underline the significance of this point, defence R&D spending has been decreasing relative 
to the commercial sector for some time.  Hartley (2011) explains how the drive to 
standardise defence products explained in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial Policy’) inevitably 
reduces the emphasis on R&D, as defence firms seek to build on existing knowledge rather 
than reinvent.  Gansler (2011) explains how in the US context:  
‘by 2005, the Defense Science Board…observed that the defence industry’s 
independent research and development…was declining significantly’ (p.5) 
R&D spend within the defence departments themselves remained higher (particularly in the 
US, where defence department R&D is significantly higher than in Europe16), but Gansler 
(2011) shows how federal R&D has been rapidly outpaced by commercial R&D since the 
1990s (see Figure 4 below): 
 
 
Figure 4: Showing the R&D expenditures by funding sector, 1953 to 2007.  Commercial activity can be seen to 
gradually out-pace federal activity to become the major source of R&D spending. (Source: Gansler, 2011: p.257) 
                                                
16 Gansler (2011) suggests that ‘US R&D is typically three to four times as large as all of Europe 
combined’ (p.18) 
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Despite these trends, Defence R&D spending remains high (particularly in the US), and 
Gansler (2011) still expects technological ‘spin-offs’ from the sector, but the author 
encourages the majority of resources to be focused on avoiding technological surprises in an 
era of rapidly developing commercial technology.  Some commentators have noted the scale 
of commercial R&D going specifically towards energy technology, and the challenge that 
defence has of simply keeping up to date with this area of research, let alone shaping it 
(Stein, 2009). 
The second more popular, and possibly more relevant call for defence to engage in the 
development of energy technologies refers to the purchasing power that defence has to ‘pull 
through’ relevant emerging energy technologies and help support them in the period 
between demonstration and commercial deployment (‘demand pull’ models of innovation).  
These calls begin by providing some context on the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy to 
defence.  The US Defence Science Board (Department of Defense, 2008b) confirms that the 
military has a strong internal rationale to help support emerging energy technologies through 
‘demand pull’: 
‘If DoD were to invest in technologies that improved efficiency at a level 
commensurate with the value of those technologies to its forces and warfighting 
capability, it would probably become a technology incubator and provide mature 
technologies to the market place for industry to adopt for commercial purposes.’ 
(p.36)  
Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute has perhaps championed the issue of US DoD 
leadership on energy technology development through demand pull most fervently.  For 
Lovins (2010), DoD should act as:  
‘[A] Catalyst for leap-ahead fuel savings in the civilian sector, which uses more than 
50 times as much fuel as DOD. Valuing saved military fuel at FBCF [The Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel] will drive astonishing innovations that accelerate civilian 
vehicle efficiency, much as past military investment yielded the Internet, Global 
Positioning System, and jet-engine and microchip industries. Such efficiency 
leapfrogs in cars, trucks, and planes could wean the United States, ultimately the 
world, from dependence on oil—the biggest security win of all.’ (p.6) 
His calls have been repeated by a number of think tanks that recognise the mutual benefit of 
the military buying and using these emerging technologies (e.g. Posner, 2010).  A Deloitte 
study (2009) asserts that ‘the DoD will necessarily become a test bed for large-scale trials 
and validation for new alternative energies, due to the significant usage of fossil fuel energy 
requirements’ (p.27).  There are real institutional precedents in the US for this, with the 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) regarded as having been very 
successful in taking emerging technologies from the demonstration stage to successful 
commercial deployment (Watson, 2009).  
However, the question remains as to the extent to which ‘demand pull’ approaches in 
defence can incubate emerging energy technologies to the extent that they can compete 
commercially.  The DSB Task Force on Energy Security (Department of Defense, 2008b) 
concede that ‘the overall national outcome of changing DoD business processes to 
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accurately value efficiency is difficult to predict’ (p.36), and Posner (2010) raises similar 
questions:  
‘from an economic standpoint, it remains to be seen whether DOD’s buying power 
will be sufficient to bring renewable and alternative energy prices down to competitive 
levels in the U.S. marketplace absent policy action at the national level.’ (p.3) 
These uncertainties have particular resonance given the context of ‘defence austerity’ 
discussed in section 2.2 on Defence Industrial Policy.  
This research contends that an acknowledgement of the more complex, networked 
landscape for innovation described in the previous section would be welcome in these 
debates about defence’s role in developing low carbon technologies. 
Lehtonen and Kern (2009) describe how a useful perspective from which to analyse change 
in these types of broad ‘innovation systems’ is to base the discussion around ‘transitions to 
socio-technical regimes’.  The next sections introduce this concept and discusses the 
potential interaction with Carbon Accounting in the defence sector. 
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2.3.3 Transitions to Socio-Technical Regimes 
 
Lehtonen and Kern (2009) introduce the concept of Socio-Technical Transitions as a means 
to understand change at the ‘system-level’: 
‘A…useful perspective, which would identify the possibilities and obstacles to more 
fundamental system transformations, is to focus on transitions in ‘socio-technical 
regimes’. Analysis from this perspective can help to understand the dynamics, 
mechanisms and patterns through which transitions come about, instead of seeing 
change as a function of supply and demand structures and individual responses to 
market incentives.’ (p.104)  
The authors discuss the energy system as a ‘socio-technical regime’ in this context: 
‘The ‘socio technical energy regime’ consists of a set of technologies embedded in a 
social, political and institutional context, with its associated regime-specific set of 
rules, procedures, habits and practices…Together these aligned elements of the 
regime provide services such as electricity or heat, but also have undesired 
consequences such as GHG emissions.’ (p.104) 
No doubt a similar description could be derived for the ‘defence enterprise’, which similarly 
will have a ‘regime-specific set of rules, procedures, habits and practices’.  These ‘rules, 
procedures, habits and practices’ are not fixed but are seen to ‘evolve’, as Scrase & 
MacKerron (2009) describe in relation to the ‘evolution’ of the automobile industry: 
‘private and often non-commercial organisations emerged to facilitate, and to lobby 
for, expansion of private automobile use.  Organisations were formed to train auto 
engineers, and academic disciplines and departments created to provide higher-level 
technical know-how.  Unions, users’ clubs and journalists all joined a ‘large, self-
sustaining network of like-minded professionals and institutions that are invaluable to 
the growth of the system’…This creates a political constituency for further growth of 
road transport.  Meanwhile societies co-evolve with technologies, and social norms, 
behaviour and even settlement patterns adapt such that people depend on (and 
therefore naturally have a preference for) car ownership and private transport.’ (p.94) 
However, directing the ‘evolution’ of these ‘socio-technical regimes’ (for example, to 
encourage the adoption of low carbon technologies within them) is not straightforward.  The 
energy system in particular is seen as a ‘socio-technical regime’ that is fairly resistant to 
change, as Woodman & Baker (2008) describe: 
‘As the UK’s energy systems became increasingly centralised from the 1950s 
onwards, technical approaches to network design and operation, embodied in 
various engineering standards and codes, were developed to reflect the 
characteristics of centralised generation. Following privatisation, the energy system 
also influenced the way in which electricity markets were designed to reward large-
scale, flexible and predictable generation, and the design of regulations to govern the 
financial operations of monopoly network operators. In economic theory, these two 
trends can be seen as centralised generation becoming ‘locked in’ to the 
system…The technology gradually influenced the design of institutional and 
economic aspects of the system, and excluded other, increasingly less viable 
alternatives. The ‘increasing returns of adoption’ enjoyed by centralised plant acted 
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as a disincentive to invest in smaller projects, which became locked out by the 
economic, political, social and legal support for locked in, centralised generation.’ 
(p.2)  
This research has not uncovered a similar description of the ‘defence enterprise’ as a socio-
technical regime, but the development of defence acquisition process over a similar time 
period could likely be described in similar terms, particularly with respect to their acceptance 
of disruptive narratives in relation to their energy use, as Lovins (2010) describes in calling 
for strong leadership from DoD on the issue: 
‘Often the very technology that can provide the United States with a disruptive 
advantage is itself disruptive to DOD’s culture, and antibodies rapidly and reflexively 
form to reject it. Yet such disruptive concepts can be so clearly beneficial that 
masterful and resolute leadership breaks through hesitancy and resistance. This is 
the Department’s imperative today.’ (p.7) 
However, changing socio-technical regimes (for example, to better develop and 
accommodate low carbon technology) can be difficult due to the power acquired by 
incumbent actors in them, who are likely to favour an extension of the status quo17.  It goes 
beyond Lovins call above for ‘strong leadership’ alone, and Smith (2009) explains how 
existing power relations need to be acknowledged to understand transitions to socio-
technical regimes.  Smith (2009) argues (in relation to the energy system) how the authority 
and interests of incumbent actors can be challenged:  
‘When sufficient political will combines with public authority and widespread 
legitimacy, then powerful actors can be challenged, and resources redistributed 
toward other policy goals. Change comes about when the legitimacy of practices, 
often underpinned by powerful, economically, and technologically resourced actors, 
is widely called into question. Under such circumstances, the importance of the 
incumbents is no longer considered to outweigh the problems caused by their 
practices. New problems, like climate change, and new ideas, like sustainable energy 
systems, cast the ‘status quo’ in a troubling light. They throw open possibilities for 
change.’ (p.70-71)  
Gaining ‘sufficient legitimacy’ is complex however, and requires participation in the energy 
debates (or ‘defence energy debates’ in our context) to be widened beyond the incumbent 
actors; to other sectors, different companies, new institutions, or individuals. 
It is in the sense of ‘widening participation in order to gain sufficient legitimacy for change’ 
that Carbon Accounting is relevant to the prospects of changing socio-technical regimes.   
  
                                                
17 Scrase & MacKerron (2009) note in relation to the energy system how ‘market structures tend to 
favour incumbents, who will be well adapted to the existing energy system, with all its inevitably 
locked in characteristics’ (p.97)   
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2.3.4 Discourse Perspectives and the Link to OCA Practices in the Defence Sector 
 
Publicly reported OCAs – as the means by which information (quantitative and qualitative) is 
presented to both internal and external stakeholders – is fundamentally relevant to the topic 
of ‘widening participation’ in defence-energy debates.  It is the main information source 
available to these parties about defence sector organisations carbon impacts, and activities 
to mitigate climate change. 
Scrase & Ockwell (2009) discuss ‘discourse perspectives’ as particularly relevant to 
‘widening participation’ in the ‘socio-technical energy regime’, and the concepts are very 
relevant to the themes of this research.  Dryzek (1997) describes discourse as: 
‘a shared way of apprehending the world.  Embedded in language it enables 
subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories 
or accounts.  Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgements and contentions that 
provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements’ (p.8) 
Most public policy debates (whether Energy Policy, Carbon Policy, or Defence Industrial 
Policy) can be seen as ‘as a struggle for ‘discursive hegemony’ in which actors seek to 
achieve ‘discursive closure’ by securing support for their definition of reality’ (Scrase & 
Ockwell, 2009: p.41).  Whilst this is a very broad concept, the way in which carbon is 
accounted and reported in the defence sector clearly plays a part in determining this 
‘definition of reality’.  
Lengyel (2007) refers to similar academic literature relevant to the ‘myths by which 
organisations operate’, and notes the following in relation to DoD energy use: 
‘As an organization matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about 
how it operates. The organization continues to operate by the shared tacit 
assumptions that have worked in practice, and it is not unlikely that the espoused 
theories, the announced values of the organization come to be, to varying degrees, 
out of line with the actual assumptions that govern daily practice. In the case of DOD 
energy use, this assumption would be the assumption that energy is cheap, plentiful, 
and for someone else to worry about…Where these differences exist, scandal and 
myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change. Left to 
themselves, change will not occur until the consequences of the actual operating 
assumptions create a public and visible scandal that cannot be hidden, avoided, or 
denied.’ (p.34-35) 
Of course, better that change can be encouraged without the need for a public and visible 
scandal.  The themes of OCA most relevant to the defence sector that have been discussed 
in this chapter each relate to the way that defence sector Carbon Accounts are ‘presented’ to 
external stakeholders, and as such they form the basis for the ‘analysis, debates, 
agreements and disagreements’ that follow, and by extension the extent to which new 
companies, institutions or individuals participate in defence-energy debates.  They play a 
role in determining the ‘definition of reality’ that they cumulatively help create.  In this sense, 
this research is exploring how Carbon Accounting practices can best ‘frame’ defence-carbon 
problems and solutions in ways that favour low carbon technology innovation. 
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Scrase & Ockwell (2009) describe how the concept of ‘storylines’ is very relevant to the way 
that debates are framed.  These storylines can when established, rapidly evoke a whole 
discursive system and ‘frame’ debates that might support or undermine low carbon 
technology innovation: 
‘actors do not draw on a comprehensive discursive system, instead this is evoked 
through storylines. By uttering a specific word or phrase, for example, ‘global 
warming’, a whole storyline is in effect reinvoked; one that is subtly different, for 
example, to that of the ‘anthropogenic greenhouse gas effect’ or ‘climate change’.’ 
(p.41) …  
‘Storylines are therefore much more than simply ‘arguments’. The meanings and 
connotations of familiar storylines are often recognised at an almost subconscious 
level.  They can thus act to define policy problems while obscuring underpinning 
interests, values and beliefs. They can add credibility to the claims of certain groups 
and render those of other groups less credible.  They therefore act to create social 
order within a given domain by serving as devices through which actors are 
positioned and ideas defined and linked together.’ (p.41)  
Scrase and Ockwell (2009) discuss the nature of, and the need to, create new storylines in 
the UK – citing acid rain as one example that took over a decade to change the storyline:  
‘in this view, to shape policy, a new discourse must dominate in public and policy 
discussions, and penetrate the routines of policy practice through institutionalisation 
within laws, regulations and organisations. In terms of policy change then, promoting 
a new storyline is a difficult task, involving dismantling those promoted by those 
actors who were able to achieve prominence for their claims and viewpoint 
originally…and which may have become embedded in institutions.’ (p.42)  
In the defence context, we might expect that the task of establishing relevant storylines that 
support low carbon technology innovation is therefore made more difficult by existing OCA 
practices that do not easily relate to underlying emissions producing activities.  The fact that 
organisational GHG totals can in aggregate appear fairly abstract and opaque means that 
their potential to create relevant storylines is significantly undermined. 
Scrase & Ockwell (2009) discuss how ‘storylines’ and the discursive systems they evoke, 
can recruit a range of actors into ‘discourse coalitions’.  The following quote stresses the 
interpretative capacity of ‘storylines’, which means that various potential audiences can 
interpret them (or misinterpret them) at different levels: 
‘Institutional arrangements are important in structuring discourses, forming routine 
understandings. Complex research findings or logical arguments are often reduced to 
an eye-catching visual representation or memorable one-liners. These gloss over 
real complexities and uncertainties, and entail significant loss of meaning.  This 
allows considerable flexibility in interpretation, which helps recruit people with 
differing views into a ‘discourse coalition’.’ (p.41-42)  
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts certainly still have the potential for mis-interpretation, given 
the complexity of defence products, but regardless offer the potential to create much more 
compelling ‘storylines’ than existing OCAs that can seem far more abstract.  In this sense, 
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they have the potential to ‘recruit’ new and relevant actors into a ‘discourse coalition’ that 
can begin to challenge the status quo in relation to defence energy issues. 
Lehtonen & Kern (2009) describe how socio-technical systems can experience structural 
change as a result of interactions between different levels: 
‘The ‘landscape level’ encompasses factors beyond the control of individual actors, 
such as demographic developments, culture or external events (e.g. oil shocks). 
‘Niches’ are protected spaces where novel technologies, ideas or practices emerge, 
some of which can come to challenge the dominant regime… Structural change 
occurs over extended periods of time through interactions between these landscape- 
and regime-specific levels and niches’ (p.104)  
Thus, efforts to support the development of low carbon technologies from the perspective of 
an individual Carbon Account should be aware of these ‘niche’ and ‘landscape’-level 
interactions.  The ‘storylines’ at the ‘niche’ and ‘landscape’ level could become mutually 
reinforcing, in order to best support the creation of a supportive selection environment for 
low carbon technology.   
Reiterating the themes from 2.3.3 above (‘Transitions to Socio-Technical Regimes’), Watson 
(2004) explains how a ‘prevailing technological paradigm’ (or socio-technical regime as 
described above) ‘embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of technical change to 
pursue and neglect’ (p.1068) and introduces the concept of a ‘selection environment’ for 
individual technologies in this context.  Glynn (2002) applies the ‘network perspective’ also 
mentioned above to the ‘selection environment’ concept, explaining that: 
‘An alternative way of looking at the idea of the selection environment is from a 
network perspective.  Innovation becomes a ‘seamless web’ where the political, 
economic and technical cannot be separated…There is no distinction here between 
an internal and external environment; both are part of the same network and, hence, 
if an innovation is to be successful then the market has to be constructed just as 
much as the technology.’ (p.937) 
Glynn goes on to describe how important ‘negotiation’ is to network building, in this context: 
‘Negotiation lies at the heart of network building as actors attempt to define roles 
through translation into a particular network.  In attempting to translate users, i.e. 
getting them to adopt a particular technology, it can be argued that expectations play 
a crucial role.  In marketing an innovation firms will situate their product within a wider 
context. However, expectations are ambivalent as they express what can be a matter 
of fact (in the future), but what they express is not (yet) a matter of fact, and users 
are rarely faced with one view of the world. Hence, there is a need to examine how 
users interpret the context in which they are making selection decisions when they 
are faced by multiple networks and differing expectations regarding possible 
technologies.’ (p.937)  
Hughes (1983) sums up how the micro-selection environment for an individual technology 
needs to be seen in the context of the wider socio-technical regime, and therefore how 
crucial are the ‘niche’ and ‘landscape-level’ interactions emphasised in this section:  
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‘As cultural artefacts, [technologies] reflect the past as well as the present. 
Attempting to reform technology without systematically taking into account the 
shaping context and the intricacies of internal dynamics may well be futile. If only the 
technical components of systems are changed, they may snap back into their earlier 
shape like charged particles in a strong electromagnetic field. The field must be 
attended to: values may need to be changed, institutions reformed, or legislation 
recast.’ (p.465)  
Therefore, in order for Defence Sector Carbon Accounting practices to encourage low 
carbon technology innovation, they need to create relevant storylines in isolation (e.g. by 
developing relevant ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts), but these also need to interact with – 
and mutually reinforce – consequential carbon accounts relevant to the wider ‘landscape-
level’ and narratives around defence capability. 
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2.4 Summary of the Literature Review and Key Themes 
 
The introduction explained the exploratory, inductive approach to this research, as it is a field 
where the academic literature and professional practices are still evolving (see section 1.3 
‘The Research Approach’).  Just as this approach informs the research methods used that 
are described in the Methodology (3), it also informs the approach to the academic literature.  
Sector-level studies of Carbon Accounting are rare in the literature at present, and as such 
an exploratory approach has been applied that has reviewed three separate academic fields 
that are all relevant to this research. 
The first part of the Literature Review began by contextualising Organisational Carbon 
Accounting (OCA) specifically within the wider field of Carbon Accounting, that can be 
categorised over a number of reporting ‘scales’ (2.1.1).  Each of sections 2.1.2-2.1.4 then 
introduced a key theme of the OCA literature that is relevant to this research, and some 
associated maturity gaps in the existing literature and their potential consequences.  
Section 2.1.2 described the difficulty in attributing emissions to different organisations in a 
standardised way that retains relevance.  It introduced the GHG Protocol as the most 
commonly used standard for OCAs, which is open to wide interpretation in practice (WRI, 
2004). The literature notes the significant potential for variance in the ways that existing 
OCAs are produced (Morel & Cochran, 2016).  There is a drive to standardise approaches 
within specific sectors (e.g. IPIECA, 2003; IAEG, 2016) in ways that do not create significant 
barriers to entry for organisations wishing to produce OCAs.  Bellassen et al. (2016) identify 
‘cost vs uncertainty’ and ‘comparability vs relevance’ as two trade-offs that are common to all 
Carbon Accounting schemes, and suggest that as Carbon Accounts become more 
standardised or comparable (in a pragmatic and relatively low-cost way), they could also 
become less ‘relevant’ to the underlying organisational activities that produce the emissions. 
Section 2.1.3 described the potential of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts to make 
organisational reporting more meaningful.  Existing OCAs tend to be immature in terms of 
their reporting of scope 3 emissions and therefore the full carbon impact of an organisation 
across the value chain is rarely explained. Organisations tend to focus on certain categories 
of scope 3 reporting that are not the most relevant ones (CDP, 2013).  Some authors 
suggest that the scope 3 category of emissions is too broadly defined at present, and that a 
‘scope 4’ should be introduced to distinguish the aspects of scope 3 relevant to the product 
lifecycle (Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber (2008).  This concept is currently rare in the 
academic literature and receives very little take-up in practice.  Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) 
is very relevant to any ‘scope 4’ account, but the variability of LCA methodologies conflicts 
with the drive to standardisation in existing OCAs.  There is lots of interest in applying LCA 
and project level assessments to corporate footprints (Harangozo, Szechy & Zilahy (2015), 
but no companies are known to have used product footprints to devise company-wide results 
as yet (Gibassier, 2015).   
Section 2.1.4 introduced a third theme of the Carbon Accounting literature, explaining the 
usefulness of ‘consequential accounting’ perspectives for connecting OCAs to decision 
making and positive change at the system-level. Where ‘attributional methods [of Carbon 
Accounting] provide static inventories of emissions allocated or attributed to a defined scope 
of responsibility … consequential methods attempt to measure the system-wide change in 
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emissions that occurs as a result of a decision or action’ (Brander & Ascui, 2015, p.100).  
The distinction has emerged in the field of LCA and is little known in the field of OCA due to 
the dominance of attributional mindsets (Brander & Ascui, 2015).  The authors note its 
relevance for OCA however, given that organisational accounts can and do inform decision 
making. 
These three ‘themes’ of OCA that have been highlighted in the Literature Review’ recur 
through this thesis as a whole.  The summary above clarifies some existing gaps in the 
literature that will be explored throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
Whilst the focus of this research is Carbon Accounting, the second and third parts of this 
Literature Review summarised some essential supporting literatures to the investigation.  
The maturity of these literatures and their relevant gaps was of less interest than with the 
Carbon Accounting literature above.  Instead, they were reviewed for content linking to the 
themes described above for the Carbon Accounting literature, which can inform the research 
more broadly. 
The second part of the Literature Review provided a focused review of the Defence 
Industrial Policy literature, introducing the literature (2.2.1), and then functioning to connect 
the themes from the OCA discussion with some of the key trends that are relevant to the 
defence sector.  Section 2.2.2 explained how the challenge of attributing emissions to 
individual organisations is particularly marked in the defence sector due to the very close 
working relationships between defence departments and their supporting industrial base.  
Section 2.2.3 described how ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts would be particularly useful in 
the defence sector, as multiple organisations often collaborate and ‘team’ around large scale 
industrial programmes.   Section 2.2.4 explained the relevance of concepts of ‘defence 
capability’ to the debates concerning consequential approaches to Carbon Accounting, due 
to their mutual focus on understanding system-level impacts in order to make effective 
decisions. 
The third part of the Literature Review provided an overview of the Innovation Studies 
literature (2.3.1), and used this to characterise existing calls for the defence sector to 
develop low carbon technologies as being based on outdated models of innovation (2.3.2).  
It explained how contemporary innovation can be understood in the context of transitions to 
established ‘socio-technical’ regimes (2.3.3), and Carbon Accounting can play a discursive 
role in establishing coalitions that can challenge incumbent interests and the accepted status 
quo (2.3.4).  With reference to the themes described above, the review suggests that Carbon 
Accounting methods that are abstract in nature (such as existing OCAs) are unlikely to 
engage the most relevant organisations to the task of reducing GHGs, whereas ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts have the potential to better represent underlying emissions-
producing activities, and therefore would be more likely to recruit new/relevant actors to 
defence-energy debates and support the development of low carbon technologies in the 
sector.  Moreover, by connecting ‘strategic narratives’ around defence capability with OCAs 
that are informed by the type of ‘Project Level’ methodologies discussed above, it could be 
possible to construct a positive selection environment for low carbon technologies in the 
defence sector.  
The introduction summarised the relevance of an exploratory approach to this research (see 
1.3 ‘The Research Approach’), which applies throughout the thesis.  Just as this section has 
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described the broad interdisciplinary approach to the academic literature, the Methodology 
chapter (3) that follows explains how an exploratory interpretivist approach was applied to 
relevant sources of public information about GHGs and climate change that have been 
produced by a sample of defence sector organisations.  Section 1.3 (‘The Research 
Approach’) remarked on the speed at which real-world initiatives to govern climate change 
are emerging, creating a huge plethora of sites of enquiry, as all inevitably involve some 
element of Carbon Accounting.  This ‘tremendous diversity and dynamism’ (Bulkeley & 
Newell, 2010, p.114) in relation to the activities underway to mitigate climate change makes 
an exploratory archival research strategy highly appropriate for connecting the themes from 
the emerging academic literature above with the activities already underway in the defence 
sector, as evidenced by relevant public sources of information. 
The next chapter describes how the themes from this Literature Review have informed the 
design of the archival research strategy, and the relevant quantitative and qualitative 
methods used. 
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3) Methodology 
 
This research is the result of an Industrial CASE Studentship between the University of 
Central Lancashire (UCLan) and BAE Systems, one of the world’s largest aerospace, 
defence and security companies.  The research began in late 2010 and will complete on a 
part-time basis by January 2017. 
This Methodology chapter describes in detail the research approach taken.  Both the 
academic context for the research and the way in which it has been carried out has made an 
exploratory, inductive approach highly appropriate.  A flexible approach that allowed relevant 
patterns to emerge throughout the research made sense in a context where both the 
academic field and professional practice were still emerging. 
The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ section (1.4) established two objectives relevant to 
the Methodology chapter.   
The first was to understand the relevance of an exploratory archival research strategy for 
analysing Carbon Accounting and climate change information produced by defence sector 
organisations.  The exploratory, inductive approach to the research makes sense given that 
relatively little is currently known about the subject, but there are increasing quantities of 
public information being made available by organisations across the world.  
The exploratory, archival research strategy is also particularly relevant for analysing the 
three ‘themes’ established in the Literature Review. 
The first theme related to the difficulty allocating emissions between organisations in existing 
OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence sector due to close working 
relationships, and may result in abstract OCA that does not engage relevant actors to the 
task of reducing GHGs.  This theme clearly requires a detailed review of organisational 
documents across the defence enterprise in order to understand all relevant OCAs that exist 
in the sector at present, and will inevitably involve some element of quantitative analysis.  
However, qualitative datasets and analysis will also be required to understand levels of 
‘engagement’ with climate change mitigation in order to investigate this theme. 
The second theme discussed the potential for ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts, focused on 
large-scale collaborative programmes to better account for the emissions of the sector in a 
way that engages new/relevant actors to defence-energy debates, supporting low carbon 
innovation.  This necessitates a review of all relevant Scope 3 Carbon Accounts that exist in 
the sector at present, as well as gaining some understanding of the maturity of ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts in defence organisations. 
The third theme related to the potential for ‘consequential carbon accounting’ perspectives to 
align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, and inform wider strategic narratives that help 
construct a positive selection environment for low carbon technologies in the defence sector.  
This theme would benefit from a broad review of relevant grey literature across the defence 
enterprise in order to identify and understand any relevant concepts or metrics that might link 
to consequential carbon accounting approaches.  These might be primary data sources from 
the organisations included in the research or secondary data sources from think tanks and 
consultants active within the defence enterprise. 
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Taken together, all three themes present a clear need to conduct a broad review of relevant 
public documents available across the defence enterprise, and therefore an archival 
approach supports the core of the research strategy.  The research has reviewed both 
narrative and numerical information on energy use, GHGs and climate change mitigation 
across the UK MoD and US DoD, as well as the ten largest multinational defence 
companies, and relevant grey literature provided by think tanks and other organisations 
related to defence.   
The second objective for the Methodology from section 1.4 (‘Aims and Objectives of the 
Thesis’) was to apply the exploratory archival strategy, and the different parts of this section 
explain in detail how relevant primary and secondary sources of data have been identified 
and reviewed for quantitative and qualitative data.   
In terms of the structure of this Methodology chapter, the next section (3.1) provides a 
thorough overview of the research approach that has been applied with reference to the 
Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2015), which is a method of breaking down 
the different stages of a research strategy.  Section 3.1 summarises the broad research 
philosophy, approach and strategy, before subsequent sections focus on more detailed 
stages of the Research Onion.  It justifies the inductive approach taken within an 
interpretivist research philosophy, and reiterates the relevance of a strongly archival strategy 
to this research.  Section 3.2 describes how the sample was selected, and explains which 
defence sector organisations have been included in the research.  It explains how this 
sample covered a significant proportion of the defence sector by spend, and allows the 
analysis to extend across different regions and types of defence company.  Despite several 
complimentary strategies being used, the research is fundamentally underpinned by an 
archival strategy and section 3.3 describes how this was designed, with reference to the 
organisations included within the research sample.  It explains a rationale for selecting 
relevant public documents for the organisations in the sample, and a systematic approach to 
identifying these.  With a large selection of relevant documents selected, section 3.4 then 
describes how quantitative datasets were established for GHG and energy data, as well 
relevant normalising data.  Qualitative datasets were also established in relation to energy 
and climate change keywords used in the documents, and any public targets or ambitions 
being communicated by them.  Section 3.5 describes relevant secondary data sources that 
have been identified and used in the research.  These sources of defence-energy grey 
literature provide some additional context to the data identified in the primary sources from 
the organisations in the sample.  The summary in section 3.6 re-iterates some of the key 
aspects of the research philosophy and describes the suitability of the datasets established 
for the correlational analysis that follows in the Results chapter (4). 
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3.1 The Research Approach 
 
The research approach is described with reference to different layers of the Research Onion, 
as described by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2015).  This section focuses on the outer 
layers of the Research Onion, focusing on the research philosophy, approach, and strategy.  
Subsequent sections of the Methodology explain the more detailed stages of the research. 
Research philosophies are often grouped into two main ontological frameworks that can be 
broadly described as positivist or interpretivist.  Bryman (2012) summarises different 
descriptions for these opposing frameworks but explains how the underlying assumptions 
are broadly similar.  Where positivist approaches assume that reality exists independently of 
the thing being studied and is interpreted consistently, interpretivist approaches never 
presume that what is observed is interpreted in the same way between participants and it is 
their responses that create the inherent meaning of social phenomena. 
This research is situated on the interpretivist end of this spectrum.  It is clear from the 
Literature Review on Organisational Carbon Accounting (2.1) that methodologies are not 
standardised and allow significant interpretation, therefore numerous value judgements will 
be required by users in order to produce an OCA.  Perhaps more significant is the significant 
room for interpretation in relation to how these OCAs are used, and the literature on 
consequential carbon accounting perspectives (2.1.4) described how attributional carbon 
accounts can be used for purposes to which they are not suited, potentially generating 
unintended consequences.  It is the interpretative nature of OCAs that make the subject 
interesting and relevant in the defence context, and this research is concerned with how they 
can be made more useful so that more people engage positively in defence-climate change 
debates. 
The two ontological frameworks that help define the research philosophy have an impact on 
the research approach taken.  There are many ways to define a research approach and 
therefore no fixed rules, but positivist philosophies can align well to deductive approaches to 
research.  Deductive approaches develop hypotheses upon pre-existing theories and then 
formulate research approaches to test these.  In this context, scenarios where reality is 
assumed to exist independently of the thing being studied and consistently interpreted can 
be supportive.  In contrast, interpretivist philosophies can align well with inductive research 
approaches.  Inductive approaches assume that observations are the starting point for the 
researcher, and patterns are looked for in the data.  There is no framework or theory that 
initially informs the data collection and instead new theories and hypotheses can be 
generated after that data has been collected – or appropriate existing theories identified. 
It follows that this research uses an inductive research approach that aligns well with the 
interpretivist philosophy that defines it.   
An inductive research approach has made sense given the industrial nature of this research 
with significant opportunities for participatory learning, as well as the long length of time over 
which it has taken place within a field where both professional practice and academic 
analysis are still relatively immature and evolving.   
Inductive approaches are also supportive of mixed-method and multi-method approaches to 
establishing a dataset, and the latter approach (distinguished by the creation of separate 
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datasets rather than one consolidated dataset) has been essential to use in this research 
given that there are some limitations on the volumes of quantitative data available, and 
therefore all data (quantitative and qualitative) is relevant.  A wide exploration of both types 
of data is also relevant for avoiding bias, as certain organisations in the defence sector may 
favour quantitative information over qualitative, and within these categories certain indicators 
might provide contrasting results. 
Having understood the need for an inductive research approach within an interpretivist 
philosophy, there were several research strategies that were relevant.   
Grounded Theory is relevant to the research (Birks & Mills, 2015), and techniques commonly 
used in Grounded Theory do inform the way that documents have been analysed and 
datasets established.  For example, the ‘constant-comparative’ approach for reviewing 
documents for codified energy and climate change keywords.  However, the research could 
not be described as Grounded Theory is this implies a specific methodological approach 
where patterns are derived from the data as a precondition for the study, whereas the 
strategy used here has been more flexible than that and sought relevant theories and 
frameworks from the literature alongside analysing the data. 
Aspects of the research could be linked to ‘Action Research’ approaches (Bryman, 2012), 
given the unique ‘community of practice’ within which the research is located (defence), and 
the focus on finding a practical approach to a specific real-world problem (how OCA 
practices can support low carbon technology innovation).   
Similarly, ‘Ethnography’ (Bryman, 2012) inevitably has some impact on the research strategy 
in a part-time industrial PhD where the researcher is embedded within an organisation that is 
part of the study.  Close observation of people and their cultural interactions across the 
defence sector has been inevitable, and alongside this a necessary requirement to see 
things from their perspective.  There are some precedents in the literature for industrial PhDs 
that have been focused on GHGs and Climate Change (Gibassier, 2015), and there are a 
number of considerations relevant to the industrial researcher, as whilst it is an ideal 
environment for participatory learning and provides a more detailed contextual 
understanding of specific issues (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999), it can influence 
the independence and impartiality of the researcher, and associated findings can be 
subjective (Bluhm, Harman & Lee, 2011).  This raises issues of ethics and bias.  The issue 
of bias is discussed more fully in section 3.2 that discusses how the research sample was 
selected.  The issue of ethics is largely countered by the strongly ‘archival’ strategy that has 
been applied to this research, with the analysis founded upon information available in the 
public domain, and a common approach applied to each organisation in the sample (see 
section 3.3 on designing the archival research method). 
Indeed, despite the numerous research strategies above all having some relevance, it is the 
‘Archival Research Strategy’ that has been by far the most influential one to this research.  
Despite the evolving nature of the Carbon Accounting field, both professionally and 
academically, there is a sufficient volume of public information being produced by 
organisations across the defence enterprise that there was a clear benefit to reviewing this 
material in a focused and systematic way. 
100 
 
This section has described some of the key layers of the Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill, 2015) relevant to this research: namely the research philosophy, approach, and 
strategy.  Subsequent sections analyse different layers of the Research Onion, and the next 
one focuses on selecting an appropriate sample of organisations from the defence 
enterprise to include in the research. 
  
101 
 
3.2 Selecting an Appropriate Sample 
 
This section of the Methodology describes how an appropriate sample of defence sector 
organisations was selected for inclusion in the research.  Given the somewhat unique nature 
of the defence sector as explained in the Literature Review (see 2.2 on Defence Industrial 
Policy), the number of organisations available to research in relation to their Carbon 
Accounting practices is smaller than other sectors, and this trait has been exacerbated by 
the industrial consolidation that has occurred in the sector in the past 20-30 years.  This 
would arguably pose challenges to a highly deductive research approach that is wholly 
reliant on quantitative methods, but is suitable for the inductive research approach taken 
here and the multi-method approach to the data.  Therefore, the sample used in this 
research focuses on twelve specific institutions that have been selected because together 
they can be seen as being largely representative of a significant part of the defence sector.   
The Literature Review on ‘Defence Industrial Policy’ (2.2) explained the importance of 
understanding the defence enterprise as one complex entity.  It was clear therefore, that the 
research should include grey literature from both defence departments and the supporting 
defence companies.  However, as explained in section 2.2, the concept of the ‘defence 
enterprise’ can be applied at numerous scales, e.g. the ‘UK Defence Enterprise’; the 
‘European Defence Enterprise’; the ‘NATO Defence Enterprise’; the ‘Western Defence 
Enterprise’ etc.  Therefore, selecting a pragmatic boundary to the research became an 
important methodological choice. 
This research has reviewed both quantitative and qualitative information on energy use, 
GHGs and climate change mitigation across the UK MoD and US DoD, as well as the ten 
largest multinational defence companies, and relevant grey literature provided by think tanks 
and other organisations related to defence.  The organisations included in this research are 
therefore as follows: 
- The US Department of Defense 
- The UK Ministry of Defence 
- Lockheed Martin 
- Boeing 
- Raytheon 
- General Dynamics 
- Northrop Grumman 
- United Technologies 
- BAE Systems 
- Airbus 
- Finmeccanica 
- Thales 
The selection of these organisations has elements of ‘convenience sampling’.  The decision 
to include defence departments from English-speaking countries only has made the archival 
research strategy easier to applier for an English-speaking researcher.  Similarly, the use of 
large multi-national organisations is convenient for their active distribution of climate change 
information in mandatory and voluntary public reporting, that also aligns well with an archival 
research strategy.  Smaller defence sector organisations are subject to fewer drivers to 
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report climate change information and therefore would not align as effectively with an 
archival research strategy. 
The use of ‘convenience sampling’ in this way does introduce elements of bias and raises 
questions as to whether the findings can be generalised across the defence sector as a 
whole.  The remainder of this section provides an overview of the contemporary defence 
sector in order to demonstrate that the organisations selected are representative of a 
significant proportion of the sector as a whole.  It is split into two further sub-sections.  The 
first (3.2.1) provides some helpful context by summarising some key trends in global defence 
spending, both within and between countries, and with specific companies.  The second sub-
section (3.2.2) then defends the rationale for a ‘convenience sample’ that includes the UK 
MoD and US DoD, and the ten largest multinational defence companies, headquartered 
across the US and Europe, arguing that these organisations are representative of the wider 
defence sector. 
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3.2.1 Context: Key Trends in Global Defence Spending 
 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) publish useful annual 
datasets that summarise trends in defence spending globally, both within countries, between 
countries, and with specific companies (e.g. SIPRI, 2011).  Table 4 in Appendix A is taken 
from SIPRI’s 2011 Yearbook Summary (SIPRI, 2011) and shows the top 10 defence 
spending countries, their budgets and their share of the total spending worldwide by 
governments on defence. These top 10 defence spending countries represent over 75% of 
the total worldwide defence spending (SIPRI, 2011), and the table underlines the clear 
dominance of the US in global defence spending.  This military spending data is often 
communicated in relation to a country’s GDP, or in more sophisticated summaries by their 
level of ‘militarisation’, as published by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC – 
see e.g. BICC, 2009). 
SIPRI also provide annual updates on arms sales between countries – or Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS), which underline the global nature of defence markets.  Gansler (2011) 
provides a useful summary of this data between 1981 and 2005, which is reproduced in 
Table 5 in Appendix A. 
As we might expect, the US is clearly the leader in defence exports, with by the largest 
domestic industrial base.  However, all countries with established defence industries are 
keen to export, with Gansler (2011) confirming that there are proportionally higher levels of 
FMS in the EU context than the US.  Other trends show that where US FMS were mainly to 
European allies in the 1980s, the proportion exported to Middle East and Asian countries 
has steadily increased.  The nature of these sales has also changed, from simply buying 
military products, to buying associated services, and more recently recipient countries are 
paying to develop the products further themselves (Gansler, 2011). 
In terms of the relatively small numbers of consolidated companies that make up this global 
‘defence industrial base’, SIPRI also provide annual updates.  Table 6 in Appendix A shows 
sales and profit data for the top 10 global defence companies in 2013, as published in 
SIPRI’s 2015 Yearbook Summary (SIPRI, 2015).  The overwhelming influence of the US is 
very clear, occupying 6 of the 10 places (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman, General Dynamics, United Technologies).  The other four companies are all 
Europe-based (BAE Systems, Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales).   
Despite the locations of the defence companies articulated in the table above the reality is 
actually much more complex and again underlines the global nature of the industry.  All of 
these companies operate as publicly traded multinational companies with international 
investors.  Gansler (2011) mentions BAE Systems in this context, commenting how:  
‘even though BAE’s headquarters was located in London, the company had a large 
percentage of its employees in the United States, and at any given point, a majority 
of its stockholders could be US citizens’ (p.42) 
However, FMS are tightly regulated by host countries, and governments have ‘golden 
shares’ that allow them to dictate any significant changes in organisational structures.  The 
companies themselves all tend to prioritise FMS, and have various percentages of 
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‘international sales’, as shown in Table 7 in Appendix A, which is derived from the annual 
reports of the ‘top 10’ defence companies listed above. 
The defence firms are obviously keen to export, arguing that it reduces costs for host 
countries and maintains domestic skills and industrial advantage, but FMS represent 
complex foreign policy decisions for host governments.  Gansler (2011) describes the 
advantages and disadvantages of FMS, and these competing concerns need to be weighed 
carefully18. 
Perhaps the other key indicator published regularly by SIPRI in relation to defence 
companies relates to their ‘defence dependence’, which is derived by comparing their 
volumes of defence and civilian sector sales.  Table 8 in Appendix A shows the percentage 
defence sales of the ten largest defence companies globally that were mentioned above. 
Gansler (2011) and Hartley (2011) provide useful summaries of the trends towards 
increasing ‘defence dependence’ of the world’s largest defence firms in both the US and 
European context respectively.  The variety of ‘defence dependence’ values across the top 
10 defence companies above prompt interesting questions as to how similar they are in 
practice.  For example, Boeing and Airbus, with their large civil aircraft businesses, are 
clearly quite different companies to more defence-focused peers such as Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems.  In reality, the former type of companies are often 
split quite explicitly into defence and non-defence entities, given the regulatory mechanisms 
required by the modern defence acquisition process. 
 
  
                                                
18 Advantages include: strengthening the domestic industrial base; providing political support to allies; 
balancing military capability in a region; preventing countries from aligning with others. Disadvantages 
include: weapons could be used against the country selling them; third country transfers can occur 
and contribute to proliferation; they can be supporting politically less desirable nations; they can 
contribute to regional ‘arms races’ 
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3.2.2 Is the Sample Representative? 
 
As explained above, the organisations included in this research were partly selected for their 
‘convenience’, given the availability of sufficient volumes of English-language material that 
could support a strongly archival research strategy. 
The use of ‘convenience sampling’ does introduce elements of bias and raises questions as 
to whether the findings can be generalised across the defence sector as a whole.   
However, as can be seen in the SIPRI data above, the use of the US DoD and UK MoD 
means that the first and third largest defence spenders globally are included, representing 
around 47% of total global defence spending. 
As regards the large defence multinationals, the inclusion of the top 10 defence 
multinationals meant that both US and European defence industrial bases were included 
(with 7 of these companies headquarted in the US, and three in Europe), aligning 
appropriately with the defence departments selected for inclusion.  Due to the consolidation 
of the defence multinationals described in the Literature Review (See section 2.2 ‘Defence 
Industrial Policy’), these companies actually cover the vast majority of the western defence 
enterprise by revenue.   
The importance of the large number of smaller companies that support the large defence 
multinationals should not be understated19, but their exclusion is partly explained due to their 
lack of published information on energy and climate change, with very few mandatory drivers 
or pressure to enrol in voluntary initiatives.  Therefore, it is unlikely that significant value 
would have been added by including them. 
Another concern in terms of the companies selected related to their degree of ‘defence 
dependence’.  This concept was explained in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial Policy’) and 
elaborated above, and given that defence multinationals can be characterised by varying 
degrees of ‘defence dependence’, it seemed appropriate that both types (‘defence 
dependent’ and not) should be included in the research.  Fortunately, the top 10 companies 
identified by SIPRI did include examples of both types. 
With an appropriate sample of organisations selected for inclusion in the research, the next 
section describes how the archival research strategy was designed, and relevant information 
sources were identified and reviewed.  
                                                
19 Gansler (2011) describes the separate ‘tiers’ of the defence supply chain, and explains how firms 
tend to become less ‘defence dependent’ further down the supply chain, and these also tend to be 
characterised by higher levels of innovation and efficiency. The US QDR (Department of Defense, 
2010a) acknowledges the value of the defence supply chain, and is keenly aware of the ‘cascading 
impact’ on these companies from policy decisions taken at high level. 
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3.3 Designing the Archival Research Strategy 
 
The previous sections have explained how this research is based on a strongly archival 
research strategy that focuses on the US DoD, UK MoD, and the ten largest multinational 
defence companies in the world.  This section describes how this archival research strategy 
has been designed. 
There are a number of accepted research designs, and these are often grouped into 
categories and characterised as either ‘descriptive’, ‘explanatory’, or ‘exploratory’ research 
designs.  Descriptive and explanatory designs can often be associated with deductive 
research approaches using quantitative research methods and significant sample sizes, 
whereas ‘exploratory’ designs are better suited to issues where there is insufficient existing 
theory or data to support a formulaic research project.  This research certainly falls into this 
latter category, being conducted in a field where both professional and academic practices 
are relatively immature and still evolving. 
The objective of the archival research strategy defined in this section is to identify a selection 
of information sources for each of the organisations included in the sample, from which 
relevant quantitative and qualitative datasets can be established.  These information sources 
might be directly concerned with energy use and climate change mitigation, or represent 
broader organisational information that has relevance for an investigation of energy use and 
climate change mitigation. Note that energy and climate change are treated equally in this 
research as they are intrinsically linked, despite the fact that different cultures or scenarios 
might lead to an emphasis on one over the other. 
One major challenge to systematically selecting appropriate documents for this analysis 
related to the definition of a ‘document’ in this context.  The way that large organisations 
publicly report information is variable and changing. An increasing amount of information is 
available online in a more fluid format than a traditional ‘document’, and where documents 
do exist, there are a variety of ‘types’ potentially relevant to this research (directives / 
standards / policies / technical manuals / videos / awards / internal magazines). 
This research focused on traditional ‘corporate reports’, but it is worth noting that 
organisations embracing emerging online content over traditional methods (most relevant to 
the companies), or with a significant quantity of public document ‘types’ (most relevant to 
defence depts.), may not always be optimally represented in the analysis. 
In order to focus this review further, it is only concerned with ‘public documents’ as these will 
benefit from another layer of consideration and conservativeness as regards their content, 
and allow any findings to similarly be made publicly available.  In addition, the review is 
concerned with public documents that are communicating to an external audience as well as 
their own employees.  Limiting the research to public documents also helps to eliminate bias, 
where the researcher may have access to greater volumes of information on some 
organisations than others by virtue of their contacts and levels of access. 
The reporting approaches of public sector organisations and private companies can be 
significantly different, owing to different legal obligations, expected common practices, and 
stakeholder groups that they have to engage with.   
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The Defence department reporting was characterised by sprawling web presences, and 
unstandardized reporting practices – even among the public corporate documents. 
Systematic searches therefore became very important in order to provide some assurance 
that the most relevant documents had been selected.   
In contrast, defence company reporting practices are far more standardised, and their web 
presences far more concise and coherent.  Therefore, retrieving the relevant documents for 
defence companies was relatively straightforward.   
As a result, this research applied different archival designs to the defence departments and 
private companies in the sample.  This section is split into two sub-sections that focus on the 
defence departments (3.3.1) and defence companies (3.3.2) in turn, followed by a summary 
of the most relevant documents for analysis at the end (3.3.3). 
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3.3.1 Defence Department Documents 
 
As explained above the defence department reporting was characterised by sprawling web 
presences, and unstandardized reporting practices – even among the public corporate 
documents. The organisations are enormous (particularly the US DoD), and therefore 
understanding the organisational structures and related agencies represents a significant 
challenge before attempting to understand the web presences and reporting outlets.  
Systematic searches therefore became very important in order to provide some assurance 
that the most relevant documents had been selected.   
The same broad approach was used to identify relevant documents for both the UK MoD 
and US DoD, and the process for identifying relevant documents for each of the 
organisations is described below. 
 
3.3.1.1 UK MoD 
 
As discussed above, the UK MoD publishes widely across numerous sources and mediums.  
This review attempted to get an overview of UK MoD reporting to understand where energy 
or climate change mitigation issues may feature either in mainstream reports, or standalone 
ones.  Identifying the best places to find these relevant documents was challenging, and 
involved a lot of web searching, and familiarisation with how the MoD presented itself online. 
The UK MoD web presence is extensive.  As might be expected from the description of 
Defence Industrial Policy in 2.2, with the UK MoD such a complex entity, made of multiple 
agencies, the potential areas to retrieve relevant information spans multiple websites that 
are all organised differently.  The single services all have their own sophisticated web 
presences and reporting, as do civilian organisations within the MoD, such as Defence 
Equipment and Support (DE&S).  Other agencies connected to the MoD are extensive and 
likewise have their own web presences and corporate reports (DSTL, Hydrographic Office, 
Defence Academy etc.).  
Familiarisation with the relevant websites revealed that they did not contain the quantity of 
UK MoD documents held on the main gov.uk website20 (which has a very good browsing 
functionality and contains most documents published by all government departments), or the 
National Archives website21 (which performs a similar function as the gov.uk site for 
documents that predate 2010).  Where documents were only held on the websites of the 
multiple UK MoD organisations, these were often best accessed via Google searches that 
provided web links to parts of their websites that would not have been easily found due to 
the un-standardised and often cumbersome ways that the sites are arranged. 
Fortunately, the UK MoD does publish a very useful orientation document called the Defence 
Framework (Ministry of Defence, 2010a).  This provides a good overview of the 
                                                
20 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications  
21 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/  
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organisational structure, and the various areas from which different types of reporting might 
originate. 
With the best places to retrieve relevant documents identified, a systematic process for 
finding relevant documents needed to be established.  Table 9 in Appendix A shows the 
steps taken in a systematic search for relevant documents, which began with the main 
websites containing government documents, and then used Google searches to try and find 
additional sources.  Documents identified in each step of the search would be logged and 
marked with the relevant ‘search number’, so that the process was replicatable and the 
document ought to be locatable by the same means (subject to websites changing).  Where 
a document was located multiple times by different searches, the first ‘search number’ that it 
was located by would take precedence. 
The process below was not pre-conceived, and therefore documents identified in earlier 
steps would be reviewed for relevance and contribute to a broader understanding of the 
organisations’ reporting practices as the search was taking place.  Therefore, subsequent 
research steps would be informed by the findings of earlier ones, until the final category 
included specific google searches for documents known to exist and have relevance to the 
research from the review work that had already taken place. 
In terms of arranging and analysing the documents identified, they were then reviewed for 
relevance with the main criteria as follows: 
- Does it represent a ‘Vision’ or ‘Strategy’ document defining the overall direction for 
the organisation?;  
- Does it represent a ‘Regular Business Report’, offering a high-level summary of the 
organisation’s progress against its main strategic objectives (e.g. annual reports), or 
providing some key information on ‘defence reform’?; 
- Is the document concerned with energy, environment, or sustainability (whether 
related to ‘operational energy’ or ‘facilities and infrastructure’)?;  
- Is the document concerned specifically with climate change? 
In line with the interpretivist research philosophy and inductive approach taken, these criteria 
were refined as the document search developed, and tended to highlight the most 
established ‘mainstream’ corporate documents and relevant ‘specialist’ documents.  
A number of UK MoD documents (38) were deemed relevant using the criteria above, and 
categorised and plotted on a timeline so that shifts in emphasis over time could also be 
identified.  This ‘long list’ identified relevant grey literature for the research, but was 
additionally reduced to a ‘shortlist’ of documents (7) deemed most relevant for use in the 
creation of relevant quantitative and qualitative datasets, as they best met the criteria 
defined above (described in section 3.4 ‘Establishing the Primary Datasets’ below). 
The shortlisted and long-listed documents are shown on a timeline in Tables 10 and 11 
respectively (see Appendix A), including a short summary of each and a reference to the 
search approach that located it. 
The timeline format was used to explore trends that can be identified in the UK MoD 
reporting over time.  Perhaps most obvious is the impact of governmental cycles.  Key 
strategic documents tend to be published when a new government comes to power (e.g. 
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National Security Strategies (Cabinet Office, 2010a), Strategic Defence and Security 
Reviews (Cabinet Office, 2010b)), and all of the related planning documents tend to be 
refreshed and overhauled at this time, whether relating to the organisation as a whole (e.g. 
MoD Business Plan (Ministry of Defence, 2012a), or sub-strategies related to specific 
functional areas (e.g. the MoD Sustainable Development Strategy (Ministry of Defence, 
2011b).  New governments can also make amendments to the style and substance of 
related (and more regular) statistical or performance reports. 
Looking at the longer list of relevant documents reviewed, significant events (such as Gray’s 
review of Defence Acquisition) can have corresponding impacts on reporting practices, with 
the review documents themselves leading to medium-term improvement plans, and regular 
dedicated performance reporting. 
Interestingly in the UK context, reporting from the single services tends to be ad hoc and 
inconsistent.  This is actually helpful in providing more coherence to the strategy documents 
from the organisation as whole, but somewhat surprising given the independence that they 
tend to maintain.  It is unclear whether using the MoD restricted link to search for relevant 
documents from the single services might provide more relevant, coherent reporting, but that 
is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
 
3.3.1.2 US DoD 
 
A similar process was followed to identify, review and select relevant US DoD documents. 
As with the UK MoD, the US DoD web presence is sprawling, and a scale of magnitude 
larger.  This is unsurprising given that the US DoD budget is roughly ten times that of the UK 
MoD (SIPRI, 2011).  There are a couple of relevant websites that attempt to collate and 
present the majority of US DoD documents22, however from wider searches it was clear that 
these were not particularly well organised and did not necessarily present the most relevant 
documents.  There is also a relevant website for US DoD internal manuals and issuances23, 
containing a huge number of working documents aimed at internal employees, but as 
discussed above these types of documents are outside the scope of this review. 
In contrast to the UK, the single services in the US have a more substantial web presence, 
and produce far more public documents, with their own ‘publishing directories’ for external 
reports, as well as relevant internal field manuals or technical documents24. 
Beyond the main websites and the single services, the other agencies linked to the US DoD, 
or complex networks of organisations within it, are very difficult to understand and 
contextualise.  Unlike the UK, there is no equivalent of the Defence Framework document to 
orientate around this complex network of organisations, and no place listing them on the 
main DoD central websites.  These other agencies (e.g. Defence Logistics Agency, the 
                                                
22 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ and http://www.dod.mil/pubs/  
23 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html  
24 US Army Publishing Directorate (http://www.apd.army.mil/); US Navy Personnel Command 
(http://www.npc.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/publications/Pages/default.aspx); US Air Force 
(http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/).   
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Engineering Corps, Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) etc.) are more 
numerous and larger than their UK-equivalents and likewise publish more documents.  Such 
is the scale of US DoD energy use, some agencies are concerned directly with the topic 
(e.g. the Office for Operational Energy), and publish their own documents from their own 
independent websites. 
With no equivalent of Gov.uk or the National Archives reliably pulling the majority of 
government documents together into one place, navigating all of these web presences 
posed a significant challenge.  Google searches actually proved far more successful in the 
context of US DoD documents, and therefore a similar systematic approach was used as in 
the UK context above, but relying more on these google searches to identify relevant 
websites, parts of websites, and documents from the sprawling DoD web presence.  Again, 
the process was not preconceived but each search informed the next, as the links and 
documents identified provided additional information and understanding. 
Table 12 in Appendix A shows the systematic search used for DoD documents.  An extra 
layer of review was included in this process to allow for the fact that with such an 
overwhelming number of websites associated with US Defence, initial google searches 
would inevitably prompt other lines of enquiry – sometimes identifying new websites that 
held a number of relevant documents.   
For example, if the Google search term was ‘Department of Defense Energy’, this might 
generate a number of links to relevant files, but may also provide links to the websites of 
other relevant organisations within or connected to the DoD.  In these cases, the ‘other 
relevant website’ was noted as a ‘sub-search’ of the initial google search and given a 
corresponding reference (e.g. if the original search was number 5, documents identified by 
the subsequent websites would be given a reference 5.1 or 5.2 depending on which of the 
subsequent websites they came from).  
As with the approach taken with the UK MoD, documents identified were reviewed for 
relevance with the same set of criteria: 
- Does it represent a ‘Vision’ or ‘Strategy’ document defining the overall direction for 
the organisation?;  
- Does it represent a ‘Regular Business Report’, offering a high-level summary of the 
organisation’s progress against its main strategic objectives (e.g. annual reports), or 
providing some key information on ‘defence reform’?; 
- Is the document concerned with energy, environment, or sustainability (whether 
related to ‘operational energy’ or ‘facilities and infrastructure’)?;  
- Is the document concerned specifically with climate change? 
A number of documents (33) were deemed relevant for the US DoD using the search 
approach and relevance criteria above.  These documents were similarly categorised and 
plotted on a timeline so that shifts in emphasis over time could also be identified.  As above, 
this ‘long list’ identified relevant grey literature for the research, but was additionally reduced 
to a ‘shortlist’ of documents (8) deemed most relevant for use in the creation of relevant 
quantitative and qualitative datasets, as they best met the criteria defined above (described 
in section 3.4 ‘Establishing the Primary Datasets’ below) 
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The shortlisted and long-listed documents are shown on a timeline in Tables 13 and 14 in 
Appendix A respectively, including a short summary of each and a reference to the search 
approach that located it.  
The results above for the US DoD contrast with UK MoD reporting approach in several ways.  
The impact of governmental cycles is undoubtedly there in the US review (e.g. the 
Quadrennial Defence Review (Department of Defense, 2010) and National Military Strategy 
(Department of Defense, 2015a) are roughly analogous to the UK Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (Cabinet Office, 2010b) and National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 
2010a)).  However, where in the UK there is a clear hierarchy of documents underpinning 
these main strategies (that are usually refreshed alongside them), the US document 
hierarchy is not so clear. 
There were many financial documents noted in the US review including plans, budgets, 
reports etc. but these did not necessarily follow a coherent structure linked to the strategies.  
Similarly, there is not the same coherent reporting of ‘major defence reform plans’, with 
associated regular reporting against these.  This could be due to the sheer scale of any 
defence reform plans in the US context, or that at the time of the search, this issue had not 
gained as much momentum as in the UK context. 
One possible reason for the lack of a clear hierarchy of DoD documents linked to the 
strategies could be related to the increased strategic reporting by the single services in the 
US context.  As noted above, the single services produce far more corporate reports than 
their UK equivalents, and are arguably therefore less dependent strategically/culturally on 
the main DoD strategic documents.  Although the single services’ documents have been 
used in this research, for comparability it is only the DoD-level documents included on the 
shortlist for creating the datasets. 
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3.3.2 Defence Company Documents 
 
By comparison with the defence departments, the process for selecting relevant documents 
for the defence companies was relatively straightforward.  They tend to have more 
standardised reporting, all for example producing an annual report, and the vast majority 
producing a ‘sustainability report’ (although the titles can vary).  More complex was 
understanding the voluntary initiatives on energy and climate change to which they 
subscribed that may provide additional sources of data, but again the majority also subscribe 
to similar global voluntary reporting initiatives (e.g. CDP).  Their reporting also tends to be 
more focused, in that beyond these standard documents, not a lot more is available.  By 
comparison to the defence departments they also tend to report more consistently over the 
longer term, not being subject to a four or five-year cycle of governmental change or specific 
reform issues and the resultant changes in strategic direction (and consequently, changes in 
reporting). 
This section is split into three sub-sections, with each reviewing the most common reporting 
types by the companies included in this review: 
- Annual Reports 
- Sustainability Reports 
- Mandatory and Voluntary Reporting Initiatives effecting Defence Sector 
Organisations 
 
3.3.2.1 Annual Reports 
 
A company’s ‘Annual Report’ tends to be a comprehensive report of a company’s activities 
throughout the preceding year and associated financial statements.  It is aimed at 
shareholders and other interested parties, and is a regulatory requirement in most 
jurisdictions.   
All companies selected for inclusion in section 3.2 (‘Selecting an Appropriate Sample’) 
produce some form of annual report, and these reports for the years 2013-2015 (inclusive) 
have been reviewed as part of this research.   
Some regional differences were noted between the documents.  US annual reports tend to 
follow a more consistent structure, linked to regulatory requirements for large companies 
(>$10m in assets / >500 owners) to produce a ‘Form 10k’ document, the contents of which 
are fixed.  Most of the US defence multinationals included in this research tend to include 
their Form 10K as a regulatory document that makes up the vast majority of their annual 
report, simply preceding it with some introductory comments about the business and 
messages from the Chairman and Board.  An exception is United Technologies, who publish 
their Annual Report (e.g. United Technologies, 2015a) and Form 10K (e.g. United 
Technologies, 2015b) separately, with the former acting as a more joined up Annual Report 
and Corporate Responsibility Report, and the latter as a standalone regulatory document. 
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The European annual reports can be quite different, as the regulatory requirements can 
differ between national jurisdictions.  The UK, for example, has a separate set of 
requirements for company annual reports split between a ‘Strategic Report’ designed to give 
users a high-level initial summary of what the companies does and the risks it faces, and a 
subsequent more detailed ‘Directors Report’, which more detailed information on various 
aspects of the organisation’s governance. 
Table 15 in Appendix A reviews all the annual reports for how closely they align to a ‘generic 
contents’ list that applies fairly well to all of the reports reviewed.  Despite regional/format 
differences they are very comparable documents, and contain a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative data relevant to this research. 
 
3.3.2.2 Corporate Responsibility / Sustainability Reports 
 
Most large companies also tend to publish a ‘Corporate Responsibility (CR)’ or 
‘Sustainability’ Report, that tends to be reported alongside their annual report providing a 
detailed summary of a company’s activities throughout the preceding year that within the 
context of its social and environmental impacts.  Like the annual report it is aimed at 
shareholders and other interested parties, but unlike the annual report it is not a mandatory 
requirement in most jurisdictions and most large companies now produce these voluntarily. 
As voluntary publications, take up and content of these reports can be more variable, 
however most of the companies selected for inclusion in section 3.2 (‘Selecting an 
Appropriate Sample’) produce some form of CR / Sustainability report, and the contents of 
all available CR and Sustainability reports for the years 2013-2015 (inclusive) have been 
reviewed. 
There are some notable differences in approach, with United Technologies (as mentioned 
above) producing a joint Annual and CR Report separate to their Form 10K, and therefore 
not publishing a standalone CR / Sustainability Report.  Boeing is notable for producing two 
standalone reports – an ‘Environment Report’ (e.g. Boeing Company, 2015b) and a separate 
‘Corporate Citizenship Report’ (e.g. Boeing Company, 2015c), topics that the other 
organisations include together in one report. 
Reporting is also less consistent year-to-year, with General Dynamics not appearing to 
produce a CR / Sustainability Report for all years investigated.  Formats can change too, 
with BAE Systems changing from an ‘Integrated Annual Report’ in 2013 (BAE systems, 
2014) to a standalone ‘CR Performance Summary’ in 2014 and 2015 (BAE Systems, 2015b; 
2016b), and Airbus substituting a hard-copy report for online content in 2015, and therefore 
directing users to its website instead. 
Lengths of these reports can vary significantly, with the shortest 19 pages (Raytheon 
2013b), and the longest 216 pages (Finmeccanica 2014b).  As with all grey literature, the 
length of the report doesn’t necessarily indicate better or more relevant content, and is likely 
to be linked to how repetitively (or not) companies report across the different mediums that 
they use (Annual Report, CR Report and Website). 
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Table 16 in Appendix A reviews all the reports for how closely they align to a ‘generic 
contents’ list that applies fairly well to all of the CR / Sustainability reports reviewed.  Despite 
the differences outlined above, and various title changes between organisations and years, 
these are very comparable documents, and contain a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
data relevant to this research. 
 
3.3.2.3 Mandatory and Voluntary Reporting Initiatives 
 
In addition to their Annual Reports and CR Reports, the global defence companies selected 
for analysis in section 3.2 (‘Selecting an Appropriate Sample’) are all subject to a variety of 
mandatory and voluntary reporting initiatives to which they provide GHG data and climate 
change-relevant information. 
Table 17 in Appendix A provides a list of some of these schemes, many of which were 
discussed in the OCA Literature Review in section 2.1.  Note that this list is not exhaustive, 
but reflects those schemes mentioned in the defence sector grey literature analysed. 
Some apply to the US; and others to Europe as a whole, or individual European countries.  
The list includes schemes aimed at numerous scales of Carbon Accounting, and both 
mandatory and voluntary schemes.  Some of these schemes require public reporting of data, 
whereas with others submissions can be private. 
Given the variability of schemes listed in Table 17 (see Appendix A), the matrix in Figure 5 
shows how comparable each of these initiatives are – both in the region that they relate to, 
and the carbon accounting ‘scale’ to which they apply.  The diagram shows that the two that 
are most relevant to the entire footprint of all companies in our selection are the CDP Annual 
Climate Change Questionnaire and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) Annual 
Questionnaire.  Given that the former is a public document25; is directly related to this 
research topic (DJSI has a wider remit); and is participated in reasonably well by the 
organisations selected, it makes the most sense to include in this review. 
 
                                                
25 Most organisational responses to the CDP Climate Change Questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and 
Appendix B) are made public, however organisations have the option of making their response private 
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Figure 5: Matrix demonstrating which mandatory and voluntary schemes are most relevant to the organisations 
included in this research, for their global emphasis and focus on the whole organisation or corporate group. 
 
The CDP Climate Change Questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B) has changed and 
developed over the last decade since it was first sent to relevant companies included in its 
investor request, but the latest contents are summarised in Table 18 in Appendix A, and a 
copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix B.  Most of the companies included in this 
research now complete a public response to the Climate Change questionnaire as shown in 
Table 19 in Appendix A. 
CDP’s ‘academic dataset’ from 2007-2014 was acquired by the University of Central 
Lancashire for the purposes of this research, and provides a summary of all data provided to 
CDP by all companies involved.  It has been a key source of quantitative and qualitative data 
used in this research. 
  
Europe US Global
Site EU ETS; Climate 
Change Agreements
EPA GHG Reporting 
Programme; 
California ETS
Regional Legal Entity Grenelle II - Article 
75; Carbon 
Reduction 
Commitment; ESOS 
(Implementing EU 
Energy Efficiency 
Directive 
(2012/27/EU))
Whole Organisation / 
Group
Companies Act 
Mandatory Carbon 
Reporting (UK); 
Grenelle II - Article 
225 (France); UK 
Greening 
Government 
Commitments
US Executive Order 
13514 on Federal 
Sustainability; 
Climate Registry
Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP); Dow 
Jones Sustainability 
Index
117 
 
3.3.3 Summary of Key Documents 
 
With an appropriate sample of organisations for the research determined in section 3.2, this 
section has explained how the corporate reports of defence departments (3.3.1) and defence 
companies (3.3.2) have been reviewed and appropriate ones selected for further quantitative 
and qualitative analysis. 
Table 20 in Appendix A shows a summary of the documents selected for inclusion for the 
defence departments and defence companies, categorised as ‘general reports’ and 
‘specialist reports’.  As these documents have all been produced directly from the 
organisations included in the sample, they represent sources of primary data. 
Taken together, these documents provide a wealth of information for analysis, and the next 
section (3.4) describes how appropriate datasets were created from the quantitative and 
qualitative data contained in them. 
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3.4 Establishing the Primary Datasets 
 
Section 3.3 summarised the archival research design used to identify relevant documents for 
the organisations in the sample, which could be used to review the existing OCA practices in 
the defence sector and their approach to climate change mitigation more generally.  As 
these documents have all been produced directly from the organisations included in the 
sample, they represent sources of primary data. 
This fourth part of the Methodology (3.4) describes how relevant datasets were established 
from these primary data sources.  Section 3.4.1 describes how the ‘Quantitative Dataset’ of 
GHG and Energy data was established for all organisations included in the review, taking 
GHG or energy data from a variety of sources and applying various conversion or emissions 
factors to make the data as comparable as possible.  It also explains how certain 
‘normalising’ data was identified and processed and can be used to support comparisons 
(correlational research) between organisations.  Section 3.4.2 describes how the ‘Qualitative 
Dataset’ of keyword terms and published targets was established, and provides narrative as 
regards the comparability of the data. 
Section 3.3 also explained how this archival research design can be characterised as 
‘exploratory’ (as opposed to ‘descriptive’ or ‘explanatory’), and therefore various quantitative 
and qualitative research methods have been used to establish and analyse the data.  This 
multi-method approach to the data is common to exploratory research designs where the 
subject being studied is not currently well known. 
The quantitative and qualitative datasets themselves are included in Appendix A but referred 
to throughout. 
 
3.4.1 Establishing the Quantitative Dataset 
 
This section describes how the ‘Quantitative Dataset’ of GHG and Energy data was 
established for all organisations included in the research. It is split into two sub-sections, with 
the first describing the GHG and energy data, and the second describing the relevant 
normalising data.   
The main quantitative research method used has been Correlational Research.  This aligns 
well with the exploratory nature of the research, looking for interesting patterns in the 
quantitative data as opposed to causal relationships or testing pre-conceived hypotheses.  
Gathering GHG and energy data, as well as relevant normalising data, should allow effective 
correlational analysis to be presented in the Results chapter. 
It should be noted that time horizons were considered in the creation of the quantitative 
dataset, and a longitudinal approach was taken given the inductive nature of the research, 
and the desire to look for any patterns that might emerge.  This means that the quantitative 
datasets in Appendix A contain data for multiple years.  However, the analysis presented in 
the Results chapter is largely cross-sectional, as these patterns proved most relevant to the 
themes described in the Literature Review.  The longitudinal nature of the quantitative 
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datasets does make them useful for future research though, and therefore the datasets are 
presented in full in Appendix A. 
 
3.4.1.1 GHG, Energy, and Energy Cost Data 
 
As discussed in section 3.3 (‘Designing the Archival Research Strategy’), reporting practices 
can be quite different between defence departments and defence companies, and this is 
certainly the case in relation to their GHG and energy data. 
Tables 21-43 in Appendix A provide historical summaries of all available GHG, energy, and 
energy cost data for the UK MoD (Tables 21-23), US DoD (Tables 25-28), and companies 
(Tables 29-43) included in this analysis respectively. 
The following explanatory notes and guidance are relevant to the types of data included in 
these tables. 
GHG data can be produced via a variety of methodologies that can substantially impact the 
organisational boundaries to which the data relates (see 2.1 ‘Organisational Carbon 
Accounting’).  Table 2 in Appendix A shows a summary of the GHG Accounting 
methodologies used by the defence organisations included in this research to produce the 
quantitative emissions data that was analysed in the Results chapter.  It demonstrates that 
the methodologies for producing OCAs in the defence sector are reasonably well aligned.  
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol Corporate Standard (WRI, 2004) is referred to by all the 
companies included in the research except General Dynamics, and though not mentioned 
specifically by the MoD or DoD, they do refer to Scopes 1, 2 and 3 in the relevant sources 
that either report, or mandate the reporting of GHG information (Ministry of Defence, 2014m; 
2015a; 2016b; Department of Energy, 2009).  Also, seven of the twelve organisations refer 
specifically to the GHG Protocol’s ‘Operational Control’ method as the means by which they 
determined the boundary to their GHG inventories. There is clearly potential for further 
standardisation, with four of the nine companies mentioning the GHG Protocol also referring 
to other methodology documents that they use alongside it.  Also, there can be significant 
discrepancies in relation to the Global Warming Potentials used within the reported GHG 
totals, with just over half of the (7 of 12) organisations in the table above reporting all of the 6 
Kyoto Protocol gases as a minimum, but others not disclosing some of these.  Emission 
factors used can also differ, with the UK Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the European Commission 
mentioned by those organisations that provide a clear reference to the source of their 
emission factors.  Finally, the ‘Emissions Boundary’ of the OCAs can also vary quite 
significantly amongst the organisations not using the GHG Protocol’s Operational Control 
method.  These methodological differences are noted in the GHG and energy tables in 
Appendix A wherever possible (Tables 21-43), but converting relevant GHG methodologies 
between organisations to make them comparable is often not possible due to the 
fundamental differences in how the data has been compiled. 
Comparisons between ‘Scope 3’ GHG data can be more problematic still, as methodologies 
and boundaries can be completely bespoke.  This data is included in the dataset where 
possible, with adjacent notes describing what it represents. 
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As a general point it should be noted that publishing GHG data is a relatively recently 
established practice for organisations, and as such data quality has been improving over 
time – both in relation to the methods used to determine relevant organisational boundaries 
to the data or the activities to be included, and the accuracy of the data itself.  This may 
mean that comparability between reporting years is not always assured, and that data may 
be subject to error particularly the further back one looks in the dataset.  Third party 
assurance details – where available, are included in the dataset.  
Often energy data is published as opposed to GHGs, as different organisations can 
emphasise one or the other depending on the focus of the organisation or document.  Where 
no published GHG data exists, energy data can be converted to a relevant GHG value.  
GHG and energy data are inextricably linked, and conversion factors for company GHG 
reporting are produced annually for DEFRA by a company called carbonsmart, and have 
been recently made available at the gov.uk website26.  The conversion factors can be used 
to convert published energy data to comparable figures in tonnes of carbon dioxide-
equivalent (tCO2e), and relevant conversions have been made to establish the datasets for 
this research, but numbers established via conversion factors (as opposed to direct from 
information sources) are displayed in red for clarity of the process used to derive them.  
These conversions are unlikely to make the resulting GHG data much less accurate, as 
similar conversion factors will have been used to produce the published GHG data from 
other organisations. 
Energy data tends to be published in different units depending on the region from which the 
data is originating (e.g. MWh, Barrels of Oil, Tonnes of Oil Equivalent), but conversion 
factors can be applied to convert from one unit of energy to another and make the energy 
data comparable.  Depending on the conversion, some assumptions may have to be made.  
For the purposes of the datasets in Appendix A all energy data has been converted into 
MWh, but where figures have been converted they are displayed in red, and appropriate 
notes included in the table. 
A key distinction relevant to published energy data is that between ‘bought energy’, and 
‘consumed energy’.  The distinction can be significant as defence organisations tend to hold 
relatively large inventories of fuel in order to be able to respond rapidly to changing demands 
on their resources.  For example, the UK MoD publishes consumed energy data, whereas 
the US DoD publishes ‘procured’ energy data.  Publication of the latter can be symptomatic 
of a lack of maturity as regards energy management, as without accurate (actual) 
consumption data, it is difficult to manage energy use effectively.  The US Defense Science 
Board (DSB) Task Force on Energy Security (Department of Defense, 2008b), and Warner & 
Singer (2009) have both highlighted the lack of energy monitoring infrastructure available to 
the US DoD.  The US DSB Task Force also suggest that corporate measurement techniques 
are more advanced, citing Walmart, but it is difficult to extend this comparison to defence 
sector companies who generally have more complex, shared ownership sites with significant 
amounts of historic legacy infrastructure.  The ‘type’ of energy data published is listed in the 
tables where possible, but conversions are not possible in relation to this data due to the 
fundamental differences in how it has been collected (i.e. from procurement spend as 
opposed to measured energy consumption). 
                                                
26 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-conversion-factors-for-company-
reporting#conversion-factors-2016  
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As with the GHG data, the collection and publication of energy data is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and as such data quality has been improving over time – both in relation to the 
methods used to determine relevant organisational boundaries to the data or the activities to 
be included, and the accuracy of the data itself.  Metering infrastructure (particularly at large, 
historic campus sites which can be common to the sector) can be poorly established or 
flawed, resulting in data accuracy issues if the data reported is ‘measured consumption’ by 
the organisation (as opposed to ‘bought energy’ metered by suppliers).  As above, third party 
assurance details, where available, are included in the tables. 
Energy cost data is also available in the documents identified in section 3.3 (‘Designing the 
Archival Research Strategy’).  This data is less easily converted to actual energy or GHG 
data due to unknown prices or aggregated fuels.  ‘Energy cost’ data is provided by some of 
the sources in this research and included in the dataset as an additional field for reference, 
but the data is not converted 
 
3.4.1.2 Normalising Data 
 
Despite the relevance of the organisations included in this research for comparison, they are 
quite clearly different.  The defence departments undertake a very different range of 
activities to the defence companies, and the defence departments themselves are very 
different, with the US DoD some ten times larger than the UK MoD (by budget) and with 
strategic ambitions to match.  Likewise, companies can be characterised by differing 
degrees of ‘defence dependence’ as discussed above, and at any given time can be subject 
to different operational demands. 
As such, relevant datasets of ‘normalising data’ will be relevant to contextualise some of the 
GHG and energy data explained above.   
Tables 44-50 in Appendix A provide some relevant normalising data identified in the 
documents reviewed, and each type of data is given a brief explanation below 
The two simplest ways to normalise energy and GHG data is by total budgets/revenues and 
headcount (Tables 44-47).  GHG or energy use normalised by these values represent widely 
accepted metrics that are requested in the CDP dataset and published in many 
organisational CR Reports.  Their relevance can be heavily dependent on the activities of 
the specific organisation, and the variability and cyclical nature of defence activity makes 
them less reliable in this context, but nonetheless they provide a simple means to quickly 
compare organisations. 
In addition to the revenue data analysed in 3.2.1 (‘Context: Key Trends in Global Defence 
Spending’) that was used to determine the research sample, further data on the revenue 
breakdown of the defence companies is useful to draw some simple comparisons between 
organisations in this research, and relate different organisations to each other.   
Tables 48-50 additionally provide revenue data split between their sales related to ‘products’, 
and sales related to ‘services’ (Table 48), and details of who their major customers are, and 
the percentage of revenues received from these customers (Table 49 / Table 50).  
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3.4.2 Establishing the Qualitative Dataset 
 
Section 3.4.1 above explained how the quantitative datasets have been established, but the 
majority of data included in the documents selected for review is narrative, and qualitative 
research methods will be required to analyse this information. 
Section 3.1 (‘The Research Approach’) explained how this research has a strongly archival 
strategy, but mentioned the relevance of several other strategies including Grounded 
Theory.  Whilst this exploratory research doesn’t meet many of the characteristics of a 
Grounded Theory project, the qualitative research methods used are quite common to it, 
such as keyword counts and the coding of documents to establish patterns and 
comparisons. 
Section 3.4.2.1 below describes the ‘keyword-count’ qualitative dataset.  Keyword counts are 
a common qualitative research method used in document analysis (Dawson, 2009) and the 
documents will be analysed in this manner, but first an appropriate list of keywords needs to 
be established, and a relevant ‘count’ performed on all relevant documents. 
Another qualitative summary that seemed relevant whilst reviewing the documents selected 
for analysis related to ‘published targets’ in relation to GHGs, energy, or climate-change 
relevant performance.  These are summarised in section 3.4.2.2 below (‘Relevant Public 
Targets Qualitative Dataset’), and required an element of ‘coding’ of the documents from 
different organisations in the sample to allow useful comparison. 
A third qualitative summary concerns some external accounts of organisational performance.  
Outside of the CDP academic dataset discussed in the previous section, CDP publish 
numerous narrative reports annually that describe trends in the various sectors, and identify 
the leading companies on energy and climate change performance.  They also publish 
‘scores’ for the companies based on the information submitted in the CDP Climate Change 
questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B), and these are described in section 3.4.2.3 
below (‘External Accounts of Organisational Performance’). 
The inclusion of several ‘qualitative datasets’ is relevant for avoiding bias, as different 
qualitative indicators might provide contrasting results.  The relationship between some of 
these indicators is discussed in the correlational analysis provided in the Results chapter 
(see 4.2 ‘Integrating the Qualitative Data’). 
 
3.4.2.1 Keyword-Count Qualitative Dataset 
 
The selected documents were reviewed in detail to allow the keywords to emerge from the 
document content.  This was considered preferable to using a formal document set (e.g. 
words associated with indicators in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2016)), as it created 
a keyword set relevant to the type of reporting, and the sector. 
Keywords (mostly nouns) relevant to energy and climate change were captured across the 
specialist environment/sustainability document set (under the assumption that the more 
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mainstream documents were unlikely to introduce new terms to this taxonomy), and then 
categorised into various higher-level topic areas.   
The selected keywords were then converted into a relevant search term for an automated 
search of a document, using the Adobe Acrobat ‘advanced search’ function.  The search 
term was then reviewed for whether it might ‘count’ inappropriate results.  A decision was 
then made as to whether data for the search term should be gathered automatically, or 
manually (Note the documents were also reviewed for images that might undermine an 
automatic search for the term). 
The final selected term-set, and associated search terms are shown in Table 51 in Appendix 
A, and organised into those associated with ‘energy’ and those associated with ‘climate 
change’, to allow analysis of the relative emphasis on these linked but distinct topics in the 
documents.  
Tables 52-55 in Appendix A summarise the results of the keyword-counts on the documents 
included in the research.  This forms the ‘Keyword-Count Qualitative Dataset’ that is 
analysed and discussed in the Results chapter (4) that follows. 
Relevant excluded terms included a wider set of ‘environment’ and ‘sustainability’ keywords 
(~150) that were identified in the documents and grouped into broad categories as follows: 
- Wider Environment Keyword Categories: Ecology; General Pollution; Water; Waste 
and Resources; Lifecycle Planning and Circular Economy; Materials; Biodiversity; 
Land Use and Remediation 
- Wider Sustainability Keyword Categories: Technology and Innovation; Health and 
Safety; Ethics and Business Conduct; Communities and Charitable Giving; HR 
Issues and Diversity; Supply Chain Management; Information Security 
These keywords have not been used in this research but could provide an opportunity to 
analyse the wider emphasis beyond energy and climate change in the public documents.  
They were not necessary for this research as it is concerned with the relative emphasis on 
energy and climate change between different organisations, rather than how the emphasis 
differs across a broad range of sustainability topics. 
There were some wider ‘types’ of term that were also categorised and consciously excluded 
to avoid distortion of the results.   
Different organisations tend to produce subtly different types of documents, both in terms of 
their style and emphasis on specific types of issue.  The following terms were excluded in 
order to focus the analysis on energy and climate change as broad topics, and reduce the 
impact of these stylistic differences. 
- Facilities Terms (E.g. Heat, cooling, Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) 
etc.): The environmental sections of documents differ in the extent to which they 
provide detailed information about their estate, or specific case studies about 
facilities management. These terms were typically mentioned in the context of 
energy, power or carbon that would be captured by the keyword-set.  This was 
deemed sufficient for an assessment of their general emphasis on energy and 
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climate change, without allowing the more facilities-focused narratives to appear 
dominant in the results. 
- Business Travel Terms (E.g. flights, business travel, air travel etc.): Some 
organisations go into particular detail about their business travel, and as such results 
could be distorted by documents that are more focused on this.  As above, these 
terms are usually mentioned in the context of energy, power or carbon that would be 
captured by the keyword-set. 
- Units of Energy / Carbon (E.g. Tons, MWh, Gallons etc.): Some reports are more 
technical than others, both in relation to their prose and visual material.  Again, these 
terms were typically mentioned in the context of energy, power or carbon that would 
be captured by the keyword-set. Additional Inclusion of them in the keyword-set 
could produce very high counts where information is presented technically, rather 
than capturing the general emphasis of the document on energy and climate change. 
- Specific Standards or Relevant Legislation (E.g. LEED; ISO14001; GHG Protocol 
etc.): As above, some documents are more technical in relation to their discussion of 
legislative compliance or specific methodologies.  Again, these terms were typically 
mentioned in the context of energy, power or carbon that would be captured by the 
keyword-set. Additional Inclusion of them in the keyword-set could produce high 
counts where there is a focus on technical compliance with legislation or standards, 
rather than capturing the general emphasis of the document on energy and climate 
change. 
The following terms were excluded because they were not appropriate to the type of analysis 
being conducted.  These were as follows, with the rationale explained alongside in each 
case: 
- Terms Referring to Processes (E.g. Risk Management; Corporate Governance etc.): 
Not interpretable via a 'keyword-count' approach to the data: A ‘keyword-count’ was 
deemed to be inappropriate to these types of term, as the narrative around such 
terms would need to be fully understood to infer a relationship with the organisations’ 
attitude towards energy and climate change. 
- References to Specific Events (E.g. Fines, Discharge, Leak etc.): As above a 
‘keyword-count’ was deemed to be inappropriate to these types of term 
- Generic References to Sustainability (E.g. Corporate Responsibility; Sustainable 
Development etc.): These terms are used frequently throughout all of the documents 
but were considered to be too broad in their interpretation to be included in the 
keyword-set, as their inclusion might dilute the emphasis of the counts on energy and 
climate change specifically. 
- Relevant 'Proximity Terms' (E.g. Efficient; Reduce; Clean; Low etc.): These terms 
often appeared near those from the keyword-set, but the dataset was not large 
enough for ‘Proximity Analysis’ to provide meaningful insight, and therefore the terms 
were excluded. 
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3.4.2.2 Relevant Public Targets Qualitative Dataset 
 
There are many ways that we might judge ‘engagement with the challenges of climate 
change’ other than the keyword count above.  Understanding the types of targets being set 
by defence sector organisations, and their relative levels of ambition, would also constitute a 
means by which to understand their level of ‘engagement’ with climate change challenges.  
The documents reviewed as part of this research regularly contain information about 
organisational targets, and therefore this data has been categorised and collated.  This data 
allows Correlational Research to be conducted with the quantitative GHG dataset in the 
Results chapter (4) that follows. 
BAE Systems, in a number of peer and customer review exercises undertaken with external 
consultant support, produced a summary of the targets and objectives that are in place 
across the defence sector.  Table 56 in Appendix A provides a summary of these targets 
including some additional ones gathered in this investigation.  Table 56 categorises the 
targets in the following ways: 
- GHG Reduction Target: An absolute GHG reduction target associated with all or part 
of the organisation, and part or all of the organisations scope 1-3 inventory 
- GHG Intensity Target: A GHG reduction target normalised against some other 
indicator (e.g. revenue) 
- Facility Energy Reduction Target: An absolute energy reduction target associated 
with all or some of the organisations facilities 
- Facility Energy Intensity Target: An energy reduction target normalised against some 
other indicator (e.g. revenue) 
- Facility Energy Generation Target: A target to generate a certain percentage of 
organisational energy use from renewable energy sources 
- Facility Energy Procurement Target: A target to procure a certain percentage of 
organisational energy use from renewable energy sources 
- Operational Energy Reduction Target: An absolute energy reduction target 
associated with all or some of the organisation’s operational energy use (applies to 
defence departments) 
- Operational Energy Intensity Target: An operational energy reduction target 
normalised against some other indicator (e.g. per mile travelled) (applies to defence 
departments) 
- Operational Energy Procurement Target: A target to procure a certain percentage of 
operational energy use from alternative sources (e.g. biofuel blends) 
These targets form the ‘Public Targets Qualitative Dataset’ for analysis in the Results 
chapter (4) that follows.  Performance against these targets tends to be communicated by 
the companies’ CR Reports and the corresponding reports for the MoD and DoD. 
 
3.4.2.3 External Accounts of Organisational Performance (CDP Scores) 
 
Outside of the CDP academic dataset discussed in the previous section, CDP publish 
numerous narrative reports annually that describe trends in the various sectors, and identify 
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the leading companies on energy and climate change performance (e.g. CDP, 2016c).  They 
also publish scores for the companies based on the information submitted in the CDP 
Climate Change questionnaire (CDP, 2017 and Appendix B).  These scores (or ‘third party 
accounts of performance’) are split between a ‘disclosure score’ (between 0 and 100), which 
describes how comprehensively the company has responded to the questions, and a 
‘performance score’ (A-F), which describes how well it is performing. 
CDP publish their scoring methodology (CDP, 2015), explaining how these scores are 
derived, but acknowledge that scoring methodologies for this topic are still in their infancy. 
These ‘external accounts’ of the performance of defence sector organisations represent 
another means by which we might judge ‘engagement with the challenges of climate change’ 
in addition to the ‘keyword count’ and ‘public targets’ datasets explained above.  Again, this 
data allows Correlational Research to be conducted with the quantitative GHG dataset in the 
Results chapter (4) that follows. 
Tables 57 and 58 in Appendix A list the disclosure and performance scores published by 
CDP (CDP, 2016d) for the organisations included in the research sample.  
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3.5 Relevant Secondary Sources of Data 
 
Whilst the previous section described how quantitative and qualitative datasets were 
established from the primary data sources (company documents), the exploratory archival 
research strategy applied here is also interested in secondary sources of data. 
This fifth and final part of the Methodology briefly summarises the environment-focused grey 
literature in the defence sector, much of which is produced by the various organisations and 
foreign policy think tanks discussed in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial Policy’) that are 
included within the ‘complex entity’ that is the defence enterprise.  This section summarises 
some of this contextual grey literature, identifying some key documents that will be used to 
support and contextualise some of the trends discussed throughout the Results chapter (4). 
Merging the topics of defence and climate change can at first glance seem slightly 
incongruous, with the histories of environmental activism and defence respectively seeming 
at opposing ends of the political spectrum.  However, the topic areas have gradually been 
recognised as meaningful ones to analyse together, and this position is becoming 
increasingly mainstream.   
The foreign policy think tanks discussed in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial Policy’) have 
arguably led the way in driving the recognition of the topic.  In the UK, the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) has published a number of relevant articles (Tibbles, 2009; 
Behrend, 2009; Bui, 2010; Stein, 2009; Banfield, Courtaux & Golightly, 2009; Vettehen & 
Ross, 2010).  However, due to the scale of the US Department of Defense and the extent of 
its military engagement through the first decade of the 21st century, the energy challenges 
are that much more critical in the US, and think tanks there have published the most relevant 
thought leadership pieces.  The Brookings Institution have published some of the most 
significant early works in this area (Lengyel, 2007; Warner & Singer, 2009), but various other 
think tanks have also been active on the topic, for example: Pew (Pew, 2010); the Center for 
a New American Security (Partemore & Nagl, 2010); and the Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (Posner, 2010).  The vast majority of this literature from the think tanks 
enthusiastically advocates for defence to place its energy challenges at the centre of its 
strategy, but it should be noted that there are some organisations such as the Heritage 
Foundation suggesting that these studies are going too far in the importance they give to the 
issue (Spencer, 2011). 
With the think tanks having established the issue in the grey literature, more recently the 
major consulting firms have also been publishing thought-leadership pieces that suggest it 
makes good economic sense to discuss environment and defence in the same context (e.g. 
Deloitte, 2009; CNA, 2009; PWC, 2010; Crowley et al, 2007; Ash & Erdmann, 2013). 
All of this activity inevitably influences activity within the defence departments themselves, 
and a US Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force within the US DoD produced a 
comprehensive report on the topic that is often referred to in the grey literature above 
(Department of Defense, 2008b). 
In the media, popular environmental news outlets such as Greenbiz have produced many 
articles discussing the potential for mutual benefit to security and the environment by 
considering the topics together (e.g. Lehner, 2011; Guevarra, 2012) and popular non-fiction 
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books have also heavily included, or been dedicated to the topic (e.g. Friedman, 2008; 
Mykleby, Doherty & Makower, 2016). 
Significantly, increasing numbers of mainstream news outlets have now also been producing 
reports relevant to the topic (BBC, 2012) that summarise the relevance of defence engaging 
with energy and climate change challenges. 
At the most enthusiastic end of this spectrum, one commentator has developed the theme of 
the ‘military-industrial complex’ to coin the term the ‘military-environment complex’ (Light, 
2014), in an effort to effectively communicate the significance of the idea, and more recently 
foreign policy think tanks specifically dedicated to the issue have arisen such as the Center 
for Climate and Security27. 
It is clear that the grey literature focused on defence-environmental challenges is rich and 
varied, and the documents referred to in this section will be used to contextualise the results 
presented in chapter 4. 
  
                                                
27 https://climateandsecurity.org/  
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3.6 Methodology Summary 
 
The introduction to this Methodology chapter briefly introduced the industrial context to the 
study, and described the relevance of an exploratory, inductive approach to the research.  A 
flexible approach that allowed relevant patterns to emerge throughout the research made 
sense in a context where both the academic field and professional practice were still 
emerging. 
Section 3.1 (‘The Research Approach’) provided a thorough overview of the research 
approach that has been applied with reference to the Research Onion (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2015), which is a method of breaking down the different stages of a research 
strategy.  Section 3.1 summarises the broad research philosophy, approach and strategy, 
before subsequent sections focus on more detailed stages of the Research Onion.  It 
justifies the inductive approach taken within an interpretivist research philosophy, and 
explains the relevance of a strongly archival strategy to this research.  Section 3.2 
(‘Selecting an Appropriate Sample’) describes how the sample was selected, and explains 
which defence sector organisations have been included in the research.  It explains how this 
sample covered a significant proportion of the defence sector by spend, and allows the 
analysis to extend across different regions and types of defence company.  Despite several 
complimentary strategies being used, the research is fundamentally underpinned by an 
archival strategy and section 3.3 (‘Designing the Archival Research Strategy’) describes how 
this was designed, with reference to the organisations included within the research sample.  
It explains a rationale for selecting relevant public documents for the organisations in the 
sample, and a systematic approach to identifying these.  With a large selection of relevant 
documents selected, section 3.4 (‘Establishing the Primary Datasets’) then describes how 
quantitative datasets were established for GHG and energy data, as well relevant 
normalising data.  Qualitative datasets were also established in relation to energy and 
climate change keywords used in the documents, and any public targets or ambitions being 
communicated by them.  Section 3.5 (‘Relevant Secondary Sources of Data’) describes 
relevant secondary data sources that have been identified and used in the research.  These 
sources of defence-energy grey literature provide some additional context to the data 
identified in the primary sources from the organisations in the sample.  
The introduction to this chapter also provided a clear link to the Literature Review, explaining 
how the ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting deemed most relevant to this research could all 
benefit from an archival strategy that analysed the increasing quantities of public information 
on the subject that are being made available by defence sector organisations across the 
world.  
The first theme related to the difficulty allocating emissions between organisations in existing 
OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence sector due to close working 
relationships, and may result in abstract OCA that does not engage relevant actors to the 
task of reducing GHGs.  This theme clearly requires a detailed understanding of all relevant 
quantitative OCAs that exist in the sector at present, and related qualitative information.  
The second theme discussed the potential for ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts, focused on 
large-scale collaborative programmes to better account for the emissions of the sector in a 
way that engages new/relevant actors to defence-energy debates, supporting low carbon 
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innovation.  This necessitates a review of all relevant Scope 3 Carbon Accounts that exist in 
the sector at present, as well as gaining some understanding of the maturity of ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts in defence organisations. 
The third theme related to the potential for ‘consequential carbon accounting’ perspectives to 
align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, and inform wider strategic narratives that help 
construct a positive selection environment for low carbon technologies in the defence sector.  
This theme benefits significantly from a broad review of relevant grey literature across the 
defence enterprise (both primary and secondary sources) in order to identify and understand 
any relevant concepts or metrics that might link to consequential carbon accounting 
approaches. 
This Methodology chapter has described how the public information on GHGs and climate 
change across the defence enterprise has been reviewed; how relevant primary and 
secondary sources have been identified; and how quantitative and qualitative datasets have 
been established. 
The Results chapter (4) that follows presents correlational analysis of this data.  It begins 
with quantitative analysis of the broad GHG trends across the sample of defence sector 
organisations included in this research.  It explains Scope 1 & 2 comparisons, and how the 
inclusion of Scope 3 data can impact this analysis.  It then integrates the qualitative data in 
order to demonstrate a correlational link between the volumes of emissions reported by 
defence sector organisations, and their level of engagement with climate change mitigation.  
Finally, it analyses the secondary sources of information described above for relevant 
concepts and metrics that have the potential to enhance the value of quantitative and 
qualitative data that the defence sector organisations are currently producing. 
The Discussion chapter (5) then comprehensively evaluates OCA practices in the defence 
sector by integrating the themes from the Literature Review with the correlation analysis 
presented in the Results chapter.  
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4) Results 
 
The Methodology chapter described how the public information on GHGs and climate 
change across the defence enterprise have been reviewed; how relevant primary and 
secondary sources have been identified; and how quantitative and qualitative datasets have 
been established.  These form the basis of the analysis that is presented in this chapter. 
The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ section (1.4) established several objectives relevant 
to the Results chapter. 
The first objective for the Results chapter (4) was to present relevant correlational analysis in 
relation to the quantitative and qualitative datasets established in the Methodology.   
This chapter begins with quantitative analysis of the broad GHG trends across the sample of 
defence sector organisations included in this research (4.1 ‘Correlational Analysis of the 
Quantitative Data’).  Comparisons of the Scope 1 & 2 data show that defence departments 
currently report the overwhelming majority of the overall emissions from the sector (4.1.1).  
However, where scope 3 data related to the value chain is available it has a significant 
impact on these quantitative trends, and is clearly acknowledged as important by the 
majority of organisations included in the sample (4.1.2).  The research uses energy usage 
breakdowns in the defence department data to suggest that ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
– if more widely available – could potentially account for a large proportion of the sectors 
total emissions complicating the picture as to which organisations in the sample are the most 
quantitatively significant (4.1.3).   
The second part of the Results chapter (4.2 ‘Integrating the Qualitative Data’) integrates the 
qualitative data to the analysis above, and demonstrates a connection between the volume 
of emissions reported and the level of priority placed on the issue of climate change 
mitigation, suggesting that the technical accounting issues that drive reported volumes do 
potentially influence organisational responses to climate change, and therefore are 
significant.   
The next objective for the Results chapter was to associate findings from the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis with information from relevant secondary sources to illustrate 
pertinent issues in defence sector Carbon Accounting.  The third part of the Results chapter 
(4.3 ‘Integrating the Secondary Sources’) describes the emergence of some new ‘strategic 
vectors’ of ‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ in the military discourse.  The Fully Burdened Cost of 
Energy (FBCE) is a metric that could be described as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon 
Accounting that is helping to drive these new strategic vectors into military doctrine and 
improve decision making in relation to defence energy use.  These concepts and metrics 
have the potential to enhance the value of quantitative and qualitative data that the defence 
sector organisations are currently producing.  However, the implementation of the FBCE 
relies on robust ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and less attributional mind-sets that are 
discussed in other parts of the thesis. 
The final objective for the Results chapter was to defend/justify the interdisciplinary approach 
taken to the academic literature, and the research strategy used.  The final part of this 
Results chapter (4.4 ‘Results Summary’) summarises the analysis and describes how the 
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relevance of the correlational analysis presented validates the exploratory, inductive 
approach to the research and the strongly archival strategy.  Despite the lack of relevant 
sector-level precedents in the Carbon Accounting literature, and the evolving nature of 
existing OCA practices, relevant patterns are identified in the quantitative and qualitative 
data.  When aligned to the secondary sources of defence-energy grey literature, strong 
trends can be observed that could begin to define some relevant ways forward for OCA 
practices in the sector, validating the research approach taken. 
The ‘Results Summary’ (4.4) also briefly describes the relevance of the analysis for the 
‘themes’ of OCA in the defence sector that were established in the Literature Review.  This 
provides a link to the Discussion chapter (5) that follows, which comprehensively evaluates 
OCA practices in the defence sector by integrating the themes from the Literature Review 
with the correlation analysis presented throughout the Results chapter. 
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4.1 Correlational Analysis of the Quantitative Data 
 
This section is focused on the correlational analysis of the quantitative data, and is split into 
three sub-sections, with the first analysing the trends in the Scope 1 & 2 data, which show 
that the defence departments account for the vast majority of the defence sectors GHG 
impacts and are by extension deemed the most significant organisations in the sample 
(4.1.1).  However, the second sub-section focuses on the trends within the available Scope 3 
data published by the defence companies in the sample, and shows the clear focus on 
indirect Scope 3 emissions as opposed to those related to the value chain.  Where these 
‘value chain-relevant’ emissions (e.g. ‘emissions associated with products in use’) are 
available, the scale of magnitude of these Scope 3 categories is clearly highly significant 
(4.1.2).  The third sub-section uses the data available to show the high proportion of 
emissions that could be connected between the organisations in the sample if relevant 
Scope 3 data was more widely published, and suggests that if Scope 3 emissions were 
properly accounted for, then the relative significance of different organisations within the 
sample could change (4.1.3). 
 
4.1.1 Analysis of Scope 1 & 2 Data 
 
This sub-section compares the volumes of Scope 1 & 2 GHGs emitted by different defence 
sector organisations.  The results are discussed across two separate figures, with the first 
(Figure 6) providing simple organisational comparisons of Scope 1 & 2 GHGs emitted, and 
then the second (Figure 7) applying the normalisation metrics.  Both show that a clear 
majority of emissions are reported by the defence departments.   
 
 
Figure 6: Showing Annual Scope 1 & 2 emissions (Million tCO2e) compared across the organisations included in 
the research. It shows that the defence departments in the sample report the overwhelming majority of the 
sector’s Scope 1 & 2 emissions (Source: Quantitative dataset (Source: Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29). 
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Figure 6 shows the total Scope 1 & 2 GHGs reported by the twelve organisations included in 
this research, in descending order. 
As expected, the US DoD, which is by far the largest organisation in the research, emits far 
larger quantities of GHGs than any of the other organisations.  Much of the ‘defence-energy 
grey literature’ (see section 3.5 ‘Relevant Secondary Sources of Data’) makes reference to 
the US DoD’s ‘exceptional appetite for energy’ (Warner & Singer, 2009: p.3), contextualising 
how the organisation would rank 34th in the world in average daily oil use, just behind Iraq 
and just ahead of Sweden, and its electricity use would rank 58th in the world between 
Denmark and Sweden’s national totals (Lengyel, 2007: p.11).  The exceptional nature of its 
energy use is clearly reflected in the uniquely high volumes of GHGs emitted by the 
organisation as shown in the Figure 6 above. 
However, it is also notable that amongst the other organisations, the UK MoD also emits a 
significantly larger volume of GHGs than the other any of the defence companies, 
suggesting that the defence departments are accounting for a much larger volume of the 
sector’s GHG emissions than the supporting industrial base.   
The defence companies can be seen to be fairly similar in the volume of GHGs reported. 
 
 
Figure 7: Showing Annual Scope 1 & 2 GHG emissions normalised for revenue and employee numbers. It shows 
how both metrics maintain the trend from Figure 6 that the defence departments are the most GHG-intensive 
organisations in the research sample. (Source: Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29, 44, 45, 46, 47) 
 
When common normalisation metrics are applied (for revenue, or headcount) that ought to 
adjust to some extent for the difference in size between the organisations included in this 
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research, it can be seen that the findings above still hold – namely, that the defence 
departments (rightly or wrongly) tend to account for a much larger ‘share’ of the sectors’ 
emissions.  Therefore, the Carbon Accounting practices currently used across the defence 
sector assign a larger volume of emissions to the defence departments. 
Interestingly, although the defence departments and the defence companies sit broadly in 
two categories of ‘emissions-intensity’ in the Figure 7 above, there is variation between 
defence departments (the US DoD is clearly more ‘GHG-intensive’ then the UK MoD under 
current OCA practices). 
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4.1.2 Analysis of Scope 3 Data 
 
This section describes the current (immature) state of Scope 3 Carbon Accounting in the 
public disclosures in the defence sector.  It explains the inadequacy of current Scope 3 
reporting as it applies to the value chain, with most accounts focused on less material Scope 
3 categories such as business travel, with the exception of those published by Lockheed 
Martin.  Where accounts more relevant to the value chain do exist, they demonstrate the 
scale of emissions associated with other parts of the lifecycle of defence products.  It 
contrasts the lack of quantitative data available in this area with the qualitative emphasis 
placed on the importance of these more direct ‘value chain’ impacts of defence products in 
the public documents of many of the organisations included in this research. 
To recap some of the introductory information from the Carbon Accounting Literature Review 
(2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their Limitations’), Scope 3 accounts are defined as follows by WRI (2004): 
- ‘Scope 3 allows for the treatment of all other indirect emissions.  They are a 
consequence of the activities of the organisation, but occur from sources it does not 
own control. Some examples of scope 3 activities are extraction and production of 
purchased materials; and use of sold products and services.’  (p.25) 
This is a wide category, and the challenges that organisations have in reporting Scope 3 
information were described in section 2.1.3 (‘Scope 3 Emissions Inventories and the 
Relevance of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts’).  Section 2.1.3 also discussed some 
distinctions in the scope 3 categories between emissions that relate more directly to the 
value chain, and those that do not.  Table 61 in Appendix A shows how the defence 
companies included in this research report their Scope 3 emissions for each of the 15 
categories of emissions established in the GHG Protocol and reported in CDP’s climate 
change questionnaire.  Of these 15 categories of emissions, some are clearly more directly 
relevant to the value chain than others.  This research would contend that the most directly 
relevant categories to the value chain for manufacturing organisations are the emissions 
associated with ‘purchased goods and services’, and those associated with ‘the use of sold 
products’ (highlighted in bold italics in Table 61 in Appendix A).  Many of the other categories 
of emissions are not so directly relevant to the value chain (e.g. Business Travel), or in the 
case of some of the categories (e.g. franchises, investments) not relevant to the sector more 
generally. 
Table 61 (see Appendix A) shows that Business Travel is by far the most well reported 
category with 8 of the 10 companies reporting against it.  After this, no other category is 
reported by more than 4 of the 10 companies, and as with the ‘business travel’ category 
these are not so directly relevant to the value chain.  Only one company, Lockheed Martin, 
reports against the most ‘value chain’ relevant categories of ‘Purchased Goods and 
Services’ and ‘Use of Sold Products’ (highlighted red).  Beneath these highlighted categories 
in the table, there are a number of categories against which none of the companies report, 
and these generally appear to be categories that are not as relevant to defence as other 
sectors of the economy. 
Reasons for the gap between the numbers of companies reporting against the most ‘value 
chain relevant’ categories and the least ‘value chain relevant’ categories could be as simple 
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as the availability of relevant information.  Business travel for example is likely to be the most 
reported category because of the ease with which large companies can access data.  These 
‘indirect’ categories also benefit more from top down measures for estimating emissions 
relevant to a category (e.g. one can estimate employee commuting relevant to organisation 
size and turnover etc.).   
In contrast, value chain-relevant data, particularly in a sector like defence where particularly 
complex products are produced at low volume, can be far more difficult to derive. 
In terms of reported scope 3 information, Figure 8 shows the volume of emissions reported 
by the defence companies across their ‘less-value chain relevant’ reported categories (i.e. 
Lockheed Martin’s data on ‘purchased goods and services’ and ‘use of sold products’ is not 
included in Figure 8).  The black line overlaying the stacked columns shows each 
organisations’ Scope 1 & 2 emissions for reference.  Figure 8 clearly shows that the reported 
Scope 3 emissions are generally lower, and often small, when compared in aggregate to the 
Scope 1 & 2 emissions of the reporting organisations.  The Literature Review made clear in 
2.1.3 (‘Scope 3 Emissions Inventories and the Relevance of ‘Project Level Carbon 
Accounts’) that Scope 3 emissions tend to represent the vast majority of an organisation’s 
overall GHG impact (~75%), and therefore it does appear that the less ‘value chain relevant’ 
categories of Scope 3 emissions reported by the defence companies included in this 
research do not represent where their biggest impacts are. 
 
 
Figure 8: Annual Scope 3 emissions for all defence companies included in the sample, in the context of their 
Scope 1 & 2 disclosures.  The figure excludes Scope 3 data related to the ‘use of sold products’ or ‘purchased 
goods and services’ from Lockheed Martin, which is analysed separately in Figure 9.  It illustrates how the 
volumes of Scope 3 emissions currently reported by organisations in the sample are in a similar order of 
magnitude to their Scope 1 & 2 emissions, but this is likely to be because their Scope 3 emissions do not 
currently include emissions relevant to the value chain. (Source(s): Appendix A, Table 29, and Tables 32-40) 
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Figure 9 below confirms the hypothesis above.  Lockheed Martin are the only organisation in 
the research who publish data for the most ‘value-chain relevant’ categories of Scope 3 
emissions, and this data demonstrates that these categories clearly dwarf the Scope 1 & 2 
emissions of defence companies. 
 
 
Figure 9: Summary of Lockheed Martin’s Annual Scope 3 Emissions related to ‘Purchased Goods and Services’ 
and ‘Use of Sold Products’ in the Context of their Scope 1 & 2 Disclosures. It illustrates the significance of the 
Scope 3 emissions categories that relate to the value chain, which are currently only reported by Lockheed 
Martin.  The emissions from these Scope 3 categories are far more quantitatively significant than the Scope 1 & 2 
emissions reported by the organisation. (Source(s): Appendix A, Tables 29, 39 and 40) 
 
Lockheed Martin’s data confirms that the emissions associated with its most direct value 
chain impacts (the purchase of goods and services, and particularly the use of sold 
products) is where its biggest GHG impacts are.  These two categories represent over 99% 
of its total reported Scope 3 emissions, and over 98% of its total Scope 1-3 emissions. 
BAE Systems have produced some ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts that are not available 
publicly but demonstrate a similar scale of emissions in other parts of the product lifecycle.  
In one of these studies for a complex defence platform, emissions related to manufacturing 
represented just 3.4% of the total lifecycle emissions, whereas the ‘use of sold products 
phase represented 94.3%. 
Therefore, despite the difficulty in deriving the Scope 3 emissions values that are most 
relevant to the value chain, the submissions by Lockheed Martin in figure 9 above (and the 
private data from BAE Systems) would suggest that these are by far the most relevant ones 
to be reporting. 
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Whilst very little value-chain relevant GHG data exists in the public reporting in the defence 
sector, the emphasis on its importance is clear qualitatively in the documents. 
Defence departments are quick to recognise the importance of their supply chains to their 
products and capability (Cabinet Office, 2010b; Department of Defense, 2010a), and there 
are many references in their specialist public documents to the importance of having energy 
efficient products and services and limiting the environmental impacts of these (Ministry of 
Defence, 2011b; Department of Defense, 2014b).  
The ‘Sustainable Procurement’ guidance of the defence departments (much of which is 
publicly available) is also designed to ensure that suppliers limit the environmental impacts 
of their products in later phases of the product lifecycle.  In the US DoD context, there is lots 
of guidance available on Sustainable Procurement of products and services (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2016), and Sustainable Procurement is actually mandated across the 
organisation with the Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (Department of Defense, 
2014b) publicising a target for 95% of procurement to be conducted sustainability, which 
means that contracts should: 
‘contain requirements for (as relevant and where such products and services meet 
DoD performance requirements): energy‐efficient (ENERGY STAR or Federal 
Energy Management Program [FEMP] designated), water‐efficient, biobased, 
environmentally preferable, non‐ozone depleting, containing recycled content, and/or 
are non‐toxic or less‐toxic alternatives’ (p.24) 
The US DoD has also mandated that the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (see section 4.3.2 
‘Integrating the Secondary Sources’ below) be used in the ‘Analysis of Alternatives’ at 
concept phase to ensure that whole life costing rewards more energy efficient equipment 
(BAE Systems CORDA, 2015). 
Many of the most relevant UK MoD Sustainable Procurement guidance is available via 
registered access or the MoD internal network, but this documentation is also showing an 
increased emphasis on the environmental impacts of products in use, albeit without the 
same sort of pan-organisation requirements being mandated by the US DoD (BAE Systems 
CORDA, 2015). 
Similarly, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Reports from all of the defence 
companies included in this research provide significant narrative sections on ‘product 
stewardship’ that summarise the activities they are undertaking to limit the environmental 
impacts of their products and services (see ‘Specialist’ public documents summarised in 
Appendix A, Table 20). 
A review by Context for BAE Systems (Context, 2015) provides a useful summary of some 
of the key activities undertaken by the defence companies to engage with their suppliers.  
Most companies clearly demand that suppliers satisfactorily complete questionnaires relating 
to their environmental impacts, but some have additionally published targets in relation to 
this, with Raytheon having set a target to increase eco-friendly procurement by 20% by 
2015, and Thales planning to assess environmental maturity of 80% of suppliers by 2015. 
The same review (Context, 2015) also summarised some of the activities taken to ensure 
the environmental efficiency of their products, with most companies conducting Lifecycle 
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Assessments where appropriate and convening ‘Product Environmental Working Groups’ to 
share best practice across their organisations.  However, there are very few quantitative 
metrics or targets in this area, and indeed only Boeing seem to communicate a quantitative 
goal for their products, declaring in their 2014 Environment Report their aim that biofuel will 
meet 1% of global jet demand by 2016. 
Despite this clear qualitative emphasis on environmental performance across the value 
chain, and the recognition of it as fundamental to environmental strategy, examples of GHG 
data published by organisations that is relevant to the value chain are scarce. 
Lockheed Martin are clearly beginning to publish relevant data in this area (see Figure 9 
above), and BAE Systems are doing it internally for certain products and services.  The 
numerous references to the use of lifecycle assessments in the public reporting of defence 
companies suggests that others are also generating this type of data, if not making it public 
or calculating it for the organisation as a whole. 
On the defence department side, there are clearly some efforts to understand their own 
‘supplier emissions’ in quantitative terms, with the US Navy notable for having joined CDPs 
Supply Chain scheme (CDP, 2016e) and asking its major suppliers to provide GHG data 
associated with the supply of their products and services to the organisation. 
However, these efforts remain immature in the sector at present.  The lack of good, public 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts is notable, and limits the relevance of OCA where Scope 3 
emissions inventories generally do not contain information relevant to the most significant 
parts of the defence value chain, or those where the majority of emissions are located. 
Recognising the lack of data available in this area, the next section analyses the published 
energy breakdowns of the different organisations across the defence sector, and suggests 
that the way that Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems have quantified the value chain 
relationships above appears to hold across the sector more broadly. 
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4.1.3 How the Significance of Different Organisations in the Sample Could Change if 
Scope 3 Emissions were more Widely Available 
 
This sub-section compares the ‘operational energy’ demands of the defence departments 
with relevant portions of the defence company totals.  It reinforces the scale of emissions 
likely to be linked to defence products, and contrasts the scale of these ‘linked’ accounts with 
the large differences in volumes reported by organisations in the existing organisational 
accounts.  As the defence departments tend to wholly account for the GHGs emitted in the 
usage phase of defence products at present, their organisational totals will inevitably be far 
higher than those of the defence companies, despite the significant impact that defence 
companies have on the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of these products.  
In the absence of a full set of Scope 3 emissions data, linking a portion of the departmental 
emissions to the supporting industrial base gives some indication of the scale of emissions 
that can be associated across the defence value chain. 
The ‘facility’ and ‘operational’ split is common language in the defence department reporting, 
and is useful for understanding the volume of emissions that can be connected across the 
defence value chain.  The ‘facility’ emissions refer to those related to a given defence 
department’s (largely domestic) static estate, and the ‘Operational’ emissions represent the 
‘operational fuel’ that the department is buying to power its equipment.  Lengyel (2007) 
explains in the US context: 
‘In simple terms, DOD energy use can be divided into two main categories: 
petroleum based fuel for mobility platforms, and infrastructure energy based on 
electricity, natural gas. The vast majority of DOD energy consumption, some 74% of 
total energy cost, supports mobility platforms – aircraft, ships, and ground 
vehicles…Buildings/facilities account for 22% of DOD’s energy cost.’ (p.9) 
In the UK the breakdown is fairly similar (see next sub-section), and these percentage-splits 
are obviously subject to change over time as deployed operations occupy a larger or smaller 
proportion of defence activity (Pew, 2010). 
This division is partly founded on the organisational structures of defence departments, with 
facility energy and operational energy often located in separate areas of the organisation, as 
Partemore & Nagl (2010) describe: 
‘there is no single official who oversees DOD’s entire energy portfolio; authority within 
DOD is currently divided’ (p.4) … 
‘Within OSD and the services, responsibility is generally split between those 
managing energy for military installations and those managing operational energy. 
This is in part a legacy divide: Positions governing operational energy in OSD and 
the services have only been stood up as dedicated offices over the past few years, 
while offices governing energy use at military bases have long been part of the DOD 
organizational structure.’ (p.19) 
It is reinforced by the public reporting, which distinguishes fairly heavily between facility and 
operational energy, and in the case of the US they are reported on separately. 
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Figure 10 demonstrates the scale of difference between the defence departments and 
defence companies in the proportion of ‘operational energy’ that they report.   
Note that the ‘facility’ and ‘operational’ split does not apply well to the companies included in 
this research because they don’t have the same concept of ‘deployed operations’ described 
above.  However, the companies do tend to publish details of the energy mix that underpins 
their reported GHG data (via CDP), and therefore we can make an imperfect, but interesting 
comparison with the defence departments by splitting out the liquid fuels that they use 
(assumed mostly relevant to testing and trialling equipment), from their solid fuels and 
purchased electricity (assumed relevant to their ‘static estate’). 
 
 
Figure 10: ‘Facility-Operational Split’ in energy consumption compared across defence sector organisations.  It 
demonstrates a significant difference between the defence departments and defence companies in the proportion 
of ‘operational energy’ (or liquid fuels) that they report (Source: Appendix A, Tables 23-24, 26-27, 41-43) 
 
One conclusion from Figure 10 above is that the facility-operational profile of the 
organisations in the research differs so markedly between defence departments and defence 
companies because they are doing significantly different tasks, with the defence 
departments using mobile platforms and the defence companies simply manufacturing and 
testing them.  However, these are strongly linked activities given that the ‘operational loads’ 
of the defence departments are often based on the equipment and services provided to them 
by the defence companies. 
Table 62 in Appendix A is reproduced from Page (2007) with some additions, and 
demonstrates the extent to which BAE Systems is the dominant supplier to the UK MoD in 
relation to the products that use a significant amount of the department’s operational energy 
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use.  The table implies that it is reasonable to make a comparison of the operational energy 
use of the MoD and BAE Systems total ‘revenue adjusted’ emissions for their sales to that 
customer (see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of ‘revenue-adjusted’ BAE Systems emissions with the operational energy use of the UK 
MoD.  This represents an attempt to ‘link’ a relevant proportion of BAE Systems’ emissions with those of the UK 
MoD.  The BAE Systems emissions have been normalised for the proportion of total company sales that went to 
the UK MoD (26%).  All of the MoD’s emissions related to operational energy use are included as it can be 
demonstrated that the vast majority of their combat platforms are supplied by BAE Systems (see Table 62).  The 
figure illustrates how these ‘linked emissions’ together represent a very significant volume of emissions, which 
are currently overwhelmingly reported by the defence department.  (Source: Appendix A, Tables 21, 29, 50) 
 
Similarly, one might hypothesise that the US DoD’s main combat platforms are supplied by 
one or other of the top US defence contractors.  Figure 12 below shows the same 
comparison of US DoD operational energy use and revenue-adjusted emissions of the top 
US defence companies. 
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Figure 12: Comparison of ‘revenue-adjusted’ emissions for US defence companies in the sample with the 
operational energy use of the US DoD. This represents an attempt to ‘link’ a relevant proportion of relevant 
defence company emissions with those of the US DoD.  The US defence company emissions have been 
normalised for the proportion of total company sales that went to the US DoD.  All of the US DoD’s emissions 
related to operational energy use are included as the vast majority of their combat platforms are supplied by 
these companies.  The figure illustrates how these ‘linked emissions’ together represent a very significant volume 
of emissions, which are currently overwhelmingly reported by the defence department. (Source: Appendix A, 
Tables 25, 29, and 49)  
 
These estimates of ‘linked emissions’ in the sector as a whole corroborate the scale of 
Scope 3 value chain emissions estimated by Lockheed Martin above and derived in the 
internal BAE Systems product-level footprint.  Figure 13 below aggregates the organisational 
totals described in section 4.1.1 (‘Analysis of Scope 1 & 2 Data’) and highlights the elements 
of them that link together between defence departments and defence companies. 
As can be seen, despite the huge difference in volumes of emissions reported by the 
defence departments and the defence companies, a very significant proportion of the 
defence department emissions can be linked in some way to the defence companies. 
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Figure 13: Comparison of ‘revenue-adjusted’ annual emissions of all defence companies in the sample with the 
operational energy use of the US DoD and UK MoD.  This combines the data from figures 10 and 11 to show the 
same comparison for all organisations in the sample.  This figure also shows these ‘linked’ emissions (in blue) in 
the context of the total reported Scope 1 & 2 emissions from all organisations in the sample (‘other emissions’ in 
red in the figure above).  The figure illustrates how these ‘linked emissions’ together represent a very significant 
volume of the total emissions reported by the sample, which are currently overwhelmingly reported by the 
defence departments. (Source: Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29, 49, 50) 
 
The scale of these ‘linked emissions’ emphasises the potential value that ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts can add in producing accounts for carbon that better acknowledge the 
extent to which the organisations are linked together by this equipment across the defence 
sector. 
The scale of the emissions that can be linked across different organisations in the defence 
enterprise also gives some indication of how the significance of different organisations in the 
sample might change if certain categories of Scope 3 emissions were published.  Section 
4.1.1 analysing the scope 1 & 2 emissions showed a clear quantitative emphasis on the 
defence departments over the defence companies in the sample, however the analysis from 
the subsequent sections suggests that the some or all of the companies in the sample would 
become far more quantitatively significant if relevant categories of Scope 3 emissions are 
included. 
The next section integrates the qualitative data to this analysis.  It shows a correlational link 
between the quantity of emissions accounted for and the emphasis placed on the issue of 
climate change mitigation in the public documents that are produced by the defence 
organisations in the sample.  This suggests that the OCA practices can potentially have a 
real impact on the level of importance placed on climate change mitigation, and the extent to 
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which the innovative capacity of different organisations is being leveraged in the fight against 
climate change.  Thus, OCA practices that assign the overwhelming majority of emissions to 
the defence departments may not encourage the whole of the defence enterprise to 
effectively engage on climate change mitigation.  
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4.2 Integrating the Qualitative Data 
 
This section integrates the qualitative data discussed in the Methodology (section 3.4.2 
‘Establishing the Qualitative Dataset’) to analyse the significance of the higher volumes of 
emissions accounted for by the defence departments, highlighting a correlation between the 
volumes of emissions reported, and the level of importance placed on the issue by the 
organisation concerned.  This is significant because it suggests that OCA practices can 
potentially have a real impact on the level of importance placed on climate change mitigation 
by the organisations in the sample, and the extent to which their innovative capacity is being 
leveraged to help mitigate dangerous climate change. 
This section is split into two sub-sections that each compare total reported emissions with 
some relevant indicators taken from the qualitative dataset.  Section 4.2.1 compares 
reported emissions with the use of certain climate change ‘keywords’ in the public reporting 
of the organisations in the sample, and section 4.2.2 compares reported emissions with the 
levels of ambition enshrined within their public targets for reducing GHGs. 
 
4.2.1 Volumes of Emissions Reported vs Public Use of Energy and Climate Change 
Keywords 
 
The public use of energy and climate change keywords can be used as one indicator of the 
level of importance placed on the issue of climate change mitigation by the organisations 
included in this research.  By comparing this to the volumes of emissions reported by the 
organisations in the sample, the analysis below demonstrates that when higher volumes of 
emissions are reported by a particular organisation can increase the emphasis that they 
place on the topic in their public reporting. 
Figure 14 below shows that there is no clear relationship between climate change and 
energy keywords used in the ‘general’ public documents produced by the organisations in 
this research and their relative GHG intensity.  However, Figure 15 shows quite a clear 
relationship in relation to the ‘specialist’ public documents produced by the organisations 
included in the research. 
Note that it is important to normalise for page numbers, as the documents reviewed can vary 
significantly in length, and differ in relation to how concise they are. 
It is also interesting to see the split between ‘climate change’ keywords and ‘energy’ 
keywords in these documents.  Certainly the US DoD appears to have a strong preference 
for discussing ‘energy’ in preference to ‘carbon’ or ‘climate change’, and this may reflect 
cultural issues within the regions and organisations analysed.  These cultural influences on 
the language used is beyond the scope of this research, but the keyword-count datasets 
shown in section 3.4.2 (‘Establishing the Qualitative Dataset’) have potential to be used for a 
more in-depth analysis of this issue, particularly if the further categories within ‘energy’ and 
‘climate change’ are explored. 
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Figure 14: Showing the number of climate change and energy keywords in ‘general’ public documents produced 
by the organisations included in the sample (normalised for total number of pages in the document), compared to 
their GHG-intensity measured by their annual tCO2 per $m revenue. It shows the lack of a clear correlation in 
relation to the ‘general’ public documents between the volume of emissions reported by organisations and the 
level of emphasis placed on energy and climate change in their public reporting.  This is in contrast to the clear 
correlation in relation to the ‘specialist’ public documents described in Figure 15. (Source: All ‘general’ public 
documents described in Appendix A, Table 20. GHG Intensity derived from Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29, 44, 
45, 46, and 47) 
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Figure 15: Showing the number of climate change and energy keywords in ‘specialist’ public documents 
produced by the organisations included in the sample (normalised for total number of pages in the document), 
compared to their GHG-intensity measured by their annual tCO2 per $m revenue. It shows a correlation in 
relation to the ‘specialist’ public documents between the volume of emissions reported by organisations and the 
level of emphasis placed on energy and climate change in their public reporting. (Source: All ‘specialist’ public 
documents described in Appendix A, Table 20. GHG Intensity derived from Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29, 44, 
45, 46, and 47) 
 
The next section analyses whether the same correlations hold when considering the 
qualitative data related to GHG and Energy targets that are set by the organisations in the 
sample. 
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4.2.2 Volumes of Emissions Reported vs Energy and GHG Targets 
 
Another indicator that helps describe the level of priority that organisations are placing on 
climate change mitigation is the type and scale of public targets that they are setting.  This 
indicator can also be compared to the total volume of emissions that the organisations report 
to determine whether a correlation exists. 
Figure 16 below shows where absolute GHG reduction targets exist across the organisations 
in this research, and how these compare to the GHG intensity of the organisations. 
As can be seen, the two organisations clearly reporting the highest volumes of GHGs (US 
DoD and the UK MoD) are clearly setting public GHG reduction targets, and the reduction 
ambition of these targets neatly track each organisation’s GHG Intensity measured by tCO2 
per $m Revenue.  There will be other drivers pushing these organisations to set emissions 
reductions targets, for example the fact that they are public sector organisations subject to 
wider federal reduction targets.  However, there is a notable correlation between the 
emissions intensity of the organisations and the scale of ambition demonstrated by their 
public targets, and the defence-energy grey literature (see 3.5 ‘Relevant Secondary Sources 
of Data’) demonstrates how defence departments (particularly the US DoD) come under 
some pressure to set energy and GHG targets of an appropriate ambition, partly as a result 
of the scale of emissions that they have declared.  For example, Warner & Singer (2009) 
and Partemore & Nagl (2010) have both debated relevant energy targets for the US DoD in 
their thought-leadership pieces28. 
The picture is far more mixed for the defence companies included in this research.  The 
presence of absolute GHG reduction targets for only 3 of the 10 companies included in the 
research does suggest that their lower reported volumes of emissions may be a driver in 
their decisions to publicly declare GHG reduction targets.  This is clearly not the case for 
three of the organisations in the research (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and 
Raytheon), who are setting emissions reduction targets that look particularly ambitious given 
their reported volumes of emissions.  Interestingly, when referring to the qualitative dataset 
of ‘external accounts of performance’ (see Appendix A, Tables 57-58), the scores given to 
the defence companies by CDP for the period to which the data in Figure 16 relates would 
confirm these three organisations a ‘good performers’, as they were the only three 
organisations to receive the highest performance score of ‘A’ in that year.  This implies some 
correlation between the different qualitative indicators used in this research, which suggests 
that any potential bias in the analysis is likely to have been reduced to an acceptable level. 
  
                                                
28 Warner & Singer (2009) recommended that ’based upon existing analysis and discussions with 
defense energy experts of what would be an ambitious but achievable goal, it is our contention that a 
target can be set for an overall reduction goal of 20 percent by 2025 and for the DoD to be a net-zero 
energy consumer at its bases and facilities by 2030’ (p.5). Partemore & Nagl (2010) recommend that 
‘DOD should ensure that it can operate all of its systems on non-petroleum fuels by 2040…Ensuring 
that DOD can operate on non-petroleum fuels 30 years from today is a conservative hedge against 
prevailing economic, political and environmental trends, conditions and constraints.’ (p.3) 
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Figure 16: Showing the relationship between the GHG intensity of the organisations in the sample (measured by 
their annual tCO2 per $m revenue) and their published GHG reduction targets.  For the defence departments, it 
shows a correlation between the GHG intensity of the organisation and their level of ambition in relation to 
reducing their GHG emissions.  For the defence companies, three companies are setting absolute reduction 
targets, which appear particularly ambitious in relation to their GHG intensity. Interestingly, these three 
companies appear to be scoring better than the others in the sample in relevant external accounts of 
environmental performance, such as those from CDP. (Source: Targets taken from Appendix A, Table 56.  GHG 
Intensity derived from Appendix A, Tables 21, 25, 29, 44, 45, 46, and 47) 
 
This section has illustrated a correlation between the volume of emissions reported by an 
organisation and the level of priority placed on the issue of climate change mitigation, by 
comparing total emissions with some qualitative analysis of public documents from the 
relevant defence sector organisations.  It suggests that the technical accounting issues 
driving reported volumes may not only influence the absolute reported volumes of GHGs, but 
by extension the extent to which the organisation acts to mitigate climate change. 
Some analysis from Kauffman, Tebar Less & Teichmann (2012) would reinforce this 
assessment, concluding that ‘in practice there seems to be a strong link between GHG 
emission reporting and the development of a corporate climate change strategy’ (p.24), and 
that discussing GHG reporting schemes (whether mandatory or voluntary) is a key lever for 
making organisations act to mitigate climate change. 
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4.3 Integrating the Secondary Sources 
 
The exploratory approach and archival strategy applied in this research emphasised the 
relevance of using secondary sources from the defence sector (see Methodology section 3.5 
‘Relevant Secondary Sources of Data’), where the topic of defence energy use and defence-
climate issues has gathered significant momentum.  These secondary sources highlight 
some relevant concepts and metrics related to defence energy use that are summarised in 
this part of the Results chapter, and returned to in the ‘Results Summary’ and Discussion 
chapter that follow. 
In addition to the quantitative and qualitative analysis above, this analysis of the secondary 
sources provides some broader context to the way that defence-energy and defence-climate 
issues are being framed across the defence enterprise. 
This section is split into three further sub-sections.  The first (4.3.1) describes the emerging 
concepts of ‘endurance’ and ‘resilience’ in defence that help to contextualise defence-energy 
challenges at the system-level.  The second sub-section (4.3.2) describes some relevant 
metrics that connect to these emerging concepts.  It focuses on the ‘Fully Burdened Cost of 
Energy’ (FBCE) metric, which has illustrated the substantially increased cost of actually 
using energy in military operations, when a system-level perspective is applied that includes 
the logistics implications of delivering energy to remote and hostile locations.  The third sub-
section (4.3.3) explains the current state of the FBCE in practice, explaining how it has 
successfully established itself in the military lexicon, but there remain challenges in 
practically implementing it across defence decision making.  The barriers to its practical 
application are of particular relevance to this research, and are summarised in relation to the 
lack of good ‘project level’ data (see section 4.1.2 ‘Analysis of Scope 3 Data’) that can 
support calculation of the FBCE in different scenarios, but also the emphasis on individual 
functions, departments or organisations that make it difficult to realise the potential benefits 
illustrated by the metric at the system level.  This latter barrier can be seen as analogous to 
the emphasis on attributing emissions to individual organisations in traditional OCA 
practices. 
 
4.3.1 Emerging System-Level Concepts in the Defence-Energy Grey Literature 
 
Recent commentaries have emphasised the clear links between defence energy use and 
defence capability.  When asked in 2003 what was the most important area of military 
research that was currently needed Lieutenant General James Mattis famously responded: 
‘unleash us from the tether of fuel’ (Lengyel, 2007).  This ‘tether of fuel’ places large 
restrictions on the military becoming the type of agile, flexible and ‘light-footed’ force required 
for the ‘new wars’ described in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial Policy’) that characterise the 
contemporary security environment.  The previous Results sections have described the large 
volumes of energy required to support defence, but this is only part of the story – the 
logistics associated with delivering this fuel to point of use are very significant.  Many recent 
studies from think tanks and military research organisations have focused on the logistical 
burden of having to supply fuel to deployed forces, highlighting the disparity between the 
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force requirements for logistics and that used for actual operations.  Warner & Singer (2009) 
elaborate on this issue, highlighting how the current US scenario harks back to civil war 
logistics: 
‘In a study of fuel use in Iraq, the Marines found that only 10 percent of their 
consumption was by armed vehicles. The remainder was consumed by logistics 
vehicles. For the Army, only two of its top ten fuel consumers are combat vehicles. 
Ironically, three of the four least fuel-efficient Army vehicles are trucks that haul 
fuel…the current situation echoes…Civil War logistics, when mule teams hauled 
wagons of supplies, half of whose tonnage was feed for the mules.’ (p.2) 
Lengyel (2007) summarises that ‘the United States’ unique ability to project military power 
anywhere on the globe requires incredible quantities of liquid hydrocarbon fuel’ (p.52).  The 
DSB Task Force on Energy Security discussed the issue of the logistical burden being 
carried by the US Armed Forces in their 2008 review (Department of Defense, 2008b) 
commenting on the poorly balanced ratio of ‘operational effect’ to ‘logistics effort’, or as they 
describe it ‘tooth-to-tail’.  The ‘tail’ of contemporary forces is huge, and this considerably 
restricts movement in the battlespace.  
The ‘logistics tail’ has proved a vulnerable target to enemy attack in deployed environments.  
The following passage from a Deloitte study (2009) elaborates further on the fuel 
requirements of contemporary armed forces, the success that enemy forces have had in 
disrupting fuel supply, and how this ‘logistics vulnerability’ is very much a feature of 
contemporary conflict: 
‘High fuel requirements in forward deployed locations present the military with a 
significant logistical burden…More importantly, the transport of this fuel via truck 
convoy represents casualty risks, not only from IEDs and enemy attacks, but also 
rough weather, traffic accidents, and pilferage. DoD officials reported that in June 
2008 alone, a combination of these factors caused the loss of some 44 trucks and 
220,000 gallons of fuel’ (p.15 Deloitte study) 
Deloitte (2009) show a correlation between the fuel demands of US Forces and the increase 
in US casualties, and Warner & Singer (2009) describe how ‘a mere 1 percent improvement 
in energy efficiency would mean that soldiers in Iraq would have to serve on 6,444 less 
convoy missions, a role considered one of the most dangerous in the operation’ (p.3).  The 
UK scenario is no different, with Stein (2009) commenting that ‘fuel supplies are often 
targeted by enemy forces and 139 personnel and 89 tankers have been lost while delivering 
fuel since 2006 alone’. 
Warner & Singer (2009) highlight the potential that reducing the logistics footprint has to 
‘enhance mobility and lighten footprint’, emphasising that these are ‘crucial goals in both 
conventional operations and a counterinsurgency campaign.’ (p.3).  Lovins (2010) notes the 
potential advantages: 
‘A lean or zero fuel logistics tail increases mobility, manoeuvre, tactical and operational 
flexibility, versatility, and reliability—all required to combat asymmetrical, adaptive, de-
massed, elusive, faraway adversaries.’ (p.4) 
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The fact that both authors tie this trend to the contemporary character of conflict is 
significant, with a mobile and agile force essential to the ‘new wars’ described in section 2.2 
(‘Defence Industrial Policy’).  In this context energy efficiency is increasingly being seen as 
an enabler of defence capability, as opposed to a trade off with it.  The DSB Task Force 
(Department of Defense, 2008b) confirm that the DoD need not choose between capability 
and energy efficiency: 
‘The payoff to DoD from reduced fuel demand in terms of mission effectiveness and 
human lives is probably greater than for any other energy user in the world. More 
efficient platforms would enhance range, persistence and endurance. They also 
would reduce the burden of owning, employing, operating and protecting the people 
and equipment needed to move and protect fuel from the point of commercial 
purchase to the point of use…In short, more efficient platforms increase warfighting 
capability.’ (p.18) 
Some new ‘strategic vectors’ have emerged to try and encapsulate this mind-set where 
energy efficiency is considered an enabler of defence capability, as opposed to a trade-off 
with it.  Lovins (2010) describes these as ‘endurance’ and ‘resilience’, and these are 
discussed in more depth next. 
Lovins (2010) describes how ‘Strategic Vectors’ can be summed up as ‘succinct descriptions 
of capabilities that would make a big difference in military operations’ (p. 3-4).  The current 
vectors used are speed, stealth, persistence and networking (Department of Defense, 
2008b: p.35).  The DSB Task Force on Energy Security recommend two further vectors to 
appropriately consider energy within this process: endurance and resilience. 
‘Endurance exploits improved energy efficiency and autonomous energy supply to 
extend range and dwell—recognizing the need for affordable dominance, requiring 
little or no fuel logistics, in persistent, dispersed, and remote operations, while 
enhancing overmatch in more traditional operations. Resilience combines efficient 
energy use with more diverse, dispersed, renewable supply—turning the loss of 
critical missions from energy supply failures (by accident or malice) from inevitable to 
near-impossible.’ (Department of Defense, 2008b: p.35) 
Creating ‘strategic vectors’ that better relate to the energy challenges that defence faces 
provides a means of summarising the challenge at the ‘system-level’, and relating it strongly 
to the overarching issue of ‘defence capability’ discussed in section 2.2 (‘Defence Industrial 
Policy’).   
To take ‘resilience’ first, this ‘vector’ might be seen to apply best to infrastructure energy use, 
with bases both in deployed or allied locations and at home needing a secure supply of 
energy to support operations.  This vector is particularly important considering the 
contemporary character of conflict, where these operating bases are used extensively to 
support deployed forces through C4ISTAR operations (surveillance, reconnaissance, 
information analysis etc.). 
The ‘endurance’ vector is perhaps most relevant to this research, with Lovins (2010) 
connecting this ‘vector’ strongly to platform energy use, and therefore it is directly relevant to 
the type of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts discussed in section 4.1.2 (‘Analysis of Scope 3 
Data’) above: 
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‘Endurance is needed in every “platform” using energy in the battlespace, from 
mobility platforms to expeditionary base power to battery-powered land-warrior 
electronics. Endurance is even more valuable in stability operations, which often 
need even more persistence, dispersion, and affordability than the combat operations 
with which they now enjoy comparable priority.’ (Lovins, 2010: p.4) 
The same author uses this ‘vector’ to describe the system-level context and rationale for 
change (efficiency) at the project level: 
‘radically boosting platforms’ energy efficiency and combat effectiveness at 
reasonable or reduced up-front cost can turn each of these energy risks into major 
warfighting gains. Requiring and exploiting Endurance can give DOD more effective 
forces and a more stable world, at reduced cost and risk. This better-than-free 
opportunity must become a cornerstone of military doctrine.’ (p.6) 
This is particularly relevant in a context of increasing platform energy use at present.  These 
increases can be partly justified by the increased capability of newer equipment, for example 
Lockheed Martin’s 2013 Sustainability Report (Lockheed Martin, 2014b) explains the relative 
‘energy efficiency of their ‘force multiplier F-22 and F-35 aircraft [that] do the work of several 
prior-generation airplanes’ (p.22).  However, the energy demands of new defence platforms 
are growing more intensive.  Section 4.1.2 (‘Analysis of Scope 3 Data’) discussed the lack of 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts published in the defence sector, but some analysis by DoD 
and the Rocky Mountain Institute has suggested that:  
‘oil intensity per warfighter rose 2.6%pa for the past 40 years, and is projected to rise 
another 1.5% pa through 2017, due to greater mechanization, remote expeditionary 
conflict, rugged terrain, and irregular operations’ (Lovins, 2010: p.1) 
Therefore regardless of capability gains per platform, they are becoming more energy 
hungry.  The same study suggests that compared with operations during the Cold War, 
‘warfighting is [now] about 16 times more energy-intensive’ (Lovins, 2010: p.1).  A Dutch 
Task Force on Energy Security (Vettehen & Ross, 2010) note a similar trend: 
‘Since the end of the Cold War, the number of personnel within the Armed Forces 
has been substantially reduced, similar to the numbers of armoured vehicles, ships 
and aircraft. Declining numbers are partially compensated for by new technology. 
However, this new technology generally demands more energy – the energy 
consumption of a single soldier has risen by 175 per cent over the last three 
decades. It will continue to rise and increase the dependency on fossil fuels if policies 
to reduce energy consumption are not implemented.’ (p.94) 
A Deloitte study (2009) notes similar issues and states that as a result defence has 
experienced ‘a steady increase in the dependence on fossil fuels since World War II’ (p.3). 
Lovins (2010) summarises the importance of the ‘endurance’ vector within this context of 
increasing platform energy use: 
‘An Endurance capability will create transformational strategies and tactics that both 
tell the requirements-writer to make a new platform fuel efficient and inspire the force 
planner to exploit its increased range and agility. Today’s DOD habits would instead 
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tend to make it heavier with the same range—much as Detroit’s engine 
improvements since the 1970s, rather than saving one-third of civilian cars’ fuel, only 
made them more muscular.’ (p3-4) 
There is some suggestion in the defence-energy grey literature that the latter habits are 
occurring at present, with the DSB Task Force on Energy Security (Department of Defense, 
2008b) suggesting that ‘combat and combat related systems generally are inefficient in their 
use of fuel’ (p.17) and summarising many potential broad technical improvements that would 
increase platform efficiency.  Indeed, some authors suggest that fundamentally redesigning 
around energy efficiency might be the best way to enhance capability (Tibbles, 2009).  
Applying the wider concept of both the technical efficiency of platforms and the way in which 
they are used, Lengyel (2007) cites an internal Air Force study that: 
‘identified $750 million in potential fuel savings through: aircraft weight reduction;… 
increased use of simulators for flight training; reduced aircraft rotations to Iraq and 
Afghanistan; basing aircraft closer to operating areas; more direct aircraft routing 
through improved diplomatic over flight clearances; fuel efficient ground operations; 
eliminating unnecessary air refuelling.’ (p.37) 
Lovins (2010) heralds the identification of the need for these overarching strategic vectors as 
a real achievement of the DSB Task Force’s report on Energy Security (Department of 
Defense, 2008b), but also discusses the need to ‘drive them into doctrine’: 
‘Endurance and Resilience are new capabilities that drive and apply new operational 
requirements…The need to change entrenched habits in force planning and 
operational requirements makes big new capabilities both vital and hard. Driving 
them deeply into doctrine, strategy, organizational structures, cultures, training, 
reward systems, and behaviours needs strong, consistent, persistent senior 
leadership. But once so embedded, new capabilities disruptively and profoundly 
improve military effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.” (p.3-4) 
It is in this context that new ‘metrics’ are relevant to enable decisions to reflect these new 
strategic requirements.  The DSB suggest that at present: 
‘DoD lacks accepted tools to value their operational and economic benefits [of new 
technologies]. As a result, cost effective technologies are not adopted, science and 
technology programs significantly under-invest in efficiency relative to its potential 
value, and competitive prototyping to accelerate deployment of efficiency 
technologies is not done.’ (Department of Defense, 2008b: p.4) … 
‘The same lack of analytical tools that prevent the requirements and acquisition 
processes from developing more efficient systems also prevent science and 
technology investments from identifying the most effective investments in energy 
efficiency technologies. Investments should be guided by a common understanding 
of their operational, force structure and cost value, but the tools and business 
processes needed to establish this understanding do not exist.’ (Department of 
Defense, 2008b: p.6-7) 
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The DSB confirm that ‘Implementing new analytical products to better inform key decisions 
will be essential to enabling effective energy management’ (p.6).  Likewise, Warner & Singer 
(2009) state that: 
‘Part of achieving success is having the metrics on hand to implement measurable 
standards across the DoD and know what type of progress (or not) is being made in 
usage on an annual basis.’ (p.6) 
The next section will focus on these types of ‘metric’, specifically discussing the Fully 
Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) metric within this context.  
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4.3.2 Relevant Metrics Connecting the System-Level Concepts and Decision Making 
(Fully Burdened Cost of Energy) 
 
This sub-section describes some relevant metrics that connect to the emerging concepts 
above.  It focuses on the ‘Fully Burdened Cost of Energy’ (FBCE) metric, which has 
illustrated the substantially increased cost of actually using energy in military operations, 
when a system-level perspective is applied that includes the logistics implications of 
delivering energy to remote and hostile locations.  This sub-section explains the 
development of the metric, the range of cost projections associated with the FBCE, and the 
potential it has to substantially improve the business case for low carbon technology and 
behaviours in defence decision making.  It has the potential to connect ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts to wider strategic vectors like ‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ that enhance 
defence capability, and could be viewed as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon 
Accounting (as discussed in section 2.1.4) given its focus on (reducing) future emission 
profiles in given scenarios, and its emphasis on helping to make good decisions that affect 
positive change at the system level. 
The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) has rapidly gained credibility in the military 
lexicon as a method used to understand the true cost of the energy that defence 
departments are procuring at point of use.  Friedman (2008) provides an engaging summary 
of the FBCE (often described as the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) in the American 
context), discussing the background to its development and the implications of the finding for 
military investment decisions and the efficiency possibilities in deployed locations. 
Lengyel (2007) describes how the DoD has traditionally valued energy in a very simple way: 
‘fuel costs for budgeting and resource planning have traditionally been based on the 
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) standard price, which does not reflect the 
cost of the fuel logistics system required to deliver fuel to the war fighter. The 
standard price of fuel represents only a fraction of the true cost.’ (p.11-12) 
The DSB Task Force (Department of Defense, 2008b) confirms that: 
‘If the acquisition process does not understand the total ownership cost of buying, 
moving and protecting fuel to systems in combat (fully burdened cost of fuel), then its 
business case analyses will use only the commodity price for fuel. This distorts the 
results to make high return investments in efficiency look much worse than they 
really are.’ (p.26) 
The FBCE metric has been a response to this issue, and attempts to determine the full cost 
implications of energy used, at whichever point in the system it is being used.  Lovins (2010) 
describes some of the ways that the FBCE can be determined: 
‘Just the dollar cost of protecting fuel convoys can be “upward of 15 times the actual 
purchase cost of fuel…[increasing] exponentially as the delivery cost increases or 
when force protection is provided from air.” The ~8,000 gallons per troop-year 
consumed in Afghanistan at a typical delivered cost of $25–45/gal, reportedly 
accounts for ~20–36% of the ~$1 million/troop-year cost of deployment there…Yet 
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most of the fuel delivered at such high cost could have been avoided by far more 
efficient use.’ (p.2-3) 
A Deloitte study (2009) provides a similar break down of how these FBCE estimates can be 
put together (building on work and previous reports by the Brookings Institute and Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA).  The study explains: 
‘Beyond the basic purchase cost of fuel are other ‘hidden’ costs, including 
maintaining fuel transport equipment, training personnel, and maintaining and 
protecting the oil supply chain. The military currently pays between $2 and $3 per 
gallon for fuel depending on market conditions. The process of getting the fuel to its 
intended destination, even assuming that no protection is provided to the convoys 
during transport, increases the cost to nearly $15 a gallon. Protection of fuel convoys 
in combat zones requires an enormous show of force in the form of armoured 
vehicles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft, forcing costs even higher. …Protecting 
fuel convoys from the ground and air costs the DoD upward of 15 times the actual 
purchase cost of fuel, depending on the level of protection required by the convoy 
and the current market prices of the fuel commodity. Fuel costs grow exponentially 
as the delivery distance increases or when force protection is provided from air” 
(p.19) 
There are many ‘multipliers’ from standard domestic energy prices quoted in the context of 
the FBCE.  The variety is understandable because the FBCE in a given scenario can be 
different depending on what the scenario is.  Likewise, considering the FBCE in relation to a 
platform may differ depending on what that platform is doing.  This strong link to scenarios 
and decision making connect it very closely to the ideas of ‘consequential Carbon 
Accounting’ discussed in section 2.1.4, and particularly how these practices relate to 
‘defence capability’. 
There have been many studies produced in relation to the FBCE, and as expected, a range 
of values appear.  A Pew report (2010) summarises:  
‘Estimates of the fully burdened costs of fuel, depending on when and where it is 
needed, range from two to 20 times the pump price for aerial refuelling, to hundreds 
of dollars a gallon when delivered to a forward area. In that scenario, some estimates 
run as high as $400 a gallon.’ (p.9) 
In the US, Lengyel (2007: p.13) suggests that the average FBCE for the Army is around 
$5.62 per gallon; for the Navy was $3.08 per gallon; and for the Air Force was around $6.36 
per gallon – although this rose to $42 per gallon if delivered via air-refuelling. 
A team at BAE Systems in the UK produced a model for the UK MoD to better calculate the 
FBCE in different operational scenarios, and summarise in relation to Forward Operating 
Bases, that they: 
‘typically only account for 3% of the fuel usage in a deployed scenario, they can 
account for 20–30% of the fully burdened energy costs when all of the supporting 
infrastructure and elements of the supply chain are taken into account.’ (Banfield, 
Courtaux & Golightly, 2009: p.90) 
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As an effect on overall departmental budgets, a RUSI article on the FBCE summarises in the 
US context that: 
‘although 3.3 % of the US DOD budget is spent on raw energy, when the cost of 
infrastructure and logistics support is included this increases to approximately 10–
15%.’ (Banfield, Courtaux & Golightly, 2009: p.89) 
The same authors comment in the UK context that:  
‘although forward bases typically account for 3% of the fuel usage in a deployed 
scenario, they can account for 20-30% of the fully burdened energy costs’ (p.90). 
Therefore, energy – when valued properly – can have an enormous impact on defence 
budgeting, and this is before one considers that energy prices themselves can vary 
significantly.  The Deloitte study (2009) considers the issue of price variability in depth, and 
Warner & Singer (2009) put the impact of energy price variation in the context of the impact 
on defence planning (note – this is before the energy is valued at FBCE): 
‘each and every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil increases the price of DoD 
operations by $1.3 billion. To put this into context, each $10 price increase is 
equivalent to a loss of almost the entire U.S. Marine Corps procurement budget.’ 
(p.3) 
In terms of the implications of the FBCE for decision making, the BAE Systems team behind 
the UK model summarise: 
‘The assertion that the fully burdened spend on energy amounts to approximately 
10–15% of the defence budget is a real and stark reminder that energy use will come 
under increasing levels of scrutiny as budgets are squeezed. Those procuring 
military platforms which have an in-service life extending into the middle of this 
century will need to consider options for reducing energy usage. Fully burdened cost 
savings may provide an opportunity to shorten the payback periods for investing in 
these energy saving options and enhance the sustainability of these platforms” 
(Banfield, Courtaux & Golightly, 2009: p.91) 
The Deloitte (2009) study of FBCE in the US context agrees, commenting that the business 
case for alternative energy – so often founded on ecological grounds – are now being seen 
on cost grounds, with the FBCE clearly showing Defence departments the potential that 
these technologies have: 
‘The business case for alternative energy development has rested first on the 
concept of a sustainable planet…With the dramatic rise in the price of oil seen in 
2008, and increased recognition that the oil supply may be limited, the business case 
has shifted emphasis to the economic benefit for developing and using renewable 
energy sources…This study demonstrates that the development and use of 
alternative energy can be a direct cause for reductions in wartime casualties and may 
rank on par with the business cases for development of ever more effective offensive 
weapons, sophisticated fuel transport tankers, mine resistant armoured vehicles, and 
net-centric sensing technologies…Aerospace and Defense firms, their government 
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customers, and research labs around the world are well positioned to accelerate the 
development and deployment of such technologies.’ (p.19) 
Lovins (2010) emphatically agrees, suggesting that the metric could and should unlock 
substantial investment in energy efficiency: 
‘Even before these conservatisms are made realistic, initial FBCF estimates value 
saved fuel often one to two orders of magnitude higher than previously. If these new 
metrics gain momentum and top-level focus, they could drive strategic shifts and 
innovations that could revolutionize military capability and effectiveness.’ (p.3) 
With such clear benefits offered, the next sub-section discusses the barriers to 
implementation of the FBCE in practice. 
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4.3.3 Barriers to Implementation of the FBCE Metric and the Importance of System-
Level Perspectives 
 
In terms of the rate at which the FBCE has been incorporated into US defence decision 
making, the US DSB report provides a useful reference point (Department of Defense, 
2008b), complaining that despite having advised it in 2001, by 2008 the metric had still not 
been incorporated into departmental decision making.  However, more recent progress has 
been more promising with the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (US Congress, 
2008) recognising FBCE (FBCF in the US context) as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) 
and due to receive similar weight to traditional KPPs like lethality, protection, and reliability.  
However, more needs to be done to implement the FBCE and other metrics operationally, as 
Lovins (2010) describes: 
‘In principle, FBCF and energy KPPs will both guide requirements-writing, Analyses 
of Alternatives, choices in the acquisition tradespace, and the focus of DOD’s 
science and technology investments. In practice, energy KPPs have not yet been 
applied (their “selective use” is allowed but not yet launched), and much work must 
be organized and resourced to get the FBCF numbers right and apply them 
systematically.’ (p.3) 
The FBCE is currently in a similar position in the UK context, with the MoD having stated the 
need to use the FBCE in departmental decision making as part of its climate change 
strategy, but with more work to be done to have the metric fully understood and implemented 
at the department. 
With the rationale for the FBCE established and the potential benefits clearly significant, it is 
useful to reflect on the potential barriers to the application of the metric in practice.  This sub-
section discusses two barriers that are very relevant to this research. 
The first (and perhaps most obvious) reason for its lack of use in practice would be the 
complexity of determining the FBCE for any given scenario.   
Some of this complexity is evident in Lovins’ (2010) critique of the immature ways that the 
metric is applied at present even where it is used: 
‘The FBCFs initially in use are incomplete. Current guidance still appears to omit 
support pyramids, multipliers to rotational force strength, actual (not book) 
depreciation lives, full headcounts including borrowed and perhaps contractor 
personnel, theft and attrition adjustments, and uncounted Air Force and Navy lift 
costs to and from theater. All should be included: FBCF should count all assets and 
activities—at their end-to-end, lifecycle, fully burdened total cost of ownership—that 
will no longer be needed, or can be realigned, if a given gallon need no longer be 
delivered’ (p.3) 
Thus, the successful application of the FBCE inevitably relies on significant amounts of data, 
and indeed this was one of the areas that the DSB task force focused on in relation to 
improvements that would better enable metrics like the FBCE (Department of Defense, 
2008b).  The UK Defence Reform Unit made similar comments in the UK context about the 
lack of good management information maintained by the UK MoD (Ministry of Defence, 
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2011a).  In the context of the wider discussion above, it is clear that the tangible nature of 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts make them far more relevant than traditional organisational 
accounts.  Moreover, these ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts have the potential to far better 
support scenario based ‘system-level’ calculations of the FBCE. 
The second barrier to implementation of the FBCE that this sub-section discusses is also of 
significant interest to this research, and is concerned with how the potential benefits of 
system-level concepts of Carbon Accounting are realised in a context where the dominant 
perspectives are strongly attributional.  The FBCE clearly identifies system-level benefits, but 
the challenge of adequately realising these benefits across defence – both between 
functions within defence departments, and across the sector more broadly – should not be 
underestimated. 
Put simply within the defence context, the issue is that often the acquisition department or 
even the single services buying the equipment don’t see many of the logistics costs that the 
FBCE shows to be clearly relevant to their decisions 
The DSB Task Force (Department of Defense, 2008b) summarise this as the ‘split 
incentives’ argument: 
‘[It is] a well-known management issue and one DoD recognizes. It says the owner of 
one corporate account is not incentivized to make investments that only benefit the 
owners of other accounts, even if the investment is in the best interest of the 
corporation overall. For DoD, the issue is investing acquisition funds to reduce 
operating and support costs. If a more efficient combat system requires more 
acquisition investment, DoD could decide to increase the acquisition budget at the 
expense of the operating and support budget. The argument goes that the logistics 
community will not permit their budgets to be reduced, so the acquisition programs 
will not get the increased funding.’ (p.36) 
They continue, arguing that:  
‘this is no reason for choosing not to understand that the option 
exists…Understanding the full range of costs, benefits and risks of making deployed 
systems more efficient reveals options to decision makers that would not otherwise 
be visible. Having more options available is better than having fewer.’ (p.36) 
The point goes wider than the defence departments too.  Defence companies are aware of 
the concept of the FBCE (in the UK context above, it is BAE Systems providing MoD with 
thought leadership on the subject), but without the right signals from their customers they are 
similarly slow to transform the products and services supplied. 
Partemore & Nagl (2010) connect the conversation back to the strategic benefits that began 
this section, and suggest that the DoD can realise energy benefits for strategic gain, but 
must send the right signals to the private sector in this regard: 
‘DoD need not choose between accomplishing its mission and minimizing the 
strategic risks, price fluctuations and negative environmental effects of petroleum 
consumption. By providing the private sector with stable market signals and 
incentives to invest in scaling up the fuels that meet its unique energy needs, DoD 
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will never need to sacrifice performance or national security for energy security. 
Rather, reducing reliance on petroleum will only help the armed services to 
accomplish their missions in the years and decades to come.’ (p.5) 
Warner & Singer (2009) are critical that at present ‘without firm requirements, defense 
contractors that sell to the department don’t yet know how seriously to program energy 
efficiency into their submissions’ (p.4). 
Thus, the FBCE relies on mind-sets that look beyond individual functions within the defence 
departments, and indeed mind-sets that go beyond the department itself and include the 
companies that support them.  
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4.4 Results Summary 
 
The Methodology chapter described the exploratory nature of this research, which was 
emphasised in the introduction as appropriate to a subject area where little is currently 
known.   
The Literature Review explored three distinct sets of literature relevant to Carbon Accounting 
in the defence sector, which was necessary given the lack of sector-level studies in the 
literature.  It also emphasised the scale of activity in relation to Carbon Accounting, with 
many sites of enquiry, and a slowly emerging academic literature sometimes struggling to 
keep pace with.   
As a result, the Methodology explained in detail how an archival research strategy focused 
on public information in the defence sector on Carbon Accounting and climate change 
mitigation was an appropriate response.  This archival strategy established both quantitative 
and qualitative data in order to support an inductive research approach that would look for 
patterns within and across these datasets that were relevant to the themes established in the 
Literature Review. 
This Results chapter has presented the correlational research, describing relevant patterns 
associated with the quantitative data (4.1) and qualitative data (4.2), and summarising 
relevant information from the secondary sources (4.3). 
Section 4.1 presented the quantitative analysis, which showed that defence departments 
report the overwhelming majority of the overall emissions from the sector.  It also described 
the current immature state of Scope 3 Carbon Accounting in the defence sector, where 
despite some narrative emphasis from many organisations about the importance of their 
impacts across the value chain, little GHG information exists publicly that connects to the 
product lifecycle.  Some rare examples of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts were described, 
and these clearly show the scale of impacts across the value chain that defence products 
can have, particularly in the usage phase.  This section showed how these ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts potentially link very significant portions of the organisational accounts 
together between defence departments and defence companies, complicating the picture as 
to which organisations in the sample are the most quantitatively significant.   
Section 4.2 integrated the qualitative data to the analysis and demonstrated a connection 
between the volume of emissions reported and the level of priority placed on the issue of 
climate change mitigation, suggesting that the technical accounting issues that drive 
reported volumes do potentially influence organisational responses to climate change, and 
therefore are significant.  It showed that the organisations reporting the highest volumes of 
emissions appeared to emphasise the topic of climate change more in their public 
documents, and in some cases set more ambitious targets for reducing their environmental 
impacts. 
This third part of the Results chapter (4.3) focused on relevant secondary sources of 
defence-energy grey literature, and described some emerging concepts and metrics that are 
helping to frame energy and climate change issues across the defence enterprise.   
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It introduced the concept of ‘the tether of fuel’ in contemporary conflict, and described the 
emergence of some related ‘strategic vectors’ of ‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ that have been 
introduced to military discourse.  The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) – a metric that 
could be described as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon Accounting – is helping to drive 
these new strategic vectors into military doctrine and decision making.  The section 
explained the potential of the FBCE to radically alter the business case for low carbon 
technologies in defence contexts, but significant barriers to its implementation remain at 
present.  These include the lack of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts, but also the attributional 
mind-sets that characterise the current OCA practices, where a focus ‘individual 
organisations’ or ‘individual functions’ can undermine the clear system-level benefits of 
certain activities.   
The analysis presented in this chapter has validated the exploratory, inductive approach 
taken to the research topic.  Despite the lack of relevant precedents in the Carbon 
Accounting literature, and the evolving nature of existing OCA practices, relevant patterns 
can be found from the quantitative and qualitative data available.  When aligned to the 
secondary sources of defence-energy grey literature, some strong trends emerge that begin 
to define some relevant ways forward for OCA practices in the sector.   
The exploratory and interdisciplinary approach to the academic literature has also proved a 
valuable methodological choice.  By reviewing three distinct but relevant sets of literature, 
the Literature Review was able to summarise the research topic into three key themes of 
Carbon Accounting that are grounded in the contemporary defence context, and relevant to 
the prospects for low carbon technology innovation in the sector.  The results presented and 
summarised above confirm the relevance of these themes that were established in the 
Literature Review (see section 2.4 ‘Summary of the Literature Review and Key Themes’).  
These three themes are re-iterated and elaborated on below. 
The first theme related to the challenge of attributing emissions to individual organisations in 
the Carbon Accounting literature.  This was likely to be particularly marked in the defence 
sector due to the very close working relationships between defence departments and their 
supporting industrial base, and the resultant accounts have the potential to be abstract in 
nature, limiting the extent to which they can engage the new/relevant actors to the task of 
mitigating climate change.  This diminished potential for creating relevant coalitions that can 
challenge the established interests would significantly inhibit the potential for low carbon 
technology innovation in the sector.  The Results chapter has confirmed the relevance of this 
theme, demonstrating how the quantitative data provided by existing OCA practices does not 
necessarily highlight the most significant organisations in the sample, due to the lack of 
available Scope 3 data for the emissions categories most relevant to the value chain.  The 
qualitative analysis from section 4.2 (‘Integrating the Qualitative Data’) confirms the 
relevance of this, as the results suggest that technical accounting issues can have real 
impacts on organisational behaviours and their level of engagement with climate change 
mitigation. 
The second theme emphasised the relevance of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts to the 
defence sector, as multiple organisations often collaborate and ‘team’ around large scale 
industrial programmes.  Where OCAs had the potential to be quite abstract as organisational 
boundaries could be difficult to define, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts would likely be 
simpler and better connect to the underlying emissions-producing activities.  They would 
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therefore be more likely to recruit new/relevant actors to defence-energy debates and 
support the development of low carbon technologies in the sector.  The results also confirm 
the relevance of this theme, with ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and relevant Scope 3 
reporting likely to connect relevant organisations together across a large proportion of the 
sector’s total emissions.  
The third theme related to ‘consequential carbon accounting’ perspectives that have 
emerged in the field of LCA.  These perspectives were more relevant to decision making 
than existing OCA practices, which are almost wholly ‘attributional’ in character.  This is due 
to their focus on the potential that decisions have to generate system-level changes.  The 
Literature Review noted the mutual focus of ‘defence capability’ concepts on system-level 
impacts and effective decision making.  It suggested that relevant strategic narratives linked 
to defence capability, when aligned to OCA practices informed by ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts, could help construct a positive selection environment for low carbon technologies 
in the defence sector.  The results also confirm the relevance of this theme, with section 4.3 
(‘Integrating the Secondary Sources) describing the emerging strategic concepts of 
‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ that are responding to defence-energy challenges, and metrics 
such as the FBCE beginning to drive these concepts into military doctrine and decision 
making.  It demonstrated the transformational impact that system-level perspectives with an 
emphasis on decision making and GHG reductions at the system level can have.  However, 
it also highlighted the extent to which these rely on representative ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts that are currently immature in the defence sector, and the extent to which they can 
be undermined by strongly attributional mind-sets that characterise existing OCA practices. 
With the Results chapter having clearly confirmed the relevance of the three themes 
established in the Literature Review, the Discussion chapter (5) that follows expands on 
these themes in order to develop some recommendations that can inform the ongoing 
development of OCA practices in the defence sector.  
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5) Discussion 
 
The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ that were set out in section 1.4 step through the 
different cognitive levels of Blooms Taxonomy, with successive chapters building on each 
other in order for more sophisticated concepts to be presented.  This Discussion chapter 
relates to the higher levels of Blooms Taxonomy and aims to bring together the themes from 
the Literature Review, and the analysis from the Results chapter in order to comprehensively 
evaluate OCA practices in the defence sector, and create some recommendations for 
defence sector organisations as to how these might be improved to better support low 
carbon technology innovation. 
The relevant objectives for this chapter are as follows: 
- Relate the themes identified in the Literature Review to the analysis of OCA practices 
in the defence sector that was presented in the Results chapter 
- Generate a set of recommendations for defence sector Carbon Accounting practices 
that will better support low carbon technology innovation 
The three themes that were described across the Literature Review and summarised in 
section 2.4 (‘Summary of the Literature Review and Key Themes’) form the structure of this 
Discussion, with sections 5.1 to 5.3 focusing on each of these in turn. 
The first theme related to the difficulty of allocating emissions between organisations in 
existing OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence sector due to close 
working relationships, and may result in abstract OCAs that do not connect effectively to the 
underlying activities causing emissions to be produced.  This is likely to inhibit the extent to 
which the accounts engage new/relevant actors and support low carbon technology 
innovation.  Section 5.1 reiterates the context for this theme from the Literature Review and 
summarises the defence sector-specific attempts to standardise OCA practices and the 
implications of this.  It concludes that existing OCA practices are likely to produce abstract 
accounts and are therefore unlikely to support low carbon technology innovation. 
In contrast, the second theme running through the thesis relates to the potential for ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts focused on large-scale collaborative programmes to better account 
for the emissions of the defence sector in a way that engages new/relevant actors to 
defence-energy debates. These accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCAs to 
support low carbon technology innovation.  Section 5.2 reiterates the context for this theme 
from the Literature Review, which described how Scope 3 reporting is immature at present – 
particularly where relevant to the product lifecycle and value chain.  The section then 
summarises how the quantitative analysis from the Results chapter showed the lack of 
relevant Scope 3 reporting at present in the defence sector, despite a clear recognition of the 
importance of this data.  There is a conflict between the recognised need to produce ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts, which are inevitably scenario specific, and the ongoing drive to 
standardise OCA practices.  However, the defence sector is well placed to resolve this 
conflict, being characterised by several large scale industrial projects.  It concludes that if 
this conflict in organisational reporting can be overcome, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
have the potential to engage new and relevant actors to defence-climate change debates, 
and are therefore more likely to support low carbon technology innovation. 
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However, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts cannot work effectively in isolation, which leads 
onto the third theme running through this thesis related to the potential for ‘consequential 
carbon accounting’ perspectives to align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, in order to 
inform wider strategic narratives that help construct a positive selection environment for low 
carbon technologies in the defence sector.  Section 5.3 reiterates the context for this theme 
from the Literature Review, which described the relevance of ‘consequential accounting’ 
perspectives for connecting emissions inventories to positive change at the system level.  
This aligns them to ‘defence capability’ concepts that are likely to provide the strategic 
context through which ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts are understood and interpreted.  It 
refers back to the Results chapter and the emergence of relevant strategic vectors of 
‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’, and associated metrics such as the FBCE.  It explains the 
FBCE as a type of consequential carbon account, but one which is underpinned by ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts in order to work in practice.  The section then describes the 
relevance of the innovation studies literature in this context, and the need for ‘storylines’ at 
the niche and landscape level to be mutually reinforcing in order for a positive selection 
environment to be created in the defence sector.  In other words, ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts and a wider strategic framework of relevant tools and metrics will both be required 
in order for OCA practices to effectively support technology innovation. 
The final section (5.4) reiterates the themes above, and generates some recommendations 
for the development of OCA practices in the defence sector so that they can better support 
low carbon technology innovation. 
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5.1 Theme 1: OCA Practices and the Difficulty of Attributing Emissions to 
Organisations in the Defence Sector 
 
This first theme relates to the difficulty of allocating emissions between organisations in 
existing OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence sector due to close 
working relationships, and may result in abstract OCA that does not connect effectively to 
the underlying activities causing emissions to be produced.  This is likely to inhibit the extent 
to which the accounts engage new/relevant actors and support low carbon technology 
innovation. 
The Literature Review described the difficulty in attributing emissions to different 
organisations in a standardised way that retains relevance (2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their 
Limitations’).  It introduced the GHG Protocol as the most commonly used standard for 
OCAs, which is open to wide interpretation in practice (WRI, 2004). The literature noted the 
significant potential for variance in the ways that existing OCAs are produced (Morel & 
Cochran, 2016).  There is a drive to standardise approaches within specific sectors (e.g. 
IPIECA, 2003; IAEG, 2016) in ways that do not create significant barriers to entry for 
organisations wishing to produce OCAs.  Bellassen et al. (2016) identified ‘cost vs 
uncertainty’ and ‘comparability vs relevance’ as two trade-offs that are common to all Carbon 
Accounting schemes, and suggested that as Carbon Accounts become more standardised 
or comparable (in a pragmatic and relatively low-cost way), they could also become less 
‘relevant’ to the underlying organisational activities that produce the emissions. 
Section 2.2.2 (‘The Increasing Role of the Private Sector in All Defence Tasks’) in the wider 
review of Defence Industrial Policy (2.2) described how these challenges of attributing 
emissions to organisations in a way that retains relevance is likely to be particularly marked 
in the defence sector.  It described how defence budgets decreased in the post-cold war era, 
the Defence industry consolidated around a small number of large multinational companies, 
with an increasing focus on supplying services as well defence product.  These trends as 
well as a preference for supporting national industries have resulted in close private sector 
involvement in all defence activity.  Defence austerity and defence reform (as well as ‘core 
competency’ models) are encouraging further outsourcing of military activity to the private 
sector.  The result is highly complex defence sites and programmes where multiple 
organisations are involved.  Lines of responsibility for emissions are likely to be hard to 
discern, even if relevant measurement infrastructure is available.  Therefore, as Bellassen et 
al. (2016) might predict, finding a pragmatic, low cost solution for the defence sector to 
account for its emissions at the organisational level is likely to simplify emissions accounting 
to the point where it begins to lose relevance. 
Section 3.4.1 of the Methodology chapter (‘Establishing the Quantitative Dataset’) explained 
how the methodologies for producing OCAs in the defence sector are reasonably well 
aligned.  Despite the ongoing challenges of standardisation, there is clearly some degree of 
consistency between defence sector OCAs focused around the GHG Protocol and the 
Operational Control method.  The Literature Review summarised some of the challenges 
that organisations have had in determining organisational boundaries using the GHG 
Protocol’s ‘Operational Control’ method (see 2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their Limitations’), with the 
guidance in the standard open to wide interpretation: 
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‘A company has operational control over an operation if the former or one of its 
subsidiaries has the full authority to introduce and implement its operating policies at 
the operation … It is expected that except in very rare circumstances, if the company 
or one of its subsidiaries is the operator of a facility, it will have the full authority to 
introduce and implement its operating policies and thus has operational 
control…Under the operational control approach, a company accounts for 100% of 
emissions from operations over which it or one of its subsidiaries has operational 
control.’ (WRI, 2004, p.18) 
Section 2.2.2 of the Literature Review (‘The Increasing Role of the Private Sector in All 
Defence Tasks’) explained how the statement above can be very difficult to apply to large 
defence sites, with many organisations involved in the various activities taking place on 
them.  The example of Portsmouth Naval Base was used to illustrate some of these 
complexities in practice with a variety of stakeholders that cross organisational boundaries 
having some degree of influence on the emissions created by this large, complex defence 
site.  A survey undertaken within BAE Systems was also described that confirmed the 
complexity of applying the ‘Operational Control’ criteria in the defence context, with just over 
half of the sites surveyed clearly able to say that they were 100% in control of the facility.   
Even if it were simple to determine which party controlled relevant site activities, it is very 
unlikely that measurement infrastructure (whether utility meters, of various types and 
reliability across static infrastructure; or measurement devices associated with mobile 
vehicles) would neatly align to these distinctions, especially at large, often very old defence 
sites.  Some of the environmentally focused grey literature from the defence enterprise that 
was described in section 3.5 (‘Relevant Secondary Sources of Data’) highlights the 
importance of this issue at US DoD sites, with the DSB Task Force on Energy Security 
(Department of Defense, 2008b) declaring that: 
‘Effectively managing fuel demand requires an in depth understanding of the 
activities that are creating the demand. Unfortunately, data on energy usage are 
unevenly collected across the Department, making it difficult to form a 
comprehensive picture’ (p.15) 
The GHG Protocol ‘Operational Control’ method clearly allows wide scope for interpretation 
as to what should be included in an emissions inventory, and we can see that this is 
particularly challenging at large, complex defence sites.  In practice this means that even 
where defence organisations are referring to the same methodology, and the same 
approach for determining their emissions boundary, there is significant scope for 
interpretation (and therefore difference) in the way that this method is applied. 
One effort to better standardise approaches to applying the GHG Protocol’s Operational 
Control method has been provided by the International Aerospace Environment Group 
(IAEG).  Their working group focused on GHG Reporting has produced a document (IAEG, 
2016) for the sector that supplements the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard (WRI, 2004) 
and is endorsed by the WRI.  The guidance has received slow take up in practice, and Table 
60 in Appendix A shows that it is currently only referenced by three of the organisations in 
this research.  However, the table also shows that the clear majority of organisations in the 
sample are members of the IAEG and therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that take-
172 
 
up may well increase over time, depending on the extent to which it requires organisations to 
amend their established mechanisms for reporting GHGs. 
The IAEG Guidance (IAEG, 2016) is explicit in relation to the emissions boundary ‘rules’ to 
use from the GHG Protocol, recommending that ‘reporters shall utilize the operational control 
approach to define their organization boundary’ (p.4), but does little to resolve some of the 
complexity of determining which parties have operational control of different activities.  
However, the guidance does pragmatically advise that reporting aligns with ‘energy 
measurement’ points for static infrastructure, focusing on the main utility meters from which 
a site is billed in order to determine the data that it is reported by an individual 
organisation29.  More recent legislative initiatives in the UK have also focused on the points 
where utilities are billed in order to determine reported volumes, with the simplified version of 
the UK’s Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) scheme (Environment Agency, 2015) 
requiring companies to report their billed volumes of electricity and gas that have been 
delivered to the site. 
These pragmatic approaches allow for comparable approaches between organisations, but 
have the potential to simplify the broad definition of ‘operational control’ above to the extent 
that the emissions from a large and complex site can be allocated in a fairly binary way to 
one organisation or another.  Thus, the relevance of the resulting OCAs may be reduced as 
the reported total does not reflect the different organisations active on the site and their 
related emissions producing activities. 
These simplifications of the broad requirement to determine ‘operational control’ are relevant 
to the trade-off discussed in the Literature Review (2.1.2 ‘OCAs and their Limitations’) 
between ‘comparability’ and ‘relevance’ of the carbon accounts (Bellassen et al, 2016), and 
in this case as in others that the authors note ‘comparability often trumps relevance’ (p.533). 
This has implications for GHGs reported at the organisational level, where technical Carbon 
Accounting decisions made at site level that may not be entirely representative of the 
underlying activities involved, have the potential to become particularly abstract once 
aggregated to the organisational level of a large multinational.   
The abstract nature of the accounts produced has implications for the extent to which 
existing OCA practices can support low carbon technology innovation.  The Innovation 
Studies literature (see 2.3) explained that contemporary ‘network’ perspectives on innovation 
have an emphasis on creating relevant coalitions that can ‘negotiate for discursive 
hegemony’ in order to change established socio-technical regimes.  Carbon Accounting is 
relevant for the discursive role it can play in establishing ‘storylines’ that engage 
new/relevant actors in defence-climate change debates.  The existing OCA methods 
described above – by seeking pragmatic approaches to standardisation – are becoming 
increasingly disconnected from the underlying activities that give rise to emissions in the 
defence sector.  This disconnect means that the resultant accounts lose relevance, and are 
                                                
29 ‘In short, companies shall report GHG emissions for all leased buildings for which the company 
directly pays the utility bills. In the event that the utility bills are a part of the rent and not 
independently available, an estimation of GHG emissions shall be derived consistent with the 
guidance identified in The Corporate Standard. Where utility data is directly available, the company 
shall report them.’ (IAEG, 2016: p4) 
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therefore unlikely to support ‘storylines’ that engage new actors, or the most relevant 
organisations to the task of reducing GHGs. 
The Results section showed some of the effects of this in practice, with Figures 15 and 16 in 
Section 4.2 (‘Integrating the Qualitative Data’) demonstrating how the higher volumes of 
emissions accounted for by the defence departments (due to the technical GHG Accounting 
decisions described above) correlated with an increased emphasis on climate change 
mitigation in their public reporting and organisational objectives and targets.  The defence 
companies, despite having significant innovative capacity and being deeply involved in the 
process of creating defence equipment, were accounting for far fewer emissions and 
appeared to be less engaged with climate change mitigation in their public reporting and 
target setting. 
In contrast to the traditional OCA practices described in this section, ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts have the potential to better represent the underlying emissions-producing activities 
in the sector and are the focus of the second theme that runs through this thesis. 
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5.2 Theme 2: ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and their Relevance to the 
Defence Sector 
 
The second theme running through the thesis relates to the potential for ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts focused on large-scale collaborative programmes to better account for the 
emissions of the defence sector in a way that engages new/relevant actors to defence-
energy debates. These accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCAs to support low 
carbon technology innovation. 
The Literature Review described the potential of ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts to make 
OCA more meaningful (see 2.1.3 ‘Scope 3 Emissions Inventories and the Relevance of 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts’).  Existing OCAs tend to be immature in terms of their 
reporting of scope 3 emissions and therefore the full carbon impact of an organisation across 
the value chain is rarely explained. Organisations tend to focus on certain categories of 
scope 3 reporting that are not the most relevant ones (CDP, 2013).  Some authors suggest 
that the scope 3 category of emissions is too broadly defined at present, and that a ‘scope 4’ 
should be introduced to distinguish the aspects of scope 3 relevant to the product lifecycle 
(Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber (2008).  This concept is currently rare in the academic 
literature and receives very little take-up in practice.  Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is very 
relevant to any ‘scope 4’ account, but the variability of LCA methodologies conflicts with the 
drive to standardisation in existing OCAs.  There is lots of interest in applying LCA and 
project level assessments to corporate footprints (Harangozo, Szechy & Zilahy (2015), but 
no companies believed to have used product footprints to devise company-wide results as 
yet (Gibassier, 2015).   
The Defence Industrial Policy literature described how these ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts are likely to be a good fit for the sector (see 2.2.3 ‘International Collaborative 
Programmes and Industrial Teaming’).  The section described how the need to standardise 
defence equipment across regions is a crucial and widely acknowledged challenge for 
defence departments due to the need for inter-operable equipment and economic efficiency 
amongst allies.  Industrial activity has driven some of the most notable trends towards 
standardisation as the global defence industry has consolidated around a shrinking volume 
of orders overall.  International collaborative projects supported by industrial ‘teams’ are now 
common, and allow partners to share the costs and risks of developing high-tech equipment, 
and achieve economies of scale in production runs.  In contrast to the discussion in theme 1 
above, where contemporary trends in the defence sector made OCA more challenging, this 
trend makes ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting particularly well suited to the sector. 
The Literature Review described the relative lack of maturity in relation to Scope 3 emissions 
reporting by organisations.  The Results chapter showed that this trend is certainly relevant 
to the defence sector, where limited scope 3 data is available.  Section 4.1.2 (‘Analysis of 
Scope 3 Data’) explained the inadequacy of current Scope 3 reporting as it applies to the 
value chain, with most accounts focused on less material Scope 3 categories such as 
business travel, with the exception of those published by Lockheed Martin.  Matthews, 
Hendrickson & Weber (2008) suggest these ‘value chain-relevant’ emissions could be called 
‘Scope 4’ emissions, and it is these that would be particularly relevant to the defence sector.  
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Where these types of account do exist, they demonstrate the scale of emissions associated 
with other parts of the lifecycle of defence products.   
These ‘value chain-relevant’ accounts also change the ways that the total emissions of the 
sector can be apportioned between organisations.  Section 4.1.3 of the Results chapter 
(‘How the Significance of Different Organisations in the Sample Could Change if Scope 3 
Emissions were more Widely Available’) described how comparisons of existing OCAs 
across the sector show defence departments as by far the most significant organisations in 
the sample, with the defence companies being ‘low impact’ organisations by comparison.  
This is driven by the fairly simplistic ‘operational-facility’ split in defence department energy 
use, with the former (‘operational energy use’) wholly accounted for by the defence 
departments, despite the products that consume this energy being designed and 
manufactured by the supporting industrial base.  The Results chapter compared this 
‘operational energy use’ of the defence departments, with the ‘revenue-apportioned’ part of 
the emissions associated with the defence companies in the sample.  This comparison 
suggested that the defence companies in the sample were actually far more quantitatively 
significant than the existing Scope 1 & 2 OCAs had suggested. 
An increase in ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting that showed the impact of defence 
products across the lifecycle, or a related increase in Scope 3 emissions reporting 
associated with the value chain (‘Scope 4’ for Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber (2008)) 
would be highly beneficial for better understanding the emissions of the sector and which 
organisations are most relevant or best placed to improve the energy efficiency of the sector 
as a whole.  The organisations in the sample clearly recognise the relevance of these 
emissions.  Section 4.1.2 (‘Analysis of Scope 3 Data’) contrasted the lack of quantitative 
data available in this area with the qualitative emphasis placed on the importance of these 
more direct ‘value chain’ impacts of defence products in the public documents of many of the 
organisations included in this research. 
Despite the recognition of the importance of Scope 3 data in the defence sector, practical 
challenges do remain for organisations wanting to produce quantitative summaries of their 
scope 3 impacts.  Section 5.1 above described some challenges of interpretation with 
traditional Scope 1 & 2 OCA and the literature on Scope 3 (see section 2.1.3) acknowledges 
that methodologies used by organisations are highly variable.  Even for the more commonly 
published indirect categories of Scope 3 emissions there are wide inconsistencies in how the 
data is reported and the methodologies used are bespoke in nearly all cases.  Just as there 
are ongoing efforts to standardise methodologies for producing Scope 1 & 2 accounts as 
described in relation to the first theme above (5.1), there are also efforts in place to 
standardise approaches towards Scope 3 reporting.  Morel & Cochran (2016) confirm that: 
‘scope 3 emissions can represent the lion’s share of emissions and cannot be 
ignored…however, due to more complex calculations and data needs, 
standardization of scope 3 emissions quantification approaches is ongoing’ (p.310) 
In relation to the defence sector, the latest iteration of the IAEG guidance for reporting GHGs 
(IAEG, 2016) includes some guidance for reporting Scope 3 emissions, but this only focuses 
on the more established indirect categories of Business Travel, Employee Commuting, and 
Transportation and Distribution.   
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However, the challenge of producing relevant Scope 3 accounts is far more significant in 
relation to the value-chain relevant categories of Scope 3, which are scenario-specific by 
nature and whose methodologies as a result are likely to be highly bespoke.  The Literature 
Review (2.1.3 ‘Scope 3 Emissions Inventories and the Relevance of ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts) referred to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is the best known 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting scheme in use, as having to accept a great variety of 
project-specific methodologies relevant to the different types of scheme that it interacted 
with.  The guidelines produced for the CDM (United Nations, 2016) have attempted to 
reduce the number of methodologies in use, but there are currently still over 200 
methodologies allowed that are in active use. 
Thus, whilst scope 3 reporting related to the value chain is clearly highly relevant to 
companies, it is very difficult to reconcile with the ongoing trends towards standardisation of 
OCA practices that were described in relation to theme 1 above (5.1).  Despite this inevitable 
tension, the defence sector is well placed to reconcile these conflicting interests, as it is 
currently characterised by international collaboration and industrial teaming, around a 
relatively small number of large, high-profile programmes.  As a result, relatively few 
‘Project-Level’ Carbon Accounts could account for a significant proportion of the sectors 
emissions, and therefore meaningfully interact with organisational reports. 
The prize for resolving this conflict and producing relevant ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
in the defence sector would be that OCA practices could begin to better support low carbon 
technology innovation, in a couple of meaningful ways. 
The first is that, by making OCAs less abstract, and more understandable, new actors are 
more likely to be drawn into defence-climate change debates.  The activities that underpin 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts are far easier to understand and conceptualise.  For 
example, one can quite quickly and easily explain the relevance of emissions associated 
with a programme to build a new multi-role jet aircraft – it needs fuel for flying through-life, 
and emissions are likely to be produced in its manufacture, testing, and end of life disposal.  
In contrast, conceptualising the emissions associated with a large and complex multi-
national organisation is far more difficult, with legal structures and other boundaries to 
organisational accountabilities rendering the resultant OCA opaque to all but the most 
institutionally embedded observers. 
The Innovation Studies literature (see 2.3) explained that contemporary ‘network’ 
perspectives on innovation have an emphasis on creating relevant coalitions that can 
‘negotiate for discursive hegemony’ in order to change established socio-technical regimes.  
Carbon Accounting is relevant for the discursive role it can play in establishing ‘storylines’ 
that engage new actors in defence-climate change debates.  Thus, the more new actors that 
can be attracted to these debates, the more likely it is that a coalition of interests can 
emerge that challenge the status quo, and lay the foundation for innovation.  This research 
contends that it is ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts that are far more likely to engage these 
new actors than existing practices that are focused on attributing emissions to individual 
organisations. 
However, it is worth noting that ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts would not just increase the 
number of actors engaged with defence-climate change debates due to their conceptual 
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accessibility.  They would also support low technology innovation in the sector by engaging 
the most relevant actors to these debates. 
The Results chapter showed (see section 4.1 ‘Correlational Analysis of the Quantitative 
Data’) that where traditional Scope 1 & 2 OCAs simplistically highlighted the defence 
departments as the only organisations that were quantitatively significant, attempts to 
connect emissions across the organisations in the sample (via the defence departments’ 
operational energy use) showed that a large proportion of the emissions of the sector are 
relevant to multiple organisations.  Therefore, a description of the most ‘quantitatively 
significant’ organisations in the sample would likely be different, and certainly include some 
of the defence companies, if more Scope 3 information were available.  The Results chapter 
also described (see section 4.2 ‘Integrating the Qualitative Data’) a correlation between the 
volume of emissions reported by organisations in the sample and their level of engagement 
with the topic of climate change mitigation.  Therefore, as well as attracting new actors to 
defence climate change debates, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts are also likely to motivate 
organisations that become more quantitatively significant in the reporting to engage.  
Therefore in addition to new actors, these accounts could engage the most relevant actors to 
engage with defence climate change debates. 
The first part of the introduction to this thesis (1.1 ‘Background’) described how technology 
innovation is widely seen as the most relevant contribution the defence sector can make to 
climate change mitigation.  This discussion across themes 1 and 2 has made the argument 
that the more that OCA practices can engage with ‘Project Level’ narratives, the more 
effective they are likely to be engaging new and relevant actors, and supporting low carbon 
technology innovation. 
However, the innovation literature (see section 2.3.4 ‘Discourse Perspectives and the Link to 
OCA Practices in the Defence Sector’) described how ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
alone, and the new actors that they ‘recruit’, are unlikely to be sufficient to change an 
established socio-technical regime.  Hughes (1983) sums up how the micro-selection 
environment for an individual technology needs to be seen in the context of the wider socio-
technical regime that also needs to be attended to in order to create a positive environment 
for technological change:  
‘As cultural artefacts, [technologies] reflect the past as well as the present. 
Attempting to reform technology without systematically taking into account the 
shaping context and the intricacies of internal dynamics may well be futile. If only the 
technical components of systems are changed, they may snap back into their earlier 
shape like charged particles in a strong electromagnetic field. The field must be 
attended to: values may need to be changed, institutions reformed, or legislation 
recast.’ (p.465)  
To use Hughes’ words, the next part of this discussion ‘attends to the field’ – and looks to the 
ways that the wider context in which ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts are presented in the 
defence sector can help create a positive selection environment for low carbon technology. 
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5.3 Theme 3: Connecting ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and Strategic 
Narratives in order to construct a Positive Selection Environment for Low 
Carbon Technologies in the Defence Sector 
 
The third theme running through this thesis relates to the potential for ‘consequential carbon 
accounting’ perspectives to align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, and inform wider 
strategic narratives that help construct a positive selection environment for low carbon 
technologies in the defence sector. 
The Literature Review (section 2.1.4 ‘Attributional-Consequential Distinctions in Carbon 
Accounting and the Implications for OCAs’) explained the usefulness of ‘consequential 
accounting’ perspectives for connecting OCAs to decision making and positive change at the 
system-level. Where ‘attributional methods [of Carbon Accounting] provide static inventories 
of emissions allocated or attributed to a defined scope of responsibility … consequential 
methods attempt to measure the system-wide change in emissions that occurs as a result of 
a decision or action’ (Brander & Ascui, 2015, p.100).  The distinction has emerged in the 
field of LCA and is little known in the field of OCA due to the dominance of attributional 
mindsets (Brander & Ascui, 2015).  The authors note its relevance for OCA however, given 
that organisational accounts can and do inform decision making. 
The Defence Industrial Policy (see section 2.2.4 ‘Concepts of Defence Capability’) described 
how the sector is currently characterised by a complex threat environment and a period of 
diminished economic resources.  In this context, many authors stress the need for defence 
debates to move from second order questions about specific items of equipment, to 
conversations about strategic outputs and ‘defence capabilities’.  The Literature Review 
summary (see section 2.4 ‘Summary of the Literature Review and Key Themes’) explained 
the relevance of these ‘defence capability’ concepts to the debates concerning 
consequential approaches to Carbon Accounting, due to their mutual focus on 
understanding system-level impacts in order to make effective decisions. 
Whilst the discussion across themes 1 and 2 has emphasised the relevance of ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts for engaging new and relevant actors to defence-climate change 
debates, the previous section also highlighted how these need to align with wider strategies 
at the system level in order to create a positive selection environment for low carbon 
technology.  Thus, consequential approaches to Carbon Accounting that engage with 
system-level debates linked to defence capability will be necessary to interact with these 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts. 
The analysis of the secondary sources of data in the Results chapter (see 4.3 ‘Integrating 
the Secondary Sources’) summarised some relevant ‘strategic vectors’ of ‘resilience’ and 
‘endurance’ that emphasise the strong link between defence energy use and defence 
capability.   
In order to drive these strategic vectors into military doctrine and decision making, relevant 
tools and metrics are required, and the most notable of these is a metric termed the Fully 
Burdened Costs of Energy (FBCE).  The FBCE is particularly relevant here as it can be 
viewed as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon Accounting.  It is concerned with specific 
179 
 
scenarios, and models the system-wide energy impacts associated with it.  A Deloitte study 
(2009) explains the types of things the FBCE needs to cover, and the impact it can have: 
‘Beyond the basic purchase cost of fuel are other ‘hidden’ costs, including 
maintaining fuel transport equipment, training personnel, and maintaining and 
protecting the oil supply chain. The military currently pays between $2 and $3 per 
gallon for fuel depending on market conditions. The process of getting the fuel to its 
intended destination, even assuming that no protection is provided to the convoys 
during transport, increases the cost to nearly $15 a gallon. Protection of fuel convoys 
in combat zones requires an enormous show of force in the form of armoured 
vehicles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft, forcing costs even higher. …Protecting 
fuel convoys from the ground and air costs the DoD upward of 15 times the actual 
purchase cost of fuel … [These] costs grow exponentially as the delivery distance 
increases or when force protection is provided from air” (p.19) 
The FBCE supports decision making, by allowing users to understand the real energy costs 
associated with a given operation, and the knock-on effects it may have on other areas of 
military activity.  It has proved powerful in demonstrating the true cost of military energy use, 
and therefore has significant potential to alter defence decision making 
However, the Results chapter (4.3.3 ‘Integrating the Secondary Sources’) also described the 
barriers to the widespread use of the FBCE in practice.  One of these relates to the 
attributional mind-sets characterised for Carbon Accounting by theme 1 above, where the 
process of attributing emissions to one organisation or another entailed a significant loss of 
meaning in the data.  This is in some ways analogous to the ‘split incentives’ argument that 
inhibits the use of the FBCE in practice, where the allocation of costs to different parts of the 
organisation (e.g. the function that buys the fuel, the function that transports the fuel; the 
function that maintains the oil supply chain etc.), entails significant loss of meaning as to the 
system wide impact of the activity. 
The other barrier to the adoption of the FBCE is a more pragmatic but equally important one, 
and relates to the lack of ‘Project Level’ data that can inform FBCE modelling.  This is 
particularly relevant to the discussion above, given the recommendation that ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts need to be integrated as much as possible with defence sector OCA 
practices. 
Just as the discussion of theme 2 above concluded by suggesting that the ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts need wider strategic narratives available to connect to, likewise the 
strategic vectors and associated metrics described here are equally reliant on the ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts. 
Lehtonen & Kern (2009) describe how socio-technical regimes can experience structural 
change as a result of interactions between different levels: 
‘The ‘landscape level’ encompasses factors beyond the control of individual actors, 
such as demographic developments, culture or external events (e.g. oil shocks). 
‘Niches’ are protected spaces where novel technologies, ideas or practices emerge, 
some of which can come to challenge the dominant regime… Structural change 
occurs over extended periods of time through interactions between these landscape- 
and regime-specific levels and niches’ (p.104)  
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Thus, the ways that defence sector Carbon Accounting is designed to support low carbon 
technology innovation should be aware of these ‘niche’ and ‘landscape’-level interactions.  
The ‘storylines’ created by ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts at the ‘niche’ level, and concepts 
of endurance and the FBCE metric at the ‘landscape’ level need to become mutually 
reinforcing.  Only in their positive interaction can a supportive selection environment for low 
carbon technology be created in the defence sector. 
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5.4 Discussion Summary 
 
This Discussion has brought together the themes from the Literature Review and the 
analysis from the Results chapter in order to comprehensively evaluate OCA practices in the 
defence sector. 
The first theme related to the difficulty of allocating emissions between organisations in 
existing OCAs, which is likely to be particularly marked in the defence sector due to close 
working relationships, and may result in abstract OCAs that do not connect effectively to the 
underlying activities causing emissions to be produced.  This is likely to inhibit the extent to 
which the accounts engage new/relevant actors and support low carbon technology 
innovation.  Section 5.1 reiterated the context for this theme from the Literature Review, 
before summarising the detail of the methodologies used for producing OCAs in the defence 
sector as well as attempts to further standardise these.  It concluded that existing OCA 
practices are likely to produce abstract accounts and are therefore unlikely to support low 
carbon technology innovation. 
In contrast, the second theme running through the thesis related to the potential for ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts focused on large-scale collaborative programmes, to better account 
for the emissions of the defence sector in a way that engages new/relevant actors to 
defence-energy debates. These accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCAs to 
support low carbon technology innovation.  Section 5.2 reiterated the context for this theme 
from the Literature Review, which described how Scope 3 reporting is immature at present – 
particularly where relevant to the product lifecycle and value chain.  The section then 
summarised how the quantitative analysis from the Results chapter showed the lack of 
relevant Scope 3 reporting at present in the defence sector, despite a clear recognition of the 
importance of this data.  There is a conflict between the recognised need to produce ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts, which are inevitably scenario specific, and the ongoing drive to 
standardise OCA practices.  However, the defence sector is well placed to resolve this 
conflict, being characterised by several large scale industrial projects.  It concluded that if 
this conflict in organisational reporting can be overcome, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
have the potential to engage new and relevant actors to defence-climate change debates, 
and are therefore more likely to support low carbon technology innovation. 
However, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts cannot work effectively in isolation, which led onto 
the third theme running through this thesis related to the potential for ‘consequential carbon 
accounting’ perspectives to align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, in order to inform 
wider strategic narratives that help construct a positive selection environment for low carbon 
technologies in the defence sector.  Section 5.3 reiterated the context for this theme from the 
Literature Review, which described the relevance of ‘consequential accounting’ perspectives 
for connecting emissions inventories to positive change at the system level.  This aligns 
them to ‘defence capability’ concepts that are likely to provide the strategic context through 
which ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts are understood and interpreted.  It referred back to 
the Results chapter and the emergence of relevant strategic vectors of ‘resilience’ and 
‘endurance’, and associated metrics such as the FBCE.  It explained the FBCE as a type of 
consequential carbon account, but one which is underpinned by ‘Project Level’ Carbon 
Accounts in order to work in practice.  The section then described the relevance of the 
innovation studies literature in this context, and the need for ‘storylines’ at the niche and 
182 
 
landscape level to be mutually reinforcing in order for a positive selection environment to be 
created in the defence sector.  In other words, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and a wider 
strategic framework of relevant tools and metrics will both be required in order for OCA 
practices to effectively support technology innovation. 
Together these themes suggest that if OCA practices in the defence sector are to effectively 
support low carbon technology innovation, then existing practices need to change; ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts need to be developed; and these need to be presented within an 
appropriate strategic framework.  This implies a number of recommendations for existing 
OCA practices in the defence sector as follows. 
To focus on existing OCA practices first, despite their limitations in supporting low carbon 
technology innovation, it is important to stress that they do have a legitimate role.  There is a 
strong rationale for the existing ‘attributional’ approaches to Carbon Accounting that 
encourage organisations to take ownership of their climate change impacts and act to 
reduce their GHG emissions.  Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of ways that policymakers can 
regulate for organisations to take action without ‘attributional’ Carbon Accounts that quantify 
their emissions – regardless of the method used to do this.  Similarly, external stakeholders 
(investors, civil society) would struggle to put pressure on organisations to act to mitigate 
climate change without some way of understanding their individual impacts and comparing 
them to their peers.  This latter point is particularly relevant, with financial market actors 
gaining increasing influence over how organisations account for their GHG impacts and 
responses to climate change (Bebbington & Larrinaga, 2014).  
However, Schaltegger et al (2015) emphasise the different roles that Carbon Accounting can 
play: 
‘Corporate climate accounting can either be introduced as a means to create 
information for reporting to various public stakeholders or customers.  Another 
purpose can be to initiate company internal processes of reducing the carbon 
footprint of the organisation and to support organizational learning processes’ (p.8) 
This research is concerned with the extent to which OCA practices support low carbon 
technology innovation, as this is seen as the best way that the defence sector can contribute 
to climate change mitigation.  From this perspective, existing OCAs are unlikely to widen 
participation in defence-energy debates or establish compelling storylines that support low 
carbon technology innovation.  The existing trends in both Organisational Carbon 
Accounting and Defence Industrial Policy are only likely to make these accounts less 
supportive of technology innovation, with increasing pressure to pragmatically standardise 
Carbon Accounting methodologies so that individual organisations can be compared (driving 
decreased ‘relevance’), and defence sector organisations becoming increasingly integrated 
in relation to all aspects of defence activity (making the challenges of attributing emissions to 
individual organisations yet more difficult). 
Therefore, in terms of recommendations for OCA practices in the defence sector, this 
research would suggest that defence sector organisations should support and effectively 
respond to the demands placed on them by regulators and external stakeholders to produce 
standardised and comparable Organisational Carbon Accounts.  However, these methods 
should not dominate their agenda as at present in relation to climate change mitigation, and 
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wherever possible (for example in their public reporting that does not respond to regulatory 
agendas) they should seek to provide more relevant ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts. 
This research recommends that the Defence sector should collaboratively create these 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts as a means to establish their scope 3 inventories, and make 
these publicly available wherever possible so as to ‘recruit’ as many new or relevant actors 
into ‘discourse coalitions’ that are supportive of low carbon technology development in the 
sector. 
In the context of the mounting pressure on organisations to develop and publish their scope 
3 inventories, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts jointly created by multiple organisations could 
be a very relevant way to build up relevant scope 3 accounts that communicate the value 
chain impacts of different organisations, as opposed to the existing scope 3 accounts that 
are focused on less relevant categories such as business travel or employee commuting.  
The concept of ‘Scope 4’ Carbon Accounting introduced by Matthews, Hendrickson & Weber 
(2008) is useful in this respect to focus organisations on the most relevant impacts to the 
product lifecycle, but is probably only practical for defence sector organisations to apply if it 
is recognised in a widely use methodology such as the GHG Protocol. 
Given the potential that ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts have to establish relevant 
‘storylines’ and create ‘coalitions’ relevant to the development or integration of low carbon 
technologies to the specific projects with which they are concerned, this research 
recommends that these ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts should be created whenever 
organisations have capacity to create their own carbon accounting and climate change 
narratives (outside of regulatory requirements).  They should actively seek to include 
relevant Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in these activities, who are largely 
without GHG reporting drivers at present (Buhr, Gray & Milne, 2014) but can often be more 
agile and innovative than larger organisations.   
Where existing OCA practices were likely to get less relevant given contemporary trends in 
the sector, the opposite seems true for ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts, supported as they 
are by the increasing trends towards international collaboration and industrial teaming, and 
the continuing standardisation and inter-operability of defence products. 
As well as producing ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts wherever possible, this research also 
recommends that these are presented within a relevant framework of strategic concepts and 
tools. 
This research recommends that OCA practices in the defence sector need to be very 
conscious of the interplay between ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and relevant strategic 
narratives. 
Alone, both the ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts discussed in the second theme of this thesis 
and ‘system-level’ perspectives discussed in the third theme, are limited in the change that 
they can achieve.  However, together they can have a transformative impact on the way that 
the sector views energy use and GHG emissions, and begin to construct a strong selection 
environment for low carbon technologies that effect positive change at the system level. 
There is significant potential to do this at present, given the growing acknowledgement of 
energy as ‘the key enabler of military power’ (Lengyel, 2007: p.8).  Despite this 
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acknowledgement, the overall approach to defence energy issues at present lacks strategic 
coherence (Warner & Singer, 2009), and the types of Carbon Accounting practices 
recommended in this research provide one means to start addressing this. 
This chapter has comprehensively evaluated OCA practices in the defence sector, and 
generated some relevant recommendations for the organisations within it.  The Conclusion 
that follows summarises the thesis as a whole before reflecting on the implications of this 
‘sector-level’ research for the emerging field of Carbon Accounting more broadly, suggesting 
ways that it might become more effective in supporting the fight against climate change as it 
continues to develop. 
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6) Conclusion 
 
This thesis is titled “An investigation of Organisational Carbon Accounting (OCA) practices in 
the Defence Sector to determine how these can best support Low Carbon Technology 
Innovation”. 
Section 1.4 of the introductory chapter described ‘The Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’, 
categorising these according to the different ‘cognitive levels’ of Blooms Taxonomy and the 
relevant chapters of the thesis that addresses them.  This concluding chapter provides a 
chronological summary of the thesis by describing how these objectives have been met.  
The Conclusion then finishes by addressing the final objective listed in 1.4, for the research 
to “Formulate some recommendations for the wider field of Carbon Accounting that can 
inform its ongoing development”. 
There were several objectives associated with the Literature Review (chapter 2).  The first 
simply aimed to provide the reader with a broad knowledge of the history and key theories 
associated with three academic fields: Carbon Accounting; Defence Industrial Policy; and 
Innovation Studies.  Given the emerging nature of the field of Carbon Accounting, 
particularly as regards sector level research, the supporting literatures of Defence Industrial 
Policy and Innovation Studies were reviewed to provide essential context to the Carbon 
Accounting debates discussed. 
For the ‘themes’ of Carbon Accounting identified as most relevant to this research, the thesis 
aimed to describe the gaps and areas of immaturity in the existing knowledge.  The three 
‘themes’ identified related to the difficulty of attributing Scope 1 & 2 emissions to individual 
organisations with methodologies still evolving; the lack of mature Scope 3 emissions 
accounting and ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts related to the value chain despite their 
acknowledged importance to organisational reporting; and the relevance of little-known 
‘consequential perspectives’ for OCAs that are increasingly informing organisation decision 
making.  
The third objective was to convey how the gaps in the Carbon Accounting literature are 
reinforced by contextual aspects of the Defence Industrial Policy supporting literature.  The 
Literature Review described how the difficulty of attributing emissions to individual 
organisations was particularly challenging in the defence sector due to the increasing private 
sector involvement in nearly all defence tasks, to the extent that defence departments and 
their supporting industrial base can be highly integrated and difficult to separate for 
emissions accounting purposes.  In contrast, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounting methods 
align well to a sector that is increasingly characterised by a small number of large, high 
profile international programmes supported by industrial ‘teams’ comprising multiple 
companies.  Similarly, consequential perspectives on Carbon Accounting align well with 
concepts of ‘defence capability’ that are gaining traction in a period of defence reform in 
most western countries. 
The Literature Review explained how Carbon Accounting can influence technology 
innovation, most notably in its discursive power to build coalitions of interests that can 
challenge established ways of working, and existing socio-technical regimes.  It 
characterised the existing calls for defence to support low carbon technology innovation as 
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based on outdated models of innovation (technology push, demand pull), and described how 
Carbon Accounting was particularly relevant to more contemporary ‘networked’ models of 
innovation. 
The final objective for the Literature Review was to convey the relevance to the reader of an 
interdisciplinary approach, with the use of relevant supporting literatures necessary to 
effectively investigate Carbon Accounting at the sector level, given the way that strengths 
and weaknesses of existing Carbon Accounting methods can be amplified or reduced in the 
sector-specific context.  Given that the defence sector is widely characterised as a 
‘technology innovator’ in climate change debates, the innovation studies literature was also 
particularly relevant for reflecting on the purpose of OCA practices in the sector. 
The first objective for the Methodology (chapter 3) of the thesis was that the reader should 
understand the relevance of an exploratory archival research strategy for analysing Carbon 
Accounting and climate change information produced by defence sector organisations.  The 
exploratory, inductive approach to the research made sense given that relatively little is 
currently known about the subject, but there are increasing quantities of public information 
being made available by organisations across the world.   
The second (related) objective was that the reader should be able to apply the exploratory 
archival strategy used in this research, and the different parts of the Methodology chapter 
explained in detail how relevant primary and secondary sources of data were identified and 
reviewed for quantitative and qualitative data.  A sample of defence organisations was 
selected for inclusion in the research that included the UK MoD, US DoD, and the ten largest 
multi-national defence companies globally.  The Methodology explained how this sample 
covered a significant proportion of the defence sector by spend, and allowed the analysis to 
extend across different regions and types of defence company.  The chapter described a 
rationale for selecting relevant public documents for the organisations in the sample, and a 
systematic approach to identifying these.  With a large selection of relevant documents 
selected, the Methodology then described how quantitative datasets were established for 
GHG and energy data, as well relevant normalising data.  Qualitative datasets were also 
established in relation to energy and climate change keywords used in the documents, and 
any public targets or ambitions being communicated by them.  Secondary sources of 
defence-energy grey literature were also reviewed to provide some additional context to the 
data identified in the primary sources from the organisations in the sample. 
The Results chapter (4) presented relevant correlational analysis from the quantitative and 
qualitative datasets established in the Methodology.  Comparisons of the quantitative data 
showed that defence departments currently report the overwhelming majority of the overall 
emissions from the sector.  Where scope 3 data related to the value chain was available it 
had a significant impact on these quantitative trends, and suggested that ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts could potentially account for a large proportion of the sectors total 
emissions, complicating the picture as to which organisations in the sample are the most 
quantitatively significant.  By integrating the qualitative data, a connection could be 
demonstrated between the volume of emissions reported and the level of priority placed on 
the issue of climate change mitigation, suggesting that the technical accounting issues that 
drive reported volumes do potentially influence organisational responses to climate change, 
and therefore are significant.   
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The second objective for the Results chapter was to associate findings from the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis with information from relevant secondary sources to illustrate 
pertinent issues in defence sector Carbon Accounting.  The Results chapter described the 
emergence of some new ‘strategic vectors’ of ‘resilience’ and ‘endurance’ in the military 
discourse.  The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy (FBCE) is a metric that could be described 
as a ‘consequential approach’ to Carbon Accounting that is helping to drive these new 
strategic vectors into military doctrine and improve decision making in relation to defence 
energy use.  However, the implementation of the FBCE relies on robust ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts and less attributional mind-sets that are discussed in earlier parts of the 
thesis. 
The final objective for the Results chapter was to defend/justify the interdisciplinary approach 
taken to the academic literature, and exploratory archival research strategy employed.  
Despite the lack of relevant precedents in the Carbon Accounting literature, and the evolving 
nature of existing OCA practices, relevant patterns were identified in the quantitative and 
qualitative data.  When aligned to the secondary sources of defence-energy grey literature, 
strong trends were observed that could begin to define some relevant ways forward for OCA 
practices in the sector, validating the research approach taken. 
The Discussion (5) aimed to bring the preceding chapters of the thesis together in order to 
comprehensively evaluate OCA practices in the defence sector, and their potential to 
support low carbon technology innovation.  The first objective set in 1.4 (‘Aims and 
Objectives of the Thesis’) was to relate the most relevant themes of defence sector Carbon 
Accounting that were identified in the Literature Review to the analysis of OCA practices 
presented in the Results chapter.  The first of these themes related to the difficulty of 
allocating emissions between organisations in existing OCAs, which is likely to be 
particularly marked in the defence sector due to close working relationships, and may result 
in abstract OCAs that do not connect effectively to the underlying activities causing 
emissions to be produced.  This is likely to inhibit the extent to which the accounts engage 
new/relevant actors and support low carbon technology innovation.  In contrast, the second 
theme running through the thesis related to the potential for ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts 
focused on large-scale collaborative programmes, to better account for the emissions of the 
defence sector in a way that engages new/relevant actors to defence-energy debates. These 
accounts are therefore more likely than existing OCAs to support low carbon technology 
innovation.  However, ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts cannot work effectively in isolation, 
which led onto the third theme running through this thesis related to the potential for 
‘consequential carbon accounting’ perspectives to align with concepts of ‘defence capability’, 
in order to inform wider strategic narratives that help construct a positive selection 
environment for low carbon technologies in the defence sector.   
The other objective for the Discussion was to generate a set of recommendations for OCA 
practices in the defence sector that will better support low carbon technology innovation.  
The research concludes that if OCA practices in the defence sector are to effectively support 
low carbon technology innovation, then existing practices need to change; ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts need to be developed; and these need to be presented within an 
appropriate strategic framework.  Existing OCA practices focused on attributing Scope 1 & 2 
to individual organisations do have a legitimate role in the Carbon Accounting landscape, 
given their usefulness for policymakers and civil society across all sectors.  However, for 
defence sector organisations these accounts should be seen as a means to a regulatory 
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end, and any spare capacity should be focused on producing collaborative ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts that are more likely to widen participation in energy and climate change 
debates in the defence sector.  Given that technology innovation is seen as the most 
valuable contribution that the defence sector can make to climate change mitigation, these 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts – by widening participation – are more likely to support the 
building of relevant ‘discourse coalitions’ that can challenge incumbent interests in the sector 
and encourage technology innovation.  Finally, this research recommends that OCA 
practices in the defence sector need to be very conscious of the interplay between ‘Project 
Level’ Carbon Accounts and relevant strategic narratives.  Alone, both the ‘Project Level’ 
Carbon Accounts discussed in the second theme of this thesis and ‘system-level’ 
perspectives discussed in the third theme, are limited in the change that they can achieve.  
However, together they can have a transformative impact on the way that the sector views 
energy use and GHG emissions, and begin to construct a strong selection environment for 
low carbon technologies that effect positive change at the system level. 
The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ (section 1.4) also set an objective relevant to this 
concluding chapter.  This chapter will “Formulate some recommendations for the wider field 
of Carbon Accounting that can inform its ongoing development”. 
In terms of the implications for the wider field of Carbon Accounting, it has been clear 
throughout this thesis that OCA can clearly benefit from incorporating methodologies and 
perspectives from wider parts of the Carbon Accounting field.   
Ascui and Lovell’s (2011) definition of Carbon Accounting that was used to introduce the 
topic of Carbon Accounting (See section 1.2 ‘Academic Context and Novelty’, Figure 1) 
demonstrates the breadth of the field.  Brander & Ascui (2015) explain how there is 
significant potential for learning across different parts of this field: 
‘methods of carbon accounting…have developed in a number of semi-isolated fields 
of practice, such as national inventory accounting, corporate carbon accounting, 
project level accounting, and product life cycle assessment, and there appears to be 
considerable potential for learning across these different fields’ (p.100) 
These existing ‘semi-isolated fields of practice’ are arguably not working, and Burritt, 
Schaltegger & Zvedov (2011) conclude that there is currently a lack of sophistication to 
Carbon Accounting that to an extent undermines its utility.  Whilst climate change mitigation 
is a much broader challenge than Carbon Accounting alone, Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) 
emphasise the technicalities of Carbon Accounting, and that we ‘should not forget [its] 
powerful shaping role’ (p.203).  
Bulkeley and Newell (2010) comment on the limitations of existing activities: 
‘despite the enormous proliferation of initiatives aimed at reporting, benchmarking, 
and measuring performance…it would be difficult to argue that the world is showing 
genuine progress in moving away from a model of development that is fuelling 
climate change.’ (p.110) 
Bailey, Gouldson & Newell (2010) mention the concern that the plethora of complex 
regulatory regimes can reinforce existing Carbon Accounting practices, and act to stifle 
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innovation or ‘alternative framings’ of the issue (in this case discussing the experience of 
regulated carbon markets): 
‘A final issue concerns the degree to which the recent formation of these market-
based approaches has locked corporations, countries and the wider international 
community into a neoliberal experiment with climate governance…the opportunity for 
more radical voices to impact upon the dominant framings or governance processes 
seems very limited indeed.’ (p.15) 
Section 1.2 (‘Academic Context and Novelty) introduced the rarity of sector-level analyses of 
OCA, but this perspective has proved particularly useful in this research for identifying 
relevant Carbon Accounting methods from other fields of practice that can improve 
‘Organisational’ Carbon Accounting specifically.  The sector-level perspective is particularly 
relevant, as the strengths and weakness of different methods can be amplified by the sector-
specific context.  This research has shown that existing OCA practices focused on attributing 
scope 1 & 2 emissions to individual organisations do not align well to contemporary trends in 
the defence sector, but ‘Project Level’ methodologies have considerable potential. 
Thus, OCA practices can be significantly improved by borrowing from other areas of the 
wider Carbon Accounting field, and various techniques and methods will be appropriate 
depending on the specific sector in question.  From this perspective, the wide range of 
activity across all ‘scales’ of Carbon Accounting is cause for optimism, as it offers a dynamic 
and growing set of activities from which to borrow, as Bulkeley & Newell (2010) confirm: 
‘While the tremendous diversity and dynamism of climate governance generates 
huge challenges of co-ordination, accountability and effectiveness … the plurality of 
sites of action could also be a positive thing as actors move between arenas trying to 
advance action in the fastest and most effective way they can, working with whom 
they need to, wherever that happens to be.’ (p.114) 
Bebbington & Larrinaga (2014) emphasise the scale of the challenge but would also 
welcome this diversity, arguing that ‘the scientific and technical indeterminacy of the social 
and physical processes giving rise to global climate change precludes taking any 
measurement method for granted’ (p.205), and suggesting that some of the core 
philosophical pillars of Carbon Accounting (such as the scope 1-3 distinctions) that have 
been dominant date do need to remain open to question: 
‘accounting research has not substantively engaged with those issues but they are 
the bedrock issues for approaching any reporting and are exactly the issues of detail 
that will have an impact on the relevance of carbon accounting data’ (p.205) 
Therefore, the sector-level perspective can clearly prove useful in challenging the dominant 
OCA practices, and identifying relevant areas of the wider Carbon Accounting field that can 
make them more relevant to the sector specific context.  However, more fundamentally the 
sector-level perspective is useful for first understanding the contribution to climate change 
mitigation expected of a given sector, before critically analysing the role that OCA plays in 
inhibiting or supporting this contribution. 
From the defence sector perspective, this thesis began by characterising the defence sector 
as a ‘technology innovator’ in climate change mitigation debates (see 1.1 ‘Background’), and 
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this research has demonstrated that the defence sector could potentially improve its capacity 
to develop low carbon technologies by adopting certain Carbon Accounting techniques that 
challenge the existing dominant OCA practices.  
Thomson (2014) argues that this connection between the challenges of sustainable 
transformations and the accounting techniques employed by organisations and others is 
crucial to the development of the field: 
‘The radical nature of sustainable transformations…requires our research questions 
to be more radical and ambitious.  As a community, we need to be challenging 
assumptions, engaging in actions and thinking that seeks to resist unsustainable 
practices, participating effectively in sustainability conflicts and focusing on solving 
problems.’ (p.26) 
This research would strongly endorse these perspectives on the future challenges for OCA, 
and argues that the sector-level perspective is particularly useful for critically analysing 
existing practices and future trajectories; and focusing on solutions to real world problems in 
a specific context.   
Section 1.2 (‘Academic Context and Novelty’) described how despite the significant volume 
of grey literature focused around the many schemes and initiatives aiming to mitigate climate 
change, the academic literature is relatively immature, and significant edited volumes by 
Schaltegger et al (2015) and Bellassen & Stephan (2016) have only emerged in the last 
year.  This research argues that ‘sector-level’ perspectives need to inform this literature as it 
develops, and will inevitably drive the field to become more interdisciplinary.  Just as it has 
been necessary to engage with the Defence Industrial Policy and Innovation Studies in this 
research, other sector-level studies will require engagement with other literatures relevant to 
the sector in question.  The choice of relevant supporting literatures needs to be based on 
an understanding of the most effective contribution the sector in question is likely to make to 
the challenge of mitigating climate change, and an exploratory, inductive approach to the 
research can help ground the investigation in its unique context. 
Given the scale of the challenge of mitigating climate change, we must ensure that all 
sectors of the economy meaningfully contribute to the task, and we should be conscious of 
the powerful shaping role that Carbon Accounting can play in this regard.  
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7) Recommendations for Further Work 
 
The ‘Aims and Objectives of the Thesis’ (section 1.4) also described another objective for 
this thesis to “develop some suggestions of specific areas of further work that could 
effectively build on this exploratory research”.   
This final chapter of the thesis describes some recommended areas of further work that 
would be beneficial to investigate but are beyond the scope of this research.  It is often 
considered that exploratory research approaches in under-developed academic fields can be 
most valuable in the basis they create for further investigation, and this responds by 
describing two areas related to Carbon Accounting in the defence sector where further 
research could be particularly beneficial. 
The first is a pragmatic area of further research, and relates to the practical feasibility of 
defence sector organisations making ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts widely available in a 
sector understandably known for its emphasis on secrecy. 
This research clearly recommends that the Defence sector should collaboratively create 
‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts as a means to establish their scope 3 inventories, and make 
these publicly available wherever possible so as to ‘recruit’ as many new or relevant actors 
into ‘discourse coalitions’ that are supportive of low carbon technology development in the 
sector.  They should actively seek to include relevant Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) in these activities, who are largely without GHG reporting drivers at present (Buhr, 
Gray & Milne, 2014) but can often be more agile and innovative than larger organisations.  
As well as producing ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts wherever possible, this research also 
recommends that these are presented within a relevant framework of strategic concepts and 
tools. 
Given the priorities for recruiting new actors into a ‘discourse coalition’ that challenges 
incumbents and the status quo, it is important that these accounts and frameworks are made 
public so as to communicate their impacts to as wide an audience as possible.  It is 
acknowledged that this may be a challenge to defence sector practices, where product 
information is very rarely made public for the potential security threat it presents by providing 
information to potential adversaries.  Indeed, this has been the rationale used by the IAEG 
for not determining any guidance for the sector as regards emissions related to ‘products in 
use’.  However, significant high-level information is already widely communicated about 
significant defence products on platforms like Wikipedia, and high-level GHG information is 
unlikely to offer adversaries any more benefit than the type of information that already exists, 
but could serve to change the narrative around defence sector emissions.  A balance needs 
to be struck between the potential threat that releasing this type of information poses, and 
the potential benefits it could offer. 
This would be a valuable avenue of further research that explores some of the practical 
realities of implementing some of the recommendations from this research. 
The second area of further research is a more theoretical line of enquiry, related to energy 
system debates.  This thesis has been concerned with how Carbon Accounting methods in 
the defence sector have discursive power to influence technical change within the sector 
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itself.  However, the defence sector could also be analysed as an actor in its own right with 
significant discursive power to effect wider energy system debates. 
The ‘energy security’ of western powers represents an increasing threat to national security, 
particularly in countries that are net importers of energy, such as the US and UK.  The MoD 
Strategic Trends report predicts that global energy demand is likely to grow by more than 
half again by 2035, and that nations will be increasingly reluctant to trust the security of their 
energy supply to market forces and the integrity of the international trading system (Ministry 
of Defence, 2013e).  Moreover, there is widespread acknowledgement of how the reliance of 
western industrialised countries on large volumes of imported energy can complicate foreign 
policy options, due to the need to maintain good business relations with oil exporting 
countries. 
Therefore, with both a fundamental requirement to maintain secure supplies of energy, and a 
strategic benefit to reducing dependence on imports, the defence sector has a key interest in 
supporting the transition to a sustainable energy system.  The question of how it could best 
support system-level change in the area of power generation is very relevant to this.  There 
is a substantial volume of literature on sustainable energy systems (e.g. Hofman & Elzen, 
2010; Sauter & Bauknecht, 2009; Schreuer, Rohracher & Spath, 2010), which is linked to the 
innovation studies literature described in section 2.3 and characterises existing centralised 
systems of power generation in industrialised countries as socio-technical regimes in ‘lock in’ 
(Unruh, 2000).  Building on concepts of ‘selection environments’ for energy technologies as 
discussed in this thesis, centralised power generation systems and their associated 
institutional structures and political and industrial lobbies, can be hostile to new technologies.  
The literature applies discursive perspectives to socio-technical regimes characterised by 
‘lock in’, and suggests that by widening the participation in energy debates to new 
institutions, individuals, and sectors (e.g. Defence), the legitimacy of powerful incumbent 
actors can be challenged at the energy system level. 
Defence is a particularly relevant actor from this perspective as it aligns with one of several 
‘core imperatives’ that constrain the influence that discourse can have in neo-liberal societies 
(Dryzek, 1997).  Just as ‘economic growth’ is a core imperative that many advocates of 
sustainable energy systems align with in order to advance their argument, likewise security 
concerns could offer a similarly attractive framing to challenge energy system incumbents, if 
the defence sector was to effectively engage with the debate. 
This research has been concerned with how OCA practices can better ‘frame’ debates within 
the defence sector.  It emphasised the relevance of niche and landscape level interactions in 
order to creative a positive selection environment for low carbon technology (Lehtonen & 
kern, 2009), explaining in this case how ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts and strategic 
concepts and metrics are mutually reinforcing.  However, there is an even wider ‘landscape-
level’ to be considered, which is concerned with the energy system itself.  In this sense, the 
defence sector itself and its activities could be seen as the ‘niche … protected space where 
novel technologies, ideas or practices emerge’ (Lehtonen & kern, 2009, p.104), and the 
landscape level debates and narratives relate to energy policy and the energy system as a 
whole. 
Just as strategic narratives and ‘Project Level’ Carbon Accounts can become mutually 
reinforcing within the sector; defence sector activities and energy system debates can also 
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become mutually reinforcing.  The introduction to this thesis mentioned a relevant historical 
precedent in this context, with the military development of the jet engine crucial to the 
development of the combined cycle gas turbine that heralded a shift in how power was 
generated in all developed economies (Watson, 2004).  Despite the defence sector and its 
role in the innovation process having changed significantly since the 1960s, it could still play 
a significant role in contemporary socio-technical models of change, if effective ‘storylines’ 
can be advanced at both the sector and energy system level. 
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Appendix A: Datasets used in the Research 
 
Emissions Boundary 
(CC8.1) 
Number of Records Percentage of Total 
Operational Control                                  1,259  66% 
Financial Control                                      504  26% 
Equity Share                                        67  4% 
Other                                        74  4% 
Table 1: Emissions Boundary Methodologies Reported to CDP in 2014 (Original Analysis. Source Data: CDP Academic Dataset) 
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  Methodology Used Global Warming Potentials Included Emission Factors Emissions Boundary 
Thales The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) 
CO2; CH4; N20; HFCs; PFCs; SF6 - IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4 - 100 year) 
No reference Operational control 
United 
Technologies 
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) 
CO2; CH4; N20; HFCs; PFCs; SF6 - IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4 - 100 year) 
US EPA Operational control 
Lockheed Martin 
Corporation 
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) 
CO2; CH4; N20; HFCs - IPCC Second Assessment 
Report (SAR - 100 year) 
No reference Operational control 
Northrop 
Grumman Corp 
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) 
CO2; CH4; N20; HFCs; PFCs; SF6; NF3 - IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4 - 100 year); IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (SAR - 100 year) 
No reference Operational control 
Raytheon 
Company 
US EPA Climate Leaders Guidance Documents; The 
GHG Protocol; Defra Voluntary Reporting Guidelines; 
Australia - National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act; Other 
CO2; CH4; N2O; HFCs; PFCs; SF6 - IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (SAR - 100 year) 
US EPA Operational control 
Airbus Group The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) 
CO2; CH4; N2O; Other: HCFC-22; Other: HFC-134a; 
Other: R404a; Other: R407a; Other: R407c; Other: 
R408a; Other: R410a; Other: R507; Other: R417a; 
Other: HFC-23 
Commission 
Decision of 16 
April 2009 
Operational control 
Finmeccanica The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised 
Edition); ISO 14064-1; Other 
CO2; CH4; N2O - GHG Protocol Tool 2011. HFCs; 
PFCs; SF6 - IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4 - 
100 year) 
No reference Other: 149 sites are included in the 
CMS, in line with the Environmental 
Reporting perimeter 
BAE Systems The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised 
Edition); Defra Voluntary Reporting Guidelines 
CO2; CH4; N2O - Linked to DEFRA guidance for 
conversions to CO2e 
Bespoke 
spreadsheet 
Operational control 
Boeing Company The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised 
Edition); Australia - National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act; Other 
CO2; CH4; N2O; HFCs; PFCs; SF6; NF3 - IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4 - 100 year) 
Bespoke 
spreadsheet 
Other: GHGs represent 108 facilities 
located primarily in the U.S.; 
Operations of Boeing Australia and 
Boeing UK 
General 
Dynamics 
Not disclosed Not disclosed Not disclosed US Based Business Units, Including 
their Foreign Operating Sites (2012 
Sustainability Report) 
MoD None specified, but Scope 1-3 referenced CO2; CH4; N2O; HFCs; PFCs; SF6 DEFRA factors Described for 'goal-subject GHGs' - 
~400 core facilities 
DoD None specified, but Scope 1-3 referenced CO2; CH4; N2O; HFCs; PFCs; SF6 None mentioned Data files simply list as 'Department 
of Defense' 
Table 2: Carbon Accounting Methodologies used by Organisations in the Research Sample (Source(s): CDP Academic Dataset for company 
information, Sustainable MoD Annual Reports (Ministry of Defence, 2014m; 2015a; 2016b), Department of Energy Federal Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories (Department of Energy, 2016), Department of Energy Overview of Executive Order 13514 (Department of Energy, 2009)) 
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Site No Control % Estimate 
1 100% 
2 100% 
3 90% 
4 10% 
5 NA 
6 100% 
7 75% 
8 90% 
9 90% 
10 100% 
11 90% 
12 100% 
13 90% 
14 65% 
15 100% 
16 100% 
17 100% 
18 100% 
19 100% 
20 100% 
Table 3: ‘Top 20 GHG-Producing Sites’ at BAE Systems and estimate of the companies’ percentage control based on some simple survey 
questions. Sites have been anonymised and included as a number. 
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Rank Country Spending ($ 
billion) 
World Share (%) 
1 USA 698 43% 
2 China [119] [7.3%] 
3 UK 59.6 3.7% 
4 France 59.3 3.6% 
5 Russia [58.7] [3.6%] 
6 Japan 54.5 3.3% 
7 Saudi Arabia 45.2 2.8% 
8 Germany [45.2] [2.8%] 
9 India 41.3 2.5% 
10 Italy [37] [2.3%] 
Table 4: Table (reproduced) showing Top 10 defence spending countries. Where figures are in square brackets they represent a SIPRI 
estimate. (Source: SIPRI, 2011: p. 9) 
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  1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2005 
United States          11,797           10,229           11,641           10,377           5,516           7,101  
Russia          16,814           14,378             5,221             3,589           5,548           5,771  
France            3,622             2,629                 902             1,651           1,133           2,399  
Germany            1,673             1,302             2,372             1,618              640           1,855  
United Kingdom            1,919             1,733             1,394             1,526           1,070              791  
Netherlands                697                 342                 423                 381              190              840  
Italy            1,549                 334                 506                 414              185              827  
Sweden                172                 275                 184                 118              459              592  
China                825             2,143             1,100                 707              408              129  
Ukraine  n/a   n/a   n/a                 236              702              188  
World Total          41,997           37,241           25,928           22,079        17,332        21,961  
US percent of total 28.1% 27.5% 44.9% 47.0% 31.8% 32.3% 
Table 5: Table (reproduced) showing Foreign Military Sales: Major Suppliers, 1981 to 2005 (millions of 1999 US dollars). (Source: Gansler, 
2011: p.150) 
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Rank Company Arms Sales ($m) Profit ($m) 
1 Lockheed Martin (US) 
                    
35,490  
              
2,981  
2 Boeing (US) 
                    
30,700  
              
4,585  
3 BAE Systems (UK) 
                    
26,820  
                 
275  
4 Raytheon (US) 
                    
21,950  
              
2,013  
5 Northrop Grumman (US) 
                    
20,200  
              
1,952  
6 General Dynamics (US) 
                    
18,660  
              
2,357  
7 EADS (trans-Europe) - now Airbus 
                    
15,740  
              
1,959  
8 United Technologies (US) 
                    
11,900  
              
5,721  
9 Finmeccanica (Italy) 
                    
10,560  
                   
98  
10 Thales (France) 
                    
10,370  
                 
761  
Table 6: Table (reproduced) showing the 10 largest arms-producing companies, 2013 (Source: SIPRI, 2015: p.17)  
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  Domestic Sales 
($m) 
 Foreign Sales 
($m)  
 Percentage 
Domestic  
Source 
Lockheed Martin 37,765  7,735  83% 2013 Annual 
Reports 
(some 
interpretation 
of 
data/narrative 
required) 
Boeing 37,248  49,375  43% 
BAE Systems 7,386  21,020  26% 
Raytheon 17,305  6,401  73% 
Northrop Grumman 22,161  2,500  90% 
General Dynamics 24,255  6,963  78% 
Airbus 28,329  50,364  36% 
United Technologies 23,798  38,828  38% 
Finmeccanica 3,757  17,535  18% 
Thales 5,500  13,350  29% 
Table 7: The breakdown of the ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ sales for the companies included in this review (Source(s): Lockheed Martin, 2014a; 
Boeing, 2014a; BAE Systems, 2014a; Raytheon, 2014a; Northrop Grumman, 2014a; General Dynamics, 2014a; Airbus, 2014a; United 
Technologies, 2014a; Finmeccanica, 2014a; Thales, 2014a) 
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   Total 2013 Arms 
Sales ($m)  
 Total Sales ($m)  Percentage Arms 
Sales ('Defence 
Dependence') 
Lockheed Martin                    35,490                     45,500  78% 
Boeing                    30,700                     86,623  35% 
BAE Systems                    26,820                     28,406  94% 
Raytheon                    21,950                     23,706  93% 
Northrop Grumman                    20,200                     24,661  82% 
General Dynamics                    18,660                     31,218  60% 
Airbus                    15,740                     78,693  20% 
United Technologies                    11,900                     62,626  19% 
Finmeccanica                    10,560                     21,292  50% 
Thales                    10,370                     18,850  55% 
Table 8: The revenue split between the ‘commercial sales’ and ‘defence sales’ for the companies included in this review (Source: SIPRI, 2014: 
p.3) 
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Search 
No 
Source Website Search Criteria / Browsing Section (of website) 
1 www.gov.uk/government/publications MoD; Corporate Reports 
2 www.gov.uk/government/publications MoD; Policy Papers 
3 www.gov.uk/government/publications MoD; Statistics 
4 www.gov.uk/government/publications MoD; Any other category of document 
5 www.gov.uk/government/publications Any Dept; Search Term "Defence" 
6 National Archives 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) 
  
7 Google searches aimed at finding British 
Army Documents 
"British Army Strategy"; "British Army Sustainability"; "British Army Environment" 
8 Google searches aimed at finding Royal 
Navy Documents 
"Royal Navy Strategy"; "Royal Navy Sustainability"; "Royal Navy Environment" 
9 RAF Website Downloads / Publications Section 
10 Google searches aimed at finding RAF 
Documents 
"Royal Air Force Strategy"; "Royal Air Force Sustainability"; "Royal Air Force 
Environment" 
11 Specific google search for additional 
documents known to exist but not located 
via above searches 
"UK SDSR 2010"; "MoD Strategic Trends" 
12 Documents located from references in 
other documents found using search terms 
above 
  
Table 9: Summarising approach used to identify relevant MoD documents for use in this research 
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Document 
Type 
Search 
No 
Name & Example 
References 
Summary Publication Date 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Vision / 
Strategic 
6; 11; 
12 
Strategic Defence & 
Security Review 
(Cabinet Office, 
2010b; 2015) 
The UK SDR and UK NSS 
provide the policy 
framework for defence. 
The Strategy for Defence 
and Defence Plan sit 
beneath these public 
documents but are not 
public and therefore not 
included here. 
    X (6)               X (11)         X 
(12) 
Vision / 
Strategic 
12 National Security 
Strategy (Cabinet 
Office, 2010a) 
                    X (12)           
Regular 
Business 
Report 
1 MoD Business Plan 
(Ministry of 
Defence, 2012a) 
Describes how MoD is 
managing its 
commitments in the 
Defence Plan 
        X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1)   
Regular 
Business 
Report 
1 MoD Annual Report 
and Accounts 
(Ministry of 
Defence, 2014k; 
2015e; 2016a) 
The MoD Business Plan 
and the Annual Report 
and Accounts are 
published annually 
together 
        X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1) 
Energy / 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
1 Sustainable 
Development 
Strategy: A Sub 
Strategy of the 
Strategy for Defence 
2011-2030 (Ministry 
of Defence, 2011b) 
This is a sub-strategy of 
the 'Strategy for Defence'.  
It provides a 20-year 
strategy and a 4-year plan 
(to align with the wider 
defence plan) 
                      X (1)         
Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
1 Sustainable MoD 
Annual Report 
(Ministry of 
Defence, 2014m; 
2015a; 2016b) 
Report refers to (1) the 
targets from the SD 
Strategy 2011-2030 above 
and (2) the greening 
government 
commitments (GGCs) of 
the coalition government 
                      X (1)   X (12) X (1) X (1) 
Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
1 MoD Greening 
Government 
Commitments 
Annual Report 
(Ministry of 
Defence, 2012e; 
2013a) 
Standalone report 
published annually 
communicating 
performance against the 
GGCs 
                        X (12) X (1)     
Table 10: Shortlisted MoD documents included in this research.  Their year of publication is mapped alongside a number that identifies the 
search method used to identify the document (these numbers cross reference to Table 9) 
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Type Sub-
Topic 
Name & Example Reference Publication Date 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 201
5 
Strategy / Vision Defence 
Reform 
Defence Reform Implementation Outline 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009) 
                  X (2)             
Strategy / Vision Defence 
Reform 
Defence Reform: An Independent Report 
into the Structure & Management of the 
Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence, 
2011a) 
                            X (1)   
Strategy / Vision Defence 
Reform 
Ministry of Defence Improvement Plan 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014a) 
                            X (1)   
Strategy / Vision Defence 
Reform 
2010-2015 Government Policy: Armed 
Forces and Ministry of Defence Reform 
(Ministry of Defence, 2012) 
                              X (2) 
Strategy / Vision Single 
Services 
Transforming the British Army (British 
Army, 2013) 
                          X (12)     
Strategy / Vision Single 
Services 
Future Navy Vision (Royal Navy, 2011)                       X (12)         
Strategy / Vision Single 
Services 
RAF Strategy (Royal Air Force, 2006)         X (12)   X (12)     X (12)       X (12)     
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics UK Defence Statistics Compendium 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014b) 
              X (12) X (12) X (12) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics MoD Annual factsheet 2013 (Ministry of 
Defence, 2013b) 
              X (12) X (12) X (12) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics Formations, Vessels and Aircraft Report: 
2014 (Ministry of Defence, 2015b) 
                            X (3) X (3) 
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics UK Armed Forces and UK Civilian 
Operational Casualty and Fatality 
Statistics 2014-15 (Ministry of Defence, 
2015c) 
                    X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3) X (3) 
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics Defence Departmental Resources 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014c) 
                          X (3) X (3) X (3) 
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel 
Report: 2013 (Ministry of Defence, 
2014d) 
                          X (3) X (3)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Equipment Holding Statistics 2014 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014e) 
                          X (3) X (3)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics International Defence Expenditure 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014f) 
                          X (3) X (3)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Statistics UK Manufacturers' Sales by Product 
(PRODCOM): Defence-Related Activities 
in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 
2014) 
                            X (5)   
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Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
MoD Capability Action Plan 2011-12 
(Ministry of Defence, 2012c) 
                        X (2)       
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Defence Growth Partnership: Strategic 
Vision for the UK Defence Sector 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014g) 
                            X (2)   
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Defence, Equipment & Support: 
Corporate Plan 2014-2017 (Ministry of 
Defence, 2014h) 
                      X (1)     X (1) X (1) 
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Defence Equipment Plan (Ministry of 
Defence, 2015d) 
                          X (1) X (1) X (1) 
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of 
State for Defence (Gray, 2009) 
                  X (6)             
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
The Defence Strategy for Acquisition 
Reform (Ministry of Defence, 2010b) 
                    X (2)           
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Better Defence Acquisition: Improving 
how we Procure and Support Defence 
Equipment (Ministry of Defence, 2013c) 
                          X (1)     
Regular Business 
Report 
Acquisiti
on 
Defence, Equipment & Support: 
Framework Document (Ministry of 
Defence, 2014i) 
                            X (1)   
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates Defence Estates Development Plan 2009 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009b) 
                  X (1)             
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates Defence Infrastructure Organisation 
Business Plan 2012-2016 (Ministry of 
Defence, 2012d) 
                        X (1)       
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates Defence Infrastructure Interim Land and 
Property Disposal Strategy (Ministry of 
Defence, 2011c) 
                        X (1)       
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates MoD Estate Information (Ministry of 
Defence, 2013d) 
                            X (1)   
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates MoD Land Holdings 2008-2014 (Ministry 
of Defence, 2014j) 
                          X (3) X (3)   
Energy/Env/ 
Sustainability 
Estates Defence Accommodation Management 
Strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2011d) 
                      X (1)         
Climate Change/ 
Megatrends 
General Global Strategic Trends out to 2040 
(Ministry of Defence, 2013e) 
                            X 
(12) 
  
Table 11: Longlisted MoD documents included in this research as contextual grey literature.  Their year of publication is mapped alongside a 
number that identifies the search method used to identify the document (these numbers cross reference to Table 9)
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Search 
No 
Source Website Search Criteria / Section of website 
1 defense.gov Current Releases 
2 Google Search (specific) "Quadrennial Defense Review" 
3 Google Search (specific) "National Defense Strategy" 
4 Google Search (specific) “National Military Strategy” 
5 Google search "Department of Defense Energy" 
5.1 energy.defense.gov (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs) Home Page 
5.2 www.nrel.gov/defense (National Renewable Energy Lab) Publications section 
5.3 http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense - Installations and Environment) Home Page; Reports sections 
6 Google search "Department of Defense Sustainability" 
6.1 DoD Sustainability' Web page (http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/1010_energy/)   
6.2 Center for Climate and Security website (https://climateandsecurity.org/2014/11/05/release-pentagons-strategic-sustainability-
performance-plan/) 
  
6.3 Whitehouse.gov   
7 Google search "Department of Defense Environment" 
7.1 DENIX (DoD Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Network and Information Exchange) http://www.denix.osd.mil/   
7.2 EPA website (https://www.epa.gov/p2/defending-environment-department-defense-using-environmentally-preferable-purchasing-
procedures) 
  
7.3 REPI Programme (Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration) http://www.repi.mil/   
7.4 SERDP/ESTCP website (https://www.serdp-estcp.org/) - DoD's environmental research programs   
8 Google search "Department of Defense Climate 
Change" 
9 US Army Publishing Website (http://www.apd.army.mil/)   
10 Google search "US Army Energy" 
10.1 Army Office of Energy Initiatives (http://www.asaie.army.mil/Public/ES/oei/index.html)  - previously 'army energy initiatives task 
force' 
  
10.1.1 AEPI (http://www.aepi.army.mil/) Army Environmental Policy Institute   
10.2 Army energy and water management program (http://army-energy.hqda.pentagon.mil/)    
11 Google search "US Army Sustainability" 
11.1 US Army Corps of Engineers (http://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/Sustainability.aspx) Publications section  
12 Google search "US Army Environment" 
12.1 US Army Environmental Command (http://www.aec.army.mil/) References section 
13 Google search "US Army Climate Change" 
14 US Navy Personnel Command (http://www.npc.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/publications/Pages/default.aspx)   
15 Google search "US Navy Energy" 
15.1 US Navy Greenfleet (http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/) Various 
15.2 Assistant Secretary of the Navy - Energy, Installations & Environment (http://www.secnav.navy.mil/eie/Pages/Energy.aspx)   
16 Google search "US Navy Sustainability" 
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16.1 NESDI (Navy Environmental Sustainability Development to Integration (NESDI) Program - http://www.nesdi.navy.mil/)   
17 Google search "US Navy Environment" 
18 Google search "US Navy Climate Change" 
19 US Air Force e-publishing Website (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/)   
20 Google search "US Air Force Energy" 
20.1 USAF Installations and Environment site (http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/energy/)   
20.2 Air Force Energy Initiatives site (http://www.af.mil/EnergyInitiatives.aspx)   
20.2.1 Civil engineer's Center for Renewables - (http://www.afcec.af.mil/energy/ratesandrenewables/index.asp)   
21 Google search "US Air Force Sustainability" 
22 Google search "US Air Force Environment" 
23 Google search "US Air Force Climate Change" 
Table 12: Summarising approach used to identify relevant DoD documents for use in this research 
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DoD or 
Services? 
Document Type Name & Example 
References 
Summary Publication Date 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DoD Vision / 
Strategic 
Quadrennial Defense 
Review (Department 
of Defense, 2010a; 
2014a)  
The main 
vision / 
strategy 
documents 
for DoD 
            X (2)       X (2)       X (1)   
DoD Vision / 
Strategic 
National Military 
Strategy (Department 
of Defense, 2015a) 
        X (3)             X (1)       X (3) 
DoD Regular 
Business Report 
Strategic Management 
Plan (Department of 
Defense, 2011b; 
2013a) 
Main 
business 
planning 
doc for DoD 
                X (1) X (1)   X (1) X (1) X (1) X (1)   
DoD Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
DoD Strategic 
Sustainability 
Performance Plan 
(Department of 
Defense, 2014b) 
Unites the 
'operational' 
and 'facility' 
energy 
reporting 
below 
                      X (5.3) X (5.3) X (6.2) X (6.2)   
DoD Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
DoD's Operational 
Energy Strategy 
(Department of 
Defense, 2011a) 
Key strategy 
doc re DoD 
Operational 
Energy Use 
                      X (5.1)         
DoD Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
Operational Energy 
Annual Report 
(Department of 
Defense, 2012b; 
2013d; 2014e; 2015b; 
2016b) 
Annual 
report on 
DoD 
Operational 
Energy Use 
                      X (5.1) X (5.1) X (5.1) X (5.1) X (5.1) 
DoD Energy/ 
Environment/ 
Sustainability 
Annual Energy 
Management Report 
(Department of 
Defense, 2009b; 
2010c; 2011c; 2012a; 
2013c; 2014d; 2015c) 
Annual 
report on 
DoD Facility 
Energy Use 
                  X (5.3) X (5.3) X (5.3) X (5.3) X (5.3) X (5.3) X (5.3) 
DoD Climate Change 
/ Megatrends 
DoD Climate Change 
Adaptation Roadmap 
(Department of 
Defense, 2014c) 
'Adaptation 
focused' but 
discusses 
wider 
climate 
change 
themes 
                            X (5.3)   
Table 13: Shortlisted US DoD documents included in this research.  Their year of publication is mapped alongside a number that identifies the 
search method used to identify the document (these numbers cross reference to Table 12) 
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DoD or 
Services? 
Document 
Type 
Name Publication Date 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DoD Vision / 
Strategic 
National Defense Strategy 
(Department of Defense, 2008a) 
          X (3)     X (1)               
DoD Financial DoD Budget Fact Sheet FY2016 
(Department of Defense, 2015d) 
                              X (1) 
DoD Financial DoD Fiscal Year 2015 Budget 
Request (Department of Defense, 
2014f) 
                            X (1) X (1) 
DoD Financial Defense Budget Priorities and 
Choices_FY2014 (Department of 
Defense, 2013b) 
                          X (1)     
DoD Financial FY2009 Summary Performance and 
Financial Information (Department 
of Defense, 2010b) 
                  X (1)             
DoD Acquisition Performance of the Defense 
Acquisition System Annual Report 
(Department of Defense, 2016a) 
                          X (1) X (1)   
DoD Estates DoD Base Structure Report: A 
Summary of DoD's Real Property 
Inventory (Department of Defense, 
2009a) 
                  X (1)             
DoD Estates Defense Installations Strategic Plan 
(Department of Defense, 2007) 
              X 
(5.3) 
                
DoD Energy / Env Microgrid Study: Energy Security for 
DoD Installations (Van Broekhoven 
et al, 2012) 
                        X 
(7.4) 
      
DoD Energy / Env Solar Energy on DoD Installations in 
the Mojave and Colorado Deserts 
(Kwartin et al, 2012) 
                        X 
(7.4) 
      
US Army Energy / Env Army Net Zero Energy Roadmap and 
Program Summary (National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2013) 
                          X 
(5.2) 
    
US Army Energy / Env US Army Energy Security and 
Sustainability Strategy (US Army, 
2015) 
                              X 
(10.1
) 
US Army Energy / Env US Army Sustainability Report (US 
Army, 2014) 
                    X   X X X 
(11.2
) 
  
US Army Energy / Env How The Army Can Be An 
Environmental Paragon on Energy 
(Army Environmental Policy 
Institute, 2005) 
          X 
(10.1.
1) 
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US Army Energy / Env The Army Strategy for the 
Environment (Army Environmental 
Policy Institute, 2004) 
        X 
(10.1.
1) 
                      
US Army Energy / Env Future International Environmental 
Security Issues & Potential Military 
Requirements over the period 2010-
2025 (Army Environmental Policy 
Institute, 2001) 
  X 
(10.1.
1) 
                            
US Army Energy / Env Maintaining a Trained and Ready 
Army from an Environmental 
Perspective (Army Environmental 
Policy Institute, 2002) 
    X 
(10.1.
1) 
                          
US Army Energy / Env Understanding International 
Environmental Security: A Strategic 
Military Perspective (Army 
Environmental Policy Institute, 
2000) 
X 
(10.1.
1) 
                              
US Navy Energy / Env A Navy Energy Vision for the 21st 
Century (Department of the Navy, 
2010a) 
                    X 
(15.1
) 
          
US Navy Energy / Env Department of the Navy's Energy 
Program for Security and 
Independence (Department of the 
Navy, 2010b) 
                    X 
(15.1
) 
          
US Navy Energy / Env Strategy for Renewable Energy 
(Department of the Navy, 2012) 
                        X 
(15.1
) 
      
US Navy Energy / Env US Navy Climate Change Roadmap 
(Department of the Navy, 2010c) 
                    X 
(18) 
          
US Air 
Force 
Energy / Env US Air Force Energy Strategic Plan 
(US Air Force, 2013) 
                          X 
(20.1
) 
    
US Air 
Force 
Energy / Env US Air Force Energy Plan (US Air 
Force, 2010a) 
                    X 
(20) 
          
US Air 
Force 
Energy / Env US Air Force Infrastructure Energy 
Plan (US Air Force, 2010b) 
                    X 
(20) 
          
Table 14: Longlisted US DoD documents included in this research as contextual grey literature.  Their year of publication is mapped alongside 
a number that identifies the search method used to identify the document (these numbers cross reference to Table 12) 
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 Lockheed Martin 2013 Annual Report (Lockheed 
Martin, 2014a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Lockheed Martin 2014 Annual Report (Lockheed 
Martin, 2015a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Lockheed Martin 2015 Annual Report (Lockheed 
Martin, 2016a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Boeing 2013 Annual Report (Boeing Company, 
2014a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Boeing 2014 Annual Report (Boeing Company, 
2015a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Boeing 2015 Annual Report (Boeing Company, 
2016a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Raytheon 2013 Annual Report (Raytheon, 2014a) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Raytheon 2014 Annual Report (Raytheon, 2015a) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Raytheon 2015 Annual Report (Raytheon, 2016a) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 General Dynamics 2013 Annual Report (General 
Dynamics, 2014) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 General Dynamics 2014 Annual Report (General 
Dynamics, 2015a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 General Dynamics 2015 Annual Report (General 
Dynamics, 2016) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Northrop Grumman 2013 Annual Report (Northrop 
Grumman, 2014a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Northrop Grumman 2014 Annual Report (Northrop 
Grumman, 2015a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 Northrop Grumman 2015 Annual Report (Northrop 
Grumman, 2016a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y   Y 
 United Technologies 2013 Annual Report and Form 
10k (United Technologies, 2014a; 2014b) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y Y Y 
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 United Technologies 2014 Annual Report and Form 
10k (United Technologies, 2015a; 2015b) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y Y Y 
 United Technologies 2015 Annual Report and Form 
10k (United Technologies, 2016a; 2016b) 
Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y     Y Y Y Y 
 BAE Systems 2013 Annual Report (BAE Systems, 
2014) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
 BAE Systems 2014 Annual Report (BAE Systems, 
2015a) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
 BAE Systems 2015 Annual Report (BAE Systems, 
2016a) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
 Airbus 2013 Annual Report (Airbus Group, 2014a) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y     Y Y Y 
 Airbus 2014 Annual Report (Airbus Group, 2015a) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y     Y Y Y 
 Airbus 2015 Annual Report (Airbus Group, 2016) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y     Y Y Y 
 Finmeccanica 2013 Annual Report (Finmeccanica, 
2014a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y     Y         Y 
 Finmeccanica 2014 Annual Report (Finmeccanica, 
2015a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y     Y         Y 
 Finmeccanica 2015 Annual Report (Finmeccanica, 
2016a) 
Y Y   Y Y Y     Y         Y 
Thales 2013 Registration Document (Thales, 2014a) Y Y Y Y Y Y     Y     Y Y Y 
Thales 2014 Registration Document (Thales, 2015a) Y Y Y Y Y Y     Y     Y Y Y 
Thales 2015 Registration Document (Thales, 2016a) Y Y Y Y Y Y     Y     Y Y Y 
Table 15: Defence company annual reports compared against a generic contents list, demonstrating their comparability 
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Lockheed Martin Sustainability Report 2013 (Lockheed Martin, 2014b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lockheed Martin Sustainability Report 2014 (Lockheed Martin, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lockheed Martin Sustainability Report 2015 (Lockheed Martin, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Boeing Environment Report 2013 & Corporate Citizenship Report 2012 (Boeing Company, 2013a; 2013b) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Boeing Environment Report 2014 & Corporate Citizenship Report 2013 (Boeing Company, 2014b; 2014c) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Boeing Environment Report 2015 & Corporate Citizenship Report 2014 (Boeing Company, 2015b; 2015c) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Boeing Environment Report 2016 & Corporate Citizenship Report 2015 (Boeing Company, 2016b; 2016c) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Raytheon CR Report 2013 (Raytheon, 2014b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Raytheon CR Report 2014 (Raytheon, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Raytheon CR Report 2015 (Raytheon, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
General Dynamics CSR Report 2011 (General Dynamics, 2012) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
General Dynamics CSR Report 2015 (General Dynamics, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Northrop CR Report 2013 (Northrop Grumman, 2014b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Northrop CR Report 2014 (Northrop Grumman, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Northrop CR Report 2015 (Northrop Grumman, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
BAE Systems CR Performance Summary 2014 (BAE Systems, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
BAE Systems CR Summary 2015 (BAE Systems, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Airbus CR & S Report 2013 (Airbus Group, 2014b) Y Y   Y       Y Y Y   
Airbus CR & S Report 2014 (Airbus Group, 2015b) Y Y   Y       Y Y Y   
Finmeccanica Sustainability Report 2013 (Finmeccanica, 2014b) Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y   
Finmeccanica Sustainability Report 2014 (Finmeccanica, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y   
Finmeccanica Sustainability & Innovation Report 2015 (Finmeccanica, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y   Y Y   Y   
Thales CR Report 2013 (Thales, 2014b) Y Y   Y Y   Y   Y Y   
Thales CR Report 2014 (Thales, 2015b) Y Y   Y Y   Y   Y Y   
Thales 2015 Integrated Report - Corporate Responsibility (Thales, 2016b) Y Y   Y Y   Y   Y Y   
Table 16: Defence company Corporate Responsibility / Sustainability Reports compared against a generic contents list, demonstrating their 
comparability 
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Scheme Carbon Accounting 
'Scale' 
Regional 
Application 
Mandatory / 
Voluntary 
Private / Public 
Disclosure of 
Data 
Summary Notes 
EU ETS Site/Facility Europe Mandatory Private EU-wide, applies to facilities with significant combustion; allowances 
need to be acquired for tCO2e emitted 
Climate Change Agreements Site/Facility UK Voluntary Private Reporting method (performance vs target) linked to discounts on 
Climate Change Levy 
EPA GHG Reporting Programme Site/Facility (Public 
Sector) 
US Mandatory Public (unless 
confidentiality 
agreement) 
Applies at facility level for public sector sites emitting >25,000 tCO2e 
(rules for suppliers and emitters).  Data must be submitted via EPA 
online reporting platform 
California ETS Site/Facility US Mandatory Private As EU ETS, but for certain facilities in California 
Carbon Reduction Commitment 
(CRC) 
Regional Legal 
Entity 
UK Mandatory Private Originally a reporting approach with league table, now a tax. Covers 
~10% of UK emissions, and applies to organisations using >6,000MWh 
pa. 
Energy Savings Opportunity 
Schemes (ESOS) 
Regional Legal 
Entity 
UK Mandatory Private (status-
only reported) 
Consumption reporting required for relevant legal entities, and 
efficiency surveys conducted for >95% of the measured consumption.  
Applies in the UK, implementing Article 8 of the EU Energy Efficiency 
Directive (2012/27/EU) 
Grenelle II - Article 75 Regional Legal 
Entity 
France Mandatory Private French scheme, similar to CRC above 
UK Greening Government 
Commitments 
Public Sector 
Organisation 
UK Mandatory Public Mandatory targets and reporting requirements imposed on UK 
Government Departments (previously Sustainable Operations on the 
Government Estate (SOGE) Targets) 
US Executive Order 13514 on 
Federal Sustainability 
Public Sector 
Organisation 
US Mandatory Public Each Federal Agency was required in 2010 to submit a 2020 GHG 
pollution reduction target from its estimated 2008 baseline.  An overall 
federal target is the aggregate of 35 Federal Agency self-reported 
targets 
Companies Act - Mandatory 
Carbon Reporting Regs 
Corporate Group UK Mandatory Public Applies to UK-listed companies, requiring mandatory GHG reporting in 
the 'Directors Report' section of the annual report 
Grenelle II - Article 225 Corporate Group France Mandatory Public French scheme, similar to Companies Act - Mandatory Carbon 
Reporting Regs above 
Climate Registry Corporate Group US Voluntary Public NGO platform that many US businesses use to record and track their 
GHG emissions 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index Corporate Group US Voluntary Private Index measuring the sustainability performance of the largest 2,500 
companies listed on the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index 
(questionnaire to relevant companies) 
CDP Climate Change 
Questionnaire 
Corporate Group US Voluntary Public NGO questionnaire aiming to drive increased disclosure of 
organisational GHG emissions 
Table 17: Summary of mandatory and voluntary schemes affecting the defence sector for which Carbon Accounting is required  
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Questionnaire Section Summary of Topics Covered 
1) Governance 1.1) Board Interaction 
1.2) Performance Incentives 
2) Strategy 2.1) Processes to manage risks and opportunities 
2.2) Integration of Climate Change to Business Strategy 
2.3) Influencing Climate Change Policy 
3) Targets & Initiatives 3.1) Do you have an emissions reduction target 
3.2) Does the use of your goods/services enable emissions to be avoided by 3rd parties 
3.3) Emission reduction initiatives active in the year 
4) Communication (of climate change info) 4.1) Published information on Climate Change / GHG emissions 
5) Climate Change Risks 5.1) Risks Driven by Changes in Regulation 
5.2) Risks driven by changes in physical climate parameters 
5.3) Risks driven by changes in other climate-related developments 
6) Climate Change Opportunities 6.1) Opportunities Driven by Changes in Regulation 
6.2) Opportunities driven by changes in physical climate parameters 
6.3) Opportunities driven by changes in other climate-related developments 
7) Emissions Methodology 7.1) Emissions Base Year 
7.2 / 7.3 / 7.4) Emissions Methodology 
8) Emissions Data 8.1) Emissions Boundary used 
8.2) Scope 1 Emissions 
8.3) Scope 2 Emissions 
8.4) Sources of scope 1 and 2 not included above 
8.5) Estimated of Uncertainty Level 
8.6 / 8.7 / 8.8) Assurance & Verification 
8.9) Biologically Sequestered Carbon 
9 / 10) Scope 1 / Scope 2 Emissions Breakdown 9.1 / 10.1) By Country / Region 
9.2 / 10.2) By Business Division; Facility; Activity 
11) Energy 11.1) Percentage of Operational Spend on Energy 
11.2) Quantities of fuel, steam, heat, cooling 
11.3) Breakdown of 'fuels' 
11.4) Low carbon electricity 
12) Emissions Performance 12.1) Comparison to Previous Year 
12.2) Revenue metric and change to previous year 
12.3) Employee metric (or other relevant metric) and change to previous year 
13) Emissions Trading 13.1) Participation in Emissions Trading 
13.2) Originating Carbon Credits 
14) Scope 3 Emissions 14.1) Accounting for scope 3 emissions 
14.2) Verification of Scope 3 emissions 
14.3) Trends in scope 3 emissions 
14.4) Supplier engagement on emissions 
15) Sign Off Sign Off 
Table 18: Summarised Contents of the CDP Climate Change Questionnaire (Interpreted from: CDP, 2017)  
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Company (Organised by Earliest to 
Latest Participation) 
Participation in CDP 
Raytheon CDP Response 2007-08; 2009-2014 
Boeing CDP Response 2008-2014 
Finmeccanica CDP Response 2008-2014 
Thales CDP Response 2008-2014 
United Technologies CDP Response 2009-2014 
Lockheed Martin CDP Response 2010-2014 
Northrop Grumman CDP Response 2010-2014 
BAE Systems CDP Response 2012-2014 
Airbus CDP Response 2012-2014 
General Dynamics Do not participate 
Table 19: Participation in CDP’s Climate Change Questionnaire by the Companies Included in this research 
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Organisation General Reports Specialist Reports 
UK MoD National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a); Strategic Defence & Security 
Review (Cabinet Office, 2010b; 2015); MoD Business Plan (Ministry of Defence, 
2012a); MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2015 (Ministry of Defence, 2014k; 
2015e; 2016a) 
Sustainable Development Strategy: A Sub Strategy of the Strategy for Defence 
2011-2030 (Ministry of Defence, 2011b); Sustainable MoD Annual Reports 2013-
2016 (Ministry of Defence, 2014m; 2015a; 2016b); MoD Greening Government 
Commitments Annual Report 2011-2013 (Ministry of Defence, 2012e; 2013a) 
US DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, 2010; 2014a); National 
Military Strategy (Department of Defense, 2015a); Strategic Management Plan 
2012-2015 (Department of Defense, 2011b; 2013a);  
DoD Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (Department of Defense, 2014b); 
DoD's Operational Energy Strategy (Department of Defense, 2011); Operational 
Energy Annual Report 2011-2015 (Department of Defense, 2012b; 2013d; 2014e; 
2015b; 2016b); Annual Energy Management Report 2008-2015 (Department of 
Defense, 2009b; 2010c; 2011c; 2012a; 2013c; 2014d; 2015c); DoD Climate Change 
Adaptation Roadmap (Department of Defense, 2014c) 
Lockheed Martin Annual Report 2013-2015 (Lockheed Martin, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Sustainability Reports 2013-2015 (Lockheed Martin, 2014b; 2015b; 2016b); CDP 
Response 2010-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Boeing Annual Report 2013-2015 (Boeing Company, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Environment Reports 2013-2016 (Boeing Company, 2013a; 2014b; 2015b; 2016b); 
Corporate Citizenship Reports 2012-2015 (Boeing Company, 2013b; 2014c; 2015c; 
2016c); CDP Response 2008-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Raytheon Annual Report 2013-2015 (Raytheon, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Corporate Responsibility Reports 2013-2015 (Raytheon, 2014b; 2015b; 2016b); 
CDP Response 2007-08; 2009-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
General Dynamics Annual Report 2013-2015 (General Dynamics, 2014; 2015a; 2016) Corporate Sustainability Reports 2012 & 2015 (General Dynamics, 2012; 2015b); 
No CDP responses available 
Northrop 
Grumman 
Annual Report 2013-2015 (Northrop Grumman, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Corporate Responsibility Reports 2013-2015 (Northrop Grumman, 2014b; 2015b; 
2016b); CDP Response 2010-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset 
United 
Technologies 
Annual Report & Form 10K 2013-2015 (United Technologies 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 
2015b; 2016a; 2016b) 
CDP Response 2009-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
BAE Systems Annual Report 2013-2015 (BAE Systems, 2014; 2015a; 2016a) Corporate Responsibility Summary 2014-2015 (BAE Systems, 2015b; 2016b); CDP 
Response 2012-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Airbus Group Annual Report 2013-2015 (Airbus Group, 2014a; 2015a; 2016) Corporate Responsibility & Sustainability Report 2013-14 (Airbus Group, 2014b; 
2015b); CDP Response 2012-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Finmeccanica Annual Report 2013-2015 (Finmeccanica, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Sustainability Reports 2013-2015 (Finmeccanica, 2014b; 2015b; 2016b); CDP 
Response 2008-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Thales Registration Documents 2013-2015 (Thales, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a) Corporate Responsibility Reports 2013-2015 (Thales, 2014b; 2015b; 2016b); CDP 
Response 2008-2014 (CDP Academic Dataset) 
Table 20: Summary of Documents used to create the Quantitative and Qualitative Datasets 
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Source Description Year (UK financial year April-March) 
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Aggregated Totals 
(processed for 
comparison with 
other organisations 
in the sample) 
Scope 1 & 2 Emissions (Sum of Facility GHGs and Assumed 
Equipment GHGs) (tCO2e) 
          
1,359,043  
          
4,580,632  
          
4,280,124  
          
3,984,215  
          
4,149,309  
          
2,873,633  
 N/A  
Scope 1 & 2 GHGs Associated with Facility Energy Use 
(Assumed all facility GHGs for GCC Targets) (tCO2e) 
          
1,359,043  
          
1,364,055  
          
1,210,328  
          
1,168,036  
          
1,141,033  
          
1,090,872  
 N/A  
Scope 1 & 2 GHGs Associated with Equipment Energy Use 
(Assumed total scope 1-3 emissions less facility GHGs and 
all business travel) (tCO2e) 
                      
-    
          
3,216,577  
          
3,069,796  
          
2,816,179  
          
3,008,276  
          
1,782,761  
 N/A  
Scope 3 GHGs related to business travel (tCO2e)              
135,971  
             
115,368  
             
125,876  
             
124,785  
             
125,691  
             
123,367  
 N/A  
Original Published 
Totals (MoD, 2014m, 
p.26; MoD, 2015a, 
p.27; MoD, 2016b, 
p.53) 
GHG Total Scopes 1,2,3 (tCO2e)           
1,495,000  
          
4,696,000  
          
4,406,000  
          
4,109,000  
          
4,275,000  
          
2,997,000  
 N/A  
GHG Total Scope 1 (million tCO2e)                     
578  
                 
3,796  
                 
3,557  
                 
3,238  
                 
3,558  
                 
2,236  
 N/A  
GHG Total Scope 2,3 (million tCO2e)                     
917  
                    
900  
                    
849  
                    
871  
                    
717  
                    
761  
 N/A  
Published Totals 
associated with GGC 
Targets (MoD, 
2014m, p.7; MoD 
2015a, p.12; MoD 
2016b, p.23) 
Total GHGs for targets (tCO2e)           
1,448,791  
          
1,442,393  
          
1,285,675  
          
1,244,483  
          
1,217,989  
          
1,165,988  
          
1,113,909  
GHGs associated with Estate Energy (tCO2e)           
1,359,043  
          
1,364,055  
          
1,210,328  
          
1,168,036  
          
1,141,033  
          
1,090,872  
          
1,050,751  
GHGs associated with Domestic Business Travel (tCO2e)                
89,748  
               
78,338  
               
75,347  
               
76,447  
               
76,956  
               
75,116  
               
63,158  
Published GHGs for 
Business Travel 
(MoD, 2014m, p.17; 
MoD, 2015a p.19; 
MoD 2016b, p.35) 
GHGs associated with all Business Travel (tCO2e)              
135,971  
             
115,368  
             
125,876  
             
124,785  
             
125,691  
             
123,367  
             
118,616  
Table 21: UK MoD Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2009-10 to 2015-16. 
No external methodology specified by UK MoD, but Scopes 1-3 used throughout. DEFRA conversion factors referenced, as are the 6 Kyoto 
Protocol gases.  Does not include Non-Department Public Bodies and other MoD-funded bodies.  Estimated that 75-90% of Defence estate 
included.  Data is assured by Carbon Smart on behalf of DEFRA to validate reported information relevant to the GCCs but noted that the data 
are not presented as National Statistics (Ministry of Defence, 2014m).  Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form 
of aggregation or conversion from the original published data. No significant conversions, but some assumptions required to aggregate the data 
(Noted in the table where relevant. Not possible for 2015-16 due to missing data)  
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Description Year (UK financial year April-March) 
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Aggregated Total Facility Energy Use (MWh) 4,333,898  4,330,224  3,773,828  3,638,953  3,772,989  3,405,114   NA  
Electricity: Non-Renewable (MWh) 1,460,770  1,464,106  1,282,421  -    -    -    1,212,917  
Electricity: Renewable (MWh) 20,440  20,486  142,491  1,481,564  1,384,227  1,223,272  -    
Gas (MWh) 2,482,020  2,475,352  1,952,488  1,740,426  1,971,184  1,804,037  1,931,147  
LPG (MWh) 80,070  80,403  82,000  79,391  79,425  53,247  38,375  
Other (MWh) 290,598  289,877  314,428  337,572  338,153  324,558   NA  
Table 22: UK MoD – Facility Energy Use 2009-10 to 2015-16.  
Data taken from the following sources: MoD, 2014m, p.26; MoD, 2015a, p.27; MoD, 2016b, p.53. Assumed 'consumed energy' as opposed to 
'bought energy'. 'Other' energy data not broken down or explained; 'Renewable energy' relates to low carbon tariffs as opposed to actual 
generation. Data is assured by Carbon Smart on behalf of DEFRA to validate reported information relevant to the GCCs but noted that the data 
are not presented as National Statistics (Ministry of Defence, 2014m).  Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form 
of aggregation or conversion from the original published data.  In this case this only applies to the aggregated total, which is a simple 
aggregation of the other fields.  
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Source Description Year (UK financial year April-March) 
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Original Published Data 
in Litres (MoD, 2014m, 
p.9/p.26; MoD, 2015a, 
p.10/p.27; MoD, 2016b, 
p.20/p.53) 
Total Energy Use (Litres) 1,250,000,000  1,231,000,000  1,187,000,000  1,071,000,000  1,068,000,000           928,000,000   NA  
Aviation Fuel (Litres) 827,800,000  792,400,000  767,400,000  693,097,000  627,420,000           584,022,000   NA  
Diesel (retail & mineral blend) (Litres) 340,500,000  354,300,000  339,300,000         NA  
Diesel (retail blend) (Litres) -    -    -    118,394,000  105,318,000             85,125,000   NA  
Diesel (100% mineral blend) (Litres) -    -    -    214,154,000  215,965,000           157,390,000   NA  
Gas Oil (Litres) 74,300,000  79,700,000  74,900,000  40,602,000  34,329,000             33,976,000   NA  
Petrol (Litres) 7,000,000  4,600,000  5,800,000  4,462,000  8,882,000               3,975,000   NA  
Converted data in MWh 
for comparison with 
other organisations in 
the sample 
Total Energy Use (MWh) 13,005,097  12,825,312  12,368,000  11,152,898  10,333,701              8,992,620    
Aviation Fuel (MWh) 8,485,919  8,123,027  7,866,748  7,105,055  6,431,789              5,986,909    
Diesel (retail & mineral blend) (MWh) 3,654,689  3,802,808  3,641,809                           -                             -                             -      
Diesel (retail blend) (MWh)                          -                             -                             -    1,270,758  1,130,410                 913,672    
Diesel (100% mineral blend) (MWh)                          -                             -                             -    2,298,579  2,318,017              1,689,314    
Gas Oil (MWh) 797,484  855,444  803,924  435,793  368,463                 364,675    
Petrol (MWh) 67,006  44,033  55,519  42,712  85,021                   38,050    
Table 23: UK MoD – Operational Energy Use 2009-10 to 2015-16.  
Assumed 'consumed energy' as opposed to 'bought energy'. Data variously referred to as 'Equipment Energy', 'Equipment and Operations', 
and 'Operational Energy' throughout document set. Data is assured by Carbon Smart on behalf of DEFRA to validate reported information 
relevant to the GCCs but noted that the data are not presented as National Statistics (Ministry of Defence, 2014m).  Note where values appear 
in bold italics they are subject to some form of aggregation or conversion from the original published data, as follows: Aviation Fuel: The 
conversion from litres to kWh is based first converting to kg using DEFRA’s current assumed density of Aviation Fuel (DEFRA “AVIATION 
TURBINE FUEL”: 1,253 litres per tonne), and then multiplying by 12.84471 (DEFRA’s current assumed kWh per kg (Gross CV)).  All types of 
Diesel and Gas Oil treated as Light Fuel Oil for Conversion: The conversion from litres to kWh is based first converting to kg using DEFRA’s 
current assumed density of Light Fuel Oil (DEFRA “GAS OIL”: 1,172 litres per tonne), and then multiplying by 12.57943 (DEFRA’s current 
assumed kWh per kg (Gross CV)). Petrol: The conversion from litres to kWh is based first converting to kg using DEFRA’s current assumed 
density of Petrol (1,368 litres per tonne), and then multiplying by 13.09491 (DEFRA’s current assumed kWh per kg (Gross CV)). NOTE - Defra 
mid-2015 published factors used for all years; all data subsequently converted from kWh to MWh (divide by 1,000)   
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Description Year (UK financial year April-March) 
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Total Energy Spend (GBP)                 
677,649,000  
                
908,413,000  
                
930,030,000  
             
1,002,075,000  
                
992,169,000  
                
891,755,000  
                
600,481,000  
Facility Energy Cost (GBP)                 
195,715,000  
                
280,563,000  
                
294,676,000  
                
243,266,000  
                
261,124,000  
                
317,074,000  
                
267,979,000  
Equipment Energy Cost (Fuel) 
(GBP) 
                
481,934,000  
                
627,850,000  
                
635,354,000  
                
758,809,000  
                
731,045,000  
                
574,681,000  
                
332,502,000  
Total MoD Spend (GBP)            
37,994,285,000  
           
38,116,370,000  
           
37,176,648,000  
           
35,210,412,000  
           
37,383,571,000  
           
34,567,604,000  
           
35,252,526,000  
Table 24: UK MoD – Energy Spend Data 2009-10 to 2015-16. (MoD, 2014m, p.26).  Data is assured by Carbon Smart on behalf of DEFRA to 
validate reported information relevant to the GCCs but noted that the data are not presented as National Statistics (Ministry of Defence, 
2014m).  Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form of aggregation or conversion from the original published data.  
In this case this only applies to the aggregated total, which is a simple aggregation of the other rows. 
 
  
257 
 
Source Description Year (US FY October-September) 
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Aggregated 
Totals 
(processed 
for 
comparison 
with other 
organisations 
in the 
sample) 
Scope 1 & 2 Emissions (Sum of Facility GHGs and 
Assumed Equipment GHGs) (tCO2e) 
77,225,335  -    76,935,742  74,648,147     69,558,567  -    -    -    -    
Scope 1 & 2 GHGs Associated with Facility Energy 
Use (Assumed as 'goal-subject scope 1 and 2 
emissions') (tCO2e) 
26,855,109  -    27,427,436  25,894,940     24,613,290  -    -    -    -    
Scope 1 & 2 GHGs Associated with Equipment 
Energy Use (Assumed as 'non-goal-subject scope 1 
and 2 emissions') (tCO2e) 
50,370,226  -    49,508,306  48,753,207     44,945,277  -    -    -    -    
Scope 3 GHGs (total published scope 3 emissions - 
broader than business travel) (tCO2e) 
7,707,646  -    7,436,554  8,159,246       7,653,704  -    -    -    -    
Published 
Totals 
converted to 
simple scope 
1, 2, 3 
GHG Total Scopes 1,2,3 (tCO2e) 84,932,980  -    84,372,296  82,807,393     77,212,271  -    -    -    -    
GHG Total Scope 1 (tCO2e) 59,105,170  -    57,969,886  56,643,014     52,715,085  -    -    -    -    
GHG Total Scope 2 (tCO2e) 18,120,165  -    18,965,856  18,005,133     16,843,482  -    -    -    -    
GHG Total Scope 3 (tCO2e) 7,707,646  -    7,436,554  8,159,246       7,653,704  -    -    -    -    
Published 
Totals 
associated 
with Federal 
Targets 
(source 
website 
below) 
Total GHGs for targets - Scopes 1-3 (tCO2e) 34,489,256  -    34,782,258  33,976,975     32,217,802  -    -    -    -    
Total GHGs not subject to targets - Scopes 1-3 
(tCO2e) 
50,443,725  -    49,590,038  48,830,418     44,994,469  -    -    -    -    
Total GHGs for targets - Scope 1 (tCO2e) 9,647,351   NA  9,744,947  9,103,558        8,603,918   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total GHGs not subject to targets - Scope 1 (tCO2e) 49,457,819   NA  48,224,939  47,539,455      44,111,167   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total GHGs for targets - Scope 2 (tCO2e) 17,207,758   NA  17,682,489  16,791,381      16,009,372   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total GHGs not subject to targets - Scope 2 (tCO2e) 912,407   NA  1,283,367  1,213,751           834,110   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total GHGs for targets - Scope 3 (tCO2e) 7,634,147   NA  7,354,822  8,082,035        7,604,512   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total GHGs not subject to targets - Scope 3 (tCO2e) 73,499   NA  81,732  77,211             49,192   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Table 25: US DoD Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2006-07 to 2015-16  
Federal GHG Inventory data available at https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/federal-greenhouse-gas-inventories-and-performance'.  Executive 
Order 13514 required federal departments to submit this data, in Scopes 1-3, and with reference to the 6 Kyoto Protocol gases (Department of 
Energy, 2009). Unclear whether the data is assured. Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form of aggregation or 
conversion from the original published data (only simple aggregations in this case) 
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Source Description Year (US FY October-September) 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
DoD Annual 
Energy 
Management 
Reports 
(Department of 
Defense, 2009b; 
2010c; 2011c; 
2012a; 2013c; 
2014d; 2015c) 
Energy Use (MWh)   60,161,081    60,712,186    61,530,484    61,795,038    62,358,462    59,833,761    60,785,217    60,076,025    59,256,553    
Energy Use (Billion 
btu) - Total        205,120  
       206,999         209,789         210,691         212,612         204,004         207,248         204,830         202,036    
Energy Use (Billion 
btu) - Subject to 
Energy Reduction 
Targets         
       197,212         187,404         189,448         187,530         184,836   NA  
Energy Use (Billion 
btu) - Not Subject to 
Energy Reduction 
Targets   
               15,400           16,600           17,800           17,300           17,200   NA  
Table 26: US DoD Facility Energy Use 2006-07 to 2015-16.  
Data covers facility energy activities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and the following Defense Agencies: Defense Contract 
Management Agency; Defense Commissary Agency; Defense Finance and Accounting Service; Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense 
Logistics Agency; Missile Defense Agency; National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security 
Agency; and Washington Headquarters Services (Department of Defense, 2013c, p.6). Note where values appear in bold italics they are 
subject to some form of aggregation or conversion from the original published data. In this case some data has been converted from British 
Thermal Units (btu) to MWh (assuming that 1btu = 0.000293297 kWh), in addition to simply aggregating totals.  
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Source Description Year (US FY October-September) 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
(forecast) 
DoD 
Operational 
Energy 
Annual 
Reports 
(Department 
of Defense, 
2012b; 
2013d; 
2014e; 
2015b; 
2016b) 
DoD Total (BOE)        
117,300,000  
       
114,300,000  
       
110,600,000  
       
112,600,000  
       
113,400,000  
       
103,900,000  
         
89,800,000  
         
87,400,000  
         
88,500,000  
         
87,800,000  
Army (BOE)          
17,900,000  
         
19,900,000  
         
18,700,000  
         
19,000,000  
         
20,200,000  
         
16,100,000  
         
12,700,000  
         
10,100,000  
           
7,300,000  
         
11,700,000  
Navy (BOE)          
35,800,000  
         
32,900,000  
         
29,200,000  
         
29,700,000  
         
31,100,000  
         
31,500,000  
         
28,400,000  
         
28,200,000  
         
28,500,000  
         
33,800,000  
Air Force (BOE)          
62,300,000  
         
60,800,000  
         
61,600,000  
         
63,000,000  
         
61,300,000  
         
55,700,000  
         
47,800,000  
         
48,600,000  
         
52,000,000  
         
38,800,000  
Marine Corps 
(BOE) 
              
600,000  
              
500,000  
              
600,000  
              
400,000  
              
300,000  
              
200,000  
              
200,000  
              
200,000  
              
200,000  
              
800,000  
Other DoD (BOE)               
700,000  
              
200,000  
              
500,000  
              
500,000  
              
500,000  
              
400,000  
              
700,000  
              
300,000  
              
500,000  
           
2,700,000  
Converted 
Totals (MWh) 
for 
comparison 
with other 
organisations 
in the sample 
DoD Total (MWh)        
199,410,000  
       
194,310,000  
       
188,020,000  
       
191,420,000  
       
192,780,000  
       
176,630,000  
       
152,660,000  
       
148,580,000  
       
150,450,000  
       
149,260,000  
Army (MWh)          
30,430,000  
         
33,830,000  
         
31,790,000  
         
32,300,000  
         
34,340,000  
         
27,370,000  
         
21,590,000  
         
17,170,000  
         
12,410,000  
         
19,890,000  
Navy (MWh)          
60,860,000  
         
55,930,000  
         
49,640,000  
         
50,490,000  
         
52,870,000  
         
53,550,000  
         
48,280,000  
         
47,940,000  
         
48,450,000  
         
57,460,000  
Air Force (MWh)        
105,910,000  
       
103,360,000  
       
104,720,000  
       
107,100,000  
       
104,210,000  
         
94,690,000  
         
81,260,000  
         
82,620,000  
         
88,400,000  
         
65,960,000  
Marine Corps 
(MWh) 
           
1,020,000  
              
850,000  
           
1,020,000  
              
680,000  
              
510,000  
              
340,000  
              
340,000  
              
340,000  
              
340,000  
           
1,360,000  
Other DoD (MWh)            
1,190,000  
              
340,000  
              
850,000  
              
850,000  
              
850,000  
              
680,000  
           
1,190,000  
              
510,000  
              
850,000  
           
4,590,000  
Table 27: US DoD Operational Energy Use 2006-07 to 2015-16 
Data is based on ‘purchased fuel’ as opposed to ‘consumed fuel’. Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form of 
aggregation or conversion from the original published data. In this case some data has been converted from Barrels of Oil Equivalent (BOE) to 
MWh (assuming approximately 1,700 kWh per BoE).  
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Source Description Year (US FY October-September) 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
(forecast) 
Energy Spend Data ($ bn) 
from DoD Operational 
Energy Annual Reports 
(Department of Defense, 
2012b; 2013d; 2014e; 
2015b; 2016b) 
Total Energy Spend ($ 
bn) 
                             
20.9  
                     
20.3  
                     
18.9  
                     
18.2  
                     
16.8  
  
Facility Energy Cost ($ 
bn) 
                                
4.1  
                        
4.0  
                        
4.1  
                        
4.2  
                        
3.9  
  
Operational Energy 
Spend ($ bn) 
                      
11.0  
                      
15.3  
                      
10.2  
                      
13.3  
                      
16.8  
                      
16.3  
                      
14.8  
                      
14.0  
                      
12.9  
                      
10.0  
Table 28: US DoD Energy Spend 2006-07 to 2015-16.  Note where values appear in bold italics they are subject to some form of aggregation 
or conversion from the original published data.  In this case this only applies to the aggregated total, which is a simple aggregation of the other 
rows.  
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 377,340                291,002                267,075                253,101                275,457                264,405                248,295  
United Technologies Corporation                2,081,907             1,886,208             1,914,377             1,772,220             1,682,590             2,115,982  
Lockheed Martin Corporation                  1,511,909             1,374,988             1,320,633             1,234,497             1,107,832  
Northrop Grumman Corp                  1,466,838             1,261,650                708,973                858,595                609,047  
Raytheon Company               708,473                661,930                  613,363                602,876                566,205                537,587                527,107  
Airbus Group (EADS NV pre-2014)                      1,048,900             1,013,207             1,009,188  
Finmeccanica                 481,531                363,669                514,953                591,562                575,534                572,140                577,315  
BAE Systems                      1,017,000                868,680             1,215,120  
Boeing Company              1,692,000             1,679,000             1,720,000             1,717,000             1,793,000             1,574,000             1,636,000  
General Dynamics*                 966,900                956,232                918,788                914,956        
Table 29: Scope 1 & 2 GHG Data in tCO2e for All Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset).   
Data displayed in bold italics as it has been aggregated from Scope 1 and 2 data in tables 30 and 31 below, or otherwise manipulated as 
explained with the General Dynamics note below.  
* General Dynamics data from their 2012 Sustainability Report (Assumed Scope 1 & 2 combined (not made clear in source document)), and 
had to multiply by $m of revenue as normalised values were published as opposed to actual data) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                  377,340                 121,703                 105,900                   95,130                   94,330                   97,707                   87,824  
United Technologies Corporation                    968,080                 905,586                 946,075                 856,354                 801,694                 955,785  
Lockheed Martin Corporation                      341,082                 313,866                 309,529                 249,491                 241,148  
Northrop Grumman Corp                      354,885                 323,050                 170,019                 216,213                 148,470  
Raytheon Company                140,568                 125,455                   109,449                   98,909                   95,700                 101,715                 102,999  
Airbus Group (EADS NV pre-2014)                          593,530                 581,115                 585,374  
Finmeccanica                  145,793                 148,060                 199,107                 247,293                 204,467                 232,302                 232,911  
BAE Systems                          353,000                 277,920                 535,370  
Boeing Company                  550,000                 575,000                 579,000                 595,000                 718,000                 576,000                 610,000  
General Dynamics NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Table 30: Scope 1 GHG Data in tCO2e for All Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 8 
(2011-14); Section 12.1 (2010); Various Sections (2007-2009) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                    169,299                 161,175                 157,971                 181,127                 166,698                 160,471  
United Technologies Corporation                 1,113,827                 980,622                 968,302                 915,866                 880,896              1,160,197  
Lockheed Martin Corporation                   1,170,827              1,061,122              1,011,104                 985,006                 866,684  
Northrop Grumman Corp                   1,111,953                 938,600                 538,954                 642,382                 460,577  
Raytheon Company                567,905                 536,475                   503,914                 503,967                 470,505                 435,872                 424,108  
Airbus Group (EADS NV pre-2014)                          455,371                 432,092                 423,814  
Finmeccanica                  335,738                 215,609                 315,846                 344,269                 371,067                 339,838                 344,404  
BAE Systems                          664,000                 590,760                 679,750  
Boeing Company               1,142,000              1,104,000              1,141,000              1,122,000              1,075,000                 998,000              1,026,000  
General Dynamics NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Table 31: Scope 2 GHG Data in tCO2e for All Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 8 
(2011-14); Section 12.1 (2010); Various Sections (2007-2009)) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                        94,085                   87,453                 105,979                   89,527                   91,349  
United Technologies Corporation                        59,477                   66,336                   85,054                   90,066                   99,673  
Lockheed Martin Corporation                     219,518                212,431                188,319                 191,295                 172,300  
Northrop Grumman Corp                      185,884                 186,981                 156,211                 153,498                 124,749  
Raytheon Company                          102,239                 134,360                 128,582  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                        52,165                     68,043                   39,677    
BAE Systems                          125,000                 137,820                 243,710  
Boeing Company                     229,000                 255,000                 322,000                 384,000                 296,000  
General Dynamics                 
Table 32: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Business Travel for all Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP 
Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010)) 
Note data in bold italics subject to some form of processing for comparability (all simple aggregations from the original data in this case). 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                              17,868                   15,727  
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                 
Northrop Grumman Corp                 
Raytheon Company                 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                              21,605                   21,120  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 33: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Upstream Leased Assets (lease cars in both these cases) for all Companies Included in the 
Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, 2010)) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                                46,899  
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                              313,300  
Northrop Grumman Corp                      439,099                 394,673                 231,849                 196,179                 188,569  
Raytheon Company                 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                 
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 34: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Employee Commuting for all Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP 
Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010)) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                              24,442                     2,300  
Northrop Grumman Corp                            487,835                 518,469  
Raytheon Company                                17,707  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                            227,840                   91,551  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 35: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Upstream Transportation and Distribution for all Companies Included in the Research 2007-
2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010))  
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                                  2,300  
Northrop Grumman Corp                      630,850                 638,497                 733,959                 135,106                 154,933  
Raytheon Company                 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                            227,840                   91,551  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 36: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Downstream Transportation and Distribution for all Companies Included in the Research 
2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010)) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                           129,700  
Northrop Grumman Corp                 
Raytheon Company                         118,840              106,903  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                      19,211                 21,020                   16,964                 17,995  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 37: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Fuel and Energy Related Activities Not Included in Scopes 1 & 2 for all Companies Included 
in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, 2010)) 
Note data in bold italics subject to some form of processing for comparability (all simple aggregations from the original data in this case). 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                                1,900  
Northrop Grumman Corp                 
Raytheon Company                              3,260                   3,100  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                      47,037                   28,067                 29,045                 34,937  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 38: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Landfill Emissions of Waste Generated in Operations for all Companies Included in the 
Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010)) 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                         27,800,000  
Northrop Grumman Corp                 
Raytheon Company                 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                      138,669                 131,440                 198,389                 168,274                 129,700  
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 39: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Purchased Goods and Services for all Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 
(Source: CDP Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010)) 
Note that data published by Finmeccanica in this category follows a very limited interpretation of this Scope 3 category, listing several raw 
materials for which purchasing records are used to make an estimate (ammonia, nitric acid, urea, petrochemicals, iron and steel, aluminium, 
magnesium, paper and cardboard packaging).  This would not include any components, articles, or manufactured products purchased and 
therefore the published total is misleading for being so small. 
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  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales                 
United Technologies Corporation                 
Lockheed Martin Corporation                         87,000,000  
Northrop Grumman Corp                 
Raytheon Company                 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)                 
Finmeccanica                 
BAE Systems                 
Boeing Company                 
General Dynamics                 
Table 40: Scope 3 GHG Data in tCO2e Related to Use of Sold Products for all Companies Included in the Research 2007-2014 (Source: CDP 
Academic Dataset: Section 14.1 (2014, 2013); Section 15.1 (2012, 2011, and 2010))  
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Thales 
               
215,065  
                 
47,507                        
                      
439      
United 
Technologies 
Corporation 
            
2,696,209  
                 
38,250  
                 
26,875  
            
1,132,290  
                 
28,979    
               
823,384      
               
2,779  
               
6,660  
                 
91,966        
                  
149  
Lockheed 
Martin 
Corporation 
               
997,334  
                   
5,247  
                 
19,712  
                 
20,556  
                 
12,266  
               
163,061                      
Northrop 
Grumman 
Corp 
               
548,039      
                   
9,831  
                 
17,395      
                 
60,973  
                  
345                
Raytheon 
Company 
               
293,855  
                   
2,479    
                 
40,769        
                 
41,358                  
Airbus Group 
(EADS NV 
from 2013 
back) 
            
1,488,584    
                 
14,158  
                   
2,506  
                 
38,673    
               
989,142  
                   
4,205          
                 
19,298        
Finmeccanica   
                   
7,788    
                   
1,594  
                 
13,014      
                 
50,281  
               
7,541            
               
794,992    
BAE Systems 
               
957,278      
                 
27,150  
                 
27,681      
                 
88,815  
               
3,084    
               
2,275  
            
1,030,539        
               
1,015  
Boeing 
Company 
            
1,861,000  
                 
68,000  
                 
17,000  
                 
33,000      
               
627,000    
               
2,000                
General 
Dynamics NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Table 41: Breakdown of Combustion Fuels used by the Companies Included in the Research for 2014 (MWh) (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: 
Sections 11.2 and 11.3 (2014))  
274 
 
  Electricity Heat Steam  Cooling  
Thales                613,952                   26,518      
United Technologies Corporation             2,361,579                     53,618    
Lockheed Martin Corporation             1,709,064                          -                            -                     22,990  
Northrop Grumman Corp             1,149,101        
Raytheon Company                912,981                       8,057                   61,726  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)             1,463,417                 116,448      
Finmeccanica                872,336                   55,456      
BAE Systems             1,239,368                   227,248    
Boeing Company             2,325,000        
General Dynamics NA NA NA NA 
Table 42: Breakdown of Delivered Energy used by the Companies Included in the Research for 2014 (MWh) (Source: CDP Academic Dataset: 
Sections 11.2 and 11.3 (2014)) 
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Facility Energy Use Operational Energy Use 
Thales                855,975                   47,507  
United Technologies Corporation             5,233,175              2,029,563  
Lockheed Martin Corporation             2,749,100                 201,130  
Northrop Grumman Corp             1,697,485                   88,199  
Raytheon Company             1,276,619                   84,606  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back)             3,101,905              1,034,526  
Finmeccanica             1,730,325                   72,677  
BAE Systems             3,458,532                 145,921  
Boeing Company             4,205,000                 728,000  
General Dynamics NA NA 
Table 43: Illustrative Split of ‘Facility Energy Use’ and ‘Operational Energy Use’ for the Companies Included in the Research for 2013 (MWh). 
Note that ‘Facility Energy Use’ is assumed as the following fields from Tables 41 and 42 above: Electricity; Steam; Cooling; All Gases; All Solid 
Fuels.  ‘Operational Energy Use’ is assumed to be: All Liquid Fuels.  Manipulating the data is for illustrative purposes to compare to the defence 
department energy usage data but will be subject to some error (some liquid fuels will be used for facility purposes and vice versa). (Source: 
CDP Academic Dataset: Sections 11.2 and 11.3 (2014)) 
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  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Thales 
              
 15,483  
               
15,753  
              
 14,223  
                
14,488  
               
 14,332  
United Technologies Corporation 52,924  
               
54,324  
               
58,182  
                
57,702  
                
62,622  
Lockheed Martin Corporation 
               
45,186  
               
45,802  
               
46,501  
                
47,136  
                
46,160  
Northrop Grumman Corp 
               
40,746  
               
35,046  
               
26,356  
                
34,482  
                
25,115  
Raytheon Company 
               
24,883  
               
25,183  
               
24,855  
                
25,970  
                
25,100  
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back) 
               
58,817  
              
 58,817  
               
58,817  
               
 67,924  
                
71,161  
Finmeccanica 
               
18,596  
              
 21,362  
              
 20,784  
                
20,661  
                
21,083  
BAE Systems 
               
28,055  
               
28,055  
               
28,055  
                
24,819  
               
 29,087  
Boeing Company 
               
68,254  
               
64,307  
               
69,496  
                
81,554  
                
86,561  
General Dynamics 
               
31,964  
               
32,122  
               
30,992  
                
30,930  
                
30,852  
Table 44: Revenues for the Companies Included in the Research 2010-2014 ($m). Data taken from Annual Reports and CDP Academic 
Dataset (some values subject to conversion where not originally published in dollars (highlighted bold italics); Exchange Rates Used of 1.6 
USD to 1 GBP; 1.2 USD to 1 Euro) 
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  2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
UK MoD ($m)             60,790              60,986              59,482               56,336               59,813  
UK MoD (£m)              37,994               38,116               37,176                35,210                37,383  
Table 45: UK MoD Budget 2009-10 to 2013-14 (£m and converted to $m). (Source: Ministry of Defence, 2014m; 2015a; 2016b). Exchange 
Rate Used of 1.6 USD to 1 GBP 
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  2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
US DoD ($m) 
             
691,000  
             
687,000  
             
645,500  
              
577,600  
              
581,200  
Table 46: US DoD Budget 2009-10 to 2013-14 ($m). (Source: Department of Defense, 2014f: p.1-4) 
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Organisation Headcount Source(s) 
US DoD 
          
3,200,000  
World Economic Forum Website (World Economic Forum, 
2015) 
UK MoD 
             
220,500  
UK Defence Statistics Compendium 2013 (Ministry of 
Defence, 2014b) 
Thales 
               
66,000  2013 Registration Document (Thales, 2014a) 
United Technologies Corporation 
             
212,000  2013 Annual Report (United Technologies, 2014a) 
Lockheed Martin Corporation 
             
115,000  2013 Annual Report (Lockheed Martin, 2014a) 
Northrop Grumman Corp 
               
65,300  2013 Annual Report (Northrop Grumman, 2014a) 
Raytheon Company 
               
63,000  2013 Annual Report (Raytheon, 2014a) 
Airbus Group (EADS NV from 2013 back) 
             
144,061  2013 Annual Report (Airbus Group, 2014a) 
Finmeccanica 
               
65,578  2013 Annual Report (Finmeccanica, 2014a) 
BAE Systems 
               
84,600  2013 Annual Report (BAE Systems, 2014) 
Boeing Company 
             
168,400  2013 Annual Report (Boeing Company, 2014a) 
General Dynamics 
               
96,000  2013 Annual Report (General Dynamics, 2014) 
Table 47: 2013 headcount for all organisations included in the research sample  
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  Percentage Products Percentage Services Source 
Lockheed Martin 80% 20% 2013 Annual Reports (some 
interpretation of 
data/narrative required) Boeing NA NA 
BAE Systems NA NA 
Raytheon NA NA 
Northrop Grumman 57% 43% 
General Dynamics NA NA 
Airbus 85% 15% 
United Technologies 57% 43% 
Finmeccanica 72% 28% 
Thales 78% 22% 
Table 48: Revenue split between the ‘product sales’ and ‘services sales’ for the companies included in this research. (Source(s): Lockheed 
Martin, 2014a; Northrop Grumman, 2014a; Airbus Group, 2014a; United Technologies, 2014a; Finmeccanica 2014a; Thales, 2014a) 
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Organisation Percentage Sales to Customer 
US DoD Other US 
Government 
Foreign Military 
Sales 
Direct Military Sales Other Source 
Lockheed Martin 61% 21% 8.5% 8.5% 1% 2013 Annual Reports (some 
interpretation of data/narrative 
required) Boeing 34% Split not available 
Raytheon 68% 4% 13% 14% 1% 
Northrop Grumman 86% 10% 4% 
General Dynamics 49% 9% 3% 19% 19% 
United Technologies 16% Split not available 
Table 49: Details of the major customers for the companies included in this research, and the percentage of revenues received from these 
customers where available (US). (Source(s): Lockheed Martin, 2014a; Boeing, 2014a; Raytheon, 2014a; Northrop Grumman, 2014a; General 
Dynamics, 2014a; United Technologies, 2014a) 
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Organisation Percentage Sales to Customer 
Home Defence Ministry Rest of Europe US Rest of World Source 
BAE Systems 26% NA - included in Rest of World 37% 37% 2013 Annual Reports 
(some interpretation of 
data/narrative 
required) 
Airbus Split not available 
Finmeccanica 18% 39% 23% 20% 
Thales 29% 30% 10% 30% 
Table 50: Details of the major customers for the companies included in this research, and the percentage of revenues received from these 
customers where available (Europe). (Source(s): BAE Systems, 2014; Airbus Group, 2014a; Finmeccanica, 2014a; Thales, 2014a) 
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Main 
Topic 
Keyword Relevant Variations / Interpretations to Cover Search Criteria 
to Best Cover 
Potential misinterpretation risks 
Climate 
Change 
Climate 
Change 
Climate / climatic / UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  Climat Manual to avoid generic reference to 'business climate' 
extreme weather; changing weather patterns Weather Low risk as document set unlikely to discuss weather in general terms 
Global Warming Global 
Warming 
None 
Emissions Emission / emissions / emit Emission None 
Emit emitting noise' and financial term 'reemit') 
Offset / offsetting / offsets Offset Potential for 'defence offsets' interpretation 
Greenhou
se Gases 
Greenhouse Gas / GHG Greenhouse None 
GHG None 
Carbon / Carbon equivalent / Carbon Dioxide / Carbon dioxide 
equivalent / CO2 / CO2e / Carbon Neutral / Zero Carbon / 
hydrofluorocarbons / perfluorocarbons (below) 
Carbon Some risk (carbon fibre etc.) 
CO2 Some risk of suffix issues 
Methane / (CH4) Methane None 
CH4 Some risk of suffix issues 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Nitrous Oxide None 
N20 Some risk of suffix issues 
Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) - full words incl carbon search HFC Some risk of suffix issues 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - full words covered incl in carbon search PFCs Some risk of suffix issues 
Sulphur Hexafluoride; (SF6) Hexafluoride None 
SF6 Some risk of suffix issues 
Energy   Energy / Energy Storage / Energy Security / energy generation / 
Wind Energy / Solar Energy / ocean/tidal energy / geothermal 
Energy Some risk in terms of 'energy' of people etc 
Fuel / Fossil Fuel / Clean Fuel / Fuel Efficiency / Fuel Burn / Refuel / 
Biofuel / Alt Fuel / Synthetic Fuel / fuel (blend) / Combustion fuels 
Fuel Many interpretations but nearly all relevant so low risk 
Oil Oil Risk of inclusion in other words 
Diesel Diesel Low risk 
Petrol Petrol Low risk 
Power/Power Generation/Wind Power/Solar Power/Hydropower/ 
ocean-wave-tidal power/geothermal power/uninterruptible power 
Power Some risk as many potential interpretations in a non-electrical context 
Electricity/electric/electrical/Electricity Generation/hydroelectric electr None 
Gas / Natural Gas / LPG / refrigerant gas / gasoline Gas Risk that it is part of other words 
Renewable Renewable None 
Biomass Biomass None 
Hybrid / hybri (energy context) Hybri Some risk of other interpretations (financial interpretation / 'hybrid 
conflict') 
grid / microgrid / smart grid / distributed generation Grid Some risk of other interpretations other than electrical grids 
Table 51: Energy & Climate Change Keyword Term-set  
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Keyword Relevant Variations / Interpretations to Cover Search Term Automatic 
/ Manual 
Search 
General Documents Specialist Documents 
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 88 
pages  
 24 
pages  
 38 
pages  
 116 
pages  
 21 
pages  
 48 
pages  
 193 
pages  
 20 
pages  
Climate 
Change 
Climate/climatic/UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  
Climat Manual 7 0 0 214 0 0 3 142 
extreme weather; changing weather patterns Weather Automate 3 0 0 14 2 1 9 12 
Global Warming Global 
Warming 
Automate 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 
Emissions Emission / emissions / emit Emission Automate 1 0 0 74 0 1 4 2 
Emit Manual 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Offset / offsetting / offsets Offset Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greenhouse 
Gases 
Greenhouse Gas / GHG Greenhouse Automate 1 0 0 21 2 1 4 2 
GHG Automate 0 0 0 29 0 0 5 0 
Carbon / Carbon equivalent / Carbon Dioxide / Carbon 
dioxide equivalent / CO2 / CO2e / Carbon Neutral / Zero 
Carbon / hydrofluorocarbons / perfluorocarbons (below) 
Carbon Manual 1 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
CO2 Manual 0 0 0 14 0 2 6 0 
Methane / (CH4) Methane Automate 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 
CH4 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Nitrous Oxide Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N20 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) - full words incl in carbon 
search 
HFC Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - full words incl in carbon search PFCs Manual 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 
Sulphur Hexafluoride; (SF6) Hexafluoride Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SF6 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Energy Energy/Energy Storage /Energy Security/energy 
generation/Wind Energy/Solar Energy/ocean/tidal 
Energy Manual 13 1 26 483 242 346 1002 12 
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energy/geothermal energy 
Fuel/Fossil Fuel/Clean Fuel/Fuel Efficiency/Fuel 
Burn/Refuel/Biofuel/Alternative Fuel/Synthetic Fuel/fuel 
(blend)/Combustion fuels 
Fuel Automate 7 0 0 120 80 252 65 2 
Oil Oil Manual 0 0 0 5 13 0 16 0 
Diesel Diesel Automate 0 0 0 4 0 2 8 0 
Petrol Petrol Automate 0 0 0 26 9 7 34 0 
Power/Power Generation/Wind Power/Solar Power/ 
Hydropower/ocean/tidal power/geothermal power/ 
uninterruptible power 
Power Manual 0 0 0 63 12 165 66 0 
Electricity/electric/electrical/Electricity 
Generation/hydroelectric 
electr Automate 0 0 0 155 11 145 138 2 
Gas / Natural Gas / LPG / refrigerant gas / gasoline Gas Manual 2 0 0 37 1 7 67 0 
Renewable Renewable Automate 2 0 0 98 2 3 170 0 
Biomass Biomass Automate 0 0 0 4 0 3 6 0 
Hybrid / hybri (energy context) Hybri Manual 0 0 0 18 2 9 8 0 
grid / microgrid / smart grid / distributed generation Grid Manual 0 0 0 15 4 8 54 1 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs 
13 0 0 398 7 5 33 158 
   Energy 
Refs 
24 1 26 1,028 376 947 1,634 17 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs per 
10 Pages 
1 0 0 34 3 1 2 79 
   Energy 
Refs per 
10 pages 
3 0 7 89 179 197 85 9 
 
Table 52: ‘Keyword Count Qualitative Dataset’ for US DoD Documents Included in the Analysis   
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Keyword Relevant Variations / Interpretations to Cover Search Term Automatic 
/ Manual 
Search 
General Documents Specialist Documents 
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39 pages 75 pages 174 pages 18 pages 31 pages 34 pages 14 pages 
Climate 
Change 
Climate / climatic / UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  
Climat Manual 8 13 10 0 14 20 14 
extreme weather; changing weather patterns Weather Automate 1 0 2 0 0 2 2 
Global Warming Global 
Warming 
Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Emissions Emission / emissions / emit Emission Automate 2 0 3 2 10 41 23 
Emit Manual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Offset / offsetting / offsets Offset Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Greenhouse 
Gases 
Greenhouse Gas / GHG Greenhouse Automate 0 0 2 2 2 15 7 
GHG Automate 0 0 0 0 6 15 5 
Carbon / Carbon equivalent / Carbon Dioxide / Carbon 
dioxide equivalent / CO2 / CO2e / Carbon Neutral / Zero 
Carbon / hydrofluorocarbons / perfluorocarbons (below) 
Carbon Manual 2 6 2 0 1 11 12 
CO2 Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 
Methane / (CH4) Methane Automate 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CH4 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Nitrous Oxide Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
N20 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) - full words incl carbon search HFC Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - full words incl in carbon search PFCs Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sulphur Hexafluoride; (SF6) Hexafluoride Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SF6 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
  Energy / Energy Storage / Energy Security / energy 
generation / Wind Energy / Solar Energy / ocean-wave-
tidal energy / geothermal energy 
Energy Manual 8 55 6 0 15 59 36 
Fuel / Fossil Fuel / Clean Fuel / Fuel Efficiency / Fuel Burn / 
Refuel / Biofuel / Alternative Fuel / Synthetic Fuel / fuel 
Fuel Automate 3 9 29 2 9 10 4 
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(blend) / Combustion fuels 
Oil Oil Manual 2 7 13 0 1 2 4 
Diesel Diesel Automate 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 
Petrol Petrol Automate 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Power / Power Generation / Wind Power / Solar Power / 
Hydropower / ocean-wave-tidal power / geothermal 
power / uninterruptible power 
Power Manual 1 4 3 0 1 2 2 
Electricity / electric / electrical / Electricity Generation / 
hydroelectric 
electr Automate 4 14 12 0 0 5 7 
Gas / Natural Gas / LPG / refrigerant gas / gasoline Gas Manual 1 10 9 2 2 18 13 
Renewable Renewable Automate 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 
Biomass Biomass Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hybrid / hybri (energy context) Hybri Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
grid / microgrid / smart grid / distributed generation Grid Manual 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs 
13 19 19 4 37 116 81 
   Energy 
Refs 
20 101 72 4 29 106 78 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs per 10 
Pages 
3 3 1 2 12 34 58 
   Energy 
Refs per 10 
pages 
5 13 4 2 9 31 56 
 
Table 53: ‘Keyword Count Qualitative Dataset’ for UK MoD Documents Included in the Analysis  
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Keyword Relevant Variations / Interpretations to 
Cover 
Search Term Automatic / 
Manual 
Search 
General Documents (2013 Annual Report unless otherwise stated) 
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 68 
pages  
 168 
pages  
 148 
pages  
 272 
pages  
 84 
pages  
 110 
pages  
 104 
pages  
 142 
pages  
 266 
pages  
 88 
pages  
Climate 
Change 
Climate / climatic / UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change  
Climat Manual 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 38 60 
extreme weather; changing weather patterns Weather Automate 0 0 4 2 1 0 1 8 2 5 
Global Warming Global Warming Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Emissions Emission / emissions / emit Emission Automate 11 19 3 13 1 0 3 2 56 11 
Emit Manual 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Offset / offsetting / offsets Offset Manual 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 
Greenhou
se Gases 
Greenhouse Gas / GHG Greenhouse Automate 1 12 1 7 0 0 2 0 13 3 
GHG Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 
Carbon / Carbon equivalent / Carbon Dioxide 
/ Carbon dioxide equivalent / CO2 / CO2e / 
Carbon Neutral / Zero Carbon / 
hydrofluorocarbons / perfluorocarbons 
Carbon Manual 2 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 6 7 
CO2 Manual 2 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 28 2 
Methane / (CH4) Methane Automate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CH4 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Nitrous Oxide Manual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N20 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) - full words incl 
carbon search 
HFC Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - full words covered 
incl in carbon search 
PFCs Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sulphur Hexafluoride; (SF6) Hexafluoride Manual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SF6 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
  Energy / Energy Storage / Energy Security / 
energy generation / Wind Energy / Solar 
Energy Manual 3 13 6 26 0 16 3 10 92 23 
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Energy / ocean-wave-tidal energy / 
geothermal energy 
Fuel / Fossil Fuel / Clean Fuel / Fuel Efficiency 
/ Fuel Burn / Refuel / Biofuel / Alternative 
Fuel / Synthetic Fuel / fuel (blend) / 
Combustion fuels 
Fuel Automate 20 2 25 0 2 2 1 0 13 12 
Oil Oil Manual 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 
Diesel Diesel Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Petrol Petrol Automate 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Power / Power Generation / Wind Power / 
Solar Power / Hydropower / ocean-wave-
tidal power / geothermal power / 
uninterruptible power 
Power Manual 2 7 6 1 5 3 3 3 10 95 
Electricity / electric / electrical / Electricity 
Generation / hydroelectric 
Electr Automate 13 108 26 88 7 9 73 58 3 28 
Gas / Natural Gas / LPG / refrigerant gas / 
gasoline 
Gas Manual 2 13 2 9 0 3 2 0 8 9 
Renewable Renewable Automate 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 15 1 
Biomass Biomass Automate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hybrid / hybri (energy context) Hybri Manual 3 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
grid / microgrid / smart grid / distributed 
generation 
Grid Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs 
18 47 9 24 2 13 7 10 155 88 
   Energy Refs 46 155 65 126 14 36 82 71 149 175 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs per 10 
Pages 
3 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 6 10 
   Energy Refs 
per 10 
pages 
7 9 4 5 2 3 8 5 6 20 
 
Table 54: ‘Keyword Count Qualitative Dataset’ for Defence Company Documents Included (General Documents)  
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Keyword Relevant Variations / Interpretations to 
Cover 
Search Term Automatic / 
Manual 
Search 
Specialist Documents (2013 CR / Sustainability Reports unless otherwise stated) 
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44 
pages 
68 
pages 
179 
pages 
17 
pages 
70 
pages 
52 
pages 
36 
pages 
116 
pages 
NA 
Climate 
Change 
Climate / climatic / UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
Climat Manual 11 3 1 14 0 15 19 16 24   
extreme weather; changing weather 
patterns 
Weather Automate 4 0 0 0 0 7 1 7 2   
Global Warming Global Warming Automate 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1   
Emissions Emission / emissions / emit Emission Automate 94 16 68 70 10 24 30 11 36   
Emit Manual 2 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0   
Offset / offsetting / offsets Offset Manual 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 0 0   
Greenhou
se Gases 
Greenhouse Gas / GHG Greenhouse Automate 11 3 13 10 4 6 15 8 3   
GHG Automate 2 0 1 6 3 4 39 4 1   
Carbon / Carbon equivalent / Carbon 
Dioxide / Carbon dioxide equivalent / 
CO2 / CO2e / Carbon Neutral / Zero 
Carbon / hydrofluorocarbons / 
perfluorocarbons (below) 
Carbon Manual 6 5 42 11 1 31 14 4 5   
CO2 Manual 53 5 3 1 1 2 5 1 37   
Methane / (CH4) Methane Automate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   
CH4 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Nitrous Oxide Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
N20 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) - full words 
incl carbon search 
HFC Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) - full words 
covered incl in carbon search 
PFCs Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Sulphur Hexafluoride; (SF6) Hexafluoride Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
SF6 Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3   
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  Energy / Energy Storage / Energy Security 
/ energy generation / Wind Energy / 
Solar Energy / ocean-wave-tidal energy / 
geothermal energy 
Energy Manual 66 28 67 84 8 132 44 22 45   
Fuel / Fossil Fuel / Clean Fuel / Fuel 
Efficiency / Fuel Burn / Refuel / Biofuel / 
Alternative Fuel / Synthetic Fuel / fuel 
(blend) / Combustion fuels 
Fuel Automate 57 13 107 11 2 14 1 3 16   
Oil Oil Manual 7 1 7 12 0 3 2 0 4   
Diesel Diesel Automate 2 3 0 8 0 0 1 0 0   
Petrol Petrol Automate 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0   
Power / Power Generation / Wind Power 
/ Solar Power / Hydropower / ocean-
wave-tidal power / geothermal power / 
uninterruptible power 
Power Manual 10 6 20 2 4 24 4 1 4   
Electricity / electric / electrical / 
Electricity Generation / hydroelectric 
Electr Automate 31 10 15 79 14 33 13 11 18   
Gas / Natural Gas / LPG / refrigerant gas 
/ gasoline 
Gas Manual 25 6 19 21 7 12 24 9 9   
Renewable Renewable Automate 5 1 5 9 0 14 8 3 1   
Biomass Biomass Automate 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0   
Hybrid / hybri (energy context) Hybri Manual 3 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 1   
grid / microgrid / smart grid / distributed 
generation 
Grid Manual 0 2 5 3 0 15 0 0 0   
   Climate 
Change 
Refs 
184 32 133 114 19 90 128 51 112 NA 
   Energy Refs 210 76 248 230 35 249 97 49 98 NA 
   Climate 
Change 
Refs per 10 
Pages 
26 7 20 6 11 13 25 14 10 NA 
   Energy Refs 
per 10 
pages 
30 17 36 13 21 36 19 14 8 NA 
 
Table 55: ‘Keyword Count Qualitative Dataset’ for Defence Company Documents Included (Specialist Documents) 
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Organisation Target Type Target Target 
Year 
Baseline 
Year 
Source Notes 
UK MoD GHG Reduction Target (Scope 1 & 2) 25% 2014/15 2009/10 Sustainable MoD Annual Report 2014/15 
(MoD, 2015a) 
Linked to 'Greening Government 
Commitments' - Applies to facility 
energy use 
GHG Reduction Target (Scope 3) 25% 2014/15 2009/10 Sustainable MoD Annual Report 2014/15 
(MoD, 2015a) 
Relates to domestic air flights 
British Army Operational Energy Reduction Target 18% 2020 2009/10 Defence Plan 15 (Not publicly available) Also requirement for services to 'advise 
on how they would manage' fuel price 
rises (25% by 2025; 75% by 2035) 
Royal Navy Operational Energy Reduction Target 22% 2020 2009/10 Defence Plan 15 (Not publicly available) As above 
Royal Air Force Operational Energy Reduction Target 27% 2020 2009/10 Defence Plan 15 (Not publicly available) As above 
US DoD GHG Reduction Target (Scope 1 & 2) 34% 2020 2008 Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Applies to 'facility energy use', linked to 
wider federal energy management 
programme 
GHG Reduction Target (Scope 3) 13.5% 2020 2008 Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Applies to 'goal subject' Scope 3 
emissions (mostly relate to business 
travel) 
GHG Reduction Target (Scope 3) 7% 2020 2011 Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Applies to employee air travel 
GHG Reduction Target (Scope 3) 30% 2020   Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Percentage of employees teleworking 1 
day per fortnight 
Facility Energy Intensity Target 37.5% 2020 2003 Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Energy intensity target related to 
domestic facilities 
Facility Energy Procurement Target 18% 2020   Strategic Sustainability Performance 
Plan 2014 (DoD, 2014b) 
Procurement of renewable energy for 
domestic facilities 
US Army Facility Energy Generation Target   2020   Army Vision for Net Zero (NREL, 2013) 5 sites to become 'net zero' in energy 
use by 2020; 25 sites by 2030 
US Navy GHG Reduction Target 50% 2015   A Navy Vision for the 21st Century (Dept 
of the Navy, 2010a) 
Applies to 'non-tactical fossil fuel usage' 
Operational Energy Reduction Target 15% 2020   A Navy Vision for the 21st Century (Dept 
of the Navy, 2010a) 
Reduce overall fuel consumption afloat 
by 50% 
Operational Energy Procurement 
Target 
50% 2020   A Navy Vision for the 21st Century (Dept 
of the Navy, 2010a) 
Half of all USN energy afloat to be made 
of alternative energy sources (e.g. 
biofuel blends) 
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Facility Energy Generation Target 50% 2020   A Navy Vision for the 21st Century (Dept 
of the Navy, 2010a) 
50% of facilities will be produced 
renewably by 2020 / 50% of facilities to 
be net-zero consumers by 2020 
US Air Force Operational Energy Intensity Target 10% 2020 2011 US Air Force Energy Strategic Plan (US 
Air Force, 2013) 
Improve aviation energy efficiency' by 
10% by 2020 
Facility Energy Reduction Target 15% 2020 2010 US Air Force Energy Strategic Plan (US 
Air Force, 2013) 
Applies to all facility energy 
Airbus         Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
BAE Systems         Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Boeing GHG Reduction Target 0% 2017 2012 Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
Maintain emissions at 2012 levels by 
2017 
Finmeccanica         Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
General Dynamics         Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Lockheed Martin GHG Reduction Target (Scope 1 & 2) 35% 2020 2010 Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
Applies to US/UK 
Facility Energy Reduction Target 25% 2020 2010 Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Northrop 
Grumman 
GHG Reduction Target (Scope 1 & 2) 25% 2014 2008 Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Raytheon GHG Reduction Target (Scope 1 & 2) 10% 2015   Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Facility Energy Reduction Target 10% 2015   Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
  
Thales GHG Intensity Target (Scopes 1-3)   2015   Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
Reduce by 10kgCO2e per 1,000 Euro 
Revenue 
Facility Energy Intensity Target   2015   Context Report for BAE Systems (Not 
publicly available) 
Reduce by 10toe per 1,000 Euro 
Revenue 
United 
Technologies 
        United Technologies Annual Reports 
2013-15 (United Technologies, 2014a; 
2015a; 2016a) 
  
Table 56: GHG and Energy Targets Summary for the Organisations Included in this Research  
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  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Airbus 69 52 70 97 95 95 NA 
BAE Systems 58 56 69 69 77 88 NA 
Boeing 86 92 89 96 97 99 NA 
Finmeccanica 64 80 81 83 75 86 NA 
General Dynamics No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp 
Lockheed Martin 76 90 93 91 98 100 NA 
Northrop Grumman 68 80 90 99 98 100 NA 
Raytheon 68 71 90 98 97 98 NA 
Thales 44 80 68 88 90 98 NA 
United Technologies 54 58 70 87 72 97 NA 
Table 57: CDP Climate Change Questionnaire - Disclosure Scores (Note from 2016 CDP are only publishing ‘Performance Scores’) 
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  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Airbus B D C B B C B 
BAE Systems D E C C C D B 
Boeing B B B A- B B A- 
Finmeccanica C C C B C C B 
General Dynamics No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp No resp 
Lockheed Martin B A A A A A- A 
Northrop Grumman C C A A A A- A- 
Raytheon B C B A B A A- 
Thales NA B C C A A- A- 
United Technologies B D C B C A A- 
Table 58: CDP Climate Change Questionnaire - Performance Scores  
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  Third Party Assurance of GHGs? Assurance Standard Level of Assurance 
Thales Yes ISAE3000 Limited 
United Technologies Corporation Yes (not complete at time of publication for 
CDP / Scope 3 data not assured) 
ISO14064-3 Limited 
Lockheed Martin Corporation Yes ISO14064-3 Limited 
Northrop Grumman Corp Yes ISO14064-3 Reasonable 
Raytheon Company Yes ISO14064-3 Limited 
Airbus Group Yes ISAE3000 Reasonable 
Finmeccanica Yes ISAE3000 Limited 
BAE Systems Yes ISAE3000 Limited 
Boeing Company Yes DNV Verisustain Protocol/ Verification Protocol 
for Sustainability Reporting 
Limited 
General Dynamics Not disclosed NA NA 
UK MoD Yes (where subject to GCC targets) Not disclosed Not disclosed 
US DoD Not disclosed NA NA 
Table 59: Assurance standards used for Organisational Carbon Accounts (Source(s): CDP Academic Dataset, Sustainable MoD Annual Report 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014m; 2015a; 2016b)) 
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  IAEG Member? IAEG GHG Guidance 
Mentioned in Public 
Reporting? 
IAEG GHG Guidance Publicly Adopted? 
Thales Yes Yes Not explicit (but Standard aligned to GHG Protocol) 
United Technologies Corporation Yes No No 
Lockheed Martin Corporation Yes No No 
Northrop Grumman Corp Yes Yes Not explicit (but Standard aligned to GHG Protocol) 
Raytheon Company Yes No No 
Airbus Group Yes No No 
Finmeccanica No No No 
BAE Systems Yes (business-level) No No 
Boeing Company Yes Yes Yes (referenced as referred to, alongside GHG Protocol - but Boeing 
methodology not formally tied to either of these) 
General Dynamics No No No 
UK MoD NA NA NA 
US DoD NA NA NA 
Table 60: Organisations endorsing the IAEG’s GHG Reporting Standard (IAEG, 2016).  (Source(s): All ‘General’ and ‘Specialist’ documents 
described in section 3.3.3) 
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  BAE 
Systems 
United 
Technologies 
General 
Dynamics 
(2011) 
Lockheed 
Martin 
Finmeccanica Northrop 
Grumman 
Boeing 
Company 
Raytheon 
Company 
Thales Airbus 
Group 
Business travel Y Y   Y Y Y Y Y Y   
Upstream transportation and 
distribution 
      Y Y Y   Y     
Downstream transportation and 
distribution 
      Y Y Y         
Employee commuting       Y   Y     Y   
Fuel and energy related activities 
(not incl in scope 1 & 2) 
      Y Y     Y     
Waste generated in operations       Y Y     Y     
Upstream leased assets (lease cars 
in these cases) 
        Y       Y   
Purchased goods and services       Y Y*           
Use of sold products       Y             
End of life treatment of sold 
products 
                    
Capital goods                     
Processing of sold products                     
Downstream leased assets                     
Franchises                     
Investments                     
Table 61: Summary of 2014 Scope 3 Reporting from the Defence Companies Included in this Research (organised in descending order from 
the ‘most reported’ to ‘least reported’ category). (Source: Quantitative Dataset 3.4.1, Tables 32-40) 
*Reliability of Finmeccanica data very questionable for this category despite submitting a value to CDP 
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Domain UK Combat Platform Main Contractor 
Air Tornado Bomber BAE Systems 
Air Tornado Fighter BAE Systems 
Air Eurofighter / Typhoon BAE Systems 
Air Nimrod Patrol Aircraft BAE Systems 
Air F-35 Lockheed Martin 
Land Warrior AIFV Alvis Vickers (now BAE Systems) 
Land Challenger II Tank Alvis Vickers (now BAE Systems) 
Land Merlin Helicopter Westland (now Finmeccanica) 
Land Lynx Helicopter   
Land Apache Helicopter   
Land Chinook Helicopter Boeing 
Land Hercules Transport Plane Lockheed Martin 
Land C-17 Globemaster Transport Plane Boeing 
Sea QE Carrier BAE Systems 
Sea Type 45 Destroyer BAE Systems 
Sea Type 26 Frigate BAE Systems 
Sea Other Complex Warships BAE Systems (6); Yarrows 15 (now BAE 
Systems); Vickers 20 (now BAE Systems); Swan 
Hunter 18; Vosper 25; Cammell Laird 6 
Sea Harrier Jet BAE Systems 
Sea Astute Submarines BAE Systems 
Sea Successor Submarines BAE Systems 
Table 62: Showing UK combat platforms and the main supplying company. Source: Page, 2007: p.254-255). Note this is not an exhaustive list, 
and the supply relationships can be more complex than implied in the table.   
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Appendix B: CDP Climate Change Questionnaire (CDP, 2017) 
 
 
CDP’s 2017 Climate Change Information Request 
Page 1 © CDP Worldwide 2017 
CDP works to reduce companies’ greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change 
risk.  In 2016, 827 investors with over US$100 trillion in assets backed CDP’s climate change 
information request.  
The following set of questions form CDP’s climate change information request.  Companies 
are asked to answer these questions in the Online Response System (ORS) provided by 
CDP through its website.  As such, this document is a representation of the request and 
whilst the questions will remain the same, the format may differ online particularly where 
drop down options and tables have been included for ease of response.  Guidance is 
available on the CDP website from December 2016 which details all of the options available 
and provides screen shots of the ORS to aid companies in completing the request. 
We request a reply to the following questions by 29 June 2017. 
Please respond to the information request using our Online Response System (ORS).  In early 
February 2017, instructions on how to access the ORS will be sent to you by e-mail.  If you are 
unable to respond via the ORS, please e-mail respond@cdp.net.  In addition to investor signatories to 
the letter requesting your response which accompanies this request, you may also be asked to share 
your response with the members of CDP’s supply chain program if they are your customers.  In this 
case, you will be notified by email in early April 2017 and asked for your approval for this.   
We encourage companies to consult CDP’s 2017 climate change reporting guidance and CDP’s 2017 
climate change scoring methodology at www.cdp.net/guidance, as well as use the guidance within 
the ORS.  Please answer the questions as comprehensively as possible.  Where you do not have all 
of the information requested, please respond with what you have as this is more valuable to investors 
than no response at all. 
We encourage companies to assess the relevance of questions in accordance with the principles of 
“The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition)” 
developed by the World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (www.ghgprotocol.org).  According to these principles, information is relevant if it 
contains the detail that users, both internal and external to the company, need for their decision-
making. 
Where questions have been amended from 2016 to 2017, this is indicated next to the relevant 
questions. 
Sector-specific Question Modules and Instructions 
In addition to questions CC0-15 that follow, specific questions have been prepared for companies in 
the Electric Utilities, Auto and Auto Component Manufacture, Oil and Gas, Information and 
Communications Technology, and Food, Beverage and Tobacco sectors. This is part of a strategic 
move by CDP to a more sector based approach. These modules will be presented within the ORS 
and can be previewed on the CDP website. Companies with businesses in these sectors should 
answer questions CC1-15 for all businesses within their consolidated boundary and provide 
information specific to businesses in those sectors in answer to the additional questions.  
CDP Questionnaire Copyright and Licensed Use: 
The copyright to CDP’s annual questionnaire/s is owned by CDP Worldwide, a registered charity 
number 1122330 and a company limited by guarantee, registered in England number 05013650. 
Any use of any part of the questionnaire, including the questions, must be licensed by CDP. Any 
unauthorized use is prohibited and CDP reserves the right to protect its copyright by all legal 
means necessary. Contact license@cdp.net for details of licenses and fees 
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CC0.    Introduction 
 
CC0.1 Introduction 
Please give a general description and introduction to your organization  
 
CC0.2 Reporting Year 
Please state the start and end date of the year for which you are reporting data 
 
CC0.3 Country list configuration  
Please select the countries for which you will be supplying data   
 
CC0.4 Currency selection  
Please select the currency in which you would like to submit your response  
 
CC0.6 Modules  
Here companies can choose to respond to a sector module if this has not already been allocated to 
them by CDP  
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CC1. Governance 
  
Group and Individual Responsibility 
CC1.1 Where is the highest level of direct responsibility for climate change within your organization?  
If “Board or individual/sub-set of the Board or other committee appointed by the Board”; “Senior 
Manager/Officer”; or, “Other Manager/Officer”: 
CC1.1a Please identify the position of the individual or name of the committee with this 
responsibility 
Individual Performance 
CC1.2 Do you provide incentives for the management of climate change issues, including the 
attainment of targets? 
If yes: CC1.2a  Please provide further details on the incentives provided for the management 
of climate change issues 
 
Who is entitled to benefit from 
these incentives? 
The type of 
incentives 
Incentivized 
performance indicator 
Comment 
    
 
CC2. Strategy 
 
Risk Management Approach 
CC2.1 Please select the option that best describes your risk management procedures with regard to 
climate change risks and opportunities 
If “Integrated into multi-disciplinary company-wide risk management processes" or “A specific climate 
change risk management process” is selected, answer questions CC2.1a - 2.1c: 
CC2.1a Please provide further details on your risk management procedures with regard to 
climate change risks and opportunities  
Frequency of 
monitoring 
To whom are results 
reported? 
Geographical areas 
considered 
How far into the future 
are risks considered? 
Comment 
     
CC2.1b Please describe how your risk and opportunity identification processes are applied at 
both company and asset level  
CC2.1c How do you prioritize the risks and opportunities identified?  
 
If “There are no documented processes for assessing and managing risks and opportunities from 
climate change” is selected: 
CC2.1d Please explain why you do not have a process in place for assessing and managing 
risks and opportunities from climate change, and whether you plan to introduce such 
a process in the future  
Main reason for not having a process Do you plan to introduce a process? Comment 
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Business Strategy 
CC2.2 Is climate change integrated into your business strategy? 
If yes:  CC2.2a  Please describe the process of how climate change is integrated into your 
business strategy and any outcomes of this process (CDP 2016 CC2.2a, 
amended) 
If no:   CC2.2b  Please explain why climate change is not integrated into your business 
strategy   
CC2.2c  Does your company use an internal price on carbon?  (CDP 2016 CC2.2c, amended) 
 If yes:  CC2.2d  Please provide details and examples of how your company uses an internal 
price on carbon (CDP 2016 CC2.2d, amended) 
Engagement with Policy Makers  
CC2.3 Do you engage in activities that could either directly or indirectly influence public policy on
 climate change through any of the following? (tick all that apply)  
 
       Direct engagement with policy makers                  Trade associations   
Funding research organizations         Other        No 
 
If “Direct engagement with policy makers” is ticked:  
CC2.3a  On what issues have you been engaging directly with policy makers?  
 
Focus of legislation  Corporate position Details of engagement  Proposed legislative solution  
    
 
If “Trade associations” is ticked:  
CC2.3b Are you on the Board of any trade associations or provide funding beyond 
membership?  
 
If yes:  CC2.3c  Please enter the details of those trade associations that are likely to take a  
position on climate change legislation 
 
Trade 
association  
Is your position on climate 
change consistent with 
theirs? 
Please explain the 
trade association’s 
position 
How have you, or are you 
attempting to, influence the 
position? 
    
 
If “Funding research organizations” is ticked:  
CC2.3d Do you publicly disclose a list of all the research organizations that you fund? 
 
If “Other” is ticked:  
CC2.3e Please provide details of the other engagement activities that you undertake  
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If “Direct engagement”, “Trade associations”, “Funding research organizations” or “Other” is ticked:  
 
 
CC2.3f What processes do you have in place to ensure that all of your direct and indirect 
activities that influence policy are consistent with your overall climate change 
strategy?   
 
If “No” is ticked:  
CC2.3g Please explain why you do not engage with policy makers  
 
 
CC3. Targets and Initiatives 
 
Targets 
 
The following details are requested 
for targets (in Questions CC3.1a 
and CC3.1b), to be inputted in 
tables in the ORS: 
 Scope 
 % of emissions in scope 
 % reduction from base year 
 Metric denominator 
(intensity targets only) 
 Base year covered by target 
 Base year emissions 
 Target year 
 Is this a science-based 
target? 
 Comment 
 
CC3.1 Did you have an emissions reduction or 
renewable energy consumption or production 
target that was active (ongoing or reached 
completion) in the reporting year?) 
 
 
If you have an absolute target: 
 
 
 
CC3.1a  Please provide details of your absolute              
‘’’’’’’’’’’’’’’target (CDP 2016 CC3.1a, amended) 
 
If you have an intensity target:  
 CC3.1b  Please provide details of your intensity 
target (CDP 2016 CC3.1b, amended) 
 
CC3.1c  Please also indicate what change in 
absolute emissions this intensity target 
reflects 
 
 
 
Direction of change 
anticipated in absolute 
Scope 1+2 emissions at 
target completion? 
% change 
anticipated in 
absolute Scope 
1+2 emissions 
Direction of change 
anticipated in absolute 
Scope 3 emissions at 
target completion? 
% change 
anticipated in 
absolute Scope 
3 emissions 
Comment 
     
 
If you have a renewable energy consumption or production target: 
CC3.1d  Please provide details of your renewable energy consumption and/or production 
target in your direct operations  
 
 
ID 
 
Energy 
types 
covered 
by target 
 
Base 
year 
 
Base year energy 
for energy type 
covered (MWh) 
% renewable 
energy in base 
year 
Target 
year 
 
% renewable 
energy in target 
year 
Comment 
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For all types of target, also: 
CC3.1e For all of your targets, please provide details on the progress made in the reporting 
year  
 
% complete (time) % complete (emissions or renewable energy) Comment 
   
 
If you do not have a target: 
CC3.1f Please explain: (i) why you do not have a target; and (ii) forecast how your emissions 
will change over the next five years  
 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives 
CC3.2 Do you classify any of your existing goods and/or services as low carbon products or do they 
enable a third party to avoid GHG emissions?  
 
If yes: CC3.2a Please provide details of your products and/or services that you classify as low 
carbon products or that enable a third party to avoid GHG emissions  
Level of 
aggregation 
Description 
of product/ 
Group of 
products 
Are you 
reporting 
low carbon 
product/s 
or avoided 
emissions? 
Taxonomy, project or 
methodology used to 
classify product/s as 
low carbon or to 
calculate avoided 
emissions 
% revenue 
from low 
carbon 
product/s in 
the reporting 
year 
% R&D in low 
carbon 
product/s in 
the reporting 
year 
Comment 
       
 
CC3.3 Did you have emissions reduction initiatives that were active within the reporting year (this can 
include those in the planning and/or implementation phases) 
If yes, complete questions CC3.3a, CC3.3b and CC3.3c: 
CC3.3a Please identify the total number of projects at each stage of development, and for 
those in the implementation stages, the estimated CO2e savings 
 
Stage of development Number of projects Total estimated annual CO2e savings in metric tonnes CO2e (only for rows marked *) 
Under investigation   
To be implemented*   
Implementation commenced*   
Implemented*   
Not to be implemented   
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CC3.3b For those initiatives implemented in the reporting year, please provide details in the 
table below 
 
Activity 
type 
Description 
of activity 
Estimated 
annual CO2e 
savings 
(metric tonnes 
CO2e) 
Scope Voluntary/ 
Mandatory 
Annual 
monetary 
savings 
(unit 
currency – 
as specified 
in CC0.4) 
Investment 
required   
(unit 
currency – 
as 
specified 
in CC0.4) 
Payback 
period 
Estimated 
lifetime of 
the 
initiative 
Comment 
          
 
 
CC3.3c What methods do you use to drive investment in emissions reduction activities?  
 
Method Comment 
  
 
If no: CC3.3d  If you do not have any emissions reduction initiatives, please explain why not  
 
 
CC4. Communications 
 
CC4.1 Have you published information about your organization’s response to climate change and 
GHG emissions performance for this reporting year in places other than in your CDP 
response? If so, please attach the publication(s)  
Publication Status Page/Section reference 
Attach the 
document 
Comment 
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CC5. Climate Change Risks 
 
CC5.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change 
risks that have the potential to generate a 
substantive change in your business operations, 
revenue or expenditure? (Tick all that apply)  
 
Please identify the relevant categories: 
 
Risks driven by changes in regulation 
 
Risks driven by changes in physical climate 
parameters 
 
Risks driven by changes in other climate-
related developments 
 
  
For all of the inherent risks and/or 
opportunities identified, please 
provide the following details in the 
table provided in the ORS: 
 Risk/Opportunity driver 
 Description 
 Potential impact 
 Timeframe 
 Direct/Indirect 
 Likelihood  
 Magnitude of impact 
 Estimated financial 
implications of the 
risk/opportunity before 
taking action 
 Methods you are using to 
manage this 
risk/opportunity 
 Costs associated with 
these actions 
 
Where inherent risks and/or 
opportunities have not been 
identified for any of the categories: 
 
Please explain why you do not 
consider your organization to be 
exposed to these 
risks/opportunities that have the 
potential to generate a substantive 
change in your business 
operations, revenue or 
expenditure 
 
 
 
CC6.     Climate Change Opportunities  
 
 
CC6.1 Have you identified any inherent climate change 
opportunities that have the potential to generate a 
substantive change in your business operations, 
revenue or expenditure? (Tick all that apply)  
 
Please identify the relevant categories: 
 
Opportunities driven by changes in regulation 
 
Opportunities driven by changes in physical 
climate parameters 
 
Opportunities driven by changes in other 
climate-related developments 
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CC7.    Emissions Methodology 
 
Base year 
 CDP requests companies to 
provide responses to questions 
CC8, CC9 and CC10 for the three 
years prior to the current reporting 
year if you have not done so 
before or if this is the first time you 
have answered a CDP information 
request 
CC7.1 Please provide your base year and base year 
emissions (Scopes 1 and 2)  
 
  
Use the table in the ORS to provide the following details for 
Scopes 1 and 2: 
 Base year 
 Scope 1 base year emissions (metric tonnes CO2e) 
 Scope 2 location-based base year emissions (metric 
tonnes CO2e)  
 Scope 2 market-based base year emissions (metric 
tonnes CO2e)  
    
Methodology 
CC7.2 Please give the name of the standard, protocol or methodology you have used to collect 
activity data and calculate Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions 
 
If you have selected “Other”: 
CC7.2a If you have selected “Other” in CC7.2 please provide details of the standard, protocol 
or methodology you have used to collect activity data and calculate Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 emissions  
CC7.3 Please give the source for the global warming potentials you have used 
 
Gas Reference 
  
 
CC7.4  Please give the emissions factors you have applied and their origin; alternatively, please 
attach an Excel spreadsheet with this data at the bottom of this page  
 
Fuel/Material/Energy Emission Factor Unit Reference 
    
 
CC8.   Emissions Data 
 
Boundary 
CC8.1 Please select the boundary you are using for your Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas inventory 
 
Select from 
 Financial control 
 Operational control  
 Equity share 
 Other 
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Scope 1 and 2 Emissions Data  
CC8.2 Please provide your gross global Scope 1 emissions figures in metric tonnes CO2e 
 
CC8.3 Please describe your approach to reporting Scope 2 emissions (CDP 2016 CC8.3, amended) 
Scope 2, location-based Scope 2, market-based (if applicable) Comment 
   
 
CC8.3a Please provide your gross global Scope 2 emissions figures in metric tonnes CO2e  
 
Scope 2, location-based Scope 2, market-based (if applicable) Comment 
   
 
CC8.4 Are there any sources (e.g. facilities, specific GHGs, activities, geographies, etc.) of Scope 1 
and Scope 2 emissions that are within your selected reporting boundary which are not 
included in your disclosure?  
If yes:  CC8.4a Please provide details of the sources of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions that 
are within your selected reporting boundary which are not included in your 
disclosure  
 
Source 
Relevance of Scope 
1 emissions from this 
source 
Relevance of 
location-based Scope 
2 emissions from this 
source 
Relevance of market-
based Scope 2 
emissions from this 
source (if applicable) 
Explain why the 
source is excluded 
     
 
Data Accuracy 
CC8.5 Please estimate the level of uncertainty of the total gross global Scope 1 and 2 emissions 
figures that you have supplied and specify the sources of uncertainty in your data gathering, 
handling and calculations  
Scope Uncertainty 
range 
Main sources of 
uncertainty 
Please expand on the 
uncertainty in your data 
1    
2 (location-based)    
2 (market-based)    
External Verification or Assurance 
CC8.6 Please indicate the verification/assurance status that applies to your reported Scope 1 
emissions  
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If Scope 1 emissions have been subject to third party verification or assurance (complete or 
underway):  
CC8.6a Please provide further details of the verification/assurance undertaken for your Scope 
1 emissions, and attach the relevant statements  
Verification 
or assurance 
cycle in 
place 
Status in the 
current 
reporting 
year 
Type of 
verification 
or 
assurance 
Attach 
the 
statem-
ent 
Page/ 
Section 
reference 
Relevant 
standard 
Proportion of reported 
Scope 1 emissions 
verified (%) 
       
 
If “No third party verification or assurance – regulatory CEMS required” is selected:  
CC8.6b Please provide further details of the regulatory regime to which you are complying 
that specifies the use of Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems (CEMS)  
 
Regulation % of emissions covered by the system Compliance period Evidence of submission 
    
 
CC8.7 Please indicate the verification/assurance status that applies to at least one of your reported 
Scope 2 emissions figures  
 
If Scope 2 emissions have been subject to third party verification or assurance (complete or 
underway):  
 
CC8.7a Please provide further details of the verification/assurance undertaken for your location-
based and/or market-based Scope 2 emissions, and attach the relevant statements  
 
Location-
based or 
market-
based 
figure? 
Verification 
or 
assurance 
cycle in 
place 
Status in 
the current 
reporting 
year 
Type of 
verification 
or 
assurance 
Attach 
the 
statement 
Page/ 
Section 
reference 
Relevant 
standard 
Proportion of 
reported 
Scope 2 
emissions 
verified (%) 
        
 
CC8.8 Please identify if any data points have been verified as part of the third party verification work 
undertaken, other than the verification of emissions figures reported in CC8.6, CC8.7 and 
CC14.2 
Additional data points verified Comment 
  
 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Biologically Sequestered Carbon 
CC8.9 Are carbon dioxide emissions from biologically sequestered carbon relevant to your 
organization?  
If yes:  8.9a Please provide the emissions from biologically sequestered carbon relevant to 
your organization in metric tonnes CO2  
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CC9.    Scope 1 Emissions Breakdown 
  
 
Electric utilities should report emissions by 
country/region using the tables in EU2 
Oil and gas sector companies are requested to provide 
breakdowns of emissions by value chain segment and 
activity in the OG module  
ICT companies can use the sector module to respond to 
CC9.2d 
FBT companies can use the sector module to provide a 
breakdown of their emissions by activity 
CC9.1 Do you have Scope 1 emissions 
sources in more than one 
country?   
 
 
If yes: 
 
CC9.1a  Please break down your 
total gross global Scope 
1 emissions by country/ 
region 
 
Country/Region Scope 1 metric tonnes CO2e 
  
 
CC9.2 Please indicate which other Scope 1 emissions breakdowns you are able to provide (tick all 
that apply)  
 
Where a breakdown option has been ticked, a table appears to allow you to enter the relevant 
emissions data 
 
CC10.  Scope 2 Emissions Breakdown  
 
 
Oil and gas sector companies are 
requested to provide the 
breakdown of emissions by value 
chain segment as shown in OG2 
ICT companies can use the 
sector module to respond to 
CC10.2c 
CC10.1 Do you have Scope 2 emissions sources in 
more than one country?  
 
 
If yes: 
 
CC10.1a  Please break down your total gross 
global Scope 2 emissions and energy 
consumption by country/region  
 
 
 
Country/Region Scope 2, 
location-
based 
(metric tonnes 
CO2e) 
Scope 2, 
market-based 
(metric 
tonnes CO2e) 
Purchased and 
consumed 
electricity, heat, 
steam or cooling 
(MWh)  
Purchased and consumed low 
carbon electricity, heat, steam 
or cooling (MWh) accounted in 
market-based approach 
     
 
CC10.2 Please indicate which other Scope 2 emissions breakdowns you are able to provide 
(tick all that apply) 
 
   By business division (CC10.2a)    By facility (CC10.2b) 
   By activity (CC10.2c)   
Where a breakdown option has been ticked, a table appears to allow you to enter the relevant 
emissions data 
 By business division (CC9.2a) By facility (CC9.2b) 
 By GHG type (CC9.2c) By activity (CC9.2d) 
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CC11. Energy 
 
CC11.1 What percentage of your total operational spend in the reporting year was on energy? 
 
CC11.2  Please state how much heat, steam, and cooling in MWh your organization has purchased   
and consumed during the reporting year  
 
 
Energy type MWh 
Heat  
Steam  
Cooling  
 
CC11.3   Please state how much fuel in MWh your organization has consumed (for energy purposes) 
during the reporting year  
 
CC11.3a  Please complete the table by breaking down the total “Fuel” figure entered above by fuel 
type  
 
 
Fuels MWh 
  
 
CC11.4 Please provide details of the electricity, heat, steam or cooling amounts that were accounted 
at a low carbon emission factor in the market-based Scope 2 figure reported in CC8.3a (CDP 
2016 CC11.4, amended) 
 
 
Basis for applying a 
low carbon emission 
factor 
MWh consumed associated with 
low carbon electricity, heat, steam 
or cooling 
Emissions factor (in units of 
metric tonnes CO2e per 
MWh) 
Comment 
    
 
CC11.5  Please report how much electricity you produce in MWh, and how much electricity you 
consume in MWh  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
electricity 
consumed 
(MWh) 
Consumed 
electricity that 
is purchased 
(MWh) 
Total 
electricity 
produced 
(MWh) 
Total renewable 
electricity 
produced (MWh) 
Consumed renewable 
electricity that is produced 
by company (MWh) 
Comment 
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CC12. Emissions Performance  
 
Emissions History 
CC12.1 How do your gross global emissions (Scope 1 and 2 combined) for the reporting year 
compare to the previous year?  
If emissions have increased, decreased or remained the same overall: 
CC12.1a Please identify the reasons for any change in your gross global emissions (Scope 1 
and 2 combined) and for each of them specify how your emissions compare to the 
previous year  
 
Reason Emissions value (percentage) 
Direction of 
change 
Please 
explain 
and 
include 
calculation 
Emissions reduction activities    
Divestment    
Acquisitions    
Mergers    
Change in output    
Change in methodology    
Change in boundary    
Change in physical operating 
conditions 
   
Unidentified    
Other    
 
CC12.1b Is your emissions performance calculations in CC12.1 and CC12.1a based on a 
location-based Scope 2 emissions figure or a market-based Scope 2 emissions 
figure?  
 
Emissions Intensity 
CC12.2 Please describe your gross global combined Scope 1 and 2 emissions for the reporting year 
in metric tonnes CO2e per unit currency total revenue  
 
Intensity 
figure = 
Metric 
numerator 
(Gross 
global 
combined 
Scope 1 and 
2 emissions) 
Metric 
denominator: 
Unit total 
revenue  
Scope 2 
figure used 
% change 
from 
previous year 
Direction of 
change from 
previous year 
Reason 
for change 
 metric 
tonnes 
CO2e 
     
 
 
 CDP’s 2017 Climate Change Information Request 
 
 
 
  Emissions 
 
  
 
 
Page 15  © CDP Worldwide 2017 
 
CC12.3 Please provide any additional intensity (normalized) metrics that are appropriate to your 
business operations  
Intensity 
figure = 
Metric 
numerator 
(Gross 
global 
combined 
Scope 1 
and 2 
emissions) 
Metric 
denominator 
Metric 
denominator
: Unit total 
Scope 
2 
figure 
used 
% 
change 
from 
previous 
year 
Direction 
of 
change 
from 
previous 
year 
Reason 
for 
change 
 
ICT 
companies 
can use the 
sector 
module to 
respond to 
this question  metric 
tonnes 
CO2e 
      
 
 
CC13. Emissions Trading 
 
CC13.1 Do you participate in any emissions trading schemes? 
 
If yes:  CC13.1a  Please complete the following table for each of the emission trading 
schemes in which you participate 
 
Scheme 
name 
Period for which 
data is supplied 
Allowances 
allocated 
Allowances 
purchased 
Verified emissions in 
metric tonnes CO2e 
Details of 
ownership 
      
 
And if “Yes” or “No, but we anticipate doing so within the next 2 years”: 
CC13.1b What is your strategy for complying with the schemes in which you participate or 
anticipate participating? 
CC13.2 Has your organization originated any project-based carbon credits or purchased any within 
the reporting period?  
If yes:  CC13.2a Please provide details on the project-based carbon credits originated or 
purchased by your organization in the reporting period (CDP 2016 CC13.2a, 
amended) 
 
Credit 
origination 
or credit 
purchase 
Project 
type 
Project 
identification 
Verified 
to which 
standard 
Number of 
credits 
(metric 
tonnes 
CO2e) 
Number of 
credits (metric 
tonnes CO2e): 
Risk adjusted 
volume 
Credits 
cancelled 
Purpose, 
e.g. 
compliance 
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CC14. Scope 3 Emissions   
 
CC14.1 Please account for your organization’s 
Scope 3 emissions, disclosing and 
explaining any exclusions  
Auto-manufacturers should refer to the sector 
module before completing question CC14.1 
 
 
CC14.2 Please indicate the verification/assurance status that applies to your reported Scope 3 
emissions  
If Scope 3 emissions have been subject to third party verification or assurance (complete or 
underway): 
CC14.2a Please provide further details of the verification/assurance undertaken, and attach 
the relevant statements  
 
Verification or 
assurance 
cycle in place 
Status in the 
current 
reporting year 
Type of 
verification or 
assurance 
Attach the 
statement 
Page/ 
Section 
reference 
Relevant 
standard 
Proportion of reported 
Scope 3 emissions 
verified (%) 
       
Sources of Scope 3 
emissions 
Evaluation 
status 
metric 
tonnes 
CO2e 
Emissions 
calculation 
methodology 
Percentage of 
emissions calculated 
using data obtained 
from suppliers or 
value chain partners 
Explanation 
Purchased goods and 
services 
     
Capital goods      
Fuel-and-energy-related 
activities (not 
included in Scope 1 or 2) 
     
Upstream transportation 
and distribution 
     
Waste generated in 
operations 
     
Business travel      
Employee commuting      
Upstream leased assets      
Investments      
Downstream transportation 
and distribution 
     
Processing of sold 
products 
     
Use of sold products      
End of life treatment of sold 
products 
     
Downstream leased assets      
Franchises      
Other (upstream)      
Other (downstream)      
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CC14.3 Are you able to compare your Scope 3 emissions for the reporting year with those for the 
previous year for any sources? 
If yes:  CC14.3a Please identify the reasons for any change in your Scope 3 emissions and 
for each of them specify how your emissions compare to the previous year 
Sources of Scope 
3 emissions 
Reason for 
change 
Emissions value 
(percentage) 
Direction of 
change 
Comment 
CC14.4 Do you engage with any of the elements of your value chain on GHG emissions and climate 
change strategies? (Tick all that apply) 
 Yes, our suppliers  Yes, our customers 
 Yes, other partners in the value chain  No, we do not engage 
If “Yes, our customers” or “Yes, other partners in the value chain” is ticked: 
CC14.4a Please give details of methods of engagement, your strategy for prioritizing 
engagements and measures of success 
If “Yes, our suppliers” is ticked 
CC14.4b To give a sense of scale of this engagement, please give the number of suppliers 
with whom you are engaging and the proportion of your total spend that they 
represent (CDP 2016 CC14.4b and CC14.4c, amended) 
Type of 
engagement 
Number of 
suppliers 
% of total spend (direct and 
indirect) 
Impact of engagement 
If “No, we do not engage” is ticked: 
CC14.4c Please explain why you do not engage with any elements of your value chain on 
GHG emissions and climate change strategies, and any plans you have to develop 
an engagement strategy in the future (CDP 2016 CC14.4d) 
Sign Off 
CC15.1 Please provide the following information for the person that has signed off (approved) your 
CDP climate change response (CDP 2016 CC15.1, amended) 
Name Job title Corresponding job category 
  CDP’s 2017 Climate Change Information Request 
Important Information 
CDP is an independent not-for-profit organization that has been requesting information relating to 
carbon and climate change on behalf of investors since 2002.  
Thousands of organizations from across the world’s major economies measure and disclose their 
environmental information through CDP. CDP puts this information at the heart of financial and policy 
decision-making and its goal is to collect and distribute high quality information that motivates investors, 
corporations and governments to act to prevent dangerous climate change and protect our natural 
resources. 
To find out more about CDP and the previous responses from other organizations, please refer to our 
website at www.cdp.net.
Why is this request from a group of shareholders and lenders to a group of companies rather 
than from an individual shareholder or lender to an individual company? 
1. To reduce the reporting burden – one standardized request that requires one corporate response
that is then delivered by CDP to multiple investors (note that CDP also works with the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) to ensure that this request and the GRI indicators are closely aligned and
complementary); and
2. To standardize responses and data – data is captured and presented back to investors in a common
format.
However, companies should not consider their CDP response a means of complying with any 
regulatory requirement to share financially sensitive non-public information with the market. 
Which companies will be asked to respond in 2017? 
Companies participating in CDP’s programs are selected using economic (market) and 
environmental criteria. Please refer to our website at https://www.cdp.net/samples to learn more 
about the companies targeted by each program and the selection criteria used. 
How can a company confirm its participation? 
On receipt of the emailed request, please register via the URL provided. If you have not received the 
request via e-mail please e-mail respond@cdp.net to confirm your participation in CDP 2017. Please 
note that your response is subject to CDP’s Terms for responding companies – investor climate 
change request which are set out on the following pages.  
What is the legal status of CDP? 
CDP Worldwide (CDP) is a UK Registered Charity no. 1122330 and a company limited by guarantee 
registered in England no. 05013650. The charity has wholly owned subsidiaries in Germany and China 
and companies in Australia, Brazil and India over which it exercises control through majority Board 
representation. In the US, CDP North America, Inc. is an independently incorporated affiliate which has 
United States IRS 501(c)(3) charitable status. 
CDP questionnaire copyright and licensed use 
The copyright to CDP’s annual questionnaire/s is owned by CDP Worldwide, a registered charity 
number 1122330 and a company limited by guarantee, registered in England number 05013650. 
Any use of any part of the questionnaire, including the questions, must be licensed by CDP. Any 
unauthorized use is prohibited and CDP reserves the right to protect its copyright by all legal means 
necessary. Contact license@cdp.net for details of licenses and fees 
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1. DEFINITIONS
Billing Company: means the organization determined in accordance with the table at the end of
these terms.
CDP: means CDP Worldwide, a charitable company registered with the Charity Commission of
England and Wales (registered charity no. 1122330 and a company number 05013650). References
to “we”, “our” and “us” in these terms are references to CDP and the Billing Company.
Deadline: means 29 June 2017.
Fee: means the fee set out in the table at the end of these terms, which is exclusive of any applicable
taxes.
Information Request: means CDP’s 2017 Climate Change Information Request.
Responding Company: means the company responding to the Information Request. References to
“you” and “your” in these terms are references to the Responding Company.
2. PARTIES
The parties to these terms shall be CDP, the Billing Company (where the Billing Company is not
CDP) and the Responding Company.
3. THESE TERMS
These are the terms that apply when you respond to our Information Request. If you do not agree to
these terms please contact us at respond@cdp.net to discuss them with us.
4. RESPONDING TO OUR INFORMATION REQUEST
General. When responding to our Information Request, you will be given a choice as to whether your
response can be made public or whether your response is non-public. We strongly encourage you
to make your response public.
Deadline for responding. You must submit your response to us using our online response system
by the Deadline for your response to be eligible for scoring and inclusion in any reports.
Public responses. If you agree that your response can be made public, we may use and make it
available for all purposes that we decide (whether for a fee or otherwise), including, for example,
making your responses available on our website, to our investor signatories and other third parties
and scoring your response (including publishing your score).
Non-public responses. If your response is non-public, we may use it only as follows:
(a) make it available as soon as it is received by CDP to our investor signatories (as listed on our 
website) either directly or through Bloomberg terminals, for any use within their organizations 
but not for publication unless any data from your response has been anonymized or 
aggregated in such manner that it has the effect of being anonymized;   
(b) make it available as soon as it is received by CDP to our group companies and affiliates (for 
example, CDP North America, Inc), our country partners, research partners, report writers and 
scoring partners: 
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(i) to score your response and to publish that score; and 
(ii) for any other use within their organizations but not for publication unless any data from 
your response has been anonymized or aggregated in such manner that it has the effect 
of being anonymized.  
Amending your response. You may amend a response that you have submitted at any time before 
the Deadline. After the Deadline has passed, your response can only be amended by our staff and 
we may charge a fee. Please note that any changes that you make to your response after the 
Deadline may not be reflected in any score or in any report. 
Scoring of responses. If you submit your response to us using our online response system by the 
Deadline your response will be scored. If you submit your response after the Deadline but on or 
before 29 September 2017 you can choose to request an ‘On-Demand’ score for a fee. Please email 
scorefeedback@cdp.net for more information.  
5. FEE
Fee. We are a not-for-profit organization and charge certain companies an annual administrative fee
to enable us to maintain the disclosure system. Unless you are exempt from paying the Fee, as set
out below, if you are listed, incorporated or headquartered in a country that is listed in the next
paragraph, you are required to pay the Fee plus any applicable taxes. The Fee is payable once
regardless of how many responses (climate change, forests and water) you submit in 2017. Please
note that we may charge an additional fee if you want to change your response after you have
submitted your response and you are seeking to make the change after the Deadline or if you submit
your response after the Deadline and you would like it to be scored.
Countries where the Fee applies. A Responding Company will be required to pay the Fee if it is
listed, incorporated or headquartered in any one of the following countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands,
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore,
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK or the USA.
Exemptions from the Fee. A Responding Company is exempt from paying the Fee if:
(a) it falls within one of CDP’s investor samples and it has not submitted a response to CDP in 
the last three years; or 
(b)  it is responding only to CDP’s supply chain request. 
Please note we will decide in our absolute discretion as to whether the Fee is payable or not and we 
will notify you before you submit your response. A full list of companies in our investor samples is 
available on our website. 
Payment of the Fee. You must pay the Fee by credit or debit card or request an invoice via CDP’s 
online portal, which must be paid within such time as set out in the invoice. Please note that you will 
not be able to submit your response unless you have paid the Fee, you have requested an invoice 
or you are exempt from paying the Fee. 
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6. RIGHTS IN THE RESPONSES
Ownership. All intellectual property rights in your response will be owned by you or your licensors.
License. You grant to us, or shall procure for us, a perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, assignable,
sub-licensable, royalty-free and global license to use your response and all intellectual property rights
in your response for all purposes.
7. IMPORTANT REPRESENTATIONS
You confirm that:
(a) the person submitting the response to us is authorized by you to submit the response; 
(b) you have obtained all necessary consents and permissions to submit the response to us; and 
(c) the response that you submit does not infringe the rights of any third party. 
8. LIABILITY
We do not exclude or limit in any way our liability to you where it would be unlawful to do so.
This includes liability for death or personal injury caused by our negligence or the negligence of our
employees, agents or subcontractors; for fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.
We are not liable for business losses. Subject to these terms, CDP and the Billing Company have
no liability to you in any circumstances for any loss of revenue, loss of profit, loss of business,
business interruption, loss of business opportunity, loss of goodwill, loss of reputation, loss of,
damage to or corruption of data or software or any indirect or consequential loss or damage.
Exclusion of liability. Subject to these terms, CDP and the Billing Company have no liability to you
in any circumstances arising from the submission of your response to us, our use of your response
and/or the use of your response by any third parties.
Limitation of liability. Subject to these terms, CDP and the Billing Company’s total liability to you in
all circumstances shall be limited to an amount equivalent to the Fee or to £625 if you are not required
to pay the Fee.
9. GENERAL
We may transfer our rights to someone else. We may transfer our rights and obligations under
these terms to another organization.
Nobody else has any rights under these terms. These terms are between you and us. No other
person shall have any rights to enforce any of its terms.
Entire agreement. These terms constitute the entire agreement between you and us unless you 
also choose to share your response with supply chain members, in which case you will also be 
subject to our Terms for responding companies – supply chain request. 
Variation. CDP (acting on its own behalf and the Billing Company’s behalf, if applicable) reserves 
the right to change these terms at any time. Such changes shall be effective immediately or such 
other time as CDP elects. In the event of any materially adverse changes, you may request to 
withdraw your response within 30 days of us notifying you of the change.  
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If a court finds part of these terms illegal, the rest will continue in force. Each of the paragraphs 
of these terms operates separately. If any court or relevant authority decides that any of them are 
unlawful, the remaining paragraphs will remain in full force and effect. 
Governing law and jurisdiction. These terms are governed by English law and you and us both 
agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts to resolve any dispute or claim arising out of 
or in connection with these terms or their subject matter or formation.  
Language. If these Terms are translated into any language other than English, the English language 
version will prevail. 
10. FEE
Location of Responding Company Fee (exclusive of any applicable taxes) 
UK £625 
Europe (excluding UK) €925 
Rest of the world US$975 
11. BILLING COMPANY
Billing 
Company CDP Worldwide 
CDP Worldwide 
(Europe) gGmbH 
CDP North 
America, Inc 
Carbon Disclosure 
Project (Latin 
America) 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project India 
Location of 
Responding 
Company 
Australia Austria Canada Argentina India 
Bahamas Belgium USA Brazil 
Cayman Islands Denmark Chile 
Channel Islands Finland Colombia 
Hong Kong France Mexico 
Indonesia Germany Peru 
Ireland Iceland 
Malaysia Italy 
Philippines Luxembourg 
Singapore Netherlands 
South Africa Norway 
South Korea Portugal 
Taiwan Spain 
Thailand Sweden 
United Kingdom Switzerland 
If the Responding Company is located in a territory that is not listed in the table above, the Billing Company shall 
be CDP Worldwide. 
